Teachers’ collective bargaining outcomes and tradeoffs

This study uses data from Illinois and Iowa public school districts to examine the factors that influence the wage and nonwage bargaining outcomes negotiated by teachers’ unions. Tradeoffs between wage and nonwage outcomes and among nonwage contract provisions are also examined. The results provide some evidence that tradeoffs exist between wage and nonwage outcomes. The findings also reveal differences in outcome and tradeoff patterns across the states for issues unrelated to union security. I am grateful to the Illinois State Board of Education, the Iowa Department of Public Instruction, and the Iowa Public Employment Relations Board for providing the data analyzed in this study. I am also grateful to the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations at the University of Illinois and the Columbia University Graduate School of Business for research support, and to Jack Fiorito, David Lewin, Susan Schwochau, Donna Sockell, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Wage and nonwage outcomes in collective bargaining: Determinants and tradeoffs

Using unskilled labor wage rates and union contract scores derived from a sample of 500 U.S. manufacturing contracts, this study finds that in 1975 there was considerable variation in unions’ abilities to deliver higher wages and desirable nonwage contractual provisions to their members (though it is clear that the stronger unions have bargained high levels of both wages and nonwage items). There are a variety of union power, employee quality, union preference, and employer cost variables which impact upon the bargaining choices made between wages and nonwage provisions, and it appears that union strength tilts the compensation package toward wages. The authors, associate professors at the University of Illinois, are very grateful to Christopher Pawlowicz, Ronald Seeber, and Roger Wolters for their help in gathering data. They also are grateful to the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Evaluation and Research of the U.S. Department of Labor and to the Research Board of the University of Illinois for financially supporting this research. Such support in no way implies, however, that the Department or the University endorses the methods or conclusions in this study.     

Is collective bargaining a collective good?

This study argues that legislation imposes on collective bargaining an artificial collective goods characteristic as a legal property, which should be distinguished from collective goods in the economic sense. The law creates an artificial freerider problem. Congressional intent was to require compulsory unionism to the extent that all workers would be required to share in the expenses incurred by the union in the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining agreements. Recent court decisions have attempted to define the obligation of employees, employers, and labor unions in terms of this legislative intent.     

Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution

We propose a new axiom, weakest collective rationality (WCR) which is weaker than both weak Pareto optimality (WPO) in Nash’s (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) original characterization and strong individual rationality (SIR) in Roth’s (Math Oper Res 2:64–65, 1977) characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. We then characterize the Nash solution by symmetry (SYM), scale invariance (SI), independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and our weakest collective rationality (WCR) axiom.     

Tax reform and endogenous gender bargaining power

The conventional studies with unitary representation of the household have been seeking for the condition in which tax systems achieve improvements of both fertility and female labor supply. Such analyses may not be enough to capture the important aspects of family behaviors since their common-preference assumption is frequently inconsistent with observed economies. By making use of a family bargaining framework, we argue that the heterogeneity in parental preferences among household members influences the result of existing studies on tax systems. Our results show that when women prefer larger family size than men, the tax reform towards individual taxation raises the fertility rate even more. In this case, female labor supply can be still increased in spite of enhanced fertility due to bargaining allocation.     

The future of public sector collective bargaining in Canada

Conclusion Looking to the future of Canadian public sector labor relations, the glass is half full. Despite regular intervals when government fiscal and economic policy “trump” public sector bargaining rights through legislation, public sector unions and collective bargaining will survive. Public sector compensation and job security will likely continue to be at least comparable to the unionized private sector, and public sector union density should remain stable, at or near its currently high levels.     

The effect of collective bargaining on production technique: A theoretical analysis

A general equilibrium approach is used to model the union effect on capitalintensity of the union and nonunion sectors. Unlike earlier general equilibrium approaches, union power is assumed to be affected by the production technique chosen. The labor relations literature argues that union power is enhanced by a high capital to labor ratio. This assumption is built into a simple two sector (union and nonunion), general equilibrium model. It is found that failing to account for the effects of capital intensity on union power results in an understatement of unions’ ability to redistribute income from capital to labor. The author thanks Jan Brueckner and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Dispute resolution mechanisms and teacher bargaining outcomes

This study investigates the impact of dispute resolution mechanisms on the wages and hours of public school teachers. The 43-state analysis presents evidence that (1) a permissible right to strike increases teacher wages by 11.5 percent and reduces class hours by 37 minutes per day; (2) a de facto right to strike increases salaries by 5.7 percent and reduces class hours by 44 minutes per day; (3) arbitration availability is associated with a wage effect of 3.6 percent and 70 fewer class minutes per day; and (4) factfinding and voluntary arbitration have no significant influences on outcomes. A direct comparison of the right to strike and the right to arbitrate indicates that a legal right to strike affords teachers greater power to increase the dollar value of their work.     

An economic analysis of public sector collective bargaining and strike activity

This paper develops a theory of public sector collective bargaining and uses it to investigate the economic determinants of public sector strike activity. The model considers union leaders, union members, bureaucrats, politicians, and voters, with the intention of explicitly recognizing both the constraints placed on the bargaining parties by their constituents and the differences between public and private sector collective bargaining. The empirical results indicate that only in cases where both negotiating parties are motivated by self-interest can we expect frequent strikes and strikes of long duration. The results also suggest that public sector strikes are countercyclical and principally influenced by the business cycle and its impact on state and local revenues.     

The legal status of collective bargaining by public school teachers

This paper examines the characteristics of area populations that predict the content of bargaining legislation for public school teachers. The authors provide evidence suggesting that 1) pro-bargaining legislation is correlated with the representation of union members and related workers who benefit from collective bargaining, and 2) the legislation appears to be demanded by career workers as a means of transferring resources away from teachers with relatively short career horizons. An N-chotomous probit model is used to estimate the form of legislation that ranges from bargaining prohibition to prescribed bargaining. Data for the study were obtained from 95 SMSAs in 35 states. We are indebted to Paul H. Rubin and Elchanon Cohn for their substantial contributions to this project. We also received helpful suggestions from Chris Paul and R. Carter Hill.     

The effect of experience on faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining: A cross-temporal analysis

We used multivariate analysis to investigate the change in the attitudes and expectations of AAUP members in a Midwestern university. Two models were developed to measure faculty attitudes toward the union, at the time of the election and four years after the election. The effect of experience on faculty attitudes toward the union is captured by comparing the results of the two models. Our findings suggest major differences in faculty attitudes and expectations prior to and after the union’s arrival. The results of our study have essential policy implications for unions in formulating successful strategies and for faculty in developing realistic expectations of collective bargaining.     

The performance effects of collective and individual bargaining: A comprehensive and granular analysis of the effects of different bargaining systems on company productivity

Using representative company‐level data for all Member States of the European Union, the authors analyse the relationship between different processes and institutional structures of collective bargaining and the development of company labour productivity. Their results clearly show that these differences have wide‐ranging effects. While some processes and structures of collective bargaining – specifically sectorally uncoordinated systems – appear to be detrimental to company performance, the opposite can be said about sectorally coordinated systems. Thus, what matters are the processes and institutional structures in which collective bargaining is embedded and not whether bargaining should be conducted collectively or individually.     

Wage determination in U.S. manufacturing 1958–1976: A collective bargaining approach

This paper presents a cross-section collective bargaining approach to the analysis of inter-industry wage movements of production workers in U.S. manufacturing over the period 1958–1976. A Hicksian model is used to classify the determinants of wage change according to their likely influence on the concession and strike costs of management and unions. Three variables which are classified as management concession and strike costs are consistently significant in empirical testing: change in value productivity, labor intensity, and the profit rate. On the basis of this finding it is suggested that inter-industry wage changes are generally a function of management concession costs. The authors acknowledge the helpful comments of an anonymous referee.     

Freedom of association and collective bargaining in the platform economy: A human rights-based approach and an ever-increasing mobilization of workers

This paper examines the exercise of the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining by platform workers. It focuses on several significant developments involving the collective organization of platform workers worldwide, and considers the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining as human rights. It contends that the shifting context of work has led to changes in modern workplaces, which, in turn, have generated a novel interest in the adoption of a human rights-based approach towards labour protection. This approach considers that all workers are entitled to rights, such as the right to collective bargaining, which derive from international human rights instruments.     

Transforming collective memory: mnemonic opportunity structures and the outcomes of racial violence memory movements

While some research on collective memory has addressed the creation of memory projects such as memorials and historical commissions, less attention has been paid to explaining variation in these projects’ success. America’s troubled history of lynchings and race riots is one topic increasingly addressed by commemorative projects. This article evaluates factors shaping efforts to imprint past racial violence into broader collective memory. Building on research on constraints imposed by actual pasts and environmental conditions, I argue that structural influences on collective memory, or mnemonic opportunity structures, powerfully affect the success of commemorative initiatives. I identify three major dimensions of mnemonic opportunity structures: (1) an environment’s present-day commemorative capacity, a past incident’s (2) ascribed significance, and (3) the moral valence of key characters at the time it occurred. Qualitative data from multiple case studies and 90 interviews, along with supplementary quantitative and qualitative comparative analyses (QCAs) of all recent projects marking segregation-era racial violence, illustrate the utility of the framework.