创新网络嵌入视角下企业研发竞争的博弈研究

研发投入是创新发展的基础和源泉,如何促进企业研发投入是实施创新驱动战略的关键。本文基于创新网络嵌入的背景,构建同一创新网络内两个企业间的博弈模型,针对不同网络位置企业竞争博弈和相同网络位置企业竞争博弈两种情形,探究在研发竞争状态下企业研发投入受网络地位、网络关系的影响情况。研究结果表明:创新网络嵌入下,同质企业的竞争性研发投入与网络范围的技术溢出、网络平均吸收能力以及网络中心度均存在正向相关关系。研究结论丰富了企业研发投入影响因素的研究成果,也为有效激励企业创新提供一个有价值的思路。     

Investing in a Shared Supplier in a Competitive Market: Stochastic Capacity Case

When firms invest in a shared supplier, one key concern is whether the invested capacity will be used for a competitor. In practice, this concern is addressed by restricting the use of the capacity. We consider what happens when two competing firms invest in a shared supplier. We consider two scenarios that differ in how capacity is used: exclusive capacity and first‐priority capacity. We model firms' investment and production decisions, and analyze the equilibrium outcomes in terms of the number of investing firms and capacity levels for each scenario; realized capacity is a stochastic function of investment levels. We also identify conditions under which the spillover effect occurs, where one firm taps into the other firm's invested capacity. Although the spillover supposedly intensifies competition, it actually discourages firms' investment. We also characterize the firms' and supplier's preference about the capacity type. While the non‐investing firm always prefers spillovers from the first‐priority capacity, the investing firm does not always want to shut off the other firm's access to its leftover capacity, especially when allowing spillover induces the other firm not to invest. The supplier's preference depends on the trade‐off between over‐investment and flexibility.     

Signaling to Partially Informed Investors in the Newsvendor Model

We analyze a signaling game between the manager of a firm and an investor in the firm. The manager has private information about the firm's demand and cares about the short‐term stock price assigned by the investor. Previous research has shown that under continuous decision choices and the Intuitive Criterion refinement, the least‐cost separating equilibrium will result, in which a low‐quality firm chooses its optimal capacity and a high‐quality firm over‐invests in order to signal its quality to investors. We build on this research by showing the existence of pooling outcomes in which low‐quality firms over‐invest and high‐quality firms under‐invest so as to provide identical signals to investors. The pooling equilibrium is practically appealing because it yields a Pareto improvement compared to the least‐cost separating equilibrium. Distinguishing features of our analysis are that: (i) we allow the capacity decision to have either discrete or continuous support, and (ii) we allow beliefs to be refined based on either the Undefeated refinement or the Intuitive Criterion refinement. We find that the newsvendor model parameters impact the likelihood of a pooling outcome, and this impact changes in both sign and magnitude depending on which refinement is used.     

网络治理的权力基础:一个跨案例研究

网络组织是当前经济活动中的普遍现象,网络治理并非信任基础上的自主治理,而是受组织间权力关系的规制,权力是决定网络组织运行的重要关系并影响了网络组织运行绩效.本文通过一个跨案例研究,分析了网络治理的权力基础,提出组织间权力来源于企业资源、结构位势和制度压力.三种权力基础的作用机理不同,其中企业资源和网络中心性显著地表现为个体层面的权力,而网络密度和制度压力则体现为网络层面的权力,个体层面权力与网络层面权力的相互作用导致网络组织呈现不同的演变趋势.     

Process Improvement,Learning, and Real Options

We use a real‐options approach to analyze investments in process improvement. We develop a simple, stochastic model of a firm making investment decisions in process improvement. Our analysis offers several interesting insights into investments in process improvement. First, early investment in process improvement results in valuable knowledge, which helps increase the value of the option to invest in process improvement in future periods. This may motivate a firm to invest in process improvements as early as possible. Second, it may be optimal for a firm to stop investing when such investments do not create enough value in the later stages of the investment horizon. Third, although one would expect the state of a firm's process relative to that of other firms to impact a firm's decision to invest in process improvement, this study finds that the impetus is conditional and identifies these conditions. Finally, in such an environment, the delay of investment in process improvement incurs an opportunity cost for a firm, and we show that the traditional net present value rule must incorporate this opportunity cost and the knowledge‐induced change in future option values to lead to a correct investment decision.     

Firm-bank trusting relationship and discouraged borrowers

Firms can be credit constrained both because banks deny credit when they apply for it and because they refrain from filing for the loan in the first place, anticipating rejection. Interestingly the latter aspect has been only marginally investigated, so far and, no previous research pays attention to firm manager’s trust in the loan manager as a factor that can affect firm’s decision to file for a loan. Present research investigates the role of the trust of firm’s managers in the loan managers as a determinant of not being discouraged from applying for a loan by looking at a strictly randomly selected sample of firms in China. By relying on a structural equation model that investigates both the direct and the mediating role of trust we find that the firm manager’s trust in the loan manager affects the firm’s decision to file for a loan by reducing the firm’s risk of being a discouraged borrower. We also discover that trust mediates the role of the firm manager’s experience and the monitoring activity pursued by the bank.     

纵向差异下的连接外部性和网络结构分析

在寡头竞争的市场环境里,相互竞争的企业通常会与竞争对手建立连接,从而影响他们在产品市场上竞争的方式。本文我们建立两阶段博弈模型研究企业建立连接的激励以及由此而形成的网络结构形态。在博弈的第一期,具有纵向差异化的企业决定是否与其竞争对手建立连接;企业观察到连接结果后在第二期进行价格竞争。本文的分析显示均衡网络结构与连接效应、连接成本和消费者偏好有关,均衡网络可能仅是一个企业与其它所有企业建立连接的星型网络结构,也可能是没有任何企业建立连接的空网络结构。本文还分析了均衡网络和社会有效网络之间的关系,发现均衡网络和社会有效网络并不总是一致的,从社会计划者的角度看,企业建立连接可能存在激励不足,因此公共政策应该鼓励企业建立连接。     

A Competitive Model of Customization with Lead‐Time Effects

In this article, we study the competitive interactions between a firm producing standard products and a firm producing custom products. Consumers with heterogeneous preferences choose between n standard products, which may not meet their preferences exactly but are available immediately, and a custom product, available only after a certain lead time l. Standard products incur a variety cost that increases with n and custom products incur a lead time cost that is decreasing in the lead time l. We consider a two‐stage game wherein at stage 1, the standard product firm chooses the variety and the custom firm chooses the lead time and then both firms set prices simultaneously. We characterize the subgame‐perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. We find that both firms can coexist in equilibrium, either sharing the market as local monopolists or in a price‐competitive mode. The standard product firm may offer significant or minimal variety depending on the equilibrium outcome. We provide several interesting insights on the variety, lead time, and prices of the products offered and on the impact of problem parameters on the equilibrium outcomes. For instance, we show that the profit margin and price of the custom product are likely to be higher than that of standard products in equilibrium under certain conditions. Also, custom firms are more likely to survive and succeed in product markets with larger potential market sizes. Another interesting insight is that increased consumer sensitivity to product fit may result in lower lead time for the custom product.     

The Effect of Competition on Recovery Strategies

Manufacturers often face a choice of whether to recover the value in their end‐of‐life products through remanufacturing. In many cases, firms choose not to remanufacture, as they are (rightly) concerned that the remanufactured product will cannibalize sales of the higher‐margin new product. However, such a strategy may backfire for manufacturers operating in industries where their end‐of‐life products (cell phones, tires, computers, automotive parts, etc.) are attractive to third‐party remanufacturers, who may seriously cannibalize sales of the original manufacturer. In this paper, we develop models to support a manufacturer's recovery strategy in the face of a competitive threat on the remanufactured product market. We first analyze the competition between new and remanufactured products produced by a monopolist manufacturer and identify conditions under which the firm would choose not to remanufacture its products. We then characterize the potential profit loss due to external remanufacturing competition and analyze two entry‐deterrent strategies: remanufacturing and preemptive collection. We find that a firm may choose to remanufacture or preemptively collect its used products to deter entry, even when the firm would not have chosen to do so under a pure monopoly environment. Finally, we discuss conditions under which each strategy is more beneficial.     

FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND INNOVATION: WHY POOR COUNTRIES DON'T CATCH UP

This paper examines micro‐level channels through which financial development can affect such macroeconomic outcomes as level of income. Specifically, we investigate theoretically and empirically how financial constraints affect a firm's innovation activities. Theoretical predictions are tested using unique firm survey data, which provide direct measures for innovations and firm‐specific financial constraints, as well as information on shocks to firms' internal funds that serve as firm‐level instruments for financial constraints. We find unambiguous evidence that financial constraints restrain the ability of domestically owned firms to innovate and hence to catch up to the technological frontier.     

Network Positions and the Probability of Being Acquired: An Empirical Analysis in the Biopharmaceutical Industry

This paper examines the relationship between the firm's direct ties, its inter‐firm network prominence and its likelihood of being acquired. The authors argue that firm's direct ties and prominence enhance the firm's visibility and signal its quality – and thus foster the firm's likelihood of being acquired. However, higher levels of direct ties and prominence, by providing access to resources and the firm's status, respectively, increase the firm's ability to remain independent and thus reduce its likelihood of being acquired. Thus, the authors posit the overall relation as an inverted U‐shaped. Furthermore, they show that, for firms that undergo an initial public offering, the aforementioned relation becomes much weaker. The hypotheses are empirically tested in the biopharmaceutical industry and important theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.     

ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH AND MORAL HAZARD

We analyze the interaction between intertemporal incentive contracts and search frictions associated with on‐the‐job search. In our model, agency problems call for wage contracts with deferred compensation. At the same time workers do on‐the‐job search. Deferred compensation improves workers' incentives to exert effort but distorts their on‐the‐job search decisions. We show that deferred compensation is less attractive when the value to the worker–firm pair of on‐the‐job search is high. Moreover, the interplay between search frictions and wage contracts creates feedback effects. If firms in equilibrium use contracts with deferred compensation, fewer firms with vacancies enter the on‐the‐job search market, and this in turn reduces the distortions created by deferred compensation. These feedback effects between the incentive contracts used and the activity level in the search markets can lead to multiple equilibria: a low‐turnover equilibrium where firms use deferred compensation, and a high‐turnover equilibrium where they do not. Furthermore, the model predicts that firms are more likely to use deferred compensation when search frictions are high and when the gains from on‐the‐job search are small.     

Cyber Security Risk Management: Public Policy Implications of Correlated Risk,Imperfect Ability to Prove Loss,and Observability of Self‐Protection

The correlated nature of security breach risks, the imperfect ability to prove loss from a breach to an insurer, and the inability of insurers and external agents to observe firms’ self‐protection efforts have posed significant challenges to cyber security risk management. Our analysis finds that a firm invests less than the social optimal levels in self‐protection and in insurance when risks are correlated and the ability to prove loss is imperfect. We find that the appropriate social intervention policy to induce a firm to invest at socially optimal levels depends on whether insurers can verify a firm's self‐protection levels. If self‐protection of a firm is observable to an insurer so that it can design a contract that is contingent on the self‐protection level, then self‐protection and insurance behave as complements. In this case, a social planner can induce a firm to choose the socially optimal self‐protection and insurance levels by offering a subsidy on self‐protection. We also find that providing a subsidy on insurance does not provide a similar inducement to a firm. If self‐protection of a firm is not observable to an insurer, then self‐protection and insurance behave as substitutes. In this case, a social planner should tax the insurance premium to achieve socially optimal results. The results of our analysis hold regardless of whether the insurance market is perfectly competitive or not, implying that solely reforming the currently imperfect insurance market is insufficient to achieve the efficient outcome in cyber security risk management.     

Sustaining the Financial Value of Global CSR: Reconciling Corporate and Stakeholder Interests in a Less Regulated Environment

In this article we examine the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firm value. This line of research is important since firms continue to invest in CSR even though past studies reveal a limited linkage between financial value and CSR. However, the business case for CSR or “doing good while making a profit,” appears to be advancing within the business ethics literature as a preferred conception of CSR. We conjecture that the greater unification and refinement of both profit maximization and stakeholder interests through corporate acts, not statements alone, will sustain the financial value of CSR in a less regulated global business environment. We study the triangle of what companies say, what companies do, and firm financial performance. We analyze Fortune 250 firms and find a positive association between what companies do based on KLD Research and Analytics, Inc. (KLD) ratings, and what companies state about ethics in their CSR statements. We then employ regression analysis and find that companies’ socially responsible acts are positively associated with overall firm value and financial performance. Yet we do not find a statistically significant association between what companies say regarding ethics in their CSR statements and their financial outcomes. These results suggest that firm value and financial performance is associated with what companies do and not what they say. Our results seem to be driven by multinational corporations (MNCs) and not by non‐MNCs. This is possibly because MNCs generally operate in a less regulated global business environment that often necessitates strong ethical corporate leadership to further stakeholder interests. Overall, these results help reconcile corporate and stakeholder objectives since evidence of a link between financial performance and doing good sustains global CSR.     

An empirical study of the impact of firm resources on alliance governance structures

Alliances between smaller biotechnology firms and larger pharmaceutical firms are the backbone of new product development strategies within the pharmaceutical industry. While pharmaceutical firms seek access to new technologies and products, small biotechnology firms depend on these alliance relationships to access key resources such as financing and downstream capabilities because they typically do not have the resources needed in-house to successfully commercialize their products. In this study, we investigate the governance structure of these alliance relationships arguing that the more resource rich a biotechnology firm is, in terms of technical, commercial, and social capital, the less likely it is to give up equity to an alliance partner. Results suggest that greater biotech patent quality, cash position, and alliance credibility impact the type of governance structure that is chosen by the alliance partners and therefore the extent of control that the biotechnology firm is willing to give up in the relationship.     

Cooperation and Knowledge Transfer within Buyer–Supplier Relationships: The Moderating Properties of Trust,Relationship Duration and Supplier Performance*

This paper examines the effect of relational factors on knowledge transfer within strategic buyer–supplier exchange. Prior research examining inter‐firm knowledge transfer has focused almost exclusively on horizontal forms of governance such as strategic alliances and joint ventures, whilst research on vertical forms, such as buyer–supplier relationships, is limited. We test the effect of four important relational properties: cooperation, trust, relationship duration and supplier performance. Quantitative data, gathered from 104 UK manufacturing firms in eight industry sectors, are used to analyse the hypothesized relationships through a moderated hierarchical regression model. Our study provides support for the importance of considering relational factors in the transfer of knowledge at the inter‐organizational level. In particular, the results indicate that knowledge transfer is positively influenced by the extent of cooperation, but that this relationship is moderated by the level of trust and the performance of the supplier firm. Managerial implications for these findings and future directions for research are then offered.     

Managing Technology Selection and Development Risk in Competitive Environments

Managing development decisions for new products based on dynamically evolving technologies is a complex task, especially in highly competitive industries. Product managers often have to choose between introducing an incrementally better, safe new product early and a superior, yet highly risky, product later. Recommendations for managing such performance vs. time‐to‐market trade‐offs often ignore competitive reactions to development decisions. In this paper, we study how a firm could incorporate the presence of a strategic competitor in making technology selection and investment decisions regarding new products. We consider a model in which an innovating firm and its rival can introduce a new product immediately or pursue a more advanced product for later launch. Further, the firm can reduce the uncertainty surrounding product development by dedicating more resources; the effectiveness of this investment depends on the firm's innovative capacity. Our model generates two sets of insights. First, in highly competitive industries, firms can adopt different technologies and effectively use introduction timing to mitigate the effects of price competition. More importantly, the firm could strategically invest in the advanced product to influence its rival's technology choice. We characterize equilibrium development and investment decisions of the firms, and derive innovative capacity hurdles that govern a firm's choice between the risky and safe alternatives. The effects of development flexibility—where firms might have the option to revert to the safe product if the advanced product fails—are also considered.     

中小企业集群信任重建机制研究——基于第三方制度干预的视角

在集群集体信任缺失,无法由企业家私人行为或企业自发行为解决的情况下,需要引入第三方制度干预机制来重建破碎的信任。基于第三方制度干预的信任重建主要在集群系统信任的层级中进行。为实现预期效果,需要建设具有创业导向的第三方制度干预平台。制度干预的内容包含:对过度竞争的管制、冲突纠纷的仲裁以及战略性生产性服务的供给。本文对集群制度干预平台的三个要素(集体企业家、博弈规则以及网络参与者)的具体内涵及其互动关系进行了分析。三要素各自方向上的合力决定了制度干预集群信任重建的效果。本文还探讨了第三方制度干预的三阶段机制,以及与其它信任重建机制的互动关系。     

Getting What You Pay For—Strategic Process Improvement Compensation and Profitability Impact

Profit‐maximizing firm owners who incentivize their managers with a bonus for process improvement create an intentional misalignment of their own objective and management attention. From the viewpoint of a single firm, such a local misalignment can never be profitable, but in this study we take a wider strategic perspective by investigating cost‐reducing process improvements of two firms competing in a Cournot market. We find that the use of a process improvement bonus (by firm A) can be profitable, by affecting the competitor's decision making. Informed about the reward structure at firm A, which provides an incentive for process improvement and thereby for increased production at that firm, the manager of the competing firm (B) is inclined to produce less if the owner of firm B only rewards profit. This leads to a higher profit for firm A. However, we also show that firm B's best strategy is to also offer a process improvement bonus, even if that firm is a cost laggard (with higher costs for process improvement), and that this leads to reduced profit for both firms in many situations unless one of them is sufficiently superior in its ability to improve processes. These results are robust for uncertain process improvement outcomes, multidimensional process improvement decisions, and information asymmetry in the owner–manager relationship.     

Foreign Participation and Hiring Patterns after Privatization

Critics of globalization claim that foreign ownership of privatized firms is linked to negative post‐privatization labor outcomes, such as more firing and less hiring. This paper uses new firm‐level data for a cross‐section of countries to test this idea and provides evidence that foreign purchasers of state‐owned enterprises tend to acquire firms that were already better restructured before privatization. Additionally, this paper does not find evidence that foreign participation in privatized firms is linked to negative labor outcomes.