韩国人口老龄化过程及其启示

韩国人口老龄化的过程与中国有很多相似之处,经历了20世纪50年代的高生育率和死亡率降低、60年代以后的生育率下降直到目前的超低生育率,韩国人口在世纪之交快速进入老龄化阶段。预计初婚年龄的升高、持续的低生育率和育龄妇女数量的减少将会使韩国人口进一步老化。快速的人口老龄化已经为韩国社会带来了一系列的经济和社会问题,应对老龄化带来的挑战成为国家面临的重大问题。韩国的老龄化过程、现状以及采取相应的对策,将对中国具有启示意义。     

Toward sustainable development: Implications for population aging and the wellbeing of elderly women in developing countries

Attaining sustainable development has significant implications for population age structure, family structure and the wellbeing of elderly women. If one of the primary goals of sustainable development is reducing fertility to attain a population growth rate which can be supported by the Earth's resources, then working toward sustainable development will lead to an aging population. This demographic change coupled with other impacts of working toward sustainable development could significantly affect the status and wellbeing of elderly women. Drawing on examples primarily from the Asian setting, this paper will examine population aging and what this demographic change may mean for elderly women in developing areas.     

Changes in the family status of elderly women in Korea

As a result of sharp declines in fertility and mortality, the aging of the Korean population has proceeded rapidly and is likely to continue in full force for some time. In societies such as Korea, where families traditionally have been the only efficient source of support for the elderly, an aging population poses a threat because families have fewer descendants available to care for increasing numbers of surviving elderly persons. The exact magnitude of the reduction in the supply of kin depends on details of the demographic trends and cannot be evaluated a priori. In this paper we use family-status life tables to assess the effects of changes in demographic processes on the family status of elderly women and to project trends in elderly women's family status.     

中国特色的人口老龄化过程、前景和对策

基于基本国情 ,中国老龄化具有老年人数多、老龄化速度快、未富先老和老龄化地区差别大的特点。老年人健康长寿水平与发达地区有很大差距 ,中国老龄政策要把老年人健康作为优先考虑的内容。老龄化速度快是低生育的结果 ,应充分利用“人口红利”为老龄化做好物质准备。老龄政策必须与经济社会发展水平相适应。在未富先老的条件下 ,老年人提高生活质量必须政府主导、社会参与、群众支持     

The Demography of Future Global Population Aging: Indicators,Uncertainty, and Educational Composition

This is an expanded version of comments on the future of the demography of aging at an invited session of the 2008 annual meeting of the Population Association of America. In an introduction, John Haaga offers reasons for a revival of interest in population aging, including greater realization of plasticity in aging trajectories at both individual and societal levels. Linda Martin proposes that population scientists working in aging emulate those studying fertility and family planning in previous decades, learning from interventions (in this case, aimed at increasing retirement savings and reducing disability at older ages). Changes in family structure will increasingly affect new cohorts of the elderly, and Linda Waite speculates on the ways in which changes in the economy, medicine, and the legal environment could affect the social context for aging. Research on mortality at older ages is “alive and well” asserts James Vaupel, who sets out six large questions on mortality trends and differentials over time and across species. Lastly, Wolfgang Lutz expands the scope of projections, showing the considerable uncertainty about the timing and pace of population aging in the developing world and the effects on future elderly of the increases in educational attainment in much of the world during the second half of the twentieth century.     

Population momentum expresses population aging

Population momentum and population aging occur when an initially growing population experiences a reduction in fertility to replacement level. Conceptually and empirically, momentum and aging express the same change, albeit on different scales. Fundamentally, they are two manifestations of the underlying process of demographic transformation. We consider three measures of aging over the transition to stationarity: the increase in mean population age, the decrease in the proportion under age 30, and the increase in the proportion over age 65. The three measures of aging are highly correlated, though the relationship to momentum is weakest for the increase in the proportion over age 65. We find that momentum is linearly related to aging. In both model and actual populations, a one-year increase in mean age translates into about 4.5% more population growth. The population below age 30 does not grow over the transition to stationarity, and the ratio of initial to ultimate proportions under age 30 is virtually identical to momentum.     

Aging in Japan: population policy implications

This article was prepared for the International Conference on Aging in the East and West in 1995. The focus is on trends in aging in Japan and demographic determinants and consequences. Findings are presented from a 1990 study conducted by the Institute of Population Problems on acceptance of alternative population policies aimed to slow population aging in Japan. Japan is the seventh most populous country in the world, and the current growth rate is around 0.3%. Declines in fertility and mortality have contributed to the low growth rate. Population aging accelerated over the decades. The present share of aged population is 14.1%. The aged population is expected to continue to increase from 14.9 million in 1990 to 32.7 million in 2020 (25.8% in 2025). Decreases in the aged population are not expected until after the mid-2040s. The proportion of very old (ages 75 years and older) will dramatically increase to 14.5% in 2025. The primary demographic determinant of population aging and fertility decline is identified as the higher proportion of never-married and the higher age at marriage. One of the consequences of population aging is the increase in the age dependency ratios and the aged-child ratios. The proportion of intergenerationally extended households declined over time, but the pace of decline has slowed recently. The proportion of aged in one person or couple only households has risen but not to the same extent as the West. The majority of older old still live with a married child. Logistic analysis of 1985 survey data reveal that the custom of the elderly living with the eldest child remains. The 1985 survey also revealed much indecision about a pronatalist policy or a fertility policy. Logistic analysis of 1990 public opinion survey data shows acceptance of immigration as a policy alternative to slowing population aging. Acceptance varied by socioeconomic, demographic, and regional factors. A pronatalist policy received stronger acceptance. However, reference is made to Kojima's literature review, which suggests that indirect policies on fertility and a comprehensive family policy would be more effective in raising fertility than a population policy.     

Some macroeconomic aspects of global population aging

Across the demographic transition, declining mortality followed by declining fertility produces decades of rising support ratios as child dependency falls. These improving support ratios raise per capita consumption, other things equal, but eventually deteriorate as the population ages. Population aging and the forces leading to it can produce not only frightening declines in support ratios but also very substantial increases in productivity and per capita income by raising investment in physical and human capital. Longer life, lower fertility, and population aging all raise the demand for wealth needed to provide for old-age consumption. This leads to increased capital per worker even as aggregate saving rates fall. However, capital per worker may not rise if the increased demand for wealth is satisfied by increased familial or public pension transfers to the elderly. Thus, institutions and policies matter for the consequences of population aging. The accumulation of human capital also varies across the transition. Lower fertility and mortality are associated with higher human capital investment per child, also raising labor productivity. Together, the positive changes due to human and physical capital accumulation will likely outweigh the problems of declining support ratios. We draw on estimates and analyses from the National Transfer Accounts project to illustrate and quantify these points.     

亲属、法律、家庭养老

中国家庭养老的传统在今天仍被社会、家庭和个人所重视和依赖。这种传统的部分基础是亲属制度。在这种制度下家中的每个人有其约定俗成的权利和义务 ,在赡养老年人的问题上也如此。亲属数量和类别的多少不仅可以增加老年人晚年接受各方面照料的力量 ,也会潜移默化地促使人们认同、接受和依靠家庭养老这种方式。国家法律也对家庭养老传统的延续起到了监督和推动的作用     

Demographic transition and population aging in Korea

"This paper describes the process of population aging in conjunction with the demographic transition in [South Korea]. Korea has recently experienced rapid decreases of both mortality and fertility, which have brought about the rapid process of population aging. The speed of...population aging in Korea is projected as one of the fastest in the world. Population aging brings about changing patterns of family composition, especially new trends of living arrangements of the elderly. Since the process of population aging [began] in Korea, the proportion of [those] living alone and [of those] living with spouse only have significantly increased."     

After the demographic transition: policy responses to low fertility in four Asian countries

In the low fertility countries of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Thailand, policy-makers are concerned about the consequences of low growth. In South Korea, a family planning (FP) program was instituted in the early 1960s, and fertility declined to 1.6 by 1987. Rural fertility is still higher at 1.96, and abortion rates are high. 32.2% of fertility reduction is accomplished through abortion. South Korean population will not stabilize until 2021, at 50.6 million people. The elderly are expected to increase and strain housing, energy, and land resources. Government support for FP is being reduced, while private sector services are being enhanced. Government sterilization programs have been reduced significantly, and revisions in the Medical Insurance Law will cover part of contraceptive cost. Integrated services are being established. Many argue for an emphasis on birth spacing, child and family development, sex education, and care of the elderly. In Taiwan, replacement level fertility was reached in 1983. Policy in 1992 recommended increasing fertility from 1.6 to 2.1. The aim was to stabilize population without pronatalist interventions. Regardless of policy decisions, population growth will continue over the next 40 years, and the extent of aging will increase. In Singapore since the 1960s, the national government focused on encouraging small families through fertility incentives, mass media campaigns, and easy access to FP services. Fertility declined to 1.4 in 1988. Since 1983, government has established a variety of pronatalist incentives. In 1989, fertility increased to 1.8. The pronatalist shift is viewed as not likely to succeed in dealing with the concern for an adequate work force to support the elderly and economic development. In Thailand, fertility declined the fastest to 2.4 in 1993. The key factors were rapid economic and social development, a supportive cultural setting, strong demand for fertility control, and a successful FP program. The goal is to reduce fertility to 1.2 by 1996. Replacement level may be reached in 2000 or 2005. Future trends are not clear.     

The Changing Family and Aging Populations

This is an expanded version of comments on the future of the demography of aging at an invited session of the 2008 annual meeting of the Population Association of America. In an introduction, John Haaga offers reasons for a revival of interest in population aging, including greater realization of plasticity in aging trajectories at both individual and societal levels. Linda Martin proposes that population scientists working in aging emulate those studying fertility and family planning in previous decades, learning from interventions (in this case, aimed at increasing retirement savings and reducing disability at older ages). Changes in family structure will increasingly affect new cohorts of the elderly, and Linda Waite speculates on the ways in which changes in the economy, medicine, and the legal environment could affect the social context for aging. Research on mortality at older ages is “alive and well” asserts James Vaupel, who sets out six large questions on mortality trends and differentials over time and across species. Lastly, Wolfgang Lutz expands the scope of projections, showing the considerable uncertainty about the timing and pace of population aging in the developing world and the effects on future elderly of the increases in educational attainment in much of the world during the second half of the twentieth century.     

Introduction

This is an expanded version of comments on the future of the demography of aging at an invited session of the 2008 annual meeting of the Population Association of America. In an introduction, John Haaga offers reasons for a revival of interest in population aging, including greater realization of plasticity in aging trajectories at both individual and societal levels. Linda Martin proposes that population scientists working in aging emulate those studying fertility and family planning in previous decades, learning from interventions (in this case, aimed at increasing retirement savings and reducing disability at older ages). Changes in family structure will increasingly affect new cohorts of the elderly, and Linda Waite speculates on the ways in which changes in the economy, medicine, and the legal environment could affect the social context for aging. Research on mortality at older ages is “alive and well” asserts James Vaupel, who sets out six large questions on mortality trends and differentials over time and across species. Lastly, Wolfgang Lutz expands the scope of projections, showing the considerable uncertainty about the timing and pace of population aging in the developing world and the effects on future elderly of the increases in educational attainment in much of the world during the second half of the twentieth century.     

Interventions to Improve Late Life

This is an expanded version of comments on the future of the demography of aging at an invited session of the 2008 annual meeting of the Population Association of America. In an introduction, John Haaga offers reasons for a revival of interest in population aging, including greater realization of plasticity in aging trajectories at both individual and societal levels. Linda Martin proposes that population scientists working in aging emulate those studying fertility and family planning in previous decades, learning from interventions (in this case, aimed at increasing retirement savings and reducing disability at older ages). Changes in family structure will increasingly affect new cohorts of the elderly, and Linda Waite speculates on the ways in which changes in the economy, medicine, and the legal environment could affect the social context for aging. Research on mortality at older ages is “alive and well” asserts James Vaupel, who sets out six large questions on mortality trends and differentials over time and across species. Lastly, Wolfgang Lutz expands the scope of projections, showing the considerable uncertainty about the timing and pace of population aging in the developing world and the effects on future elderly of the increases in educational attainment in much of the world during the second half of the twentieth century.     

Lively Questions for Demographers about Death at Older Ages

This is an expanded version of comments on the future of the demography of aging at an invited session of the 2008 annual meeting of the Population Association of America. In an introduction, John Haaga offers reasons for a revival of interest in population aging, including greater realization of plasticity in aging trajectories at both individual and societal levels. Linda Martin proposes that population scientists working in aging emulate those studying fertility and family planning in previous decades, learning from interventions (in this case, aimed at increasing retirement savings and reducing disability at older ages). Changes in family structure will increasingly affect new cohorts of the elderly, and Linda Waite speculates on the ways in which changes in the economy, medicine, and the legal environment could affect the social context for aging. Research on mortality at older ages is “alive and well” asserts James Vaupel, who sets out six large questions on mortality trends and differentials over time and across species. Lastly, Wolfgang Lutz expands the scope of projections, showing the considerable uncertainty about the timing and pace of population aging in the developing world and the effects on future elderly of the increases in educational attainment in much of the world during the second half of the twentieth century.     

Aging, fertility, social security and political equilibrium

We analyze the effect of population aging on the political choice of the size of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system, incorporating the heterogeneity of individuals in their preference for having children, and hence the endogenous fertility choices of individuals, into a simple overlapping generations model. We show that population aging may result in an increase in the contribution rate, increasing the share of the retired population who prefer a higher contribution rate; and that, if the system involves redistribution between retirees with different contributions, the increased contribution rate raises the number of individuals who have children, i.e., future contributors.     

1982—2010年中国在业人口高龄化研究

由于人口生育率的急剧下降,中国人口不仅迅速老龄化,面临着“人口红利”消失等问题,同时还出现在业人口迅速高龄化的情况。导致在业人口高龄化的主要原因是人口年龄结构的变化,同时与劳动参与程度的改变、教育发展等因素有关。到目前为止,在业人口高龄化主要是出现在农民与工人两个职业中,其他职业的情况相对不太明显。随着长期的低生育水平的延续,在业人口高龄将继续严重,并且将从以农民、工人两个职业为主,转变为全面的在业人口高龄化。此现象对中国今后的社会经济发展有什么影响,值得深思。     

China’s Demographic Future Under the New Two-Child Policy

China implemented the two-child policy in 2016, however, potential impacts of this new policy on its population reality have not been adequately understood. Using population census data and 1% population sampling data during the period of 1982–2015, this study develops a fertility simulation model to explore the effects of the two-child policy on women’s total fertility rate, and employs Cohort Component Method in population projections to examine China’s demographic future with different fertility regimes. The fertility simulation results reveal that the two-child policy will make significantly positive effects on China’s total fertility rate through increasing second births, leading to a sharp but temporary increase in the first 5 years after the implementation of the new policy. In addition, population projections using simulated total fertility rates show that the Chinese population would reach its peak value around the middle 2020s and be faced with the reduction of labor force supply and rapid aging process, featured with remarkable increases in both size and share of the elderly population. The findings suggest that the two-child policy would undoubtedly affect China’s fertility rates and demographic future; however, the effects are mild and temporary.

     

Below-replacement fertility in east and southeast asia: Consequences and policy responses

Fourteen countries in Asia have total fertility rates at or below replacement level. This is more pronounced in China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand. The implications are far-reaching and profound as they affect the age structure of the population, giving rise to population ageing, labour force shortages, increased elderly dependency ratios and feminization of the aged population. Evidence from European countries suggests that although fertility may rebound, in most countries it is highly unlikely that fertility will recover sufficiently to reach replacement level in the near future. Mortality reduction will continue to be an overriding policy goal, which would further enhance the ageing process. Therefore, the greatest challenge will be to pension systems, old-age care systems, and health systems or health insurance. This paper first examines the fertility transition in five low-fertility countries. It then discusses the policy measures that these countries have adopted in response to low fertility and population ageing. The paper concludes with the policy implications for healthcare, social care, income security and caregiving facility, and the scope for further study.     

Population aging and endogenous economic growth

We investigate the consequences of population aging for long-run economic growth perspectives. Our framework incorporates endogenous growth models and semi-endogenous growth models as special cases. We show that (1) increases in longevity have a positive impact on per capita output growth, (2) decreases in fertility have a negative impact on per capita output growth, (3) the positive longevity effect dominates the negative fertility effect in case of the endogenous growth framework, and (4) population aging fosters long-run growth in the endogenous growth framework, while its effect depends on the relative change between fertility and mortality in the semi-endogenous growth framework.