STACKELBERG, COURNOT AND COLLUSIVE MONOPOLY: PERFORMANCE AND WELFARE COMPARISONS

This article compares and evaluates performance and welfare in three classical oligopoly models: Stackelberg leader, Cournot, and collusive monopoly. Hahn's stability conditions render an unambiguous ranking of market price; the monopoly price is highest and the Stackelberg price is lowest. Welfare comparisons are less clear-cut due to additional effects coming from reallocation of outputs among sellers. Conditions under which these reallocation effects will enhance or offset the unambiguous price effects on welfare are discussed and examples are given. Possible implications for antitrust policy, regarding constraints on market share of large producers in noncompetitive markets, are examined.     

INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND MONOPOLY POWER IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Predictions of various models of public sector supply rely on the assumption of bureau monopoly power. This assumption is tested first by measuring industrial structure of the federal public sector using the concentration ratio and Herfindahl index, and second by examining the relationship between the resulting estimates and bureau monopoly power. The findings indicate that monopoly structure of the federal bureaucracy is more limited than is generally assumed. Interpretations on the basis of traditional industrial organization theory and contestable market theory suggest that bureau monopoly power is questionable and may not be the source of observed inefficiencies in bureau supply.     

WELFARE AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONALIZED PRODUCTION

I incorporate internationalized production, whereby firms hire domestic and foreign production factors, into the model of Corsetti and Pesenti (2001). In contrast to their conclusion, I find that an expansionary monetary shock can be beggar-thy-neighbor and a fiscal shock can improve national welfare. The transmission mechanism of public policy here is different from theirs. In particular, a fiscal shock can affect the short-run exchange rate and generate long-run welfare effects even if it is temporary. Results in this article offer another rationale for international retaliation and coordination. (JEL F30, F40 )     

COMPARING MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION: THE INCREASING-COST CASE

When an increasing-cost competitive industry becomes monopolized, the monopoly will possess some monopsony power in input markets. This paper presents a simple analysis comparing the performance of monopoly and competition in this case. It first assumes fixed input proportions, and then turns to the general case of variable input proportions. With variable proportions, it is shown that the monopoly's marginal cost curve lies above the competitive supply curve but the monopoly's average cost curve lies below it. The welfare cost of monopoly is not identified by the area between the monopoly's marginal cost curve and the demand curve in either case.     

LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM IN THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION

A long-run tendency of industry profit rate to converge to a single competitive level has been a fundamental tenet of the industrial organization approach to the study of competitiveness in a market economy. This paper shows that for the post World War II period a weak equalization can be econometrically identified with different reaction speeds by industry. However, persistent profit rate differences endure. Finally, a portfolio theory of risk is considered as an explanation of these differentials.     

AN ESTIMATE OF THE AGE DISTRIBUTION'S EFFECT ON CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS

We estimate the age distribution's impact on carbon dioxide emissions from 1990 to 2006 by exploiting demographic variation in a panel of 46 countries. To eliminate potential bias from endogeneity or omitted variables, we instrument for the age distribution in a country's current population with lagged birth rates, and the regressions control for total population, total output, and country and year fixed effects. Carbon dioxide emissions increase with the share of the population aged 35 to 49 years, and this result is statistically significant and quantitatively large. (JEL Q4, J1)     

THE TIMING OF WELFARE PAYMENTS AND INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE

I examine transfer schedules for the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program and find a causal relationship between the time directly after welfare payments and intimate partner violence against women. This study supports the hypothesis that the husband uses threats of violence as an instrument to gain control over the allocation of household resources, and suggests that the increased incidence in physical violence after welfare payments is associated with alcohol use. Additionally, I find that states that pay TANF recipients twice a month do not have this effect on threats of violence. This suggests that smaller, more frequent payments may reduce the husband's incentive to use verbal violence as a bargaining tool. (JEL I38, J18, J12)     

GROWTH, WELFARE, AND THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT

Using an endogenous growth model in which government purchases directly affect aggregate productivity and utility, fiscal policy experiments conducted here indicate that the macroeconomic effects of changes in fiscal policy are at least as sensitive to the mix of spending cuts as they are to the mix of tax cuts. In fact, reducing the size of the government actually reduces growth and welfare freductions in government expenditures are heavily weighted towards reductions in public capital or if the proceeds are not used to reduce capital taxation. In addition, across-the-board spending cuts are not likely to significantly improve growth and welfare. ( JEL E62, 041)     

AN ESTIMATE OF THE RENT GENERATED BY A PREMIUM COLLEGE FOOTBALL PLAYER

The National Collegiate Athletic Association limits the payments athletes can receive for their services. Colleges are effectively monosony employers so players will not be paid their marginal revenue product. Therefore, colleges capture an economic rent from players. This paper measures these rents by estimating the marginal revenue product of a top college football player. The empirical results suggest that a premium college player generates over $500,000 in annual revenues for his team.     

RENT-SEEKING FIRMS, CONSUMER GROUPS, AND THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY

Do consumers' consumer-surplus (CS)–defending activities increase the social costs of monopoly compared to when consumers are inactive? Given just one rent-seeking firm, consumers ' CS-defending activities generally increase the social costs of monopoly, but given two or more rent-seeking firms, such activities generally reduce the social costs. (JEL D72, L12)     

PEOPLE AND PLACES: WELFARE REFORM AND THE SEPARATE EFFECT OF CASELOAD CHARACTERISTICS AND LOCAL CONDITIONS

An intersectional feminist approach informs qualitative content analyses of gender and trade advocacy websites in order to gain insights into the relation between trade liberalization and women in the global South. Findings include these websites are advocating for more representation in policymaking institutions spanning the global and local divide; emphasizing the need for networks within and outside institutions; and advocating for alternatives to free trade. The diverse and often contradictory understandings and strategies displayed by these websites arise from concern with giving voice to local needs and women in the South. These findings underscore the contributions a feminist approach makes to global political economy research by bringing attention to the heterogeneity of global political economic processes and power relations, and providing insights as to how global counter-hegemonic efforts can embrace diversity rather than being homogenizing.