Welfare Effects of Local versus Central Wage Bargaining

The paper analyses the welfare effects of union bargaining (de)centralization in a dual labour market with a unionized and a competitive sector. We show that social welfare depends on both the structure of the union's objective function and the elasticities of labour demand in both sectors. The welfare‐maximizing employment allocation can be obtained under a high degree of centralization if the union maximizes the total wage‐bill. Otherwise, if the union is rent maximizing, welfare is higher under local bargaining. However, in that case neither central nor local wage setting yields the social optimum.     

Employment‐protecting Labour Market Institutions and Inward Foreign Direct Investments

Abstract. This paper proposes labour market institutional arrangements as a strategic device to induce or deter export‐substituting inward foreign direct investments (FDI) — in either instance protecting domestic employment. In a union‐oligopoly context it is shown that, if the FDI‐associated unit costs (FC) are not high enough, then employment‐neutral (‐enhancing) inward FDI will emerge in equilibrium if the domestic wage setting is credibly centralized and the unemployment benefit is sufficiently high (low), each instance arising for a different range of — intermediate — FC values. If however the FC values are sufficiently high, then the centralized structure of wage setting along with a low enough unemployment benefit will deter employment‐reducing inward FDI.     

Trade Unions,Wage Bargaining Coordination,and Foreign Direct Investment

Conventional wisdom is that a high trade union bargaining strength and a system of coordinated wage bargaining reduce the attractiveness of an economy as a location for foreign direct investment, although there is limited evidence for this. The paper takes panel data for 19 OECD economies to examine the relationship between trade union bargaining strength, bargaining coordi nation, and a range of incentives for inward foreign direct investment. It finds a strong negative effect of trade union density on inward foreign direct investment, which is dependent on the degree of wage bargaining coordination. A high degree of coordination weakens the deterrent effect of high union density, which is consistent with the notion that under certain circumstances a coordinated increase in wages can increase profits of the multinationals by hurting domestic firms.     

Monopoly Union Wage Setting and Evaluation of Public Projects: An Intertemporal General Equilibrium Approach

ABSTRACT This paper contains cost-benefit rules for public projects in a small open economy with a tradeable and non-tradeable sector, where wage setting is done by a representative household. The interpretation, with regard to traditional trade union theory, is in terms of a general equilibrium version of a monopoly union model. The intertemporal character of the model makes it possible to consider public projects which involve the creation of infrastructure that improves the future productivity of both labour and capital. A special feature of the model is the introduction of endogenous investment behaviour. However, since private investment is optimally adjusted in the initial equilibrium, envelope properties guarantee that first-order projects will only have second-order repercussions through changed investment behaviour, which means that indirect changes in private investment do not enter the project evaluation rules for small projects.     

Unemployment Benefits and Employment Policies in the Presence of a Strong Trade Union: A Comparison

Abstract. The paper analyses, within a game theoretic approach, the consequences on private employment and real wages of a government policy of raising unemployment benefits following a fall in employment. The effects of such a policy are then compared with those arising from a more conventional demand policy. Under the policy regime described the reaction of the unions will cause, when the economy is hit by a negative shock on employment, a tendency for the real wage to rise and for private employment to decrease further. As far as the comparison of such policy with a policy of direct employment by the government is concerned we have reached the following conclusions. A policy based on unemployment benefit will give rise to a smaller increase in the real wage than a policy based on public employment if the change in the marginal utility of being employed due to change in the unemployment benefit is smaller than the utility that the union will obtain from an extra employed person. Moreover it appears that a policy based on unemployment benefits has a smaller negative effect on private employment, than a policy based on direct employment. if such a policy is adopted just after an employment benefits represent also a subsidy to the firms. We have shown that the effects on the real wage of the Policy rule considered are in this case stronger. The effects on employment depend on the relative strength of the union reaction and of the policy's supply side effects.     

Delegation and Wage Determination in Trade Unions

Delegation of wage determination is modelled as the transferral of decision‐making rights to better‐informed agents. The rank and file of trade unions has less information and can, therefore, benefit from delegation. However, delegation might be disadvantageous for union members, since delegates pursue their own objectives. Also, delegates might incur a utility reduction, since becoming a delegate implies forfeiting a better‐paid outside option. We investigate under what conditions delegation of wage bargaining power is beneficial for union members and their potential leaders. The wage and employment effects of delegation are derived.     

Union Power and (Un)Employment

Is the monopoly face of unions, i.e. their ability to enforce wages above what non-unionised firms would pay, harmful to employment and output? It is shown that a positive answer to this question is far less compelling than commonly held views based on a negatively sloped labour demand curve suggest. First, the labour demand curve may be irrelevant for the employment decision of unionised firms. Second, even if the labour demand curve is relevant, selfish union workers are likely to accept a system of wage discrimination which does away with discrepancies between the marginal product and the reservation wage. And third, the labour demand curve may have a positive slope.     

Union–Firm Bargaining as a Repeated Game and the Behaviour of Wages over the Business Cycle

This paper studies a repeated game between a union and a firm in the presence of revenue fluctuations. The simple setup, mainly based on Schultz’s (1995) model, gives support to the idea that the existence of a long-term relationship may change the predictions of the static one-shot model of wage and employment determination in unionized labour markets. In particular, when revenue is fluctuating and the discount factor is moderate the players can commit themselves to some ‘second best’ strategies, rather than playing non-cooperative strategies. As a consequence of the enforcement problems a flat wage over the business cycle may arise. This analysis suggests that ‘second best’ strategies allowing for a pro-cyclical wage as well as for a counter-cyclical wage are feasible. However, when the discount factor decreases and approaches a certain threshold value the parties cannot do better than play a wage constant over the cycle. Moreover, the resulting wage varies less than the employment level, in accordance with the empirical evidence.     

The Rise in Union Wage Premiums in South Africa

The earnings premium received by African, urban, male union members in South Africa, as compared to other regular, urban male employees, is explored using two national sample surveys conducted in 1985 and 1993. The historical setting of this change is of particular interest, in the light of the transformation from the apartheid regime. Union membership grew very rapidly during this interval, as earlier prohibitions on African unions were lifted. Subsequently, the high rates of unemployment and segmentation of the labor force have been issues of central concern to the new government, elected in 1994. In this context, the paper extends prior methodology, by systematically comparing possible approaches to estimation, in addition to contributing fresh empirical results. Four approaches to estimation are adopted, allowing for: a single earnings regime with union dummy variable; the possibility of different earnings regimes among union members as compared to non‐members; endogenous switching between such regimes; sample selection arising from lack of employment and from division between regular and informal work. A series of tests on nested specifications indicate the importance of recognizing endogenous switching between differing pay structures in the covered and uncovered sectors. However (as with previous research on the South African labor market), no sample selection is detected with respect to employment status. The results suggest that collective bargaining resulted in wage compression among the expanding union membership while significantly widening the gap between members and non‐members. The latter widening gap cannot be attributed to the changing composition of union membership as reflected in observed characteristics of employees.     

Risk Aversion,Collective Bargaining,and Wages in Germany

We develop an open‐shop model of trade union membership in which workers differ in their risk attitudes, and derive conditions under which the bargained wage will fall and union membership will increase with a general rise in risk aversion. Using data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel we define broad bargaining units and show that wages decline as average risk aversion of union members in these units rises, controlling for individual effects of risk aversion. Given a negative relationship between wages and employment, this suggests that secular changes in risk attitudes, because of an aging workforce or greater female labour force participation, can help to explain variations in the employment performance of unionized economies.     

Union Bargaining,Wage Differentials and Employment

Abstract. Reviewing empirical studies concerning the corporatism-flexibility-performance nexus the paper discusses decentralized and centralized bargaining systems. Revenue pay systems, concession bargaining and two-tier wage systems as means to enhance wage flexibility at the firm level are also considered. Both theoretical and empirical evidence is presented, showing that unions are bargaining for greater employment security for the already employed (the insiders). In return, unions are ready to accept greater wage flexibility and even wage decreases. By contrast, the insider-outsider theory does suggest how unions may accentuate involuntary unemployment, because there may be ways in which a union can help to raise the wages of the insiders without reducing their chances of continued employment.     

Trade Union Preferences in Double Dividend Models

This paper analyses wage formation in a unionized economy where consumers as an externality in their utility function have the level of local pollution. If modelled in a microeconomically consistent way this externality should also be present in the preferences of the trade union. The key result is that when this trade‐off between pollution and employment is included in the trade unions’ preferences then they are willing to lower wages to generate substitution towards higher employment and lower pollution. As a consequence, an increase in the pollution tax will lead to lower wages. At a more general level the results show that in models analyzing pollution issues, such as the double dividend literature, it is very important for the policy conclusions how trade unions are introduced.     

‘Investment’ in Union Membership: A Managerial Approach

This paper concerns wage formation in a unionized economy when union membership is endogenous and determined by employment. A union is run by a leadership which has as an objective to strengthen the union’s position in the labour market. This is achieved by building up membership. Among the results, it is found that since membership is determined by employment, the inclusion of the leadership’s preferences into a union’s objective function produces lower real wages than a static version would predict. It is also shown that an increase in the union’s rate of time preference increases the natural rate of unemployment, while an increase in the speed at which workers enter/leave a union has an opposite effect.     

Employment Protection and Labour Market Segmentation: the Fiftieth Anniversary of the “Cassa Integrazione Guadagni”

Abstract. This paper analyzes the evolution of the Cassa integrazione guadagni (CIG), according to 7 different theoretical models, which offer a classification for the different cases of application that have developed since its introduction, as well as for the many policy targets pursued by the Public Authorities. Then an assessment of the economic role of CIG is attempted, divided into three separate sections. The first is aimed at evaluating the economic long-term effect on macro performance, where the crucial balance is between a “crowding-out effect” on private investment and a “profit-maintenance effect” by lowering the effective wage rate. The second section approaches the employment consequences of the CIG by examining a second crucial balance: that between the protection granted to the employed and the obstacles raised for the employment of the non-employed (above all, freezing workers' turnover). This issue is tackled too in terms of the insider-outsider theory, showing the possible relevance of CIG in segmenting the labour market and keeping the wage rate dynamics. Finally the paper briefly examines the profound revision of the CIG recently approved by the Italian Parliament, aimed at avoiding excessive costs while enhancing labour mobility.     

The Role of Profit Sharing in Dual Labour Markets with Flexible Outsourcing

We combine profit sharing for high‐skilled workers and outsourcing of low‐skilled tasks in a partly imperfect dual domestic labour market, which means that only low‐skilled labour is represented by a labour union. In that framework we analyse how the implementation of profit sharing for high‐skilled workers influences the amount of outsourcing and the labour market outcome for low‐skilled worker. By doing this, we use some specific assumptions, e.g. exponentially increasing outsourcing costs or the wage for low‐skilled workers will be determined by a union whereas the wage for high‐skilled workers is given. Assuming that low‐skilled labour and outsourcing are interchangeable we show that profit sharing has a positive effect on the wage for low‐skilled workers and helps to decrease wage dispersion. However, under these circumstances, profit sharing enhances outsourcing. Concerning the employment effects for high‐ and low‐skilled workers, we show that there is an employment reducing effect due to higher wages for low‐skilled work, which can be offset by higher productivity of highly skilled workers, as the domestic labour inputs complement each other.     

Subsidies on Labour and Capital under Wage Bargaining

ABSTRACT: Micro-policy instruments are often grouped into labour subsidies and capital subsidies. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect on employment of labour and capital subsidies when the wage rate is endogeneous. The problem is studied within a sequential three-stage model, integrating the investment decision, wage-bargaining and the employment decision. The paper demonstrates that labour subsidies may fail, depending on technology and the risk aversion of the workers.     

Is Wage Leadership an Instrument to Coordinate Unions’ Wage Policy?The Case of Imperfect Product Markets

Given an oligopolistic product market, trade unions organized at firm level want to coordinate their bargaining activities. If for some exogenous reasons centralization is not possible, unions could try to coordinate wage setting by wage leadership. The outcome of such wage leadership is compared with that of an uncoordinated bargaining and is characterized by higher utilities for all unions. But wages and employment levels are not symmetrical either for unions or for firms. The leader firm employment decreases and the follower firm employment rises compared with uncoordinated bargaining. This may cause problems with the implementation of wage leadership.     

Changes in Union Membership Over Time: A Panel Analysis for West Germany

Abstract. Despite the apparent stability of the wage bargaining institutions in West Germany, aggregate union membership has been declining dramatically since the early 1990s. However, aggregate gross membership numbers do not distinguish between employment status and it is impossible to disaggregate these sufficiently. This paper uses four waves of the German Socio‐economic Panel in 1985, 1989, 1993, and 1998 to perform a panel analysis of net union membership among employees. We estimate a correlated random‐effects probit model suggested by Chamberlain (Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. II, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1984) to take proper account of individual‐specific effects. Our results suggest that at the individual level the propensity to be a union member has not changed considerably over time. Thus, the aggregate decline in membership is due to composition effects. We also use the estimates to predict net union density at the industry level based on the IAB employment subsample for the time period 1985–97.     

Productivity,Real Wages and Worker Rights: A Cross-National Comparison

ABSTRACT: High unemployment in Europe has led many economists to recommend labour market deregulation — the removal of obstacles to labour market flexibility. These “obstacles” include union power, employment protection legislation and income security arrangements. We argue that such worker rights promote productivity and real wage growse effects. Policy-makers should be aware of these positive effects on productivity and real wage growth when considering curtailing worker rights in order to reduce unemployment.     

Macroeconomic Effects of Public‐Sector Unions

Motivated by the highly unionized public sectors, the high public shares in total employment, and the public‐sector wage premia observed in Europe, this paper examines the importance of public‐sector unions for macroeconomic theory. The model generates cyclical behavior in hours and wages that is consistent with data behavior in an economy with highly unionized public sector, namely Germany during the period 1970–2007. The union model is an improvement over a model with exogenous public employment. In addition, endogenously determined public wage and hours add to the distortionary effect of contractionary tax reforms by generating greater tax rate changes, thus producing higher welfare losses.