Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Terrorism Risk

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent establishment of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), considerable efforts have been made to estimate the risks of terrorism and the cost effectiveness of security policies to reduce these risks. DHS, industry, and the academic risk analysis communities have all invested heavily in the development of tools and approaches that can assist decisionmakers in effectively allocating limited resources across the vast array of potential investments that could mitigate risks from terrorism and other threats to the homeland. Decisionmakers demand models, analyses, and decision support that are useful for this task and based on the state of the art. Since terrorism risk analysis is new, no single method is likely to meet this challenge. In this article we explore a number of existing and potential approaches for terrorism risk analysis, focusing particularly on recent discussions regarding the applicability of probabilistic and decision analytic approaches to bioterrorism risks and the Bioterrorism Risk Assessment methodology used by the DHS and criticized by the National Academies and others.     

Challenges to the Acceptance of Probabilistic Risk Analysis

This paper discusses a number of the key challenges to the acceptance and application of probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Those challenges include: (a) the extensive reliance on subjective judgment in PRA, requiring the development of guidance for the use of PRA in risk-informed regulation, and possibly the development of robust or reference prior distributions to minimize the reliance on judgment; and (b) the treatment of human performance in PRA, including not only human error per se but also management and organizational factors more broadly. All of these areas are seen as presenting interesting research challenges at the interface between engineering and other disciplines.     

Challenges Confronting Risk Analysis of Potential Thyroid Toxicants

Screening and testing for potential thyroid toxicants using endpoints of thyroid function, including circulating levels of thyroid hormones and thyrotropin, will not capture toxicants that directly interfere with thyroid hormone action at the receptor. The goals of the present review are to provide a critique of the literature focused on thyroid hormone and brain development as it relates to testing and evaluating thyroid toxicants, and to propose possible solutions to this perceived dilemma.     

How Probabilistic Risk Assessment Can Mislead Terrorism Risk Analysts

Traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), of the type originally developed for engineered systems, is still proposed for terrorism risk analysis. We show that such PRA applications are unjustified in general. The capacity of terrorists to seek and use information and to actively research different attack options before deciding what to do raises unique features of terrorism risk assessment that are not adequately addressed by conventional PRA for natural and engineered systems—in part because decisions based on such PRA estimates do not adequately hedge against the different probabilities that attackers may eventually act upon. These probabilities may differ from the defender's (even if the defender's experts are thoroughly trained, well calibrated, unbiased probability assessors) because they may be conditioned on different information. We illustrate the fundamental differences between PRA and terrorism risk analysis, and suggest use of robust decision analysis for risk management when attackers may know more about some attack options than we do.     

A Perspective: Risk Analysis as a Tool for Reducing the Risks of Terrorism

The destruction by terrorists of the twin towers of the World Trade Center and major damage wrought to the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, followed closely by the bioterrorist anthrax attacks via the mails raised the question of whether risk analysis might have a place in defending the United States against terrorist attacks. After first reviewing the multifaceted nature of terrorism and the reasons it is likely to become endemic in world society in the long term, just as other areas of crime are endemic, this article surveys several fields of risk analysis, finding possible short- and long-term uses of risk analysis. The areas chiefly considered are: risk communication and chemical, biological, and technological risk analysis. Broad policy and other uses are also considered. The author finds that risk analysis has already played some role, perhaps informally, but he sees the possibility for a much larger, formal one, a role that is centrally important for the present and future of the United States and the world.     

Risk Analysis: Celebrating the Accomplishments and Embracing Ongoing Challenges

As part of the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Society for Risk Analysis and Risk Analysis: An International Journal, this essay reviews the 10 most important accomplishments of risk analysis from 1980 to 2010, outlines major accomplishments in three major categories from 2011 to 2019, discusses how editors circulate authors’ accomplishments, and proposes 10 major risk-related challenges for 2020–2030. Authors conclude that the next decade will severely test the field of risk analysis.     

Foundational Challenges for Advancing the Field and Discipline of Risk Analysis

Risk analysis as a field and discipline is about concepts, principles, approaches, methods, and models for understanding, assessing, communicating, managing, and governing risk. The foundation of this field and discipline has been subject to continuous discussion since its origin some 40 years ago with the establishment of the Society for Risk Analysis and the Risk Analysis journal. This article provides a perspective on critical foundational challenges that this field and discipline faces today, for risk analysis to develop and have societal impact. Topics discussed include fundamental questions important for defining the risk field, discipline, and science; the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary features of risk analysis; the interactions and dependencies with other sciences; terminology and fundamental principles; and current developments and trends, such as the use of artificial intelligence.     

A Methodology for Modeling Regional Terrorism Risk

Over the past decade, terrorism risk has become a prominent consideration in protecting the well‐being of individuals and organizations. More recently, there has been interest in not only quantifying terrorism risk, but also placing it in the context of an all‐hazards environment in which consideration is given to accidents and natural hazards, as well as intentional acts. This article discusses the development of a regional terrorism risk assessment model designed for this purpose. The approach taken is to model terrorism risk as a dependent variable, expressed in expected annual monetary terms, as a function of attributes of population concentration and critical infrastructure. This allows for an assessment of regional terrorism risk in and of itself, as well as in relation to man‐made accident and natural hazard risks, so that mitigation resources can be allocated in an effective manner. The adopted methodology incorporates elements of two terrorism risk modeling approaches (event‐based models and risk indicators), producing results that can be utilized at various jurisdictional levels. The validity, strengths, and limitations of the model are discussed in the context of a case study application within the United States.     

Guiding Resource Allocations Based on Terrorism Risk

Establishing tolerable levels of risk is one of the most contentious and important risk management decisions. With every regulatory or funding decision for a risk management program, society decides whether or not risk is tolerable. The Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) is a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grant program designed to enhance security and overall preparedness to prevent, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism by providing financial assistance for planning, equipment, training, and exercise needs of large urban areas. After briefly reviewing definitions of terrorism risk and rationales for risk-based resource allocation, this article compares estimates of terrorism risk in urban areas that received UASI funding in 2004 to other federal risk management decisions. This comparison suggests that UASI allocations are generally consistent with other federal risk management decisions. However, terrorism risk in several cities that received funding is below levels that are often tolerated in other risk management contexts. There are several reasons why the conclusions about terrorism risk being de minimis in specific cities should be challenged. Some of these surround the means used to estimate terrorism risk for this study. Others involve the comparison that is made to other risk management decisions. However, many of the observations reported are valid even if reported terrorism risk estimates are several orders of magnitude too low. Discussion of resource allocation should be extended to address risk tolerance and include explicit comparisons, like those presented here, to other risk management decisions.     

Contemporary Terrorism: Risk Perception in the London Options Market

Previous studies have a demonstrated a linkage between terrorist attacks and the operation of financial markets. This article focuses on terrorist events carried out over the last five years and examines how they have been perceived among participants on the London financial market. Data from the London options market suggest a high degree of sensitivity to these events. We argue that this sensitivity reveals a vulnerability in the financial markets should the recent trends in terrorist activity continue.     

Relative Risk Perception for Terrorism: Implications for Preparedness and Risk Communication

Terrorism presents a significant risk that is often approached at public policy, infrastructure, or emergency management level. Public perceptions of the likelihood of terrorist events, and how this may relate to individual preparedness, are not always extensively examined. The tendency to think that negative events are less likely to happen to oneself than to the average person is known as optimism bias. Optimism bias is relevant to perceptions of terrorism, because it is thought to be related to a reduction in precaution use. Using an online survey of 164 participants, this study aimed to determine whether Sydney residents thought they had a lower likelihood of experiencing terrorist events than other Australians. Significant optimism bias was observed for witnessing terrorist events, but not for personally experiencing terrorist events. In addition, Sydney residents tended to think that terrorist attacks were more likely to occur in Sydney than another major Australian city in the next five years. At the same time, household and workplace preparedness for terrorism was quite low, as was awareness of emergency strategies in the central business district. Perceptions of high likelihood of terrorism happening in one's own city, yet low preparedness present a challenge for risk communication and emergency management strategies. The diversity of possible terrorist targets, and the simple plans that can moderate the effects of a disaster may need to be emphasized in future anti‐terrorism initiatives.     

On the Complex Quantification of Risk: Systems‐Based Perspective on Terrorism

This article highlights the complexity of the quantification of the multidimensional risk function, develops five systems‐based premises on quantifying the risk of terrorism to a threatened system, and advocates the quantification of vulnerability and resilience through the states of the system. The five premises are: (i) There exists interdependence between a specific threat to a system by terrorist networks and the states of the targeted system, as represented through the system's vulnerability, resilience, and criticality‐impact. (ii) A specific threat, its probability, its timing, the states of the targeted system, and the probability of consequences can be interdependent. (iii) The two questions in the risk assessment process: “What is the likelihood?” and “What are the consequences?” can be interdependent. (iv) Risk management policy options can reduce both the likelihood of a threat to a targeted system and the associated likelihood of consequences by changing the states (including both vulnerability and resilience) of the system. (v) The quantification of risk to a vulnerable system from a specific threat must be built on a systemic and repeatable modeling process, by recognizing that the states of the system constitute an essential step to construct quantitative metrics of the consequences based on intelligence gathering, expert evidence, and other qualitative information. The fact that the states of all systems are functions of time (among other variables) makes the time frame pivotal in each component of the process of risk assessment, management, and communication. Thus, risk to a system, caused by an initiating event (e.g., a threat) is a multidimensional function of the specific threat, its probability and time frame, the states of the system (representing vulnerability and resilience), and the probabilistic multidimensional consequences.     

Recollection Bias and Its Underpinnings: Lessons from Terrorism Risk Assessments

Recollection bias is the phenomenon whereby people who observe a highly unexpected event hold current risk beliefs about a similar event that are no higher than their recollection of their prior beliefs. This article replicates and extends the authors’ previous study of recollection bias in relation to individuals’ perceptions of the risks of terrorism attacks. Over 60% of respondents in a national U.S. sample of over 900 adults believe that the current risk of a future terrorist attack by either an airplane or in a public setting is no higher than they recall having believed, respectively, before the 9/11 attack and before the Boston Marathon bombing. By contrast, a rational Bayesian model would update to a higher currently assessed risk of these previously uncontemplated events. Recollection bias is a persistent trait: individuals who exhibited this bias for the 9/11 attack exhibited it for the Boston Marathon bombing. Only one‐fifth of respondents are free of any type of recollection bias. Recollection bias is negatively correlated with absolute levels of risk belief. Recollection bias in relation to highly unexpected terrorist events—the belief that perceived risks did not increase after the surprise occurrence—dampens support for a variety of anti‐terrorism measures, controlling for the level of risk beliefs and demographic factors. Persistent recollection bias for both 9/11 and the Boston Marathon bombing is especially influential in diminishing support for protective policy measures, such as surveillance cameras in public places. Given that public attitudes influence policy, educating the public about risk is critical.