Studying the fertility peak in Beijing]

Beijing, China, is experiencing a baby boom in response to 2 periods of large population increase in the mid-1950s and early 1960s. The average number of annual births was 220,000 in the first period and 269,000 in the second period. The causes of the large increase in the population in the first period were an improvement of health conditions which led to a reduction in mortality, immigration flow, and an erroneous population policy. The causes in the second period were recuperative fertility after three years of natural calamity and increased fertility among immigrants. Net migration had an important role in population growth these two periods; it also will have an important impact in future population changes. According to population projections, another baby boom is expected to occur before the end of the end of the century. During the up-coming baby boom period, 1.54 million births are expected, 190,000 per annum. The average increase in population size is expected to 127,000 per year. In the peak year, it may be around 200,000. Thanks to the family planning (FP) program the occurrence of the third baby boom in Beijing has been postponed and the duration will be shortened. From 1972 to 1982, 2.57 million births was averted due to FP, which drastically reduced pressure on the demand for resources and on the momentum of the next baby boom. Another baby booms is not expected during the early half of the 21st century, although an elevated birth rate within the range of normal fluctuation is predicted. The projection was based on the assumption of restricted migration and the enforcement of the FP program. The realization of the projected population will depend on deferred marriage, deferred child-bearing, prolonged birth spacing, the prevention of high parity fertility, the maintenance of the current population policy, and control over the reproductive behavior of the new migrant population.     

America's baby boom generation: the fateful bulge

From 1955-64 nearly 42 million births occurred in the U.S., an unprecedented expansion. The roots of the baby boom lie in the universal rush to early marriage and favorable economic climate for the relatively scarce young men born of the Depression cohort. The impact of the boom interrupted a century-long fertility decline. Pro-marriage, pronatalist norms were revived by the Depression cohort who formed families of at least 2 children or more. During the 1960-70's schools, colleges, and universities were built to accomodate the boom and are now excessive for the baby bust cohort. Unemployment and crime rates rose and fell with the passing of the boom babies through late adolescence and early adulthood. In the 1980's, boom babies will be aged 20-30. Demands for housing will be high. Annual birth numbers will increase even if the rate of childbearing hovers below replacement level at about 1.8 per woman. Per capita earnings and overall labor productivity should improve as the boom baby cohort reaches middle age in the 1990s. However, chances for advancement will be fewer. As the cohort reaches retirement age, the over 65 population will double from 31 million in 2000 to almost 60 million in 2030. Although the burden will be somewhat offset by reduced proportions of under 18-year-olds, the ratio of active workers paying Social Security will fall drastically.     

Canada's population: growth and dualism

In Canada the current 1.3% population growth rate is causing some concern. Those concerned argue that such a rate of growth in combination with high levels of consumption could jeopardize the country's resource base and its comfortable style of living. Many Canadians are questioning high levels of immigration, for now that the fertility level is below replacement level, net immigration contributes substantially to population growth (over 1/3 in 1976). The growing proportion of non-Europeans among recent immigrants is causing resentment, and, in a tight job market, immigrants are regarded as threats to the World War 2 baby boom cohort who are now at working ages. The baby boom generation also puts stress on housing and health services, and it will increase the need for pension checks as it ages. Although French fertility is no longer high and immigration is no longer dominated by the British, the French group's 200-year struggle to preserve its identity continues on in the current effort of the Quebec government to enforce the use of French language by law within that province. Geography and climate dictate another demographic fact that divides the country and pervades its history. In addition to intense regionalism, uneven population distribution is responsible for 2 other concerns: the rapid growth of several already large cities and depopulation of many small communities. Focus in this discussion is on Canada's population growth in the past and as projected for the future, historical and current fertility, mortality and immigration trends, the search for a new immigration policy, the impact of the baby boom generation on the population's age structure and the problems this creates, and recent shifts in population distribution and in the country's ethnic and linguistic makeup. The population policy proposals evolved thus far involve to a great extent the use of immigration as a lever for achieving given population objectives.     

An analysis of baby boom characteristics in China

This article analyzed the 3rd Chinese baby boom and its causes by focusing on the fertility intensity of women and the number of births per year. The 3rd baby boom is expected to end in 2002 and to peak in 1995. The baby boom in urban areas will last a much shorter time than in rural areas. Particular differences are manifested between provinces: 1) The baby boom will last 3-4 years in Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, and will last 10 years in Liaoning, Jilin, and Jiangsu. In other provinces, the boom will last 15-23 years; 2) The peak years are different between provinces; 3) The base number of births curves are province-specific; 4) The absolute base birth numbers are different between provinces (Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, and Sichuan 700,000; Beijing, Tianjin, Qinghai, and Ningzia 100,000); and 5) The shapes of progressive increases for base number of births are province specific. The increase in the number of childbearing-age women, the unplanned higher parity births, and early marriage and childbearing have all contributed to the current baby boom. Recommendations to control the problem include controlling higher parity births, observing birth spacing, and controlling the age of marriage and childbearing.     

Power Outages,Power Externalities,and Baby Booms

Determining whether power outages have significant fertility effects is an important policy question in developing countries, where blackouts are common and modern forms of family planning are scarce. Using birth records from Zanzibar, this study shows that a month-long blackout in 2008 caused a significant increase in the number of births 8 to 10 months later. The increase was similar across villages that had electricity, regardless of the level of electrification; villages with no electricity connections saw no changes in birth numbers. The large fertility increase in communities with very low levels of electricity suggests that the outage affected the fertility of households not connected to the grid through some spillover effect. Whether the baby boom is likely to translate to a permanent increase in the population remains unclear, but this article highlights an important hidden consequence of power instability in developing countries. It also suggests that electricity imposes significant externality effects on rural populations that have little exposure to it.     

Aiming at a moving target: Period fertility and changing reproductive goals

Summary Common sense suggests that changes over time in aggregate period fertility rates should be closely, related to changes in desired completed fertility after controlling for contraceptive failure, and desired spacing and timing; the nature of the relationship is, however, far from clear. This paper shows that when desired completed fertility undergoes swings, like those in the United States in recent decades, the turning points in period fertility will precede those in desired completed fertility by as much as five years and the amplitude of the swings in period fertility will be more than twice as great. Cumulated fertility, on the other hand, will lag behind reproductive goals. Period fertility rates will exceed desired completed fertility when desires are increasing and fall below it when desires are decreasing. These theoretical results help to explain some salient features of the American baby boom and bust. It is also shown that during a demographic transition, period fertility will fall more rapidly than desired completed fertility, and that towards the end of the transition, period fertility will increase.     

U.S. population: where we are; where we're going

This Bulletin reviews recent trends in the dynamics and character of the U.S. population, the outlook for the remainder of the 1980s, and prospects for longterm growth. Estimated at 232 million as of mid-1982, the U.S. population is currently growing at about 1% a year, one of the developed world's highest growth rates. Natural increase (births-deaths) still adds some 1.7 million people a year, despite the rapid postbaby boom fall in fertility to a near-record low rate of 1.9 births/woman in 1981. With increasing numbers of refugees, net legal immigration averaged 600,000/year in 1979-81 and the net inflow of illegal immigrants may now be 500,000 a year. Uncertainty over potentially large numbers of immigrants complicates projections of future U.S. population size. Currently, the U.S. death rate is at an alltime low. More than 1/2 the population now resides in the South and West. Rural areas and small towns grew faster than urban areas in the 1970s for the 1st time in over a century. Educational attainment is at an alltime high, as is labor force participation, due to increasing employment among women and the baby boom generation's arrival at working ages. The age composition of the population, with the bulge of the baby boom generation surrounded by the older "depression" generation born during the 1930s and the younger "baby bust" generation born since the end of the 1960s, presents special problems for U.S. society.     

Is demography destiny? The role of structural and demographic factors in Australis past and future labour supply

Following the release of the Intergenerational Report, the Australian Treasury identified the levers to address the economic effects of demographic ageing as ‘the three Ps’: population, participation and productivity. To date, the first ‘P’, population, has been treated as an exogenous factor, with the common view being that there is very little that the government can do to supplant demographic ageing. Focusing upon labour supply, this paper shows how variation in Australia’s underlying demography can significantly alter Australia’s future labour supply. Although governments cannot redirect the cohort flow component of population ageing, much can be achieved in promoting growth of the labour supply by maintaining or increasing fertility (in the longer term), or increasing targeted migration (in the short to medium term). This paper also decomposes the relative role of cohort flow, changing demography and changing labour force participation on the growth of the labour supply over the past 20 years. Over this period, the entry of the baby boom generation (cohort flow) and increased labour force participation of women accounted for almost all of the growth in the labour force. Changing demography had very little effect. However, Australias future labour supply will not include a large increase in cohort flow (as caused by the baby boomers) or a very large increase in female labour force participation. Regardless of the assumptions used, labour supply growth will be considerably lower in the next and subsequent 20 years, when compared to the previous 20.     

Demographics,the Third Age and partial retirement: Policy proposals to accommodate the changing picture of female retirement in Canada

Much concern has been raised around the potential impact of the retirement of the large baby boom generation. This article specifically addresses the unique issues surrounding the retirement of female baby boomers. Demographic changes, including increased labor force participation, coupled with declining fertility rates, have resulted in a social transformation of the roles women play in society. Despite these changes, women still bear much of the caregiving responsibilities in the household, which can complicate retirement choices. This article examines female retirement in the Canadian context and presents three policy proposals to expand women’s retirement choices, encourage longer-term labor force participation, and thereby extend their working lives into the Third Age.     

Fertility in England and Wales: a fifty-year perspective

This paper provides a detailed account of fertility levels and trends in England and Wales since 1938, with a briefer coverage of a much longer time-span. The paper is concerned both with the measurement of fertility and with understanding the observed fertility behaviour. We lament and correct the failure of demographers to apply measurement tools available since the 1950s to the analysis of fertility in England and Wales, with a particular emphasis on adjustment of period measures and period parity progression ratios and show how some of the grosser errors of analysis and interpretation might have been avoided by earlier use of these approaches. We also relate these estimates to more recent ones. Once a clearer account of trends has been established, the paper goes on to reinterpret and explain the baby boom and baby bust. The conclusion looks at future prospects for fertility.     

Fertility in England and Wales: A Fifty-Year Perspective

This paper provides a detailed account of fertility levels and trends in England and Wales since 1938, with a briefer coverage of a much longer time-span. The paper is concerned both with the measurement of fertility and with understanding the observed fertility behaviour. We lament and correct the failure of demographers to apply measurement tools available since the 1950s to the analysis of fertility in England and Wales, with a particular emphasis on adjustment of period measures and period parity progression ratios and show how some of the grosser errors of analysis and interpretation might have been avoided by earlier use of these approaches. We also relate these estimates to more recent ones. Once a clearer account of trends has been established, the paper goes on to reinterpret and explain the baby boom and baby bust. The conclusion looks at future prospects for fertility.     

Below-replacement fertility in east and southeast asia: Consequences and policy responses

Fourteen countries in Asia have total fertility rates at or below replacement level. This is more pronounced in China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand. The implications are far-reaching and profound as they affect the age structure of the population, giving rise to population ageing, labour force shortages, increased elderly dependency ratios and feminization of the aged population. Evidence from European countries suggests that although fertility may rebound, in most countries it is highly unlikely that fertility will recover sufficiently to reach replacement level in the near future. Mortality reduction will continue to be an overriding policy goal, which would further enhance the ageing process. Therefore, the greatest challenge will be to pension systems, old-age care systems, and health systems or health insurance. This paper first examines the fertility transition in five low-fertility countries. It then discusses the policy measures that these countries have adopted in response to low fertility and population ageing. The paper concludes with the policy implications for healthcare, social care, income security and caregiving facility, and the scope for further study.     

Variance effects in the bongaarts-feeney formula

Bongaarts and Feeney have recently proposed an adjusted total fertility rate to disentangle tempo effects from changes in the quantum of fertility. We propose an extension to the Bongaarts and Feeney formula that includes variance effects: that is, changes in the variance of the fertility schedule over time. If these variance effects are ignored, the mean age at birth and the adjusted total fertility rate are biased. We provide approximations for these biases, and we extend the TFR adjustment to fertility schedules with changing variance. We apply our method to the Swedish baby boom and bust, and show that variance effects are important for evaluating the relative contributions of tempo and quantum effects to the fertility change from 1985 to 1995.     

Cuba: the demography of revolution

Cuba's post-revolution demographic trends, especially in regard to fertility and emigration, and the causes and consequences of these trends, were examined using available statistical data. The authors maintain that both fertility and emigration trends were highly infuenced by economic factors. The trends are described in the context of the social and economic changes instituted by the revolutionary government. Government policies were aimed at 1) eradicating inequalities in housing, income, education, and health; 2) improving the status of women; and 3) upgrading the living standards of the rural population. Government policies did alleviate many social problems and greatly improved the health and educational status of the population; however, these policies had a marked adverse effect on economic performance. The demographic transition began in Cuba earlier than in most other developing countries and it began long before the 1959 revolution. These earlier changes must be taken into account when assessing the impact of post-revolution policies on demographic trends. Cuba's birthrate declined from 26-14.8/1000 population between 1959-1979 and the total fertility rate declined from 3.7-1.9 between 1970-1978; however, during the 1960s there was a baby boom and the birth rate for 1963 exceeded 35/1000 population. The baby boom was largely a response to the temporary improvement in economic conditions which occurred shortly after the revolution. The decline in fertility during the 1970s was due in part to the increased availability of abortion and contraceptive services and to a decline in the marriage rate; however, Cuba's deteriorating economy was also a major contributing factor. The baby boom of the 1960s is negativley affecting the current economy of the country. Individuals born during the baby boom are entering adulthood and are contributing toward Cuba's current unemployment problems. Prior to the revolution, Cuba experienced a high rate of in-migration. Immediately after the revolution this pattern was reversed and between 1959-1980 more than 800,000 Cubans emigrated. Most of these emigrants went to the U.S. A large proportion of the earlier emigrants were members of the upper and middle socioeconomic classes. Recent emigrants were more evenly representative of all segments of Cuba's population. The socioeconomic characteristics of the emigrants are described and their adjustment in the U.S. is discussed. Tables provide statistical data on Cuba's demographic trends.     

曲折、艰难、辉煌的中国生育转变

从1979～2009年30年人口变动的历程来看,中国人口转变是成功的,其结果是辉煌的,但其转变的历程,尤其是生育转变的历程是曲折和艰难的,历史留给人们的经验和教训是深刻的。本文将近30年来的生育转变历程为四个阶段,从而突显了不同阶段生育水平的变化,以及生育水平与社会经济变革、生育行为以及生育政策博弈的结果。1979～1984年生育水平反弹波动,反映出严格的生育政策遇到强大阻力,结果是欲速而不达。1985～1991年生育高峰如期而至,显示了人口内在规律的强大威力,从而最大限度地调动了人口控制的力量。1992～1999生育率再次下降,并穿透替代水平生育率,宣告人口转变基本完成。2000～2009低生育水平持续稳定,人口结构性问题逐步显现,统筹解决人口问题势在必行。     

从生育高峰出生同期群看我国农村养老模式的选择

第一次生育高峰期出生的人口,受到国家计划生育政策的影响,生育的孩子数目减少,是未来农村老年贫困的高发群体。国家应该对他们的老年生活给予资助。最后,对建立普享型老年津贴的可行性进行了分析。     

The outlook of China's population after the stabilization of birth policy

A professor of the Institute of Population Research of the People's University of China attempts to project the future population development of China so that stabilization of the birth policy can be assessed. He divides China into the economically developed and population-controlled area (29% of the population), the economically subdeveloped and population fairly-controlled areas (59% of the population), and the economically less-developed areas where fertility is high (12% of the population). China's population is expected to increase because of the baby boom to 1.25-1.3 billion by the year 2000. Between 1996 and 2000, the growth rate is expected to decelerate and reach zero growth. After 2010, if growth is held at the replacement rate of 2.1, the population will still continue to grow slowly. Around 2100, China's population should be around 1.45-1.59 billion. This would cause a decrease of 27% of arable land. With a decline in fertility rate comes a rise in the amount of the aged population (4.9% in 1982 vs. 5.5% in 1987). The proportion of aged citizens is expected to rise with the stabilization policy until around 2040 where it can be held at about 18%. China's GNP by the year 2000 is expected to be US$1183.8 billion with the per capita GNP about US$934 (providing the population is controlled). Compare this figure with the per capita GNP of the world (US$30,100) and of developed countries (US$10,700) in 1988, and one can see that China is far behind the rest of the world in economic growth.     

On the effects of public and private transfers on capital accumulation: some lessons from the NTA aggregates

Intergenerational transfers are a very important part of our daily economic activity. These transfers, whether familial or public, may influence our economic decisions to the same extent that financial markets do. In this paper, we seek to shed some light on the effects of transfers on capital accumulation in the face of demographic aging. In particular, a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with realistic public and familial transfers drawn from the National Transfer Accounts project is implemented to Spain. Given that, in this case, net familial transfers mainly go from parents to children while public transfers go from children to parents, it is shown that the Spanish baby boom and baby bust could lead to capital depletion and a reduction in consumption per capita.     

The economic explanation of fertility changes in the United States

Abstract It is widely assumed that fertility varies positively with economic conditions. Actually this assumption receives little support from the historical record. For a century before 1930 fertility declined while the economy expanded and real incomes rose. Then for nearly three decades fertility and incomes fell and rose together. Since 1960 they have again moved in opposite directions. Clearly, no simple generalization about their relation will hold water. More sophisticated explanations are based on relative rather than absolute incomes. Banks suggested that the downturn in English fertility in the 1870's might have occurred because standards of middle-class consumption rose faster than middle-class incomes, but he found the evidence inconclusive. To reconcile the post-war baby boom in the United States with earlier experience, Easterlin has argued that fertility is determined by the relationship between the income of couples in their twenties and the income of their parents ten to fifteen years earlier. Among the weaknesses of this theory as applied to U.S. experience are its failure to explain the sharp drop in fertility, including that of native white urban women, in the 1920's; the fact that fertility rose most in the baby boom at the higher socio-economic levels where incomes rose least; and the sharp decline of fertility after 1962 in spite of the favourable trend of incomes, including those of younger people. The broad conclusion is that while couples no doubt do consider income, employment opportunities, etc. in deciding how many children to have, such considerations have had a relatively minor influence on changes in fertility, which for the most part have been the result of changes in attitudes. Even the post-war baby boom was a result not only of higher incomes and full employment but also of a shift in attitudes toward family size, particularly among the better-educated, economically better-off sections of society.     

The Contemporary Marriage and Fertility Revolutions in the West the Explanations Provided by Australian Participants

The last half century has witnessed both in Australia, and elsewhere in the West, first a “baby boom” (and marriage boom) and then a “baby bust” (and marriage bust). Economists, demographers, sociologists and social historians, especially in America, have developed theories to explain these phenomena. Presented to the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, New Orleans, 21–23 April 1988.