Hot Potato: Expert-Consumer Differences in the Perception of a Second-Generation Novel Food

Novel foods have been the object of intense public debate in recent years. Despite widespread efforts to communicate the outcomes of risk assessments to consumers, public confidence in risk management has been low. Social scientists have identified various reasons for this, including a disagreement between technical experts and consumers over the nature of the hazards on which risk assessments should focus. The aim of this study was to identify and compare the ways in which experts and consumers understand the benefits and risks associated with a genetically modified example crop. Two qualitative studies were conducted. In Study 1, mental models were elicited from 24 experts by means of a three-wave Delphi procedure. In Study 2, mental models were elicited from 25 consumers by means of in-depth interviews. As expected, the expert mental models were focused on the types of hazards that can realistically be addressed under current regulatory frameworks, whereas the consumers were often more concerned about issues outside the scope of current legislation. Moreover, the experts tended to define risk and benefit in terms of detailed chains of cause-effect relationships between variables for which clear definitions and measurement rules exist. The concepts the consumers used when reasoning about biological processes were very abstract, suggesting that the participants had, at most, a holistic understanding. In line with this, issues of uncertainty played a prominent role for the consumers.     

Why Study Risk Perception?

Studies of risk perception examine the opinions people express when they are asked, in various ways, to characterize and evaluate hazardous activities and technologies. This research aims to aid risk analysis and societal decision making by (i) improving methods for eliciting opinions about risk, (ii) providing a basis for understanding and anticipating public responses to hazards, and (iii) improving the communication of risk information among laypeople, technical experts, and policy makers.     

Experimental Evidence Against the Paradigm of Mortality Risk Aversion

This article deals with the question of how societal impacts of fatal accidents can be integrated into the management of natural or man‐made hazards. Today, many governmental agencies give additional weight to the number of potential fatalities in their risk assessments to reflect society's aversion to large accidents. Although mortality risk aversion has been proposed in numerous risk management guidelines, there has been no evidence that lay people want public decisionmakers to overweight infrequent accidents of large societal consequences against more frequent ones of smaller societal consequences. Furthermore, it is not known whether public decisionmakers actually do such overweighting when they decide upon the mitigation of natural or technical hazards. In this article, we report on two experimental tasks that required participants to evaluate negative prospects involving 1–100 potential fatalities. Our results show that neither lay people nor hazard experts exhibit risk‐averse behavior in decisions on mortality risks.     

Nuclear Risk Management on Stage: A Decision Analysis Perspective on the UK's Committee on Radioactive Waste Management

In 2003, the UK government set up a broad-based Committee on radioactive waste management (CoRWM) to look at the UK's policy on radioactive waste management with a view to jumpstarting a stalled policy process. The committee's brief was to come up with a set of recommendations that would protect the public and the environment, and be capable of inspiring public confidence. After consulting widely with the public and stakeholders, and drawing on advice from scientists and other experts, CoRWM arrived at a remarkably well-received set of recommendations. On the basis of our experiences of working on CoRWM's multi-criteria decision analysis of different management options, study of CoRWM documentation, and interviews with committee members, we describe the explicit and implicit principles that guided CoRWM. We also give an account of the process by which CoRWM arrived at its conclusions, covering four phases: framing, shortlisting, option assessment, and integration; and four cross-cutting activities: public and stakeholder engagement (PSE), science and engineering input, ethics and social science input, and learning from overseas practice. We finish by outlining some of the key developments in the UK's radioactive waste management process, which followed on from the publication of CoRWM's report, and present our reflections for the benefit of the risk and decision analysts of future committees that, like CoRWM, are charged with recommending to government on the management of technically complex and risky technologies, drawing on extensive public and stakeholder consultation.     

The [R]Evolving Relationship Between Risk Assessment and Risk Management

In Science and Decisions: Advancing Risk Assessment, the National Research Council recommends improvements in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's approach to risk assessment. The recommendations aim to increase the utility of these assessments, embedding them within a new risk‐based decision‐making framework. The framework involves first identifying the problem and possible options for addressing it, conducting related analyses, then reviewing the results and making the risk management decision. Experience with longstanding requirements for regulatory impact analysis provides insights into the implementation of this framework. First, neither the Science and Decisions framework nor the framework for regulatory impact analysis should be viewed as a static or linear process, where each step is completed before moving on to the next. Risk management options are best evaluated through an iterative and integrative procedure. The extent to which a hazard has been previously studied will strongly influence analysts’ ability to identify options prior to conducting formal analyses, and these options will be altered and refined as the analysis progresses. Second, experience with regulatory impact analysis suggests that legal and political constraints may limit the range of options assessed, contrary to both existing guidance for regulatory impact analysis and the Science and Decisions recommendations. Analysts will need to work creatively to broaden the range of options considered. Finally, the usefulness of regulatory impact analysis has been significantly hampered by the inability to quantify many health impacts of concern, suggesting that the scientific improvements offered within Science and Decisions will fill an crucial research gap.     

Quantifying the Effects of Expert Selection and Elicitation Design on Experts’ Confidence in Their Judgments About Future Energy Technologies

Expert elicitations are now frequently used to characterize uncertain future technology outcomes. However, their usefulness is limited, in part because: estimates across studies are not easily comparable; choices in survey design and expert selection may bias results; and overconfidence is a persistent problem. We provide quantitative evidence of how these choices affect experts’ estimates. We standardize data from 16 elicitations, involving 169 experts, on the 2030 costs of five energy technologies: nuclear, biofuels, bioelectricity, solar, and carbon capture. We estimate determinants of experts’ confidence using survey design, expert characteristics, and public R&D investment levels on which the elicited values are conditional. Our central finding is that when experts respond to elicitations in person (vs. online or mail) they ascribe lower confidence (larger uncertainty) to their estimates, but more optimistic assessments of best‐case (10th percentile) outcomes. The effects of expert affiliation and country of residence vary by technology, but in general: academics and public‐sector experts express lower confidence than private‐sector experts; and E.U. experts are more confident than U.S. experts. Finally, extending previous technology‐specific work, higher R&D spending increases experts’ uncertainty rather than resolves it. We discuss ways in which these findings should be seriously considered in interpreting the results of existing elicitations and in designing new ones.     

Multicriteria Decision Analysis: A Comprehensive Decision Approach for Management of Contaminated Sediments

Contaminated sediments and other sites present a difficult challenge for environmental decisionmakers. They are typically slow to recover or attenuate naturally, may involve multiple regulatory agencies and stakeholder groups, and engender multiple toxicological and ecotoxicological risks. While environmental decision-making strategies over the last several decades have evolved into increasingly more sophisticated, information-intensive, and complex approaches, there remains considerable dissatisfaction among business, industry, and the public with existing management strategies. Consequently, contaminated sediments and materials are the subject of intense technology development, such as beneficial reuse or in situ treatment. However, current decision analysis approaches, such as comparative risk assessment, benefit-cost analysis, and life cycle assessment, do not offer a comprehensive approach for incorporating the varied types of information and multiple stakeholder and public views that must typically be brought to bear when new technologies are under consideration. Alternatively, multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA) offers a scientifically sound decision framework for management of contaminated materials or sites where stakeholder participation is of crucial concern and criteria such as economics, environmental impacts, safety, and risk cannot be easily condensed into simple monetary expressions. This article brings together a multidisciplinary review of existing decision-making approaches at regulatory agencies in the United States and Europe and synthesizes state-of-the-art research in MCDA methods applicable to the assessment of contaminated sediment management technologies. Additionally, it tests an MCDA approach for coupling expert judgment and stakeholder values in a hypothetical contaminated sediments management case study wherein MCDA is used as a tool for testing stakeholder responses to and improving expert assessment of innovative contaminated sediments technologies.     

Limits of Knowledge and the Limited Importance of Trust

Perceived risk and related attitudes have been implicated as major factors in many of the difficult policy problems that face modern society (nuclear power, genetically modified food, etc). Experts often argue that no or very small risks are involved; people are still worried. Why? The standard answer is lack of trust. Data on trust and risk perception, however, point to only a weak relationship between the two (r approximately 0.3). It is suggested here that the reason for the surprisingly minor importance of trust is that people believe that there are clear limits to how much science and experts know. Results are presented from studies of risk perception of the public, experts, and politicians. Politicians and members of the public believe that there are many unknown effects of technology and such beliefs were strongly related to their perceived risk. Experts on nuclear waste, on the other hand, seemed to believe that little is unknown in their field of expertise. Regression analyses of risk perception showed the unknown‐effects factor to be a more important explanatory factor than trust for the public and politicians.     

Technological change,technostress, and industrial humanism

The need for more humanistic imperatives in the management of technological change must be our mandate for corporate and human excellence. Industrial Humanism is our new management creed. The imperatives of humanism such as identity, integrity, self-actualization, individuality, potentiality, responsibility, autonomy, caring, trust, meaning, self-esteem, and character growth must be enriched as the corporation moves to adopt new technologies. The imperatives of technology based on technical rationality, means-ends chain, and industrial engineering methods for programming the workflow for efficiency contain the potential for job alienation, boredom, and technostress. A new psychological contract that integrates both technical and humanistic imperatives is the challenge for the information society. This is an ethical imperative for managing technological change.     

Logic and Motivation in Risk Research: A Nuclear Waste Test Case

After two decades of massive investigation, federal approval of a nuclear waste site is drawing to a close. Large-scale research to assure that major hazards such as this one are socially acceptable is often highly inefficient, as here. A regulatory remedy would be to require not only that risk currently assessed be acceptable, but also that risk would remain acceptable given any new information. Research to test compliance with these rules has to be cost effective. Research activities should be managed according to an explicit discipline that can be imposed on powerful conflicting interests. They might be required to (1) set targets for the first- and second-order risk assessments, (2) allocate research resources to close any gap between current and target assessments cost effectively, and (3) reallocate resources, as evolving findings dictate. The interests of license applicant (Department of Energy, DOE) and society are distinguished: the former would want the application approved; the latter would want to reject an unacceptable facility.     

Understanding Gaps Between the Risk Perceptions of Wildland–Urban Interface (WUI) Residents and Wildfire Professionals

Research across a variety of risk domains finds that the risk perceptions of professionals and the public differ. Such risk perception gaps occur if professionals and the public understand individual risk factors differently or if they aggregate risk factors into overall risk differently. The nature of such divergences, whether based on objective inaccuracies or on differing perspectives, is important to understand. However, evidence of risk perception gaps typically pertains to general, overall risk levels; evidence of and details about mismatches between the specific level of risk faced by individuals and their perceptions of that risk is less available. We examine these issues with a paired data set of professional and resident assessments of parcel‐level wildfire risk for private property in a wildland–urban interface community located in western Colorado, United States. We find evidence of a gap between the parcel‐level risk assessments of a wildfire professional and numerous measures of residents’ risk assessments. Overall risk ratings diverge for the majority of properties, as do judgments about many specific property attributes and about the relative contribution of these attributes to a property's overall level of risk. However, overall risk gaps are not well explained by many factors commonly found to relate to risk perceptions. Understanding the nature of these risk perception gaps can facilitate improved communication by wildfire professionals about how risks can be mitigated on private lands. These results also speak to the general nature of individual‐level risk perception.     

主导企业适应突破性技术变革的整合研究

突破性技术变革的频率正在不断加快,而主导企业在技术范式的转换过程中却经常遭遇绩效下滑甚至被新进入企业所替代.本研究认为,主导企业能否适应技术变革取决于三个因素的平衡和交互作用:技术投资、技术能力以及互补性资产,在考察技术变革所带来的竞争含义时强调综合考虑多个视角的重要性.此外,作者根据这些因素提供了三种应对机制:利用实物期权方法进行技术投资、利用自主事业单位开发新技术,以及利用互补性资产与突破性技术发起企业建立战略联盟.     

Use of Fuzzy Evidential Reasoning in Maritime Security Assessment

Over the last few years, there has been a growing international recognition that the security performance of the maritime industry needs to be reviewed on an urgent basis. A large number of optional maritime security control measures have been proposed through various regulations and publications in the post-9/11 era. There is a strong need for a sound and generic methodology, which is capable of taking into account multiple selection criteria such as the cost effectiveness of the measures based on reasonable security assessment. The use of traditional risk assessment and decision-making approaches to deal with potential terrorism threats in a maritime security area reveals two major challenges. They are lack of capability of analyzing security in situations of high-level uncertainty and lack of capability of processing diverse data in a utility form suitable as input to a risk inference mechanism. To deal with such difficulties, this article proposes a subjective security-based assessment and management framework using fuzzy evidential reasoning (ER) approaches. Consequently, the framework can be used to assemble and process subjective risk assessment information on different aspects of a maritime transport system from multiple experts in a systematic way. Outputs of this model can also provide decisionmakers with a transparent tool to evaluate maritime security policy options for a specific scenario in a cost-effective manner.     

A Delphi Method Expert Survey to Derive Standards for Flood Damage Data Collection

For the purpose of flood damage analyses reliable, comparable, comprehensive, consistent, and up-to-date data are an indispensable need. Like in many other countries a database with this kind of datasets does not exist in Germany. To establish it, standards have to be set for flood damage data collection. We approached this problem by questioning experts about their information needs for flood damage analysis. This survey is done by applying a Delphi survey approach. The aptitude of the Delphi approach to assess, structure, and standardize expert knowledge is evaluated in this article. In the survey a panel of 55 experts working in the field of flood damage analysis for insurances, engineering companies/consultancy, public water management, and universities and other scientific institutions helped to identify common information needs. The multi-step Delphi method proved to reduce the deviation of answers thereby enabling consensual results and also enhanced the quality by modifying group answers in the direction of experience based answers. There was also a high level of congruence in information needs between experts from different fields of employment that allowed the derivation of common standards.     

Key Characteristics of the Large Innovating Firm*

Large innovating firms are a major source of the world's technology, and in the 20th century have shown great resilience in absorbing successive waves of radical innovations. The key characteristics of these firms derive from the properties of their innovative activities. First, given the specific, differentiated and cumulative nature of technological development, the range of possible choices about both product and processed technologies open to the firm depends on its accumulated competence. Second, given functional and professional specialization, the implementation of technological choices requires organization and orchestration across disciplinary, functional and divisional boundaries. Third, given cumulative development and uncertainty, the improvement of these competences requires continuous and collective learning. Fourth, in the light of these characteristics, systems for allocating resources must take into account the benefits of learning by doing, as well as the benefits of outcomes. As a consequence, the technical function in large firms involves not just the implementation of innovations, but also the definition of appropriate divisional objectives and boundaries, the exploration of radical technologies, and the formation of technological expectations about the future.     

Risk Perception and Social Acceptability of Technologies: The French Case

The authors present results of a February 1987 survey on judged frequency of mortality causes and risk perception of technologies in a representative sample of the French population. Although the French context is very different, and the impact of public controversies have been very limited on technological choices such as the nuclear energy program, strong similarities in risk perception of technologies are observed with results from U.S. surveys. Results, which could be worthwhile for other countries, suggest that risk perception is influenced by two different types of components. The first influence is the global feeling of "security" that society procures to its members. Such feeling depends on the individual's socioeconomic status, subjective state of health, and personal discomfort in daily life, and explains individual aversion to risk independently of the mortality causes or technologies involved. The second influence is the degree of perceived social legitimization of the activities involving risks. Risks of medical and transportation activities are strongly opposed to illegitimate risky behaviors (smoking, drugs, alcohol); technologies which have been an object of public debate (nuclear plants, the chemical industry, lead in gasoline) have an intermediate position reflecting the remaining uncertainties of public opinion about their risk–benefit balancing. Tentative conclusions for risk communication are proposed.     

Differences in Expert and Lay Judgments of Risk: Myth or Reality?

This article evaluates the nine empirical studies that have been conducted on expert versus lay judgments of risk. Contrary to received wisdom, this study finds that there is little empirical evidence for the propositions (1) that experts judge risk differently from members of the public or (2) that experts are more veridical in their risk assessments. Methodological weaknesses in the early research are documented, and it is shown that the results of more recent studies are confounded by social and demographic factors that have been found to correlate with judgments of risk. Using a task-analysis taxonomy, a template is provided for the documentation of future studies of expert-lay differences/similarities that will facilitate analytic comparison.     

Nanotechnology,Risk, and Oversight: Learning Lessons from Related Emerging Technologies

Emerging technologies are defined by their novelty and thus are accompanied by significant uncertainty in determining appropriate ways to manage risks associated with them. Yet, there is a body of prior knowledge about risk management and oversight policy for other technologies that have already permeated society. Here, we describe two ways in which prospective oversight policy analysis for emerging technologies can draw upon these past experiences. One involves comparing specific products that have already been marketed to similar products of the emerging technology (cognate‐product approach). The other treats the emerging technology as a body of products and methods and relates it to another technological field that has already emerged and penetrated markets (whole‐technology approach). In this article, we describe our work using these approaches to inform risk and oversight policy for nanotechnology and its products. We draw parallels between biotechnology and nanotechnology as whole fields of development and also between genetically engineered organisms in the food supply and agricultural products of nanotechnology. Through these comparisons, we find that both approaches to historical learning have value and present lessons that could be applied to nanotechnology.     

Public Perceptions of the Risks and Benefits of Technology1

This study attempted to verify and extend previous research on people's perceptions of the risks and benefits of technology and their judgments concerning the acceptability of technology safety regulations. The study addressed several limitations of prior work, in that: (1) it was the first “expressed-preference” study to collect data from large, representative samples of Americans; (2) the research design made “person,” rather than “technology,” the unit of statistical analysis; and (3) the study employed an expanded set of independent variables, including three qualitative benefit characteristics. The results confirmed several major conclusions of prior expressed-preference research, the most important being that members of the public tend to define “risks,”“benefits,” and “acceptability” in a complex, multidimensional manner; and that their definitions differ significantly from those used by professional risk-managers and other technical experts in quantitative assessments of risk and acceptability. The results also indicated that people's stances toward technology regulation tend to cut across traditional sociodemographic lines.