Engaging for a social licence to operate (SLO)

Organizations - in free and relatively free market economies - depend on permission to operate being granted by stakeholders. This often-tacit permission functions as a social licence and reflects an organization’s ability to engage with its stakeholders to identify and respond to their demands and expectations. Research suggests the generation of a social licence to operate (SLO) and its reputational benefits depends on the quality of organization-stakeholder relationships, but limited attention to how this occurs has been given in the public relations literature. This paper explores two organizational approaches to building SLO – pro-self and pro-social – and considers the role of public relations and engagement in achieving, maintaining, and repairing SLO.     

Social capital and public goods

Previous literature suggests positive relationships between social capital, pro-social behavior and subsequent economic development. We analyze the relationship between social networks and trust (two measures of social capital) and self-reported charitable contributions of time and/or money (pro-social behavior) using data collected from two ethnically distinct, low-income neighborhoods. We find that large social networks are positively related to charitable contributions, but that the effects of trust are less robust. We also find that social networks that are more geographically dispersed tend to be larger. Our results indicate that the social capital in a neighborhood is more important than ethnicity, ethnic diversity, or other demographic information in understanding public goods contributions.     

Hochtechnologische Unternehmen im Spiegel des „Varieties-of-Capitalism“-Ansatzes

What role do national institutions of labor regulation as well as work and employment systems at the company level play for the development of “new economy” industries? The article is based on eleven company case studies in the Swedish, Polish and German video game industry as well as on an analysis of industry-related expert interviews and data. Power relations between hardware, publishing and development companies play a significant role in the industry. Independent development firms are the weakest link in the value chain; they have to carry the greatest risks. The results show that the lack of a financial system for the high risky software development is a decisive factor for the low international competitiveness of the industry in all three countries. They demonstrate as well that, especially in the field of labor regulation, the “Varieties of Capitalism”-approach underestimates the divergence of industries in national economies and a leeway for flexibility in institutional systems. For instance, employment flexibility of video game development firms is very high. The comparison of the “coordinated market economies” of Germany and Sweden reveals differences regarding the integration of the industry into nation-specific institutional systems, such as the establishment of adequate vocational education and interest representation by unions.     

Demonstration of power: Experimental results on bilateral bargaining

We test the empirical effectiveness of two theoretical proposals to equilibrate bargaining power in bilateral bargaining. Our experimental design is based on the two-player versions of the multibidding game (Pérez-Castrillo & Wettstein, 2001) and the bid-and-propose game (Navarro & Perea, 2005). Both models build on the ultimatum game and balance parties’ bargaining power by auctioning the role of the proposer in the first stage. We find that proposers learn how to send an acceptable proposal by trial and error, guided by responders’ rejections. The observed behavior stabilizes for the final experimental rounds and the payoff gap between the proposer and the responder seems to close down. However, the strategies chosen by subjects are remarkably different from the theoretical ones.     

Sibling Interactions in Married and Divorced Families:

One hundred twenty-eight sibling dyads, 64 from married families, and 64 from divorced, were observed on two separate occasions while playing a structured and an unstructured game. Half of the sibling dyads within each family form were from higher socioeconomic status (SES) families and half from lower SES families. The frequency of caretaking (e.g., directing, teaching, helping), negative, and positive behaviors were coded. Results revealed that sibling interactions in divorced families are both more negative and less positive than in married families. Siblings in divorced families also engage in more caretaking behavior. Similar differences were detected between lower and higher SES families, yet differences in sibling interactions in married and divorced families were not exacerbated by socioeconomic status. Younger siblings were more likely to be the recipient of caregiving behavior and to be more positive in their interactions. However, both older and younger siblings' behavior was influenced by the game context.     

Gender differences in risk behavior and the link to household effects and individual wealth

This study examined the differences in risk behavior between men and women using a household survey that captured the risk preferences of two members in a household and recorded wealth at the individual level instead of the usual approach of representing wealth at the household level. After controlling for commonly used explanatory variables, such as gender, education, age, and wealth, household fixed effects explain about 15% of the variation in risk behavior. This highlights the magnitude of household effects in shaping one’s risk behavior. In general, females in the study area are more risk averse than males based on a risk game with real payout. The gender differences disappear when focusing on only the top land owners. However, even in those cases, females consider themselves more risk averse, supporting results from previous studies that link culture and societal norms to the gender differences in risk behavior.     

Daily Grind: A Comparison of Causality Orientations,Emotions, and Fantasy Sport Participation

In 2015, daily fantasy football entered the fantasy sports market as an offshoot of the traditional, season-long form of the game. With quicker payouts and less commitment, the new activity has drawn comparisons to other forms of illegal gambling, and the determination of whether it is a primarily a game of skill or chance has become the center of the comparison. For the most part, legal commentators and society, in general, views traditional, season-long fantasy football as an innocuous, social activity governed equally by both skill and chance. Little evidence exists, however, about participant perception of skill and chance components in daily fantasy football. The current study surveyed 535 daily and traditional-only fantasy football participants in order to understand differences and similarities in the causality orientations of participation (skill or chance). In addition, enjoyment and anxiety were tested for mediating effects on causality orientations and consumption behavior. The results suggest the differences between the activities are not extreme. However, differences were found in which causality orientations influenced enjoyment and which emotion mediated the relationship between perceived skill and consumption.     

Measuring the Quality of Bank Regulation and Supervision with an Application to Transition Economies

This study develops a methodology to evaluate the quality of the legal aspect of bank regulation and supervision (RS). We use both the Basle guidelines and the letter of banking laws to form an extensive set of criteria to evaluate banking laws. As an application, we provide measures of RS for 23 transition economies. Our measurements indicate that legal banking reforms in Poland, Hungary, and Estonia have been more ambitious than the rest of the countries in transition. Controlling for various other relevant factors, empirical evidence reveals a significant positive relationship between RS and real GDP growth in transition economies.     

SHAPING THE INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Certain types of laws and institutions shape economic behavior in market economies. In Eastern Europe these general rules and market institutions are often nonexistent, and a major problem is to create market economies while simultaneously building the supporting institutions. We describe the type of institutions inherited from Soviet-style economies and show institutional reforms and macroeconomic policies may have limited effects due to the interdependence and lack of complementary market institutions. Without a "critical mass" of market institutions, the benefits of markets are slow in realization. The advantages of reforming existing but distorted institutions over building new ones is stressed.     

Being Volunteered? The Impact of Social Participation and Pro-Social Attitudes on Volunteering

While disagreeing over the reasons why the performance of civic obligations seems to be declining, conservatives and liberals agree that people need to be reminded of their duties as citizens for this decline to be halted. But do these exhortations work? This paper tests two theories about how people become volunteers. The “normativist” perspective assumes that volunteer behavior flows from socialization into pro-social attitudes; the “social practice” perspective stresses the formative role of practical experiences and social participation. Using a panel study of high school seniors who were reinterviewed in their mid-20s and again in their early 30s, we show that volunteer work undertaken in high school has long-term benefits as does social participation more generally but that socialization into pro-social attitudes has an even stronger influence on volunteering in middle age. The implications of our study are that mandatory community service programs can boost later volunteer efforts but that socialization into appropriate citizenship attitudes is of equal, if not greater, importance.

     

Why Transition Countries May Specialize in Low-Quality Production

Politicians and economists of transition countries fear a low-quality trap for their economies. We present a model of international trade with two countries and two qualities of goods model where high-quality production exhibits economies of scale and low-quality production does not. Depending on transaction costs, the low-quality good will be produced either in the low-wage economy (i.e., the transition country) only or it will not be traded at all. Regarding the high-quality good, we discuss three potential reasons why transition countries may be trapped in the production of low quality when economies of scale in production prevail: (a) international trade policy (i.e., GATT / WTO); (b) external economies due to quality uncertainty; (c) external economies due to demand effects (big push). All reasons favor incumbents over entrants and thus lead to a low-quality trap for transition economies due to the existence of incumbents located in industrialized countries.     

Adolescent Female Offenders’ Subjective Experiences of How Peers Influence Norm-Breaking Behavior

Delinquent peers have a strong influence on adolescent delinquent behavior. However, few studies have investigated adolescents’, and in particular young females’, own perspectives of the role of peers on their delinquent behavior. The purpose of the present study was to explore how young female offenders described their delinquent behavior and more specifically the role they assign to peer relations in committing or avoiding delinquent acts. Nine female adolescents, sentenced to youth service, were interviewed, and the data was analyzed using the Consensual Qualitative Research (CQR) method. The results showed that committing crimes and taking drugs with peers were portrayed as a way for the female delinquents to socialize. Delinquent and pro-social activities with peers appear to serve similar developmental functions in the sense that it is described to fulfill the same developmental needs. The young offenders also described collectively created pressures and norms in the peer group as the main contributing factor to their norm-breaking behavior, where they described being both recipients and producers of influence in the group. Another important finding was that the female offenders showed an awareness of the importance of pro-social peers and the need to eliminate delinquent friends from their peer network in order to help them refrain from deviant behavior. Implications for prevention and intervention are discussed.     

The effect of the presence of an audience on risk-taking while gambling: the social shield

Being in a social context influences risk-taking behavior. This study aims to identify the effect of an audience’s presence on risk-taking while gambling. One hundred and thirty-two university students played a computer roulette game. They were randomly allocated to one of our three conditions: (i) either they played alone; or (ii) in the presence of the experimenter; or (iii) in the presence of the experimenter, while being videotaped. Results revealed a significant effect on risk-taking in the participants with the presence of an audience, with more risk-averse behaviors in the two types of audience conditions than in the alone condition. No differences were found between the two audience conditions. Thus, an audience may prevent risk-taking and provide a social shield.     

Market arbitrage, social choice and the core

 This paper establishes a clear connection between equilibrium theory, game theory and social choice theory by showing that, for a well defined social choice problem, a condition which is necessary and sufficient to solve this problem – limited arbitrage – is the same as the condition which is necessary and sufficient to establish the existence of an equilibrium and the core. The connection is strengthened by establishing that a market allocation, which is in the core, can always be realized as a social allocation, i.e. an allocation which is optimal according to an ordering chosen by a social choice rule. Limited arbitrage characterizes those economies without Condorcet triples, and those for which Arrow’s paradox can be resolved on choices of large utility values. Received: 30 December 1994/Accepted: 12 August 1996     

Privatization and Foreign investments: The Case of Serbia and Montenegro

The paper analyzes the privatization process with the participation of foreign investments in countries in transition. Privatization is a necessity in transition countries as a prerequisite of the move to a market economy. Foreign investments are of great importance for the economies of the transition countries, not only to inject necessary capital but also to provide access to new technologies, new markets, and organizational and marketing expertise. For the successful initiation and implementation of these processes, some basic requirements are to be met; namely, to assure more adequate protection of property rights and upgrade legislation related to privatization and foreign investments.     

Cognitive dissonance, pessimism, and behavioral spillover effects

A two-stage experiment was designed to examine spillover effects of a type of optimism/pessimism. We first exploit cognitive dissonance to induce optimism/pessimism by random assignment of high/low piece rates for performing a task. Subjects receiving the low piece rate are significantly more pessimistic with respect to performance. In Stage 2 individuals participate in an ultimatum game. Pessimistic subjects have significantly lower minimum acceptable offers, though pessimism was randomly generated in an unrelated environment. These results reveal behaviorally and economically important spillover effects - for example, pessimism regarding one’s initial conditions (e.g., living in poverty) may have spillover effects on one’s future labor market outcomes.     

What’s in a frame? Goal framing,trust and reciprocity

Economists often rely on the Berg et al. (1995) trust game, or variants thereof, to identify levels of trust and reciprocity, which are fundamental to discussions of social capital. But to what extent is behavior in this game sensitive to the way the instructions are framed? We use the Berg et al. trust game played for ten rounds with random re-matching to study this. We implement a number of variations in the way the game is presented to subjects. We show that levels of trust, reciprocity and returns to trust are significantly higher under “goal framing”, which highlights the conflict inherent in the game, between self-interest and maximizing social surplus. Furthermore, with such framing, trust measured via the experimental game exhibits significant positive correlation with trust measured via the Social Values Orientation questionnaire.     

Touching Behavior in Sport: Functional Components, Analysis of Sex Differences, and Ethological Considerations

Little research exists regarding sex differences in touching behavior in sport or recreational settings. This study investigates sex differences in amounts, types, and factors influencing same-sex touching in a sport context. Subjects were 119 members of four men's college varsity baseball teams and 52 members of three women's college varsity softball teams. All touches performed on-field between team members were recorded and classified using an ethogram designed for this study. As hypothesized, statistically significant differences were found in the following areas: females performed more touching behaviors than males, almost half of the behavior types observed were performed more frequently by one sex than the other, males performed touching behaviors more frequently at away than home games, females performed touching behaviors more frequently at home than away games, and females performed more touching behaviors than males after negative game events. The findings and implications are discussed in relation to the touching behavior literature, ethology, and comparative psychology.     

Personality preferences in laboratory economics experiments

Student volunteers at the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) participated in one of the following one-shot games: a dictator game, an ultimatum game, a trust game, or a prisoner's dilemma game. We find limited support for the importance of personality type for explaining subjects’ decisions. With controls for personality preferences, we find little evidence of behavioral differences between males and females. Furthermore, we conclude that seniority breeds feelings of entitlement—seniors at USNA generally exhibited the least cooperative or other-regarding behavior.     

Intentions and ethical behavior in trust games

This paper explores if knowledge of one's partner's intention affects cooperative behavior. Results of a trust game experiment show that Player 1's elicited intentions are consistent over an imperfect information treatment, when Player 2 is not aware of her partner's intention, and a perfect information treatment, when she knows it. Evidence highlights that people's intentions on one side of the games shape their beliefs as to how their partner wants them to act when the roles are reversed. Moreover, in the perfect information treatment, participants act in a manner consistent with their own intentions, suggesting that ethical considerations permeate behavior.