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1.
不完全信息下基于成本的倾销反倾销静态博弈分析   总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4  
本文通过国内外企业及国内政府三者之间的不完全信息静态博弈分析,得出存在倾销和反倾销的情况下国内政府部门如何确定反倾销税率以使国内社会福利达到最大化;同时,根据博弈分析结果,得出在反倾销问题上国内外企业及国内政府拟采取的优化策略及为我国企业及政府未来的倾销反倾销策略提供了理论依据。  相似文献   

2.
该文章运用微观经济学、博弈论等理论和方法探讨了在国内企业处于完全信息且先后决策的假设条件下,面对进口国政府的反倾销国外企业对商品出口或对外直接投资决策如何抉择问题;建立了绕过反倾销的可能引起对外直接投资的最小反倾销税率模型;得出了该反倾销锐率与国外企业在国内外生产产品的单位边际成本及进口国市场所用收入税税率有关以及进口国政府不能确定过高的反倾销税率等结论.  相似文献   

3.
本文研究供应不确定条件下多周期二人库存博弈问题,证明了均衡库存策略的存在性,并刻画了均衡策略的特征,探讨了供应不确定和产品替代率对零售商库存决策的影响。研究结果表明:在供应不确定条件下,多周期库存博弈问题存在多重Nash均衡库存策略。当需求分布函数满足特定条件时,博弈存在唯一纳什均衡解。此外,本文证明均衡订货策略是产品替代率的增函数,供应可靠性高的商家更具有优势且收益更大。数值实验说明,供应不确定会直接影响均衡订货量。商家的期望收益和均衡订货量是自己供应可靠性的增函数,是对手可靠性的减函数,是产品替代率的增函数。  相似文献   

4.
赵凯  王健 《管理科学》2018,21(11):35-49
传统静态研究中, 由并购引起的不确定性主要体现为参与并购企业掌握自身生产效率信息, 而外部企业无法辨识并购是否会影响参与企业的效率.文章在传统研究基础之上进行动态延伸, 假设市场中存在领导者和追随者企业, 在序贯决策的框架下研究企业并购动因及并购企业实际盈利.根据并购前后参与企业的市场角色不同, 文章研究比较了四种可能发生的并购类型, 并证明当并购伴随企业角色改变时, 即便存在效率损失, 并购仍是有利可图的.此外, 文章还从政府政策角度出发, 针对政府并购控制的介入时间以及审核标准选择进行了深入的理论探讨.结果证实当政府进行事前干预时, 消费者福利标准更加精确、严格;而当政府进行事后干预时, 社会福利标准的优势更为明显.  相似文献   

5.
本文对我国商业银行面临的利率风险做了简单介绍,提出信息不完全条件下商业银行利率风险管理的模型,其中使用了VaR方法进行分析,结果显示忽略信息不完全这一条件将使利率风险加大,商业银行应谨慎对待。  相似文献   

6.
将近年来博弈论中出现的一种新的研究方法--超模博弈理论应用于Bertrand寡头博弈中,对于具有一般成本函数的差异产品的Bertrand寡头博弈,当企业的策略只是选择价格水平时,比较了博弈为超模和对数超模博弈的充分条件,表明虽然一个对数超模博弈一定是拟超模的,因而较超模博弈的适用范围更广泛,但二者的充分条件之间不具备可比性,即不能由其中一个推出另外一个.同时既使该博弈既不是超模的也不是对数超模的,仍可能存在对利润函数的其它单调转换使博弈成为超模的.当边际生产成本为常数时,给出了具体的反例.当企业的策略为同时选择价格和广告水平,且企业的边际生产成本为常数时,表明在一般的假设下博弈为超模博弈,从而说明了为什么通常情况下较高的广告水平对应着较高的价格.  相似文献   

7.
供应链中供应商订单分配的不完全信息动态博弈研究   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
张旭梅  李国强  张翼 《管理学报》2006,3(5):519-523
针对制造商和供应商之间的不完全信息动态博弈问题,根据供应商提供的质量、交货期和价格等数据,建立了供应商选择过程中的不完全信息动态博弈模型和奖惩机制,通过判断供应商提供数据的真伪性,对供应商的订单分配问题进行了研究,并用算例验证了所建立模型和奖惩机制的可行性。  相似文献   

8.
内定溢出与信息共享中的“囚徒困境”   总被引:8,自引:2,他引:8  
本文考虑双寡头企业进行信息共享时的效应,双寡头进行信息共享后,每个企业的利润以及消费者剩余和社会福利都得以增加.但在信息共享中存在着"囚徒困境"问题,即每个企业都试图通过减少给予另一个企业的信息来增加自己的利润,但结果每个企业的利润都降低,消费者剩余和社会福利也随之降低.  相似文献   

9.
团队生产动态博弈   总被引:9,自引:1,他引:9  
本文建立了团队生产动态(微分 )博弈模型,用Pontryagin最大值原理和共轭点理论研究了该微分博弈的Nash均衡存在的充分必要条件。我们也讨论协调个人理性和集体理性的促进团队合作博弈的机制设置问题。  相似文献   

10.
倾销与反倾销的博弈分析   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
李凯  李世杰 《管理科学》2003,16(5):36-39
从理论角度建立一个倾销与反倾销的博弈论模型,研究了国外企业倾销与一国国内反倾销的博弈过程,通过对中国国内产业状况的实证分析,阐释了中国国内企业反倾销不力的原因,在此基础上提出我国部门、行业(企业)的应对对策,同时认为在该领域内尚有很多课题亟待进一步研究.  相似文献   

11.
We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one‐sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair that takes account of the inferences that the uninformed agent might make. We show that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty in incomplete‐information environments, and is a superset of the set of complete‐information stable outcomes. We then provide sufficient conditions for incomplete‐information stable matchings to be efficient. Lastly, we define a notion of price‐sustainable allocations and show that the set of incomplete‐information stable matchings is a subset of the set of such allocations.  相似文献   

12.
We define belief‐free equilibria in two‐player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best replies after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief‐free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief‐free equilibrium payoff. The characterization is applied to the analysis of reputations.  相似文献   

13.
An isotone pure strategy equilibrium exists in any game of incomplete information in which each player's action set is a finite sublattice of multidimensional Euclidean space, types are multidimensional and atomless, and each player's interim expected payoff function satisfies two “nonprimitive conditions” whenever others adopt isotone pure strategies: (i) single‐crossing in own action and type and (ii) quasi‐supermodularity in own action. Conditions (i), (ii) are satisfied in supermodular and log‐supermodular games given affiliated types,and in games with independent types in which each player's ex post payoff satisfies supermodularity in own action and nondecreasing differences in own action and type. This result is applied to provide the first proof of pure strategy equilibrium existence in the uniform price auction when bidders have multi‐unit demand, nonprivate values, and independent types.  相似文献   

14.
销售商费用信息不完全下的回收合约   总被引:2,自引:1,他引:2  
回收合约是一种非常流行的合约。但是,到目前为止,大多数的文献都假定合约的提出者知道供应商和销售商的费用结构。本文考虑不完全信息下的回收合约。供应商提出合约,但不知道零售商的费用结构。在这种情况下,我们研究回收合约的设计及对供应商、销售商和供应链的影响。我们的结论显示,如果合约的设计者不知道销售商的费用结构,他就不可能设计出使供应链达到合作的合约。这就说明共享销售商的费用信息是有价值的。  相似文献   

15.
We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions that are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. The set of outcomes that can arise in equilibrium for some information structure is equal to the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with quadratic payoffs and normally distributed uncertainty in terms of restrictions on the first and second moments of the equilibrium action–state distribution. We derive exact bounds on how prior knowledge about the private information refines the set of equilibrium predictions. We consider information sharing among firms under demand uncertainty and find new optimal information policies via the Bayes correlated equilibria. We also reverse the perspective and investigate the identification problem under concerns for robustness to private information. The presence of private information leads to set rather than point identification of the structural parameters of the game.  相似文献   

16.
We show in an environment of incomplete information that monotonicity and the Pareto property applied only when there is common knowledge of Pareto dominance imply (i) there must exist a common prior over the smallest common knowledge event, and (ii) aggregation must be ex ante and ex post utilitarian with respect to that common prior and individual von Neumann–Morgenstern utility indices.  相似文献   

17.
This paper analyzes a class of games of incomplete information where each agent has private information about her own type, and the types are drawn from an atomless joint probability distribution. The main result establishes existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) under a condition we call the single crossing condition (SCC), roughly described as follows: whenever each opponent uses a nondecreasing strategy (in the sense that higher types choose higher actions), a player's best response strategy is also nondecreasing. When the SCC holds, a PSNE exists in every finite‐action game. Further, for games with continuous payoffs and a continuum of actions, there exists a sequence of PSNE to finite‐action games that converges to a PSNE of the continuum‐action game. These convergence and existence results also extend to some classes of games with discontinuous payoffs, such as first‐price auctions, where bidders may be heterogeneous and reserve prices are permitted. Finally, the paper characterizes the SCC based on properties of utility functions and probability distributions over types. Applications include first‐price, multi‐unit, and all‐pay auctions; pricing games with incomplete information about costs; and noisy signaling games.  相似文献   

18.
具有后发优势的不完全信息专利竞赛   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
先发优势和后发优势会同时存在于专利竞赛中,它们的相对大小将决定两对称企业在专利研发投资时机选择博弈中所产生的均衡类型并影响企业的研发投资决策。考虑不完全信息和技术不确定性,引入信息披露及其滞后效应使得追随者和领导者分别具有后发优势和先发优势,建立实物期权投资决策模型。通过对各最优投资临界信念的计算和分析,结论表明,一定参数条件下,占先博弈和消耗战均有可能发生。信息披露滞后时间越长、技术不确定性程度越低、随机信号到达速度越快、信号质量越高,领导者先发优势就越明显,越易产生占先博弈;反之,追随者后发优势就越明显,越有可能发生消耗战。  相似文献   

19.
In retailing operations, retailers face the challenge of incomplete demand information. We develop a new concept named K‐approximate convexity, which is shown to be a generalization of K‐convexity, to address this challenge. This idea is applied to obtain a base‐stock list‐price policy for the joint inventory and pricing control problem with incomplete demand information and even non‐concave revenue function. A worst‐case performance bound of the policy is established. In a numerical study where demand is driven from real sales data, we find that the average gap between the profits of our proposed policy and the optimal policy is 0.27%, and the maximum gap is 4.6%.  相似文献   

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