ADJUSTMENT TO PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM

This paper considers the behavior of the firm which faces uncertainty in its production process but can adjust its output once the uncertainty is resolved. Ex post adjustment, unlike previous treatments, involves a marginal cost penalty if more output is required and a lowering of price if too much is produced. With ex post adjustment allowed in this fashion, it is found that nonlinear risk preferences do not affect the sign of the firm's marginal risk premium at optimum ex ante output. The firm will produce less output than under certainty whether it is risk averse, risk neutral, or prefers risk.     

STOCHASTIC INPUT DELIVERIES

The subject of this paper is the theory of the firm confronted with uncertain deliveries of its inputs. Examples of this form of uncertainty may be found in interruptible natural gas or electricity supply contracts, labor absenteeism and allocations of gasoline. Analyses of the firm's order quantity expansion path and order intensities are conducted. Comparisons are made between the optimal values of inputs selected under certainty and uncertainty, as well as comparisons between expected out-put and certainty output.     

NEW FACTS ABOUT FIRM RISK ACROSS COUNTRIES AND OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE

The characteristics of firm‐level risk over the cycle and across countries are studied in this paper. Low idiosyncratic firm‐level risk is found to be a feature of highly developed, stable economies, whereas the countercyclicality of firm‐level risk is associated with flexible as well as stable economies. These facts are uncovered with the help of a theoretical model where small, risk‐averse firms display procyclical risk, whereas larger, risk‐neutral firms have countercyclical risk patterns that depend on the rigidity of the business environment. The predictions of the model are then confirmed by the data using a large international firm‐level database (ORBIS) together with the World Bank Doing Business Database, during the “Great Recession” across 55 countries. The findings are critical for the growing literature of uncertainty driven business cycles, and show that firm‐level uncertainty cannot be treated as an exogenous parameter. (JEL D21, D22, E32, F44, L11, L25)     

ADJUSTMENT TO PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM: REPLY

This reply responds to two comments on our 1986 article in this journal under the same title. The comments discuss a special case of the model which gives a certainty result, and also propose several alternative formulations of the model. The reply argues that the special certainty result is not an interesting or reasonable case, and discusses the relationship between the proposed alternative formulations and the original model. The influence of risk preferences on optimal output is analyzed through comparative statics for changes in risk in the context of the original model.     

Contracts,Labor Supply and Income Targeting

In many professions and personal services, a firm offers a contract with either proportional revenue sharing of the worker’s output or a contract with 100% revenue accruing to the worker in exchange for a fixed (debt) payment. Contingent on the contract, the worker chooses the mechanism to achieve the desired level of productivity. A higher revenue split induces the worker to be more productive in output per hour resulting in a higher wage. The relevant price of effort is the after-split, after-tax wage controlled for after-tax household income. Incentives through a higher split raise productivity and the return to effort. The sample is 1,559 U.S. real estate sales professionals paid on contract splits in 2007 and choosing their hours and effort. The compensated labor supply elasticity is positive and between approximately zero and 0.3 suggesting the absence of income targeting for these workers on split and 100% revenue contracts. But the inclusion of contractual income split provisions in the model substantially increases the labor supply elasticity.     

THE EFFECT OF BUSINESS CYCLES ON GROWTH: KEYNES VS. SCHUMPETER

In contrast to recent 'neo-Schumpeterian' models, which argue that business cycles are good for growth, we develop a 'neo-Keynesian' model, where monopolistically competitive firms set prices and produce output in advance of the realization of (stochastic) monetary velocity. In such a setting, there is an asymmetry in the effect of business cycles on income: recessions are bad, because the representative firm is demand-constrained and its unsold output is wasted, but booms are not good, because the firm is output-constrained and cannot produce any more output. A more severe business cycle thus reduces the expected income of a firm, and the expected return to investment, which reduces the growth rate of the economy. ( JEL E32, E52, O41, L13)     

Contracts, Individual Revenue and Performance

In some jobs individual workers have control over revenue, effort and productivity. These jobs include professional firms for law, medicine and consulting. They include personal services in areas from hair styling to taxi driving. The firm offers contracts that allow for a sharing of risks and rewards. These incentives include a split of output between the firm and worker and employee ownership. For U.S. real estate agents, a choice is available between splitting revenue with the firm or retaining 100?% above a fixed prepaid minimum. These are equity and sequential debt contracts. Under the sequential debt contract, effort increases but output per hour declines. Separately, agents increase effort and productivity if offered ownership in the firm, effectively a claim on others?? performance.     

A NOTE ON ADJUSTMENT TO PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM

This paper analyzes the impact of production uncertainty on the firm's optimal output decision. If uncertainty is introduced by an additive risk variable, then short-run optimal output is unchanged, but the owner-manager's expected utility can change causing long-run output effects. If uncertainty is introduced by a multiplicative random variable, then short-run output can change as well.     

SAFETY FIRST, BANKRUPTCY, AND THE PRICING AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS OF THE FIRM

The paper analyzes the impact of imposing a constraint on the probability of bankruptcy for the pricing and investment choices of firms. Two models are presented in which a firm faces stochastic demand; in one costs are known with certainty, and in the other costs of production are probabilistic. In both cases the constraint induces a reduction in optimal price if demand is elastic. For less elastic demand, price increases may be indicated. With constant costs, the constraint lowers optimal investment. The results are applicable to the analysis of rating agencies' behavior, or to the design of bond covenants, especially for public utilities.     

RISK PREFERENCE ESTIMATION IN THE NONLINEAR MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION APPROACH

Risk preferences and technology are jointly estimated in the nonlinear mean-standard deviation framework for a competitive firm model under price risk. A utility function is proposed that nests various risk preference structures and risk neutrality as empirically refutable special cases. The empirical application using firm-level data finds evidence of decreasing absolute risk aversion, differences in the nature of relative risk aversion by firm size, and little support for the widely used linear mean-variance framework. The estimation results also show that ignoring risk and risk preferences can substantially overestimate output supply and input demand elasticities.     

UNCERTAIN EFFECTS OF MONEY AND THE LINK BETWEEN THE INFLATION RATE AND INFLATION UNCERTAINTY

In the postwar period high rates of inflation are associated with high levels of inflation uncertainty. In this paper I argue that the inflation rate and inflation uncertainty are linked by forecasters' uncertainty about the impact of money growth on the price level, and I present evidence indicating that this has been the case. As long as the impact of money growth on the price level remains unpredictable, then even predictable money growth will cause inflation uncertainty with its accompanying adverse effects on employment and output.     

CAN THE RISK-SHIFTING EMPLOYMENT MODEL EXPLAIN FLUCTUATING EMPLOYMENT?

It is shown by numerical examples that, for the simple "two states of the world" version of Azariadis' original model of implicit labour contracts, enormous fluctuations in output price are required to generate layoffs. The paper then modifies the simple model, replacing the perfectly competitive product market specification with a sales constraint. This modification makes a significant difference; the combination of sales constraints and risk-shifting is shown to have the potential to explain layoffs. Since this sales constraint is unmotivated by micro analysis, its inclusion does not satisfy the original aim of the risk-shifting employment model to explain layoffs as based on micro foundations. A secondary aim of the paper is to make the workings of the risk-shifting employment model easier to understand by introducing a new diagrammatic analysis based on a contract curve.     

THE OPTIMALITY OF PARTIAL PRICE ADJUSTMENT POLICIES

This paper studies the optimal price adjustment policies of a monopolistically competitive firm whose profit-maximizing price is subject to a serially correlated random disturbance. The firm chooses its price by comparing the expected cost of present and future price changes with the expected losses occurring when price deviates from its instantaneous profit-maximizing value. Partial price adjustment often is the best way to minimize the sum of these losses. Prices tend to be more flexible both in response to large shocks to the firm's profit-maximizing price and when much uncertainty exists about the future.     

THE EFFECT OF CONCEALED WEAPONS LAWS: AN EXTREME BOUND ANALYSIS

Lott and Mustard [1997] provide evidence that enactment of concealed handgun ("right-to-carry") laws deters violent crime and induces substitution into property crime. A critique by Black and Nagin [1998] questions the particular model specification used in the empirical analysis. In this paper, we estimate the "model uncertainty" surrounding the model specified by Lott and Mustard using an extreme bound analysis (Leamer [1983]). We find that the deterrence results are robust enough to make them difficult to dismiss as unfounded, particularly those findings about the change in violent crime trends. The substitution effects are not robust with respect to different model specifications. (JEL K42)     

Achieving the indeterminate: Accomplishing degrees of certainty in life and death situations

This paper explores technology's pivotal position at the intersection of control and uncertainty. It examines two areas: Intensive Care and a Labour Ward. Building on the work of Davis (1960), it argues that certainty and uncertainty are socially constructable and reconstructable. This is actively achieved by the deployment of strategies involving particular paradigms (the biomedical model) and artefacts (medical technology). Power lies in control over knowledge and the structures and practices which sustain it, including those embedded in advanced technology. The contribution of medical technology to the achievement of certainty in Intensive Care and end-game Obstetrics (the Labour Ward) is considered. Achieved certainty in medical situations is seen as: the structured masking of uncertainty by the application of medical iconography, artefacts and techniques to create the illusion of certainty. The accomplishment of uncertainty in Obstetrics (as a precursor to technological intervention) is also explored. The accomplishment of uncertainty in medical situations is seen as associated with the structured projection of uncertainty, involving using medical discourse rooted in the medical paradigm to exaggerate the generality of risk and the probability of pathology. It is argued that the highly structured and routinised settings of ICU and the labour Ward, not only aid control by the medical profession but diminish perceptions of uncertainty.     

How does labour share respond to risk? Theory and evidence from the Chinese industrial sector

This study discusses the role of firm risk in the declining labour share in China. Based on the model developed by Holmström and Milgrom (1987), the authors demonstrate that lower firm risk can motivate workers to work harder, leading to higher output per worker and average wage. However, increased output will lower the labour share. Using data from the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database for the period 1998–2007 and the World Bank's Investment Climate Survey 2005, empirical evidence supports this hypothesis and performs robustly across various model specifications and proxies for firm risk, indicating a positive correlation between labour share and firm risk.     

FIRM SURVIVAL,UNCERTAINTY, AND FINANCIAL FRICTIONS: IS THERE A FINANCIAL UNCERTAINTY ACCELERATOR?

Using a large panel of unquoted UK firms over the period 2000–2009, we examine the impact of firm‐specific uncertainty on corporate failures. In this context we also distinguish between firms which are likely to be more or less dependent on bank finance as well as public and nonpublic companies. Our results document a significant effect of uncertainty on firm survival. This link is found to be more potent during the recent financial crisis compared with tranquil periods. We also uncover significant firm‐level heterogeneity because the survival chances of bank‐dependent and nonpublic firms are most affected by changes in uncertainty, especially during the recent global financial crisis. (JEL E44, F32, F34, G32)     

If you do not know who knows what: Advice seeking under changing conditions of uncertainty after an acquisition

In this study we develop a model to explain the dynamics of advice seeking after an acquisition. We build on a theory of advice seeking that draws from prospect theory and expectancy theory. We theorize that immediately after an acquisition there is uncertainty about who knows what, but over time individuals become more aware of the expertise within the organization and they change their advice networks based upon this increased awareness. Our model examines four micro-processes of advice seeking: reciprocity, preferential attachment, transitivity, and legacy-firm tie preferences. To test our hypotheses we use post-acquisition data over four time periods in a recruitment consulting firm. Our longitudinal analysis uses a stochastic actor-orientated model and our results indicate that immediately after the acquisition individuals have a tendency to seek advice based upon reciprocity and preferential attachment. However, over time these tendencies diminish. Surprisingly, transitivity does not play a significant role, which suggests that other micro-processes such as reciprocity are dominant. In addition, individuals in the acquired firm have a tendency to make more ties and there is a preference for same firm ties in both legacy firms, with the tendency being higher in the acquired firm. Our findings add to theories on the process of advice seeking under conditions of uncertainty, on knowledge transfer processes in mergers and acquisitions, and the knowledge based view of the firm.     

The output decision of the firm — A behavioural algorithm

The neoclassical or traditional analysis of the firm's output decision is based on assumptions about human behaviour which are far removed from the findings of contemporary psychological research. Despite this the resulting deductive model enjoys pervasive influence. While many economic commentators agree that the behavioural theory of the firm has much analytical merit it is probably fair to say that the behavioural approach to the analysis of the industry is not as popular as it might be if it had produced a generic formal model of the firm's output decision. In this note I present my attempts to construct the basic elements of a deductive model of the firm's output decision based upon behavioural axioms as a step towards redressing this imbalance of theory. The behavioural algorithm I present is intended to parallel the simplicity of the marginal rules adopted by the mythical neoclassical firm.     

Unions,seniority, and public choice

This paper examines the implications of granting a seniority-based system to a union whose behavior is determined by a median voter rule. It is shown that the union will negotiate a sequence of wages that will contract union employment in each period. The model then is extended to include an active role for the firm. It is shown that when the firm has the opportunity to resist unionization, the union will not allow union employment to fall below some lower bound. This lower bound is then a steady-state equilibrium.