CAN MONETARY POLICY INFLUENCE LONG‐TERM INTEREST RATES? IT DEPENDS

Can monetary policy influence long‐term interest rates? Studies that have tackled this question using vector autoregressions (VARs) generally find that monetary policy's influence on long‐term interest rates is small and often statistically insignificant. Other studies, however, using a single‐equation approach, have found a robust relationship. Our study sheds new light on this question by estimating the effect of monetary policy shocks on long‐term interest rates in a VAR with long‐run monetary neutrality restrictions. We find that U.S. monetary policy can strongly influence long‐term interest rates, but only when the Federal Reserve has inflation‐fighting credibility and is able to firmly anchor inflationary expectations. (JEL E43, E51, E52)     

A MONETARY BUSINESS CYCLE MODEL FOR INDIA

A New Keynesian monetary business cycle model is constructed to study why monetary transmission in India is weak. Our models feature banking and financial sector frictions as well as an informal sector. The predominant channel of monetary transmission is a credit channel. Our main finding is that base money shocks have a larger and more persistent effect on output than an interest rate shock, as in the data. The presence of an informal sector hinders monetary transmission. Contrary to the consensus view, financial repression in the form of a statutory liquidity ratio and administered interest rates, does not weaken monetary transmission. (JEL E31, E32, E44, E52, E63)     

ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN BANKING,INDETERMINACY, AND MONETARY POLICY

This paper investigates economies of scale (ES) in financial intermediation as a source of equilibrium indeterminacy. Financial intermediation is embedded into a standard flexible‐price monetary model, and provides deposits (inside money) that substitute with currency to purchase consumption. The results indicate that equilibrium indeterminacy does not depend on a large degree of ES in intermediation nor a large intermediation sector, but on monetary policy and the determination of nominal interest rates. Monetary policies not targeting nominal rates allow for indeterminacy to arise for any positive degree of ES, while policies targeting nominal rates eliminate indeterminacy for all degrees of ES. (JEL C62, E44, E52)     

STOP‐GO MONETARY POLICY

We propose and estimate several discrete choice models of monetary policy decision‐making that feature time‐varying inertia. The models permit us to account for three stylized facts characterizing monetary policymaking in the United States: (1) target interest rates are gradually adjusted in small discrete movements, (2) there are some long stretches of time in which rates are repeatedly moved, and (3) there are other long stretches in which the policy rate does not change. The models are used to account for delayed monetary policy responses to the recession of 2001 and to the housing‐driven expansion of 2003–2006. (JEL E52, E58, E65)     

OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND IMPERFECT FINANCIAL MARKETS: A CASE FOR NEGATIVE NOMINAL INTEREST RATES?

This article studies optimal monetary policy in a model with credit frictions and money demand. We show that augmenting a standard New Keynesian model with money demand and financial frictions generates a mechanism that, in equilibrium, gives rise to optimal negative nominal interest rates. In addition, we find that the tighter credit markets are, the lower the optimal nominal policy interest rate and the more likely it is to be negative. Quantitatively, when credit constraints are binding, a standard calibration of the model generates an optimal nominal policy interest rate that is roughly ?4% annually. (JEL E31, E41, E43, E44, E52, E58)     

MONETARY POLICY AND ENDOWMENT RISK IN A LIMITED PARTICIPATION MODEL

A limited participation model is constructed to study the risk‐sharing role of monetary policy. A fraction of households exchange money for interest‐bearing government nominal bonds in the asset market and the government injects money through open market operations. In equilibrium, money is nonneutral and monetary policy redistributes consumption across households. Without idiosyncratic endowment risk, monetary policy becomes a perfect risk‐sharing tool, but with idiosyncratic endowment risk, it is not. The Friedman rule is not optimal in general. (JEL E4, E5)     

MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY DESIGN AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND: EVIDENCE FROM THE LAB

The global economic crisis of 2007–2008 has pushed many advanced economies into a liquidity trap. We design a laboratory experiment on the effectiveness of policy measures to avoid expectation‐driven liquidity traps. Monetary policy alone is not sufficient to avoid liquidity traps, even if it preventively cuts the interest rate when inflation falls below a threshold. However, monetary policy augmented with a fiscal switching rule succeeds in escaping liquidity trap episodes. We measure the effect of fiscal policy on expectations, and report larger‐than‐unity fiscal multipliers at the zero lower bound. Experimental results in different treatments are well explained by adaptive learning. (JEL E70, C92, D83, D84, E52, E62)     

CAPITAL CONTROLS,MONETARY POLICY,AND BALANCE SHEETS IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY

We develop a small open economy, New Keynesian model that incorporates a financial accelerator in combination with liability dollarization. Applying a Ramsey‐type analysis, we compare the welfare implications of an optimal monetary policy under flexible exchange rates and an optimal capital control policy under fixed exchange rates. In an economy without the financial accelerator, an optimal monetary policy under flexible exchange rates is superior to an optimal capital control policy under fixed exchange rates. In contrast, in an economy with the financial accelerator, an optimal capital control under fixed exchange rates yields higher welfare than an optimal monetary policy under flexible exchange rates.(JEL E44, E52, F32, F38, F41)     

FORWARD GUIDANCE AND THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY

This paper analyzes forward guidance in a nonlinear model with a zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate. Forward guidance is modeled with news shocks to the monetary policy rule, which capture innovations in expectations from central bank communication about future policy rates. Whereas most studies use quasi‐linear models that disregard the expectational effects of hitting the ZLB, we show how the effectiveness of forward guidance nonlinearly depends on the state of the economy, the speed of the recovery, the degree of uncertainty, the policy shock size, and the forward guidance horizon when households account for the ZLB. (JEL E43, E58, E61)     

THE EFFECTS OF ASSET PURCHASES AND NORMALIZATION OF U.S. MONETARY POLICY

This paper examines changes in the effects of unconventional monetary policies in the United States. To this end, we estimate a Markov-switching VAR model with absorbing regimes to capture possible structural changes. Our results detect regime changes around the beginning of 2011 and the middle of 2013. Before 2011, the U.S. large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) had relatively large impacts on the real economy and prices, but after the middle of 2013, their effects were weaker and less-persistent. In addition, after the middle of 2013, which includes the monetary policy normalization period, the asset purchase (or balance sheet) shocks had slightly weaker effects than during the early stage of the LSAPs but stronger effects than during the late stage of the LSAPs, while interest rate shocks had insignificant effects on the real economy and prices. Finally, our results suggest that the positive responses of durables and capital goods expenditures to interest rate shocks weakened the negative impacts of interest rate hikes after the middle of 2013 including the period of monetary policy normalization. (JEL C32, E21, E52)     

MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS,EXPECTATIONS, AND INFORMATION RIGIDITIES

This paper contributes to the literature by assessing expectation effects from monetary policy for G7 economies. We rely on expectation data from Consensus Economics and a panel vector autoregression framework, which accounts for international spillovers and time‐variation. We analyze whether monetary policy has changed the degree of information rigidity after the emergence of the subprime crisis and estimate effects of interest rate changes on expectations, disagreements, and forecast errors. We find strong evidence for information rigidities and identify higher forecast errors by professionals after monetary policy shocks. Our results suggest that the international transmission of monetary policy shocks introduces noisy information and partly increases disagreement among forecasters. (JEL E31, E52)     

FINANCIAL MARKET VARIABLES DO NOT PREDICT REAL ACTIVITY

The past decade has seen an extensive empirical reassessment of the information content of financial market variables sensitive to monetary policy. Particularly provocative are recent papers suggesting that some interest rates and interest rate spreads contain more information about economic activity than monetary aggregates. This paper reviews important methodological pitfalls in these studies. We then show that none of the commonly employed measures of monetary policy contain incremental information useful in forecasting real economic activity. Two conclusions are possible. Either monetary policy innovations have no significant real effects, or we (collectively) have failed in our efforts to measure monetary policy. ( JEL E52)     

DO CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS MATTER FOR MONETARY POLICY?

Central bankers and financial supervisors can have conflicting goals. While monetary policymakers work to ensure sufficient lending activities as a foundation for high and stable economic growth, supervisors may limit banks’ lending capacities in order to prevent excessive risk taking. We show that, in theory, central bankers can avoid this potential conflict by adopting an interest rate strategy that takes accounts of capital adequacy requirements. Empirical evidence suggests that while policymakers at the Federal Reserve have adjusted their interest rate to neutralizing the procyclical impact of bank capital requirements, those in Germany and Japan have not. (JEL E52, E58, G21)     

CULTURAL CONSTRAINTS ON INNOVATION‐BASED GROWTH

To what extent does the cultural composition of a society impose a constraint on its long‐run growth potential? We study this question in the context of an innovation‐based model of growth where cultural attitudes are endogenously transmitted from one generation to the next. Focusing on attitudes regarding patience, we analyze the two‐way interaction between economic growth and the intergenerational transmission of patience. Exploiting this interaction, we compare the long‐run growth performance of a culturally heterogeneous society where patience is initially underrepresented in the population with a culturally homogeneous society where all agents are perfectly patient. Our main result is that in the absence of any intrinsic preferences of patient parents to transmit their attitudes to their children, the development paths of the two societies are bound to diverge, with the culturally heterogeneous society experiencing lower growth rates. Yet, if patient parents ceteris paribus prefer their children to be patient like them, we show that the two societies can in the long run grow at the same rate.(JEL D91, E24, O30, O40, Z10)     

MONETARY POLICY REGIME SHIFTS: NEW EVIDENCE FROM TIME‐VARYING INTEREST RATE RULES

We estimate forward‐looking interest rate rules for five large Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development economies, allowing for time variation in the responses to macroeconomic conditions and in the variance of the policy rate. Conventional constant parameter reaction functions likely blur the impact of (1) model uncertainty, (2) conflicting objectives, (3) shifting preferences, and (4) nonlinearities of policymakers' choices. We find that monetary policies followed by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy are best summarized by feedback rules that allow for time variation in their parameters. Estimates point to sizeable differences in the actual conduct of monetary policies even in countries now belonging to the European Monetary Union. Moreover, our time‐varying parameter specification outperforms the conventional Taylor rule and generalized method of moment–based estimates of reaction functions in tracking the actual Fed funds rate. (JEL E52, E58, E60)     

UNION POWER,COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY

We study Ramsey policies and optimal monetary policy rules in a dynamic New Keynesian model with unionized labor markets. Collective wage bargaining and unions' monopoly power amplify inefficient employment fluctuations. The optimal monetary policy must trade off between stabilizing inflation and reducing inefficient unemployment fluctuations induced by unions' monopoly power. In this context the monetary authority uses inflation as a tax on union rents and as a mean for indirect redistribution. Results are robust to the introduction of imperfect insurance on income shocks. The optimal monetary policy rule targets unemployment alongside inflation. (JEL E0, E4, E5, E6)     

THE SWINGS OF U.S. INFLATION AND THE GIBSON PARADOX

In recent business cycles, U.S. inflation has experienced a reduction of volatility and a severe weakening in the correlation to the nominal interest rate (Gibson paradox). We examine these facts in an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with money. Our findings point at a flatter New Keynesian Phillips Curve (higher price stickiness) and a lower persistence of markup shocks as the main explanatory factors. In addition, a higher interest‐rate elasticity of money demand, an increasing role of demand‐side shocks, and a less systematic behavior of Fed's monetary policy also account for the recent patterns of U.S. inflation dynamics. (JEL E32, E47)     

LEANING AGAINST WINDY BANK LENDING

Using an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with banking, this paper first provides evidence that monetary policy reacted to bank loan growth in the United States during the Great Moderation. It then shows that the optimized simple interest‐rate rule features no response to the growth of bank credit. However, the welfare loss associated to the empirical responsiveness is small. The sources of business cycle fluctuations are crucial in determining whether a “leaning‐against‐the‐wind” policy is optimal or not. In fact, the predominant role of supply shocks in the model gives rise to a trade‐off between inflation and financial stabilization. (JEL E32, E44, E52)     

POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL

This paper tests various political business cycle theories in a New Keynesian model with a monetary and fiscal policy mix. All the policy coefficients, the target levels of inflation and the budget deficit, the firms' frequency of price setting, and the standard deviations of the structural shocks are allowed to depend on “political” regimes: a preelection versus postelection regime, a regime that depends on whether the president (or the Fed chairman) is a Democrat or a Republican, and a regime under which the president and the Fed chairman share party affiliation in preelection quarters or not. The results provide evidence that several coefficients are influenced by political variables. The best‐fitting specification, in fact, is one that allows coefficients to vary according to a regime that depends on whether the economy is in the few quarters before a presidential election or not. Monetary policy becomes considerably more inertial before elections and fiscal policy deviations from a simple rule are more common. There is some evidence that policies become more expansionary before elections, but this evidence disappears for monetary policy in the post‐1985 sample. (JEL C11, D72, E32, E52, E58, E63)