A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining

This paper proposes a new approach to equilibrium selection in repeated games with transfers, supposing that in each period the players bargain over how to play. Although the bargaining phase is cheap talk (following a generalized alternating‐offer protocol), sharp predictions arise from three axioms. Two axioms allow the players to meaningfully discuss whether to deviate from their plan; the third embodies a “theory of disagreement”—that play under disagreement should not vary with the manner in which bargaining broke down. Equilibria that satisfy these axioms exist for all discount factors and are simple to construct; all equilibria generate the same welfare. Optimal play under agreement generally requires suboptimal play under disagreement. Whether patient players attain efficiency depends on both the stage game and the bargaining protocol. The theory extends naturally to games with imperfect public monitoring and heterogeneous discount factors, and yields new insights into classic relational contracting questions.     

Fear of Miscoordination and the Robustness of Cooperation in Dynamic Global Games With Exit

This paper develops a framework to assess how fear of miscoordination affects the sustainability of cooperation. Building on theoretical insights from Carlsson and van Damme (1993), it explores the effect of small amounts of private information on a class of dynamic cooperation games with exit. Lack of common knowledge leads players to second guess each other's behavior and makes coordination difficult. This restricts the range of equilibria and highlights the role of miscoordination payoffs in determining whether cooperation is sustainable or not. The paper characterizes the range of perfect Bayesian equilibria as the players' information becomes arbitrarily precise. Unlike in one‐shot two‐by‐two games, the global games information structure does not yield equilibrium uniqueness.     

基于学习的孵化器与创投协同知识创造资源共享研究

将学习因素纳入科技企业孵化器与创投多阶段协同知识创造资源共享的微观机制,建立孵化器与创投多阶段重复主从博弈模型,研究学习因素、税收强度、财政返还、创投股权对维系孵化器与创投协同知识(信息)合作的作用,以及孵化器的最优参与度和双方总的最优投入.研究发现,当孵化器与创投进行知识(信息)协同创造后从创业项目获取收益的比例要高于创投时,孵化器参与到与创投的合作.在满足孵化器与创投合作的条件下,孵化器的最优参与度与政府税收强度和财政返还比例正相关,与创投在创业项目中所占股份负相关.孵化器和创投总的最优投入水平与税收强度、财政返还比例、初始学习因素正相关,与创投在项目中所占股份的比例、博弈阶段长度和市场利率负相关.     

On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games

A game is better-reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy x^* and every payoff vector limit u^* resulting from strategies approaching x^*, some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u_i^* even if the others deviate slightly from x^*. If strategy spaces are compact and convex, payoffs are quasiconcave in the owner's strategy, and the game is better-reply secure, then a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. Better-reply security holds in many economic games. It also permits new results on the existence of symmetric and mixed strategy Nash equilibria.