HOW GROUPS REACH AGREEMENT IN RISKY CHOICES: AN EXPERIMENT

This paper studies how groups resolve disagreement in lottery choices. In an experiment, subjects submit individual proposals, exchange chat messages, and must reach unanimity. Overall, group choices are more coherent and closer to risk neutrality than individuals'. The proposal of the minority prevails in about one instance out of five. About one third of the groups do not reach immediate agreement after communication. In these groups, extrovert subjects are more likely to lead the group outcome than confused or conscientious subjects. The amount, equality, and timing of chat messages help us to predict which choice prevails in the group. (JEL C92, D81)     

PORTFOLIO CHOICE AND RISK ATTITUDES: AN EXPERIMENT

Using financial incentives, we study how portfolio choice (how much to invest in a risky asset) depends on three well-known behavioral phenomena: ambiguity aversion, the illusion of control, and myopic loss aversion. We find evidence that these phenomena are present and test how the level of investment is affected by these motivations; at the same time, we investigate whether participants are willing to explicitly pay a small sum of money to indulge preferences for less ambiguity, more control, or more frequent feedback/opportunities to choose the investment level. First, the observed preference for "control" did not affect investment behavior and in fact disappeared when participants were asked to actually pay to gain more control. Second, while people were indeed willing to pay for less ambiguity, the level of ambiguity did not influence investment levels. Finally, participants were willing to pay to have more frequent feedback opportunities to change their portfolio, even though prior research has shown that people invest less in risky assets (and earn less) in this case . ( JEL B49, C91, D81, G11, G19)     

DYNAMIC TREATMENT EFFECTS OF TEACHER'S AIDES IN AN EXPERIMENT WITH MULTIPLE RANDOMIZATIONS

Using data from a large‐scale two‐stage experiment wherein students and teachers were randomized at both kindergarten entry and first grade to be sorted into classes either with or without full‐time teacher's aides, I estimate an econometric model that is uniquely suited to take advantage of this design to determine their effect on academic achievement. The identification strategy produces fully nonparametric dynamic average treatment effects for every treatment path. I find that the use of full‐time teacher's aides increases student achievement, but the benefits appear to accrue mostly to those of higher socioeconomic status and to White students. A cost‐benefit analysis shows that full‐time teacher's aides may be a competitive alternative to class size reductions in terms of net social benefits. (JEL I21, I28)     

PHYSICIAN RESPONSE TO A MAILED SURVEY AN EXPERIMENT IN TIMING OF PAYMENT

This article reports the results of an experiment in obtainingphysician response to a mailed questionnaire. Each physicianwas eligible for a payment of $20. A randomly selected halfreceived the payment with their initial questionnaire and coverletter; half were told they would receive their payment afterthey completed and returned the questionnaire. The same mailand telephone followup procedures were used for both groups.Overall, prepayment had significant positive effects on responserates. This paper examines these effects in terms of responserates for various specialties, field efficiencies, cost, andrepresentativeness of the sample.     

"SECRET BALLOTS" AND SELF-REPORTS IN AN EXIT-POLL EXPERIMENT

A controlled exit-poll experiment on Election Day (November3, 1992) shows that refusals to answer questions and other evasiveforms of responding were significantly lower when respondentswere given a self-administered "secret-ballot" questionnairethan when they were interviewed face-to-face. While there weresome suggestive interactions of this mode-of-data collectioneffect with age and sex, and with the partisan atmosphere ofthe precinct in which the interviews were conducted, they wereborderline in significance, inconsistent in pattern, or difficuitto interpret. More important, comparisons with official electionreturns (the truth) indicated that the secret-ballot techniquewas more accurate than were face-to-face interviews in estimatingthe final outcome on the most socially sensitive of three self-reportedvotes: a vote for or against a tax levy for elderly services.Using a genuine secret ballot in the tradition of the olderGallup preelection polls can thus increase the validity of self-reportsin exit polls today.     

FOSTERING THE BEST EXECUTION REGIME: AN EXPERIMENT ABOUT PECUNIARY SANCTIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN FIDUCIARY MONEY MANAGEMENT

Asset management often involves a conflict of interests between investors and fund managers. A main goal of financial regulators is to identify and mitigate this conflict. This article focuses on measures that may foster protection of investors' interests. In an experiment capturing the essential elements of asset management, we find that managers' accountability does not prevent their opportunistic behavior if not backed by a threat of punishment. Further, investors inefficiently sanction managers if not completely aware of managers' choices. To effectively protect investors in financial intermediations, financial regulators should ensure both managers' accountability and a credible sanctioning system.     

PERCEIVED IMPACT OF DEFAMATION: AN EXPERIMENT ON THIRD-PERSON EFFECTS

This paper explores the intersection of libel law and communicationtheory that occurs when libel juries assess the effect of adefamatory communication on others. The third-person hypothesissuggests that people often assume others will be more affectedby potentially persuasive communications than they are themselves.An experiment was conducted in which students were exposed toa variety of defamatory newspaper articles. The results confirmedseveral predictions. First, readers estimated that others wouldbe more affected by defamatory messages than the readers themselveswould be. Second, this effect was magnified as the "others"became progressively more distant from these readers. Third,when the defamation was attributed to a negatively biased sourcethe effect was also accentuated: readers themselves discountedthe message, while assuming others would be even more influenced.It is suggested that courtroom assessments of the effects ofdefamatory communications on others may be influenced by suchthird-person perceptions.     

THE IMPACT OF ENTITLEMENTS AND EQUITY ON COOPERATIVE BARGAINING: AN EXPERIMENT

In some bargaining situations—for example, collaborative policy making and compulsory arbitration—a third party imposes a backstop position that differs from the status quo. Axiomatic models of cooperative bargaining presume that the status quo in such cases will have no effect on the negotiated outcome, especially if it is Pareto inferior to the backstop. Recent literatures on equity and entitlement, however, suggest that the status quo may establish a focal point that acts as an “anchor” in current negotiations, affecting any ultimate agreement. In a two‐party, two‐attribute experiment, in which subjects jointly select from up to 200 options, we find evidence (1) that the status quo matters, perhaps because of “entitlement effects” and (2) that parties prefer egalitarian outcomes to the Nash bargain. (JEL C92, D74, H44, Q58)     

LOST IN THE MAIL: A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON CRIME

Stealing, shirking, and opportunistic behavior in general can create barriers to the development of markets. The costs associated with such behavior are shared by both firms and individuals and can be large enough to even prevent the initiation of trade. Measurement of these costs is difficult because information is not available for transactions that fail to occur. We use a field experiment to identify opportunistic crime in a task that is important and relevant for trade: the delivery of mail. We subtly manipulate the content and information available in mail sent to households across neighborhoods that vary by income, and detected high levels of shirking and stealing. Eighteen percent of the mail never arrived at its destination, and significantly more was lost if there was even a slight hint of something additional inside the envelope. Our results demonstrate the importance of transaction costs created by crime and that not all populations are equally affected. Middle‐income neighborhoods suffer the most. (JEL C93, K42, H41, L87, O21)     

GAME THEORY FOR PLAYING GAMES: SOPHISTICATION IN A NEGATIVE-EXTERNALITY EXPERIMENT

We explore the extent to which the lack of Nash payoff maximization in experimental games is attributable to the "sophistication" of participants (i.e., their understanding of strategic decision making and profit-maximizing decisions). To this end, we compare the behaviors of sophisticated participants (i.e., those who have been exposed to the concepts of game theory) against those of a more standard subject pool in a moral hazard environment. Results suggest that sophisticated subjects are significantly more likely to adopt strategies predicted by standard theory and arrive at a Nash equilibrium. ( JEL C72, C91, C92, D63, D64)     

COLLUSION IN PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS: AN EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION

Experimental methods are used to examine the existence and detectability of collusion in environments that exhibit critical parallels to procurement auctions. We find that given the opportunity sellers often raise prices considerably. Moreover, noncollusive Nash equilibrium predictions are insufficient to dismiss "suspicious" behavior as innocuous: in an environment where identical prices are predicted in a noncollusive Nash equilibrium, common prices are observed only when sellers communicate. In a second environment designed to parallel construction procurement contracting, market rotations are observed both with and without collusion, but collusion can often be detected from the pattern of losing bids.     

INNOCENT VIOLENCE: SOCIAL EXCLUSION,IDENTITY, AND THE PRESS IN AN AFRICAN DEMOCRACY

The violent attacks on African immigrants and refugees in marginal settlements surrounding South Africa's largest cities in May 2008 occasioned a rush of mostly well-intentioned attempts by journalists, public intellectuals, and government officials to discover the causes and find the cures for the outbreak. This article interrogates the glosses of “xenophobia” and “social deprivation” that were all too quickly applied to explain the attacks in public representations of this sorry episode in South Africa's post-apartheid history. The account of the focal events is based on a thorough sifting of press reports; victims', perpetrators', and police testimonies; government and civil society spokespersons' interventions; and field research. Rather than providing a monovocal, hierarchical argument for one or another analysis emerging from the reportage, this article juxtaposes complex and conflicting local accounts, justifications, forces, and circumstances to provide an intriguing if ultimately at this early stage irresolvable image of these tragic events. The implications for South African social identities, institutions, and democratic order, however, are at the end all too clearly illuminated.     

IRELAND: DISTANCE EDUCATION IN AN EXPANDING DEMOCRACY

The recent and explosive development of the Irish economy has earned the Republic the popular accolade, CelticTiger . Enticed by government subsidies and tax incentives, foreign investors favour location in Ireland in order to penetrate the Single European Market (SEM). Commensurate with the demands of foreign investors for a fully developed infrastructure, the deregularization of the Irish Telecoms market (1998) has afforded new opportunities for the transformation of education and training in Ireland. This paper explores the democratizing potential of distance education within the Irish Republic. It focuses on awareness programmes and initiatives for the promotion of information technology (IT) access, and considers particular challenges in ensuring equal access to the benefits of new technologies, for all.     

COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN A PUBLIC GOODS GAME: A FIELD EXPERIMENT

We explore the effects of competitive and cooperative motivations on contributions in a field experiment. A total of 10,000 potential political donors received solicitations referencing past contribution behavior of members of the competing party (competition treatment), the same party (cooperative treatment), or no past contribution information (control). We first theoretically analyze the effect of these treatments on the contribution behavior of agents with different social preferences in a modified intergroup public good (IPG) game. Then, we report the empirical results: Contribution rates in the competitive, cooperative, and control treatments were 1.45%, 1.08%, and 0.78%, respectively. With the exception of one large contribution, the distribution of contributions in the competitive treatment first order stochastically dominates that of the cooperative treatment. Qualitatively, it appears that the cooperative treatment induced more contributions around the common monetary reference point, while the competitive treatment led to more contributions at twice this amount. These results suggest that eliciting competitive rather than cooperative motivations can lead to higher contributions in IPG settings. (JEL D72, H41, C93)     

IMMIGRANTS IN THE NEW SOUTH: AN INTRODUCTION

This study analyzes (1) the effects of affluence perception on anomia and (2) the importance of affluence perception as an intervening variable interpreting the effects of race, education, and income on anomia. The analysis uses survey data from a probability sample of adults in Hamilton County (Cincinnati), Ohio. Affluence perception is found to be positively related to anomia and to account for part of the effects of race, education, and income on anomia. The three demographic variables, however, have stronger independent effects on anomia that cannot be accounted for by perception of affluence.     

CHARITIES, NO; LOTTERIES, NO; CASH, YES: MAIN EFFECTS AND INTERACTIONS IN A CANADIAN INCENTIVES EXPERIMENT

The effects on response rates to mail surveys of prepaymentcash incentives, charitable donations, and the chance to wina lottery prize are examined in a true experimental design.A survey on environmental issues was conducted during the fallof 1994 among 3,088 households drawn from the Grand River watershedregion of southwestern Ontario, Canada. The 20-cell incentivesexperiment crossed three levels of prepaid monetary cash incentive($2, $5, and $10) with a control group (no cash incentive),plus the offer to make a charitable donation ranging from $2to $10 on behalf of the respondent, or participation in a lotteryfor prizes of $200. The overall response rate to the survey,with three follow-ups, was 70.7 percent with the effects ofthe prepaid cash rewards demonstrated, but not those for thelottery or charitable donations. Logistic regression analysisof response rate supports a main effects model for cash incentivesbut does not support either of two alternative models for maineffects of the lottery and charitable donations or interactions.Further analysis demonstrates a pattern of earlier responseas a result of prepaid incentives. The findings are discussedin terms of their cost-benefit implications and with respectto conceptualizations of respondents' motives for completingmail questionnaires.