Franchise Contracting: The Effects of The Entrepreneur's Timing Option and Debt Financing

We solve a sequential‐moves game that involves three players: the franchisor, the entrepreneur, and the banks. The franchisor chooses the contract terms (a one‐time franchise fee and a royalty rate for on‐going payments). The entrepreneur dynamically decides when to sign this contract, open a store, and apply for debt financing to cover the initial investment. In response to the entrepreneur's application, banks competitively determine loan rates. We find that the franchisor should use royalty cash flows and not the franchise fee to extract value from the entrepreneur. This is a new explanation of empirical evidence that franchise contracts favor royalties over franchise fees. To account for the possibility of the entrepreneur's bankruptcy and bankruptcy costs, the franchisor should decrease the royalty rate. However, despite a lower rate, the threshold for the entrepreneur to open the store is higher in the model with financing than in the model without financing. This threshold is much higher than it would have been for the integrated system, which in turn is higher than the static break‐even‐NPV threshold. If a franchisor ignores financing considerations, she will suffer from having to wait longer for the store opening and from a higher bankruptcy probability. We predict that the franchisor is the main beneficiary of the entrepreneur's greater initial wealth and that the franchisor will benefit more if she assumes a greater share of the store's operating costs.     

Contractual relations and organizational structure in franchising

In this paper, we employ a new dataset based on a sample of 123 franchise systems originating from Germany to empirically test hypotheses stemming from agency theory and capital scarcity considerations on the contractual relations and the organizational structure in franchising. We include proxies for the franchisor’s capital scarcity as well as for moral hazard on the franchisee’s and the franchisor’s side. Furthermore, we distinguish between initial and ongoing franchisor support. Our results indicate that agency models based on double moral hazard do explain the design of franchise contracts and the organizational structure in terms of the proportion of franchised outlets. We find that the incentive component of the franchise contract (the royalty rate) is not influenced by moral hazard on the franchisee’s side, but rather by moral hazard on the franchisor’s side. Furthermore, the proportion franchised is strongly influenced by moral hazard on the franchisee’s side. Hence, after providing incentives to outlet managers by turning them into franchisees, thereby granting them residual claimancy, the royalty rate mainly serves to ensure ongoing franchisor input. The franchisor’s capital scarcity influences the fixed fee in franchise contracts and the proportion of franchised outlets, thus supporting standard capital scarcity arguments.     

论特许权交易的动态结构与特许扩张

特许经营是以特许权交易为纽带形成的开发与利用外部市场机会的专业化分工组织,特许扩张直接表现为特许权交易的扩张.由此,首先将特许权交易划分为特许品牌使用权交易和受许人控制权交易2个子交易,在此基础上分析了特许权交易动态结构的循环与共生特征及其内在矛盾;然后通过对特许权交易循环中的资产配置分析和特许双方的动态博弈分析,揭示特许经营稳定扩张的条件和过度扩张的形成机理;最后提出相应的对策建议.     

An Empirical Evaluation of Conflict in the Franchise System

This paper articulates the theoretical rationale for conflict in franchising, operationalizes conflict through the measurement of franchisee satisfaction and labels empirically supported stratified satisfaction levels. Two propositions are advanced in relation to the drivers of conflict in franchise systems. The first proposition is underpinned by relational exchange theory, which postulates that franchisee–franchisor goal congruence is important to the fulfilment of the alliance efficiencies which motivate inter-organizational forms. Cooperation, communication, coordination and commitment, as perceived by the franchisees, are used in the context of a survey instrument to operationalize goal congruence.
The second proposition involves franchisor-provided services. Transaction-cost analysis suggests that long-term contractual relationships must be flexibly interpreted and governed if the relationship is to be maintained over a series of transactions. We propose that the transactional intersection of the franchise system is in franchisor-provided services. The perceived importance and subsequent adequacy of delivery of these services established a tolerance zone within which transactions support and/or enhance the relationship between the franchisor and the franchisee.
The empirical objectives of the study are accomplished utilizing a questionnaire sent to nine franchise systems, to which 621 franchisees responded. Three clear clusters of franchisee conflict emerged in near equal proportions. The propositions are supported and illustrated empirically and in CHAID tree diagram form.     

Making Franchising Work: A Framework Based on a Systematic Review

There is a large and fragmented literature that examines the nature of franchising. This paper aims to collect all the empirical evidence on the factors that make franchising work and to integrate this evidence in a framework. A narrative synthesis was performed of 126 peer‐reviewed empirical journal articles. This review shows how the outcomes of franchising are determined by five major clusters of factors: ownership structure, business format design, contract design, behavior of the franchisor and the franchisee and their interaction, and the age and size of the system and its units. It identifies what franchisors and franchisees need to do to be successful and which evidence gaps and conflicting results remain. To yield better outcomes for both the franchisor and the franchisee, they should work on a recognizable brand name and a good working relationship; in addition, they should have suitable skills and attitudes as well as contractual exclusive territories. For further improvement of franchisee outcomes, high‐quality franchisor support, decentralized decision‐making, selection tools and fair contracts are essential. The effects of a high franchise proportion, active ownership, knowledge exchange and standardized operating instructions are contingent on other structural and contextual factors in the system. Conflicts and tying should be prevented. Hardly any research has been undertaken into which franchise designs are valued by customers. The authors have launched a research agenda for further research, from various theoretical perspectives, into the interactions between system elements, actors and contexts.     

Motivating Retail Marketing Effort: Optimal Contract Design

We study a distribution channel where a manufacturer relies on a sales agent for selling the product, and for investing in the most appropriate marketing effort. The agent's effort is hard to monitor. In addition, the cost of effort is the agent's private information. These impose challenges to the manufacturer in its endeavor to influence the agent's marketing effort provisions and to allocate profit between the two parties. We propose two contract forms. The franchise fee contract is a two‐part price schedule specifying a variable wholesale price and a fixed franchise fee. The retail price maintenance contract links the allowed retail price that the agent charges customers with total payment to the manufacturer and sales level. Under information asymmetry, for implementing either contract form, the manufacturer needs to offer a menu of contracts, hoping to invoke the “revelation principle” when the agent picks a certain contract from that menu. We show that the two contract forms perform differently, and each party's preference toward a particular contract form is linked with the total reservation profit level and/or the sales agent's cost type. We provide managerial guidelines for the manufacturer in selecting a better contract form under different conditions.     

Cost Allocation in Manufacturing–Remanufacturing Operations

For firms remanufacturing their products, the total life‐cycle costs and revenues from new and remanufactured products determine their profitability. In many firms, manufacturing/sales and remanufacturing/remarketing operations are carried out in different divisions. Each division is responsible for only part of the product's life cycle. Practices regarding transfer pricing across divisions vary significantly among companies, affecting the life‐cycle profit performance of the product. In this research, we identify characteristics of transfer prices that achieve the firm‐wide optimal solution. To this end, we consider a manufacturer who also undertakes remanufacturing operations and we focus on price (quantity) decisions. We determine that a cost allocation mechanism that allocates a portion of the initial production cost to each of the two stages of the product life cycle should be used. We also conclude that cost allocation should be implemented as a fixed cost allocation, where charges to the remanufacturing division should be determined independently of the actual quantity of units remanufactured.     

Resolving conflict over salespeople’s brand adoption in franchised channels of distribution

Many franchise-based retail outlets offer both the franchisor-owned brand and brands of competitors or independent suppliers. As salespeople may influence customers’ brand choices considerably, an important concern for franchisors is how to raise salespeople’s selling preferences for the franchisor-owned brand. However, the channel administration literature suggests that salespeople may not automatically favor the franchisor’s brand over other brand lines. While a large body of research examines franchise–channel relationships, previous investigations have conspicuously overlooked this channel conflict. In proposing a conceptual model grounded in the behavioral sciences, this study analyzes how franchisors can induce salespeople to advocate their brand by fostering the intention to promote the franchisor-owned brand (IFOB) in customer interaction. The results of an empirical field study show that individual brand promotion depends on factors such as salespeople’s identification with the franchisor and their tenure with the organization, as well as on the franchisor’s prestige and administration of the franchise. Moreover, we find that franchisees’ IFOB transfers to salespeople, but only if franchisees display a charismatic leadership style. We discuss these findings in light of extant theory and empirical evidence and derive several managerially relevant implications for the administration of franchised retail channels.     

Optimal Inventory Control with Dual‐Sourcing,Heterogeneous Ordering Costs and Order Size Constraints

We consider a dual‐sourcing inventory system, where procuring from one supplier involves a high variable cost but negligible fixed cost whereas procuring from the other supplier involves a low variable cost but high fixed cost, as well as an order size constraint. We show that the problem can be reduced to an equivalent single‐sourcing problem. However, the corresponding ordering cost is neither concave nor convex. Using the notion of quasi‐convexity, we partially characterize the structure of the optimal policy and show that it can be specified by multiple thresholds which determine when to order from each supplier and how much. In contrast to previous research, which does not consider order size constraints, we show that it is optimal to simultaneously source from both suppliers when the beginning inventory level is sufficiently low. We also show that the decision to source from the low‐cost supplier is not monotonic in the inventory level. Our results require that the variable costs satisfy a certain condition which guarantees quasi‐convexity. However, extensive numerical results suggest that our policy is almost always optimal when the condition is not satisfied. We also show how the results can be extended to systems with multiple capacitated suppliers.     

Enabling Opportunism: Revenue Sharing when Sales Revenues are Unobservable

We consider a supply chain with a supplier that sells to a retailer under a revenue‐sharing arrangement. Demand is uncertain and unobservable to the supplier. We assume that the retailer is rational, that is, the retailer behaves opportunistically and underreports sales revenues to the supplier whenever such underreporting is profitable. Assuming the supplier has the ability to audit the retailer and learn about the actual sales revenues, we show that the supplier will never find it optimal to audit to the point that ensures truthful reporting for all demand realizations. By committing to an auditing policy, the supplier can exploit retailer opportunism and derive profits that at times even exceed those that could be obtained when dealing with a retailer that always strictly adheres to the agreed‐upon contract terms. We also show that the retailer's opportunistic behavior can increase total supply chain profits.     

How Collection Cost Structure Drives a Manufacturer's Reverse Channel Choice

This note discusses the impact of collection cost structure on the optimal reverse channel choice of manufacturers who remanufacture their own products. Using collection cost functions that capture collection rate and collection volume dependency, we show that the optimal reverse channel choice (retailer‐ vs. manufacturer‐managed collection) is driven by how the cost structure moderates the manufacturer's ability to shape the retailer's sales and collection quantity decisions.     

Complementarities and Substitutabilities in Franchise Contracting: Some Results from the German Franchise Sector

According to the property rights approach,decision rights have to be allocated accordingto the distribution of intangible knowledge assetsbetween the franchisor and franchisee andownership rights have to be assigned according to theresidual rights of control (residual decisionrights). Since residual income rights are diluted infranchising relationships, ownership rightsinclude not only residual income rights (initial fees androyalties) but also complementary ownershipsurrogates to simulate the motivation effect of undilutedownership rights. Therefore, under a propertyrights perspective, an efficient contract structure infranchise relationships implies co-locationbetween knowledge assets and decision rights andcomplementarity between residual decision andownership rights. The more important the franchisor's(franchisee's) system-specific assets (localmarket knowhow) for the generation of residual surplus, themore decision and complementary ownership rightsshould be transferred to the franchisor(franchisee). Three hypotheses were derivedfrom the property rights approach and tested in the Germanfranchise sector. The empirical results arepartly supportive of the hypotheses.     

基于前景理论的PPP项目投资者逆向选择问题研究

PPP项目中投资者逆向选择问题时有发生，严重制约我国PPP模式的可持续发展。为减少投资者逆向选择，在采购阶段对投资者合理筛选机制的设置至关重要。考虑到政府部门和投资者均为"有限理性"，本文基于前景理论，构建了PPP项目采购阶段双方之间的信号博弈模型。研究结果表明，低能力投资者的伪装成本是PPP市场实现分离均衡的决定性因素。为节约政府部门的检查成本，并使PPP市场更容易出现分离均衡，本文引入政府部门抽检模型，即对投资者报价的合理性进行抽检，进而得到最优抽检比例，可完全杜绝投资者逆向选择。通过数值模拟显示，政府部门最优抽检比例随着高能力投资者可获得合理利润率的增加而增加，但随着伪装成本、政府惩罚力度和高能力投资者折现率报价的增加而降低；且相比于收益，投资者对损失更为敏感，但随着收益和损失的增加，其敏感程度降低，符合前景理论。前景理论的引入，考虑了博弈过程中决策者的心理因素，使结果更接近真实情况。最后，为有效抑制投资者逆向选择，本文针对性提出了相关政策建议，为政府部门和投资者的决策提供参考和依据，助力完善PPP项目治理体系。     

Assortment Planning for Vertically Differentiated Products

We consider the problem of a retailer managing a category of vertically differentiated products. The retailer has to pay a fixed cost for each product included in the assortment and a variable cost per product sold. Quality levels, fixed, and variable costs are exogenously determined. Customers differ in their valuation of quality and choose the product (if any) that maximizes their utility. First, we consider a setting in which the selling prices are also fixed. We find that the optimal set of products to offer depends on the distribution of customer valuations and might include dominated products, that is, products which are less attractive than at least one other product, on every possible dimension. We develop an efficient algorithm to identify an optimal assortment. Second, we consider a setting in which the retailer also determines the selling prices. We show that in this case the optimal assortment does not include any dominated product and does not vary with the distribution of customer valuations when there is no fixed cost. We develop several efficient algorithms to identify an optimal assortment and optimally price the products. We also test the applicability of our methods with realistic data for two product categories.     

电子商务环境下双渠道供应链协调的补偿策略研究

构建了电子商务环境下由一个制造商与一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链模型,分析、比较了集中式决策与分散式决策下双渠道供应链的最优价格,从电子渠道与传统渠道合作的角度出发,研究了双渠道供应链协调的补偿策略,论证了这种补偿策略能够实现双渠道供应链协调,且在一定范围内可以保证双渠道供应链成员的双赢.最后通过算例分析,进一步检验了所设计的补偿策略对双渠道供应链协调的有效性.     

Impact of Value‐Added Service Features in e‐Retailing Processes: An Econometric Analysis of Web Site Functions

We examine the impact of three classes of Web site functions (foundational, customer‐centered, and value‐added) upon e‐retailer performance. Using secondary panel data for 2007–2009 on operating characteristics of over 600 e‐retailers, our econometric analysis finds that only the value‐added service functions are positively associated with changes in e‐retail sales revenues across time. We also observe a decreasing marginal impact of deploying additional value‐added service features. To account for possible alternate explanations, we control for firm‐ and time‐specific fixed effects, merchant types, merchandise categories, and order fulfillment strategies. By further decomposing e‐retail sales revenues into Web site traffic, conversion rate, and average order value, we find that Web site functions affect e‐retail sales revenues mainly through their impact on Web site traffic. Our investigation demonstrates the empirical research usefulness of the Voss conceptual e‐service sand cone model. Our results identify for managers where to focus ongoing e‐retailing system development efforts, yet suggest that focusing too many retailing capabilities on exploratory and experimental value‐added service features may backfire, potentially leading to worsening e‐retailer performance.     

连锁便利商店加盟关系中止倾向之研究

以台湾全家便利连锁店为研究对象,从信任和关系中止的联系出发,采取问卷调查的方法,探讨影响加盟关系中止的主要因素.结果显示:1.加盟者的经济满足和非经济满足与其对加盟总部的信任程度正相关,非经济满足的影响更大.2.总部和加盟者之间的沟通程度与加盟者对加盟总部的信任程度正相关.3.加盟者与总部的非功能性冲突与其对加盟总部的信任程度负相关,功能性冲突与信任程度正相关,且非功能性冲突的影响大于功能性冲突.4.信任是影响加盟关系中止的前因变量,信任在非经济满足和非功能性冲突对关系中止的影响中具有中介效果.     

Traffic‐Based Labor Planning in Retail Stores

Staffing decisions are crucial for retailers since staffing levels affect store performance and labor‐related expenses constitute one of the largest components of retailers’ operating costs. With the goal of improving staffing decisions and store performance, we develop a labor‐planning framework using proprietary data from an apparel retail chain. First, we propose a sales response function based on labor adequacy (the labor to traffic ratio) that exhibits variable elasticity of substitution between traffic and labor. When compared to a frequently used function with constant elasticity of substitution, our proposed function exploits information content from data more effectively and better predicts sales under extreme labor/traffic conditions. We use the validated sales response function to develop a data‐driven staffing heuristic that incorporates the prediction loss function and uses past traffic to predict optimal labor. In counterfactual experimentation, we show that profits achieved by our heuristic are within 0.5% of the optimal (attainable if perfect traffic information was available) under stable traffic conditions, and within 2.5% of the optimal under extreme traffic variability. We conclude by discussing implications of our findings for researchers and practitioners.     

A comparison of fixed and dynamic pricing policies in revenue management

We consider the problem of selling a fixed capacity or inventory of items over a finite selling period. Earlier research has shown that using a properly set fixed price during the selling period is asymptotically optimal as the demand potential and capacity grow large and that dynamic pricing has only a secondary effect on revenues. However, additional revenue improvements through dynamic pricing can be important in practice and need to be further explored. We suggest two simple dynamic heuristics that continuously update prices based on remaining inventory and time in the selling period. The first heuristic is based on approximating the optimal expected revenue function and the second heuristic is based on the solution of the deterministic version of the problem. We show through a numerical study that the revenue impact of using these dynamic pricing heuristics rather than fixed pricing may be substantial. In particular, the first heuristic has a consistent and remarkable performance leading to at most 0.2% gap compared to optimal dynamic pricing. We also show that the benefits of these dynamic pricing heuristics persist under a periodic setting. This is especially true for the first heuristic for which the performance is monotone in the frequency of price changes. We conclude that dynamic pricing should be considered as a more favorable option in practice.     

CAPACITY AND PRODUCTION DECISIONS IN STOCHASTIC MANUFACTURING SYSTEMS: AN ASYMPTOTIC OPTIMAL HIERARCHICAL APPROACH

We present a new paradigm of hierarchical decision making in production planning and capacity expansion problems under uncertainty. We show that under reasonable assumptions, the strategic level management can base the capacity decision on aggregated information from the shopfloor, and the operational level management, given this decision, can derive a production plan for the system, without too large a loss in optimality when compared to simultaneous determination of optimal capacity and production decisions. The results are obtained via an asymptotic analysis of a manufacturing system with convex costs, constant demand, and with machines subject to random breakdown and repair. The decision variables are purchase time of a new machine at a given fixed cost and production plans before and after the purchase. The objective is to minimize the discounted costs of investment, production, inventories, and backlogs. If the rate of change in machine states such as up and down is assumed to be much larger than the rate of discounting costs, one obtains a simpler limiting problem in which the random capacity is replaced by its mean. We develop methods for constructing asymptotically optimal decisions for the original problem from the optimal decisions for the limiting problem. We obtain error estimates for these constructed decisions.