Sickness Absence,Sick Leave Pay,and Pay Schemes

Utilizing Norwegian linked register and survey data, while exploiting a discontinuity in public sick pay legislation, I show that the public sick pay compensation level causally affects male performance pay workers' sick leave days. Both male and female performance pay workers experience longer sick leaves when provided private supplementary sick pay compared with those being eligible for public sick pay only. This differential impact of the replacement rate on workers' sick leave rates reveals heterogeneous behavioural changes following public sick pay cuts, and this heterogeneity will be reinforced by the provision of employer‐provided sick pay to attractive worker groups.     

Remuneration Committees,Pay Consultants and the Determination of Executive Directors' Pay

This paper explores how Board Remuneration Committee (Remco) decisions about executive pay are influenced by pay consultants. Drawing on resource dependency theory and case study evidence from five companies, the paper illuminates the complexities of the pressures and processes confronting both Remcos and pay consultants in the determination of executive pay awards. In contrast to ‘managerial power’ arguments, it demonstrates that the Remcos are proactive in managing pay policy, conscientious in seeking to ensure that pay is appropriate and not over‐generous, and that pay consultants are independent and take their instructions entirely from the Remco. Nevertheless, Remcos' understandings of the wider pay environment, informed by the comparative data supplied by pay consultants, constructs a climate in which the Remcos come to perceive a need for periodic upward pay adjustments to ensure that executive remuneration is consistent with external benchmarks if they are to avoid recruitment and retention problems.     

Pay Referents and Satisfaction with Pay: Does Occupational Proximity Matter?

We explore whether employees compare their pay to the pay of others in a similarly prestigious occupation and, if so, whether this comparison has a negative impact on pay satisfaction. Using an experimental vignette methodology, Study 1 found that people are more inclined to compare with others from a similar or identical occupation and that comparison negatively impacts pay satisfaction. This comparison and its negative effect is particularly strong in high‐prestige occupations. Based on survey data, Study 2 also showed that the average pay of others in occupations of similar prestige is negatively correlated with employees’ pay satisfaction. This negative correlation was also stronger in higher‐prestige occupations. Our analysis highlights the importance of occupational prestige as a main factor influencing pay comparison.     

The Effects of Top Management Team Pay and Firm Internationalization on MNC Performance

We examine relationships among top management team (TMT) compensation, a firm’s degree of internationalization (DOI), and its subsequent levels of market and accounting performance. Consistent with our contingency view of information-processing theory, we find that non-CEO total pay and the use of long-term incentive pay are positively associated with subsequent performance, whereas the CEO-TMT total pay gap has negative effects on firm performance. CEO pay has no relationship with performance and TMT pay effects are much stronger in MNCs with high DOI.     

The Relative Effects of Different Frequencies of Feedback on Work Performance

Abstract

This laboratory simulation examined the relative effects of two frequencies of feedback on work performance under hourly pay and incentive pay. The study had four experimental conditions: feedback delivered after every session under hourly pay and under incentive pay, and feedback delivered after every fourth session under hourly pay and under incentive pay. Thirty-five college students were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. Each participant attended 24 thirty-minute sessions. Participants performed a simulated work task on the computer that consisted of computer-related activities such as dragging, clicking, and typing. The dependent variable was the number of correctly completed units of work. An analysis of covariance was conducted to analyze the data using pretest scores as a covariate. Participants who received feedback every session completed significantly more work units than participants who received feedback every fourth session. In addition, an interaction between feedback frequency and pay systems was found: Feedback delivered every session was more effective than feedback delivered every fourth session under the incentive pay system, but not under the hourly pay system. The results suggest that the relative effects of feedback frequency may depend upon the extent to which feedback is correlated with differential consequences for performance.     

企业薪酬管理公平性对员工工作态度和行为的影响

作者对广东省七家饭店的员工及他们的主管进行了前后两次问卷调查,通过纵断数据分析,探讨员工的薪酬公平感和满意感与他们的情感性归属感、工作积极性和工作绩效之间的因果关系。数据分析结果表明,企业薪酬管理公平性是影响员工薪酬满意感的重要因素,员工的薪酬公平感和满意感会影响他们的情感性归属感,薪酬管理信息公平性会影响员工的工作积极性和工作绩效,员工的薪酬满意感与他们的工作积极性和工作绩效存在双向因果关系。     

The importance of employee participation in determining pay system effectiveness

Managing pay systems is one of the most controversial and hotly debated areas of human resource management in which contingency theory approaches have dominated over the past few decades. The paper exposes the inadequacies of contingency approaches to pay system design and implementation and assesses the implications of more recent 'best practice' approaches, debating the role of pay within the HR bundle. It then reviews research evidence on the objectives and outcomes of different forms of variable pay, with close attention devoted to the role of employee participation in achieving pay system effectiveness. The significance of employee perceptions of distributive, procedural and interactional justice is explored as a means of explaining why employee participation in pay system management appears to be such a critical success factor. The paper concludes by arguing that we need to move away from a fixation with 'best practice' to a focus on 'best process' as a lens through which to investigate the design, implementation and management of pay systems.     

The Economics of Equal Value

Equal pay for work of equal value has come to be seen as the policy most likely to reduce the gender earnings gap. This paper explores the theoretical basis for widespread undervaluation of women's work and argues that institutionalised discrimination in the labour market also affects internal pay and grading structures. Recent recognition of the scope for discretion in pay determination undermines the “market forces” argument against equal value. The current wage structure reflects an outdated model of social and family organisation. Much poverty is now the result of women seeking economic independence in a market which rewards them as subordinate family members. However, the main obstacles to equal value lie in labour market institutions. The increasing fragmentation of pay bargaining and moves to performance-related pay will reduce rather than promote the relationship between pay and job content.     

The Impact of Investor Horizon on Say‐on‐Pay Voting

Shareholder investment horizons have a significant impact on say‐on‐pay voting patterns. Short‐term investors are more likely to avoid expressing opinion on executive pay proposals by casting an abstaining vote. They vote against board proposals on pay only in cases where the CEO already receives excessive pay levels. In contrast, long‐term investors typically cast favourable votes. According to our findings, this is due to effective monitoring rather than collusion with the management. Overall, investor heterogeneity in terms of investment horizons helps explain say‐on‐pay voting, in particular the low levels of say‐on‐pay dissent, which have recently raised questions over the efficiency of this corporate governance mechanism .     

绩效工资:一把双刃剑

绩效工资目前已成为我国薪酬支付的主流方式之一,但有关绩效工资对员工态度和行为的影响的研究还很少.本文以574名知识员工为研究对象,实证分析了绩效工资对知识员工分配公平感、帮助行为和自我发展的影响,研究同时考察个体层面的价值认同和组织层面的程序公正氛围,对绩效工资与员工态度和行为关系的调节作用.数据分析采用多层次线性模型,分析结果显示,绩效工资在个体层面有效提高了员工分配公平感和自我发展行为,而在组织层面,绩效工资降低了组织中员工分配公平感和帮助行为的整体水平.在高价值认同和高程序公正氛围中,绩效工资对员工态度和行为有更多的积极作用;在低程序公正氛围中,绩效工资则呈现一定的消极作用.本文最后讨论了研究的理论和实践意义,以及研究的局限.     

New perspectives on the governance of executive compensation: an examination of the role and effect of compensation consultants

We develop a multi-theoretic approach, drawing on economic, institutional, managerial power and social comparison literatures to explain the role of the external compensation consultant in the top management pay setting institutional field. Taking advantage of recent disclosure requirements in the UK, we collect data on compensation consultant use in 232 large companies. We show that consultants are a prevalent part of the CEO pay setting scene, and document evidence of all advisor use. Our econometric results show that consultant use is associated with firm size and the equity pay mix. We also show that CEO pay is positively associated with peer firms that share consultants, with higher board and consultant interlocks, and some evidence that where firms supply other business services to the firm, CEO pay is greater.     

产权性质、管理层权力与薪酬差距激励效应——基于政府补助的中介作用

 薪酬差距激励效应一直是理论研究和实证研究的热点。锦标赛理论和行为理论忽略了管理层权力的影响，因而对薪酬差距激励效应的解释能力有限。        将管理层权力引入研究框架，以政府补助为中介变量，检验管理层权力通过政府补助作用于薪酬差距的具体过程和经济后果，以及公司内外部机制的治理作用。特别地，考虑中国特殊的制度环境，国有企业改革导致管理层权力不断提升和膨胀，基于产权性质的视角展开对比研究。以2010年至2014年沪深A股上市公司7 999个观测值为样本，运用SAS 9.2和多元回归方法进行实证研究。        研究结果表明，在管理层权力的作用下，政府补助加剧高管与普通员工之间的薪酬差距，与民营企业相比，国有企业获得的政府补助更能加大薪酬差距；进一步地，将薪酬差距分解为管理层从政府补助中攫取的权力性薪酬差距和剔除政府补助影响后的薪酬差距后发现，权力性薪酬差距起负向激励效应，降低企业未来绩效，并且在国有企业中权力性薪酬差距的负向激励效应更强；剔除政府补助影响后的薪酬差距能够起到正面激励效应，提高企业未来绩效，并且该效应不因产权性质的不同而改变。        深入研究还发现，以董事会和政府干预为代表的内外部机制能够起到有效的治理作用，董事会规模越小、独立董事比例越高、董事会会议次数越多、政府干预程度越高，权力性薪酬差距的负向激励效应越弱。        研究结论不仅为薪酬差距激励效应的研究提供理论上的补充，也为上市公司制定更优的薪酬契约和完善的治理机制提供理论依据和指导。     

The Snowballing Penalty Effect: Multiple Disadvantage and Pay

This paper makes the case that the current single‐axis approach to the diagnosis and remedy of pay discrimination is inadequate in the case of multiple disadvantage. While a good deal is known about pay gaps, particularly those affecting women, less is known about those affecting people in other disadvantaged groups and those in more than one such group. This analysis of multiple years of pay data, n = 513,000, from a large UK‐based company shows that people with more than one disadvantaged identity suffer a significantly greater pay penalty than those with a single disadvantage. The data also suggest that penalties associated with multiple disadvantage exponentially increase. In other words, disadvantages seem to interact to the detriment of people at ‘intersections’. The paper considers the implications for policies aimed at reducing pay inequalities. These currently take a single‐axis approach and may be misdirected.     

Work Productivity as a Function of the Percentage of Monetary Incentives to Base Pay

In many individual monetary incentive systems workers receive an hourly base pay and can earn incentives when productivity exceeds a specified standard. The total amount that can be earned in incentives is often expressed as a percentage of base pay. This study examined the effects of different percentages of incentive pay to base pay on work productivity. Seventy-five college students were randomly assigned to one of five incentivebase pay conditions: 0% (no incentives), l0%, 30%. 60% or 100%. Subjects participated in 15 forty-five minute sessions during which they assem: bled parts made from bolts, nuts and washers. Subjects received a base pay amount for assembling a minimum of 50 quality parts per session and a per piece incentive for parts over 50. If subjects assernbled 120 quality parts, the production maximum, the total amount they could earn in incentives equaled 0%, l0%, 30%, 60% or 100% of their base pay. Results indicated that the productivity of subjects in the l0%, 30%, 60% and 100% groups was significantly greater than that of subjects in the 0% incentive group; however, the productivity of subjects in the l0%, 30%, 60% and 100% incentive groups did not differ.     

A Simple Model of Severance Pay Determination: The Case of Individual Dismissals in Spain

In this article we model the determinants of severance pay for individual dismissals in Spain, following an idea proposed by Jimeno and Toharia (Economistas 55: 243–255, 1993). We point out the importance of severance pay settled before judgment, since the legal framework creates a bargaining space to determine the amount paid by firms in cases of individual dismissal. The model is a simple pre‐trial bargaining game between the firm and the worker. It predicts a higher settled severance pay for dismissals on economic grounds than on disciplinary ones, which could explain the perceptions held about the wide use of disciplinary dismissals in Spain. In addition, this approach could be useful in designing labour market reforms aimed at changing dismissal costs, because it allows us to determine the key variables affecting settled severance pay. Our simple model predicts that the key variables for Spain are the severance pay for unfair dismissal and the probability of unfair dismissal.     

Perceptions of facial dominance,trustworthiness and attractiveness predict managerial pay awards in experimental tasks

Positive associations between physical attractiveness and employee reward are well-documented within the organisational literature. Although the impact of facial cues to trustworthiness and dominance on a number of social outcomes has been established outside of the workplace, the extent to which they, in addition to attractiveness, affect pay at different managerial levels is yet to be investigated. This paper presents research into this issue using a face payment task for shop floor managers (Retail Managers) and senior managers (Heads of Retail Operations). Evaluations indicated that all three facial cues were positively associated with awarded pay at both managerial levels. Moreover, attractiveness had a significantly stronger link with shop-floor managers' than senior managers' pay, whereas perceived trustworthiness and perceived dominance had significantly stronger links with pay for senior managers than shop-floor managers. It further emerged that women were paid more in this experimental task where pay was awarded solely based on facial features and that the facial features were more predictive of women's than men's pay. Awareness of the role of physical cues in pay awards can be considered by organisations to reduce biases in remuneration.     

Do Compensation Consultants Drive Up CEO Pay? Evidence from UK Public Firms

Do compensation consultants drive up CEO pay for the benefit of managers, or do they design pay packages to benefit firm owners? Using a large sample of UK firms from the FTSE All‐Share Index over the 2003–2011 period, we show a positive correlation between the presence of compensation consultants and CEO pay. Importantly, isolating this effect is somewhat dependent on the endogenous selection of consultants and the statistical modelling strategy deployed. We find evidence that compensation consultants improve CEO compensation design when their expertise is of greater importance (e.g. during the post‐financial crisis period, or for firms that have particularly weak compensation policies). In addition, our findings show that compensation consultants increase CEO pay–performance sensitivity. The balance of evidence supports optimal contracting theory more than managerial power theory, but the authors caution the limits to this verification. We are careful to note that the more compelling evidence for the positive effect of pay consultants on CEOs is based on advanced methods (such as propensity score matching and difference‐in‐differences), and that more standard approaches (such as OLS and fixed effects) are unlikely to reveal the same level of causality of consultants on CEO pay.     

Breach Penalties in Labour Contracts: Advance Notice and Severance Pay

This paper analyses the determining factors of advance notice and severance pay provisions that appear in collective bargaining agreements. The theoretical model constructed is a simple bargaining model in which advance notice and severance pay play the role of breach penalties that the firm must pay for breaking the employment relationship. The hypotheses are tested on data gathered from collective bargaining agreements from different industries that were signed between 1970 and 1989.     

Promotion,Turnover, and Compensation in the Executive Labor Market

This paper develops a generalized Roy model with human capital accumulation, moral hazard, and career concerns. We identify and estimate the model with a large panel that matches data on publicly listed firms to information on their executives. The structural estimates obtained are used to decompose the firm‐size pay gap. We find that although total compensation and incentive pay increase with firm size, certainty‐equivalent pay decreases with firm size. In larger firms, and for more highly ranked executives, weaker signal quality about effort results in higher risk premiums. This risk premium accounts for roughly 80 percent of the firm‐size gap in total compensation. Larger firms are also willing to pay more than smaller ones to attract executives. Finally, the estimated coefficients on human capital accumulation from formal education and experience gained from different firms are individually significant, but their collective effect on firm‐size pay differentials nets out.     

Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity and Gender

We test whether there are gender differences in downward rigidity, using Kahn's histogram‐location method and longitudinal registry data on all formally employed persons from the Estonian Tax and Customs Board. The results show that women resist pay cuts less than men. Also, in circumstances of increasing unemployment women's opposition to pay cuts decreases substantially, whereas men's attitudes towards pay cuts are not significantly affected by labour market conditions.