The Shi'i ulama and the state in Iran

Conclusion In this article I attempted to explain the politics of the ulama in terms of class struggle. I indicated that ulama political orientations, and the emergence of politically divergent factions in their midst, were historically correlated with the interests of the traditional petty bourgeoisie, the merchants, and the landlords. In other words, from the political class struggle viewpoint, diverse factions among the ulama tended to represent these diverse social classes. The ulama, it is true, defended their divergent political positions through their interpretations of the Islamic laws. Therefore, the assertion that a particular group of the ulama were political representatives of a particular class, say, the petty bourgeoisie, is not to suggest that they consciously interpreted their religious texts so as to justify the petty bourgeoisie interests, or that they were the enthusiastic champions of the petty bourgeoisie. What makes them representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, says Marx, is the fact that in their mind they do not get beyond the limits which the latter do not get beyond in life, that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to the same problems and solutions to which material interest and social position drive the latter practically. This is, in general, the relationship between the political and literary representatives of a class and the class they represent. I should stress that the relationship between class representatives and the class they represent is not unproblematic. Whenever the ulama have defended a particular issue, they have done so according to their own ideological mode of discourse. In their interpretations of the teachings of Shi'ism they all must follow, and submit to, the internal logic of the ideology of Shi'ism and its specific modes of discourse, which are considered proper and acceptable by all the ulama. In other words, all the ulama, conservative or radical, must base their argument on the same set of ideological premises. Thus the content of the (Usuli) teachings of Shi'ism, as well as its specific modes of discourse put limits on the range of ideologically defensible political actions. (Such limits might explain why the ulama never attempted to defend the interests of workers and peasants.) This factor combined with the ulama's conscious efforts to maintain an ideological uniformity and organizational unity may provide them with a certain degree of relative autonomy in the field of class struggle. How these factors affect the course and direction of class struggle is another aspect of ulama politics that needs an in-depth investigation.

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The Organisation and the Mouth of Hell

FLESH

‘We are now beginning a two week consultation period—but let me say this [finger raised for emphasis)—if you are not for this project [dramatic pause) you ought to be looking for a move elsewhere’. (Announcement preceding a post‐1992 university restructuring, April 2002)

‘Hang on. I am just parking the car. I am walking into the building. I am now entering the mouth of hell…’ (Conversation with a friend who was calling from his mobile phone as he entered his workplace)

‘My heart sinks every time I have to go there. It takes away your spirit’. (Former colleague writing about her experiences of going to work)

‘I am nailed to the desk at the moment…’. (My email to friend in another institution) ‘Your email was full of Catholic imagery’. (Reply)

‘We live on that border, crossroads beings, crucified beings’. (Kristeva, 1987 Kristeva, J. 1987. Tales of love, Edited by: Roudiez, L. New York: Columbia University Press.  [Google Scholar]: 254)     

THORSTEIN VEBLEN'S ECONOMIC SYSTEM

This study provides a foundation for an understanding of Veblen's economics by displaying its various parts as components of a system, and analyzing and evaluating them. An examination is made of Veblen's views on the subject-matter of economics, his general theory of economic change, his theory of economic change under capitalism, and his prediction of the end of capitalism, under the emergence of a new economic order. It is shown that he constructed a highly general theory economic change that was scientific in character, but that in dealing with capitalism he wrote primarily as a social philosopher and ideologist.     

The ��Semiotic Self��: From Peirce and Mead to Wiley and Singer

Norbert Wiley (1994) provides a synthesis of Peirce??s and Mead??s views on the self. The Peirce-Mead ideal type model of the self involves the I and the me as well as the I and the you. Hence, at each moment we are a combined ??me-I-you?? in past, present and future. Milton Singer (1989) discovers the semiotic self through his anthropological research, but does not apply the concept as rigorously as one might hope. Peirce??s triadic epistemology and Pragmatism is explored to frame his contribution to the semiotic self. His categories of Firstness, Secondnes and Thirdness are briefly considered. Some anecdotal information about the self in Indic Civilization is discussed. It is argued that the INSOR model can be useful. The key is to move beyond Cartesian notions and to see the semotic self as a ??semiotic object,?? always subject to interpretation by the person engaged in symbolic interaction and exchange.     

On Desmond: the limits of spontaneous sociology

Matthew Desmond’s “Relational ethnography,” is a manifesto for a relational turn in ethnography, liberating it from the “substantialism” of bounded places, processed people and group culture. Substantialism, however, proves to be a largely mythical category that obscures two types of relational ethnography: Desmond’s empiricist transactional ethnography and an alternative, theoretically driven structural ethnography. Drawing on Desmond’s own ethnographies, On the Fireline and Evicted, I explore the limitations of his transactional ethnography—a “spontaneous sociology” that rejects the theoretical engagement and comparative logic. I elaborate and illustrate structural ethnography, drawing out the implications for public and policy sociology.     

“Racing for Innocence”: Whiteness,Corporate Culture,and the Backlash Against Affirmative Action

This paper argues that racing for innocence is a discursive practice which functions simultaneously to disavow accountability for racist practices at the same time that everyday racism is practiced. Drawing from both fieldwork and interviews in a corporate legal department over two different time periods (in 1988–89 and in 1999), I explore the meaning and consequence of this race in my interviews with white and African-American lawyers. Further, I follow the trajectory of one African-American lawyer, Randall Kingsley, and tell his story along with the stories constructed by the white men who still work there about Randall's departure from the company. I do so to make an argument about why these white men, by virtue of their social location, cannot see how they contributed to the unfriendly climate that forced Randall out of the department. Further, I argue it is through such everyday practices that whiteness is reproduced as a structural relationship of inequality in workplaces.     

Vicissitudes of the sacred

Conclusions Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, American sociologists have been made increasingly aware, mostly by Marxist and phenomenological critics, of the latent moral or practical implications of what often purports to be objectively impersonal scientific theories. Whereas Goffman's imaginative writing style and intensely personal observational technique never allowed him to be easily placed in the camp of the positivist objectivists, the profound moral issues and assumptions of his work, as Friedson's statement implied, never fully appeared in a clear light either, probably because of Goffman's strategic decision to accommodate his moral insights somewhat to the positivist intellectual milieu of the 1950s. The present analysis reveals, however, that, even more than allowing tacit moral assumptions to operate in the back-ground of his work, Goffman focussed centrally on an investigation of the various levels of moral understanding, a project for which he used the Book of Job as his signpost. Goffman's inquiry, it should be emphasized, was not conducted through an external observation of other people's consciousness but rather by means of an intensely personal reflection upon the governing frames of his own consciousness as it looked out upon the everyday social world. What we have chronicled in this essay is the dramatic evolution of Goffman's own moral consciousness, not the moral understandings of the subjects of his studies, the latter, of course, changing as Goffman's own moral understandings evolved. exact nature and purpose of his moral investigation. As we have seen, an ongoing reference for Goffman's moral inquiry was not a rationalist philosophical treatise, but rather one of the most poetic and profound narratives of the Bible, a work in which the radical mystery and transcendence of the Sacred, beyond all structures of nature, society, and the human ego, are asserted. The symbolic and narrative features of the Job text accord well with its emphasis on the mystery of Being, whose fundamental depth and power could not easily be compressed within the outlines of abstract rationalist propositions. Goffman, likewise, combines a final emphasis on the mystery of Being, beyond all finite frames and fabrications, with a pervasively symbolic and narrative style in his writing. In directing our attention toward the ultimate mystery of Being, of which finite frames provide only a tentative revelation, Goffman mounts an additional critique of Durkheim, not only for naively assuming that sacred representations must always reflect the social rather than the individual inclinations of human nature, but also for assuming that the social dimension of homo duplex alone serves as the ultimate and final reference for sacred forms. Much like contemporary existentialists who emphasize human finitude and the mystery of Being, Goffman uses Job's increasingly open psyche as his basis for understanding that beyond nature, beyond society, and beyond the individual lies a mystery of Being that continually surpasses, indeed itself engenders the ever-changing outlines of these other finite structures of existence. In the end, Goffman is perhaps more mythmaker than moralist, a religious poet who, for an age in which the traditional symbols of Being have been displaced by new cognitive forms, particularly those of science, magically transformed contemporary scientific language into archetypal symbols of the Sacred. Goffman's task was extremely difficult, one that would have strained the intellectual ingenuity and linguistic resources of a less talented man, namely the task of conveying to large numbers of relatively unprepared, deeply preoccupied and increasingly self-absorbed moderns a message about a completely unfashionable, economically useless and essentially ego-threatening mystery. Let us hope the large silence that now exists in his absence will not be filled by words less meaningful than his own.     

Sorokin as Lifelong Russian Intellectual: The Enactment of an Historically Rooted Sensibility

Prior to his 1922 emigration to Europe and thence to the United States, Pitirim Alexandrovich Sorokin had an exceptional intellectual and political career in Russia and the Soviet Union (Sorokin 1924, 1963a; Johnston 1995; Krotov 2005). Indeed, he was among the early founders of the science of sociology in his native land, where, according to a relatively recent bibliography (Sorokin 2000), he produced 162 Russian-language publications between the ages of 21 and 33. This listing includes not only book reviews and journal articles, but also substantial monographs and a two-volume theoretical treatise. While still a relatively young man, Sorokin had thus gained widespread recognition as a scholar of the first rank. He was also the initial chairperson (from 1919 to 1922) of a fledgling department of sociology at the University of Petrograd (St. Petersburg), an elected member of the national Constituent Assembly and an appointed staff member of the 1917 Provisional Government, the first democratic regime in Russia. This much would have sufficed for an entry in a sociological encyclopedia, and Sorokin’s political career has few parallels in the history of the field, other than the involvement of Emile Durkheim in French educational policy and the participation of Max Weber in creating the Weimar Republic in Germany. Nevertheless sociologists in the United States and most western historians of the field have not yet appreciated the full influence of the formative period, especially from 1905 to 1922. Lacking familiarity with Russian culture of that era and knowing little about the larger Russian socio-historical milieu, its intellectual discourse and collective memory, they have not been able to comprehend Sorokin’s outlook, behavior and professional output in the United States in relation to these earlier contextual factors. This is arguably a fundamental reason why many U.S. sociologists have tended to see Sorokin, especially since 1937, as a marginal figure and to regard his works largely as deviations from accepted social scientific practice. This paper will argue that a more adequate appreciation of Sorokin’s background and early adult life illumines both stylistic features of his works in America and also places into proper perspective several of his substantive foci that did not accord with contemporary “normal science” (Kuhn 1962). In short, despite his overall assimilation into American society and higher education, including his appointment at Harvard University and his election as president of the American Sociological Association, Sorokin should be understood in large measure as a life-long Russian intellectual. His was a Russian-born sensibility and consciousness—indeed a “Russian soul”—so deeply ingrained that it stamped his entire professional career in the United States, including his published researches, his popular sociology and his university teaching.     

Ignorance at Risk: Interaction at the Epistemic Boundary of Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi Scheme

Most long-lived organizational deceptions require the cooperation of outsiders who are close enough to the deception to suspect it, yet deliberately limit their knowledge so as to maintain plausible deniability. The interaction of such “proximate outsiders” with insiders—those who are fully “in the know”—can be a delicate affair, yet its careful management is essential to the survival of the deception. I analyze a phone conversation between Ponzi schemer Bernard Madoff and executives at Fairfield Greenwich, the investment firm that funneled him the most money, in which they discussed an impending SEC examination. First I examine Madoff’s attempts to cajole the executives into affirming (to Madoff and eventually to the SEC) that their hands-off approach to his operation was unremarkable. Next I consider two instances in which Madoff floundered in his explanations, repeatedly aborting and restarting sentences as he attempted to explain the inexplicable and reconcile the irreconcilable. Finally, I analyze Madoff’s handling of two of the executives’ more intrusive questions, and the part that each side played in the resulting non-answer. The three parts of the analysis illustrate what I argue are recurring and generalizable challenges of interaction at the epistemic boundary, associated with coaching, reconciling, and answering.     

With/Out a State,Kurds Rising: The Un/Stated Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq

Abstract

Located in northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) rules over an autonomous province in Iraq. Constitutionally, ‘Kurdistan Region’ is not independent, but empirically the KRG behaves as if it is a sovereign entity. With an elected parliament, a president, a prime minister, a cabinet, a flag, a national anthem, schools taught in Kurdish, and a booming economy, the ‘Kurdistan’ embodied by the KRG clearly exists empirically while unrecognized internationally. In this paper, I examine the rise of the KRG as an agent in international relations since the first Gulf War in 1991. I argue that foreign policy as a field of conduct and discourse has been central to the KRG's effective agency. In my analysis, I employ and interrelate Robert Jackson's work on ‘quasi-states’, Doug McAdam's argument on ‘political opportunity structures', and Giorgio Agamben's discussion on ‘indistinct zones of politics’ as in Iraq and the Middle East. Ultimately, I contend that while less than a full state in constitutional legal form, the KRG is more than a quasi-state in substance.¹1 See the official site of KRG at: http://cabinet.gov.krd/?l=12     

Similarities with a (Crucial) Difference: Reply to Commentaries by Shapiro and Marshall

Reviewing Sigmund Freud's essays and correspondence during World War I, we find that for the most part he minimized or denied the impact the war was having on him and his patients. Just as Sandor Ferenczi's emphasis on the impact of “real” childhood events and the “real” relationship between patient and analyst was seen as aberrant, so too was Ferenczi's warning Freud to leave Germany in 1933 Ferenczi , S. ( 1933 ). Confusion of tongues between adults and the child—the language of tenderness and of passion . Contemporary Psychoanalysis , 24 , 196 – 206 . [Google Scholar] treated as paranoia. Freud's later works apply his psychoanalytic theories to society as a whole but do not consider ways to “cure” social ills, so it is not surprising that Freud didn't hear Albert Einstein's famous question, Why War? as a plea for insight into how to end war. The author suggests a reconsideration of Einstein's question from the perspective of Buddhist psychology and finds a more optimistic albeit difficult answer.     

On morality and chemistry

Cartesian separation and enlightenment have led to a widespread conceptual separation of science and technology. Consequently a certain philosophical tradition holdspure science as a metaphysical striving for irrefutable truth that is morally neutral and only (dirty?) applications as morally accountable. An opposite extreme position holds scientists responsible for everything that is done with their discoveries. Based on an interpretation of science to be a social construct and the observation that moral criteria are the results of social processes the paper demonstrates by the example of synthetic chemistry that science is not an elite end in itself and as such is not free from obligation to moral criteria. The moral responsibility of a scientist, which arises from his professional expertise, is limited to the available knowledge of his discipline. The moral responsibility, which he carries beyond that as responsible acting human, derives from the cultural identity and the normative values under which his action is carried out. This conclusion is illustrated by the examples of DDT, Aspirin and Heroin.     

The discursive origins of Israeli separatism: The case of the Arab village

Conclusions We should note, however, that the achievements of the control system cannot in and of themselves explain the success of the discourse on the Arab village. Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, one must acknowledge today that what the control system produced was a secondary order reality at best, a representation superimposed over, and obscuring other social realities. It never managed (nor did it try) to stop the proletarianization of peasants. It never managed (though it did try) to put an end to illegal construction and de-facto urbanization. It did not even manage to repress the emergence of grass-roots national political organization in the villages. More often than not, its sole achievement was to obscure official (and academic) perception of these processes. Thus, one often finds nowadays settlements to which the term village is officially applied, while their physical structure already merits urban status. Urbanization took place in the villages regardless of the designs of planners, and this fact alone is enough to demonstrate how discourse detached them from reality. This was also why, in 1976, Orientalists and government experts were completely taken by surprise, when the committee for national direction (composed of village mayors!) organized mass demonstrations to protest government plans to confiscate more Palestinian lands. The events of this day, later known as land day, signaled the emergence of rural Palestinians as a national political force to be reckoned with. Quite contrary to what the notion of hamula struggle led them to believe, experts discovered that the villages were an effective mobilizing ground for national political action.I think it is precisely the dubious character of the achievements of the control system, arising from the systematic blindness inculcated by discourse, which demonstrates that these achievements were indeed of secondary importance in comparison with what was the raison d'etre of the control system and the discourse on the Arab village: their premier achievement was to reproduce the separatist character of Israeli identity. The origins of the control system were diverse indeed: they included divide and conquer practices developed by Arabists; land planning practices; modernization discourse formulated in response to immigration; cooptation strategies developed by the Labor party for electoral purposes; bifurcation of the labor market by Jewish labor unions. There is no one person or group responsible for these. What organized all these diverse practices together was the specific rationality of the control system. This rationality was not an economic one, nor political, nor scientific, nor was it given in any of these practices. It was identical with Israeli identity and the procedures that separate it from its other. This is why Israelis still adhere to the control system and the discourse on the Arab village, even though they fail to predict Palestinian behavior or control it (i.e., it was not their goal to begin with).It is ironic that the discourse on the Arab village would reach the height of its prestige just as the achievements of the control system were evaporating. The conjunction of these two events cannot be explained by the Weberian view of power as the realization of a will, i.e., by focusing on the interest of Jews in maintaining control over Palestinians. Such a view leads to an unavoidable contradiction: If the action of participants in the discourse and the control system is based on their interests, why are they unable to recognize their failure? And if they are not capable of monitoring their own interests, how were they able to create a coherent and effective control system? The answer is that their action is circumscribed by what discourse and the control system permit them to grasp, and this understanding is indeed both limited and enabled by the premier achievement of discourse and the control system: a position of a Western-modern Israeli subject, strictly demarcated from that of the traditional-Oriental rural Palestinian. Power is not so much exercised to realize an Israeli interest, as it is constitutive of the very self-understanding that underlies this interest, a self-understanding predicated on the rejection of the Orient and its exclusion.In this sense, this article merely provides the rough outlines for a future debate on the origins and nature of Israeli separatism. Such a debate has scarcely begun, but implicit understandings of separatism are implicated in the contemporary political debate in Israel. The mainstream of Israeli political thought tends to treat the separation between Jews and Palestinians as a taken-for-granted fact, a direct consequence of Zionism as a nation-building project. Others, on the political left, question this assumption and suggest that separatism should be understood as an institutional system erected in response to certain economic, military, or political interests, a system based on the control and exploitation of Palestinians by Jews.I think both positions limit the debate about separatism. By ignoring the cultural side of separatism, its character as an identity that requires a permanent effort of constitution, they supply an alibi for intellectuals and academics. These can continue using their disciplines and discourses, and even present these as sufficiently detached for a critique of Israeli politics, without examining their role in the reproduction of a separatist identity. Moreover, if separatism is understood merely as control over Palestinians, thus ignoring its side as the subjection of Jews, the consequence is that the distinction usurped by the Israeli upper class is mis-recognized. This class can continue to present its taste, values, and style of life - all those cultural arbitraries that are marked by the double exclusion of the Orient and the diaspora - as the sacred cultural consensus of Israeli society. It was my aim in this article, on the contrary, to demonstrate that separatism informs the core of Israeli culture, and thus the intellectual tools to understand it and fight it can not be taken from among what it consecrates.     

How do others influence our attitudes? Analysis of the primus inter pares effect and mediating variables associated with this process / ¿Cómo influyen los otros en nuestras actitudes? Análisis del efecto primus inter pares y variables mediadoras asociadas a ese proceso

The study examines whether there is a primus inter pares effect in the domain of prejudiced attitudes, where there is hardly any information on this effect. It also explores the relationship between the prejudiced attitudes perceived in others and one’s own and how this relationship influences our general prejudice. To do so, we compared two opposite hypotheses in two studies. The assimilation hypothesis suggests that attitudes perceived in others influence our own attitudes and our general prejudice. The social projection hypothesis claims that our attitudes influence the attitudes we perceive in others, and consequently our prejudice. A total of 243 students in compulsory secondary education participated in the first study, in which the attitudes towards fat¹1. While ‘fat’ is generally not a socially acceptable term in English, particularly in academic discourse, the authors of this article have suggest that ‘fat’ be used in the English translation for the sake of clarity and accuracy, because in Spanish the word gordo/a (‘fat’) was used precisely because the study was on prejudices.View all notes people were measured. In the second study, 442 psychology students participated, and we measured their attitudes towards Moroccan immigrants. In both studies, participants considered themselves less prejudiced than others, and their own attitudes mediated the relationship between the attitudes perceived in others and their general prejudice.     

Constructing a Sociology for an Icon of Aesthetic Modernity: Olympia Revisited

I address the problem of constructing a sociology of the artwork through analyzing one particular painting—Manet's Olympia . The painting is an acknowledged icon of modernist art and has been variously located in discourses concerning modernity, gender, and sexuality in the modern world. My purpose is to locate this painting and modernist painting generally in the social formation. While the interpretation of a particular work of art plays a central part, here the ground of that interpretation lies in social theory. Modernist art, and Manet's work in particular, is seen as a response to the growing disjunction between "instrumental" and "solidary" social relations—a disjunction fully acknowledged in the development of classical social theory. This changing relationship is reflected in the construction of discourses centered on value and motive . It is argued that Manet's modernism instantiates a spiritual resistance to the corruption of value by motive inherent in modernity and marked by a whole range of sociological discourses—commodification, alienation, rationality, disenchantment, and so forth. I identify a specific cultural configuration at the heart of bourgeois ideology involving gender and social class, and seek to show how Manet's painting subverts and deconstructs this configuration as a discourse of social formation. The semiotic possibilities made available by a modernist "presentational code"—the cultivation of flatness, the suppression of modelling and interaction, the use of dense allusive cultural reference, and the adaption of foreign and exotic pictorial techniques, etc.—are all seen as key to the deconstructive work that the painting accomplishes.     

The Political Subject of Self-immolation

Abstract

This article examines the political practice of protest by self-burning. Focussing on Mohammed Bouazizi's self-burning in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid in 2010, I explore the intellectual background for, and implications of, conceptualising such acts as ‘self-sacrifices’ or ‘self-immolations’. I argue that the use of the concept of sacrifice to define the politics of the act, given the difficulties in determining intentionality, is to focus only on its retrospective interpretation or semiotic capture. The result is that the self-annihilating subject is bypassed altogether, and his or her distinctively suicidal politicality is ignored. I argue that these subjects do not occupy political space due to a myth-making appeal to transcendence, heroic urge to sovereignty or assumed desire for community. Rather, drawing on Walter Benjamin, I argue that in such acts we bear witness to the shattering of sovereign order by a reminder to a politically constitutive excess.     

Ilyenkov on Aesthetics: Realism,Imagination, and the End of Art

It is sometimes claimed that Evald Ilyenkov's writings, particularly those on the problem of the ideal, best express the philosophical framework of Russian cultural-historical psychology and activity theory. In this article I consider a neglected part of Ilyenkov's legacy: his work on aesthetics. Ilyenkov's writings on art cast significant light on his views of culture and mind and on the humanistic vision at the center of his philosophy. In 1964, on a rare trip to the West, Ilyenkov visited an exhibition of pop art in Vienna. He was disgusted by what he saw and wrote a scathing critique entitled "Chto tam, v Zazerkal'e?" ("What's there, through the looking glass?"). Does Ilyenkov's antipathy to pop-and, indeed, to so-called modern art in general-show him to be enamored of a narrow, reactionary form of socialist realism? If so, how can this be squared with his reputation as a creative, critical voice within Soviet Marxism? I examine Ilyenkov's other writings on aesthetics in search of a nuanced interpretation of his reaction to pop. I consider his idea that art should serve to cultivate higher forms of perception and his attendant concepts of aesthetic sensibility and imagination, and I explore how these notions contribute to his view of the unity of the cognitive virtues, his hostility to the division of labor, and his ideal of genuine human activity, guided by reason. Such themes are vital constituents of Ilyenkov's humanism, which celebrates free, creative activity as a life principle that must assert itself against the mortifying forces of mechanization and standardization. Although these ideas may not entirely redeem Ilyenkov's hostility to modern art, they reveal his stance to be far more sophisticated than appears at first sight.     

Syntactic variation and beyond: Gender and social class variation in the use of discourse‐new markers1

The paper explores the relations between syntactic variation and the large‐scale social dimensions of gender and social class. It argues on the basis of an analysis of the marking of discourse‐new entities in interview speech that syntactic variants may frequently be involved in sociolinguistic variation, but indirectly, as just one of a broad set of choices that includes forms drawn from other components of language besides syntax. The analysis shows that although there is no sociolinguistic variation in the use of the strategies speakers use to mark discourse‐new information, there are significant social class and gender differences in the use of Noun Phrases that are not marked. Whilst acknowledging the risks of generalising on the basis of large‐scale social categories, an interpretation of these differences is suggested in relation to findings from previous research that suggest differences in the interactive style of different gender and social class groups. The paper discusses some implications of the analysis for the fields of language variation and change, and pragmatics.