THE BIASES OF FEDERAL RESERVE BANK PRESIDENTS

This paper develops statistical tests which show that in Federal Open Market Committee voting, Federal Reserve bank presidents, as a group, prefer less expansionary monetary policy than Federal Reserve board members. Further tests show that a subset of Federal Reserve bank presidents vote in a manner which is consistent with the partisanship of the U.S. president during whose term they were appointed. Membership in this subset is highly correlated with a career as an economist. These results have implications for reforms which would alter the voting power of bank presidents on the FOMC.     

THE SPECIAL INTEREST AUTO AS AN APPRECIATING ASSET

This paper examines the price behavior over time of a particular make of special interest automobile. A model is developed to explain both interyear and intrayear behavior of this auto's used price.     

MOTIVATIONAL INTERVIEWING AS AN INTERVENTION FOR AT-RISK COUPLES

Thirty-one couples participated in a pilot, motivational interviewing, intervention for at-risk couples called the Marriage Checkup (MC). The MC consisted of thorough relationship assessment and individualized feedback. It attracted substantial numbers of at-risk couples who were not otherwise seeking treatment. Partners' marital satisfaction improved significantly from pre- to post-check-up and remained improved at 1-month follow up. Partners were no longer significantly different from a non-distressed comparison group following intervention. Although not addressing the efficacy of the MC, this study supports its viability as an indicated preventive intervention with couples at-risk for severe marital distress by addressing its attractiveness, tolerability, and safety.     

FIRM SPECIFIC HUMAN CAPITAL AS AN EMPLOYER DISCIPLINE DEVICE

The inability of employers to monitor perfectly the level of effort of their employees is a potentially serious impediment to labor market efficacy. Indeed, a number of recent studies have concluded that this may lead to involuntary unemployment (Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984], Sparks [1986]); an inefficient sectoral allocation of workers (Oi [1990], Strand [1986]); and discrimination against productively identical workers (Bulow and Summers [1986]). This paper shows that the lock-in effect of firm-specific human capital can help alleviate problems of worker moral hazard and thereby promote labor market performance.     

SIGNALING IN HIGHER EDUCATION: THE EFFECT OF ACCESS TO ELITE COLLEGES ON CHOICE OF MAJOR

I propose a model of postsecondary education in which major field of study can be used by individuals to signal productivity to employers. Under this signaling model, I show that geographic areas with high access to elite universities result in fewer science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) majors among lower ability students at nonelite colleges. This is distinct from the prediction of a full information model in which access to elite schools should only affect high ability individuals directly. Using data from the National Center for Education Statistics' Baccalaureate & Beyond survey, I find evidence that is consistent with the signaling model prediction, specifically a 2.3–3.7 percentage point or 16%–25% decrease in the probability of choosing a STEM major among lower ability students in areas with greater access to elite colleges. (JEL I21, J24)     

CRIMINALS AS HEROES: LINKING SYMBOL TO STRUCTURE

This article examines the phenomenon of the heroic criminal and describes the structural preconditions necessary for his appearance. The author argues that these lawbreakers are best understood as cultural products that represent a concept of extra-legal justice. Their criminality, at least initially, is imputed with political meaning. Such symbols emerge when the rational, formal, bureaucratic justice of the state fails to reflect popular conceptions of justice. These symbolic figures are endemic in any culturally complex state society, although usually their appeal is to a small and relatively powerless public. But at times when the perception of law as unjust is widespread, the heroic criminal may emerge as a national figure of epic proportions. At such times a virtual epidemic of such figures may appear since entrepreneurs, motivated by either politics or profit, “market” such symbols to a receptive public. Using comparative analysis, the author presents briefcase studies of Jesse James, William Bonney (Billy the Kid), John Dillinger, and Charles Arthur (Pretty Boy) Floyd to demonstrate how they became legendary figures. The author then describes more contemporary symbols of extra-legal justice and the structural factors that inspired their heroic image.     

READING ALOUD AS AN INITIAL ASSIGNMENT IN MARITAL THERAPY*

This paper suggests conjoint reading aloud as an initial assignment in behavioral marital therapy. The spouses are directed to read a book on marital conflict and communication five times during the week following the initial interview. At that interview they negotiate an agreement on when they will do the reading. Conjoint reading is compared with two alternative initial assignments, Caring Days and the Spouse Observation Checklist. It is argued that the advantage of the conjoint reading is that it addresses the experientially salient problems of verbal conflict. Details for instigating the assignment are presented.     

MANDATORY RETIREMENT AS A CLAUSE IN AN EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CONTRACT

This paper postulates the existence of an "employment insurance contract" in which firms insure the employment of workers, at a predetermined wage, against potential, age related declines in productivity. To limit its liability the firm establishes an age limit to its promise ––– the mandatory retirement age. It is demonstrated that Pareto-efficient contracts exist which involve mandatory retirement at a specific age. The existence of these contracts, including mandatory retirement, increases workers' life-time utility and encourages the accumulation of human capital. Empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the model.     

HOW TO HAGGLE and TO STAY FIRM: BARTER AS HIDDEN PRICE DISCRIMINATION

Barter transactions, conducted openly by established corporations, play an increasingly significant role in the U.S. economy. The model developed here helps explain why firms use barter and yields predictions concerning the circumstances under which barter is likely to occur. It is shown that when two firms barter goods used as inputs, price discrimination occurs. This price discrimination is hidden from the firms' other customers because the real values of the transacted goods to the barterers are different from the accounting prices used in the transaction. Since price discrimination that is observed by potential customers might have an adverse effect on the selling firm's future bargaining power, barter will have value as a means of hiding price discrimination.     

AN APPROACH TO SUPERVISION OF SYMBOLIC-EXPERIENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY

A model of experiential psychotherapy supervision is outlined and applied to a case study. Four stages of experiential supervision are identified with issues relevant to each stage presented. Various techniques for working with issues pertaining to the supervisory process are discussed and exemplified by case illustration.     

THE GRAVITY MODEL: AN ILLUSTRATION OF STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION AS CALIBRATION

Dawkins, Srinivasan, and Whalley (“Calibration,”Handbook of Econometrics, 2001) propose that estimation is calibration. We illustrate their point by examining a leading econometric application in the study of international and interregional trade by Anderson and van Wincoop (“Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border Puzzle,”American Economic Review, 2003). We replicate the econometric process and show it to be a calibration of a general equilibrium model. Our approach offers unique insights into structural estimation, and we highlight the importance of traditional calibration considerations when one uses econometric techniques to calibrate a model for comparative policy analysis. (JEL F10, C13, C60)