A Fifth Generation of Revolutionary Theory is Yet to Come

Despite revolution's recent return to the world stage, the progress of revolutionary theory has markedly stalled. While some have argued that recent work on the 2011 Arab Spring constitutes a new, misguided ‘fifth generation’ of theory, I show this claim to be misplaced, demonstrating the remarkable continuity between foundational fourth‐generation scholarship and present‐day analyses. Furthermore, I critically analyse the theoretical, methodological and professional obstacles which fourth‐generation theory has encountered, concluding that scholars must move beyond the fourth generation if we are to surmount them. Finally, I consider the theoretical, methodological and ethical prospects of a true fifth generation of revolutionary theory.     

Reflections on the revolutionary wave in 2011

The “Arab Spring” was a surprising event not just because predicting revolutions is a difficult task, but because current theories of revolution are ill equipped to explain revolutionary waves where interactive causal mechanisms at different levels of analysis and interactions between the units of analysis predominate. To account for such dynamics, a multidimensional social science of revolution is required. Accordingly, a meta-framework for revolutionary theory that combines multiple levels of analysis, multiple units of analysis, and their interactions is offered. A structured example of theory building is then given by detailing how the development of world cultural models and practices challenge existing political structures, affect mobilization processes, and make diffusion more likely. A structured example of study design using qualitative comparative analysis of 16 Middle Eastern and North African countries provides support for the interaction of subnational conditions for mobilization, state-centered causes, and transnational factors, including a country’s linkage to world society, as one explanation of the Revolutions of 2011.     

The impact of the Arab Spring on democracy and development in the MENA region

In evaluating the consequences of the Arab Spring 8 years later, this paper not only focuses on the short‐term consequences of the uprisings that swept through a number of countries in the Middle East and North African region but also analyzes the long‐term prospects for democratization and development in the MENA region. The impact of the Arab Spring, despite its promises and the expectations of the rest of the world, has been dismal. While only Tunisia made a successful transition to a democratic polity with a constitution guaranteeing the basic rights of the people, the rest of the Arab Spring countries remain in the grip of the authoritarian rule, and countries such as Syria, Libya, and Yemen have been degenerated into bloody civil wars with dwindling hope of peace and freedom. On economic front, the growth has been tardy, showing little difference with countries that were unaffected by the Arab Spring. Yet, the paper concludes, echoing historian Eric Hobsbawm's view, that revolutionary outcomes need not be judged as failure too quickly as they are likely to be partial success in the long term. The impact may be observed in the area of social opening, newer class alliances, and the emergence of a less rapacious, reformed, hybrid authoritarianism.     

Toward a Regeneration of Revolutionary Theory

Revolutionary theorists are currently immersed in a critical debate about the future of the field. Allinson has argued that a fifth generation of revolutionary theory has passed us by without our noticing, while I have contended that it is revolutionary theory's fourth generation that is decidedly imperilled. Ritter and Beck – for their part- contend that we should reject the very idea of theoretical ‘generations’, and instead think of progress in revolutionary theory as a series of ongoing and settled debates about certain key topics. The pair contend that revolutionary theory has reached a consensus on two core debates: defining our object of study and determining appropriate methods. Contrary to this position, I argue that while there is much to praise about rejecting generational imagery, doing so necessarily entails that we also critique the self-proclaimed ‘fourth generation' with which such imagery is intertwined. Furthermore, I argue that there does not yet exist consensus among revolutionary theorists about a single definition of revolution, or on the question of which methods to use. Finally, I call for a regeneration of revolutionary theory which moves genuinely beyond the generational mythologies of the past.     

Prior reputation and the transition from image repair to image makeover: The case of Hosni Mubarak

Through an analysis of Hosni Mubarak's speeches made over the course of the Arab Spring, this study examined Mubarak's response to criticism about his role in the crisis and the resultant attempt to repair his image. The study thereby draws attention to the image repair strategies of an individual with a negative prior reputation in a crisis. Data indicate that Mubarak's negative prior reputation resulted in his attempting not just an image repair as image repair discourse theory would suggest but rather a more complex image makeover. The cultural significance of his rhetorical choices and the implications for theory are discussed.     

North Central Sociological Association 2012 Ruth and John Useem Plenary Address. Political Renewal: Occupations,Springs, and Tea Parties

Novelty is paramount in the development of sociological theory—so much so that sometimes novelty is attributed even when it does not really exist. The study of social movements is hardly exempt from this problem and at times the craving for newness can become palpable. Despite that desire, however, some have concluded that things really have not changed much over a score of years—at least in terms of the implications for theory—but now, we think the time has finally come. Three recent mobilizations have provided us with something new into which we can sink our collective teeth. The Tea Party, the Arab Spring, and Occupy Wall Street represent changes in the motivations and tactics driving social and political change that can renew the study of protest and collective political influence. These three bursts of political behavior reveal important edges of social movement study even as they exhibit roots in the now classic ideas in the field.     

纳赛尔的阿拉伯统一思想及其当代影响

阿拉伯统一是纳赛尔主义的核心。阿拉伯统一思想并非纳赛尔的发明，但对于阿拉伯统一的途径、依靠的基本力量、统一的原则等关键问题，纳赛尔在理论和实践上都进行了深入探索。强调阿拉伯世界的政治团结和统一，突出埃及在阿拉伯统一中的核心作用，将阿拉伯统一与社会革命相联系等都是纳赛尔阿拉伯统一思想的重要特点。纳赛尔主义所强调的阿拉伯团结思想、社会公正思想以及宗教政策对当前阿拉伯世界的团结和现代化仍有很强的现实意义。     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF THE ARAB SPRING

There were large differences in the responses of Arab dictators to the Arab Spring protests. To understand these differences, I present a stylized model of how a dictator responds to mass protests for democratization in a polarized country with two ethnic or religious groups. In this model, the dictator's response crucially depends on oil revenues and his affiliation to either the majority or the minority group. I document that the model's predictions are consistent with the observed differences in the Arab dictators' responses. Hence, ethnic politics and religious divides may play an important role in political transitions and regime changes. (JEL D72, D74)     

The Arab Spring for Women? Representations of Women in Middle East Politics in 2011

This article explores the complex, liminal, and difficult space in which stories of women in “the Arab Spring” were wielded as parts of political narratives of gender, race, class, religion, democracy, and Westernization in Western media as the Arab Spring unfolded. It examines those stories by using the tools of postcolonial feminism. After briefly describing what is meant by (gender and) the Arab Spring, the article outlines a method for evaluating the significations of the media narratives surrounding it. We find two dissonant narratives (of gender as emancipatory and of gender as problematic) and ask what assumptions about gender (and sex and race and culture) have to be made to produce these particular representations. We argue that the dissonant narratives have in common using the situation of women as a barometer for the success of Westernization, liberalization, and democratization. The article concludes by exploring the implications of these findings.     

Refusing to be co-opted: revolutionary multicultural education amidst global neoliberalisation

Abstract

In this article, I explore how neoliberalism dictates the terms of debate about education reform and equity in the U.S. and abroad. In particular, I explain how two paradigmatic reforms – the edTPA evaluation for preservice teachers in the United States and the global initiative Teach For All – have co-opted the discourse of multicultural education in an attempt to advance their own priorities and not those at the heart of the field, thus jeopardising the possibility of real justice. Finally, I envision a way forward, through a theory of revolutionary multicultural education, as we seek to reimagine the terms of debate about the goals of educating all students.     

Ideology, culture, and ambiguity: The revolutionary process in Iran

Conclusion To varying degrees, polysemous appeals are a feature of nearly all political coalitions and negotiations. But they are especially important in revolutions in which mass protests accompany a sudden collapse and elimination of the old regime state. In such a situation, it is not the case that a few coalition planks are ambiguous in an otherwise institution-alized political structure; instead, even the main outlines of how politics will operate in a new regime is undetermined. Given the chaos and uncertainty, revolutionary unity necessarily focusses upon rejection of the regime itself, and revolutionaries appeal to widely familiar cultural images (as in the appeal to Islam) whose durability within the society has depended on a degree of flexibility in interpretation and application. There is neither time nor reason for the opposition coalition to settle upon a detailed post-revolutionary program.Ambiguous (i.e., polysemous) ideology is an essential component of revolutionary unity and sets the stage for the struggle over the meaning of the revolution, after the fall of the old regime. Different factions struggle over the particular meaning of the images and concepts that had united the revolutionary coalition as a whole. However, this ambiguity makes quite probable an outcome in which revolutions eat their children; the initial revolutionary unity cannot possibly survive, as the construction of a new revolutionary state will necessarily reject some interpretations of the meaning of ambiguous revolutionary ideology.Particularly astute revolutionary leaders - Khomeini or Lenin, for instance - can take advantage of such a situation to create a new revolutionary state in their own image, before many of their potential adversaries fully understand what is happening or how most effectively to resist. In such a case, there often is no obvious, specific program that could truly represent the coalition as a whole, or even a majority of it. The faction that defines the ideology of the revolution by taking control of revolutionary state formation and suppressing alternatives may forever remain a minority. To take one illustration, while both the Bolsheviks and the Islamic Republican Party redefined political discourse, in both cases voting patterns suggested their minority status even after the seizure of power. The Bolsheviks, outpolled by the Socialist Revolutionaries, remained a minority in the voting for the Constituent Assembly after the October Revolution, and thus disbanded the assembly. As the Islamic Republic was institutionalized as a theocracy, voting participation steadily declined. There remains broad opposition to the clerical regime among many initial supporters of the revolution.Nevertheless, while revolutions are situations in which ambiguity is likely to be especially significant, there are different kinds of revolutions; ambiguity will matter more or less depending on exactly how the revolutionary crisis emerges and plays itself out. (Thus the following discussion is partly a response to Skocpol's call for a closer examination of the different revolutionary circumstances that allow ideology to have different kinds of effects.)In some revolutions (though the exception more than the rule) unifying revolutionary ideology will be more specific than the connotative images and concepts that unified the Iranian opposition to the Shah. This is especially likely when there is a revolutionary group poised to implement a program (after the fall of the old regime) because it has a history as an organized, clearly dominant opposition, with an identifiable program and a mass following. This fact may explain why Poland, benefitting from the earlier establishment of Solidarity, at least initially seemed more directed than some of its neighbors in establishing a new political and social order after the collapse of communist states in 1988–1989.Solidarity, then, is an example of the fact that the more time there is for the identity and intentions of a revolutionary group to become known, the less likely that such a group can hide behind an ambiguous program. Protracted civil war is another context that will generally clarify the ideologies of the adversaries, though those adversaries may have initially been united by an ambiguous ideology. And the context of civil war will place great pressure on all organized political groups to choose one side or another.However, sudden revolutionary crises may involve some political floundering for some time, in cases where there is not a long-standing, organized opposition and there do not emerge leaders with a coherent revolutionary vision and the strategic skill to take advantage of the ambiguous ideology and uncertain outcome of revolutionary situations. In the absence of leaders willing or able to negotiate through such unknown terrain, to construct a new state on the basis of a new program - without turning allies into adversaries too quickly - the ultimate meaning of the revolution may be contested for some time. In the case of Madero's anti-reelection revolution in Mexico, for example, mass mobilization and sudden victory over the Diaz regime was followed by the absence of any coherent program, and a subsequent slide into chaos and civil war. A different version of this scenario may be developing in much of Eastern Europe today. Clearly the nations of Eastern Europe experienced sudden state collapse precipitated by mass mobilization. Participants experienced the ectasy and unity of opposition to, and sudden success against, the old regime. But it quickly became unclear what was to be done next. In some cases, there was an apparent commitment to a free-market ideology, but there was little commitment to the details and difficulties that a free-market program would actually entail. While free-market advocates initially appeared dynamic and exciting, their ultimate success may prove superficial. In other cases, as in the former Czechoslovakia, there seemed to be less a post-revolutionary program than an uncertain pattern of continued dismantling of the past, with no obvious replacement offered to guide the future.In such cases, where dominant factions do not commit themselves to a coherent program, Goldstone's explanation of the rise of nationalism may be quite relevant. He argues that nationalism becomes the rallying cry, to a large extent, because revolutionary leaders are unable to deliver on initial promises about economic rejuvenation. Nationalism has of course been one of the primary ideological developments in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Goldstone's schema also helps explain revolutions in which no faction attempts, or is able, to implement a coherent program soon after the fall of the old regime. For example, in cases where the initial crisis weakens but does not eliminate the old regime state, and elites and masses do not both emphasize total elimination of a hated regime, the revolutionary crisis can initiate a protracted process of increasing revolutionary mobilization best explained by Goldstone's approach. Such would be the case in the French Revolution, for example, where none of the main revolutionary players initially advocated what ultimately became the program of the revolution. Still, even in such cases, ambiguous propositions can be a powerful aspect of unifying ideology: Goldstone notes that, in the heady early days of the French Revolution, the will of the people was the one principle that all accepted for the resolution of conflicts.... One could add to Goldstone's observation that this unifying principle was a very ambiguous one.There are additional factors that may be relevant to the role of ambiguity in revolutionary process and ideology, and whose significance is worthy of further inquiry. For example, it seems likely that some significant degree of shared cultural or political identity is necessary for an ambiguous ideology to serve as a point of unity at all. Thus, while ethnic divisions in Iran were certainly significant in the revolution, the main revolutionary proponents thought of themselves fundamentally as Iranians and, usually, as Shiites. However, to unite ideologically all the societies of the former Soviet Union, after the August 1991 failed coup, would have required such extensive ambiguity as to be unworkable. While the images and concepts that unite a diverse revolutionary coalition can be quite general in nature and subject to diverse interpretations, they do have to be shared and strongly felt.The Iranian Revolution demonstrated how significant shared but unspecified revolutionary ideology can be; and Ayatollah Khomeini and the clerical radicals demonstrated what new ideological directions a revolution can take as a result of the perilous and uncertain struggle to define the new regime of meaning that is a crucial aspect of revolutionary states.     

Fanon on Decolonization and Revolution: Bodies and Dialectics

This article sets up a conversation with Frantz Fanon about his stretching of dialectics. Against a backdrop where multiple dominant epistemologies of political theory and international relations presume and are shaped by a segregation of the world into anarchy and the desire for an ordered global, Fanon's reading of imperialism's effects in the Wretched of the Earth is of utmost relevance. First, Fanon's work allows us to think dialectics along with ‘globality’ and to confronting dominant presumptions about a Manichean world: anarchy, order, and ‘bodies.’ He focuses on colonization and the White–Black relation and the radical dehumanization of the Other (Black, colonial slave, non-European, etc.). Second, his engagement of colonial violence pushes him to stretch dialectics, reactivating the ‘partially neutralized antagonisms.’ In addition, Fanon wants to think revolutionary practice as a kind of internationalism which will reunite into its own humanness in an open-ended-way—a world where no human being will be subject to dehumanization. I conclude with some ideas on what a revolutionary thinking about a revolutionary subjectivity, movement and thought entails for revolutionary struggles and dialectics today.     

Local Solidarities: How the Arab Spring Protests Started

Coming as a surprise to most observers and following the self‐immolation of a street vendor in a remote town of central Tunisia, the Jasmine Revolution of 2010–2011, the first uprising of the Arab Spring, has often been seen as a success story for digital communication through widespread use of social media. We suggest that this applied to the later phase of the protests in Tunisia but not to the initial phase, which occurred in local areas in impoverished and marginalized regions with highly limited access to the Internet. The initial phase lasted a full 10 days before the protests reached major cities where social media operated. Building on Tilly's concept of trust network, we offer the concept of local solidarities as key to the beginning of the Arab Spring uprisings and as encompassing spatial proximity, shared marginalized status, and kinship, all of which combined to serve as a basis for trust and collective action.     

What was Bitcoin,what will it be? The techno-economic imaginaries of a new money technology

In its first decade, Bitcoin has not proven to be a practical money form for most circumstances, but it has become a staging ground for debate around the cultural role of money in society. This debate is poised between two related but ultimately incompatible techno-economic imaginaries: infrastructural mutualism and digital metallism. Each offers a theory not just of money, but also of relations, identities, and the larger imaginaries we call ‘society’ and ‘the economy’. In particular, they offer distinct visions of what it means to be a ‘peer’ in a peer-to-peer money system, and perhaps, a peer-to-peer society. This article traces the pre-history of Bitcoin, as well as more recent developments, to inquire about its future, as well as the future of money more broadly.     

Youth mobilisations and political generations: young activists in political change movements during and since the twentieth century

This paper uses political generations theory to examine the main youth mobilisations during and since the twentieth century: pre-1939 fascist and communist movements; the student movements of the 1960s and 70s; movements that challenged colonial and neo-colonial rulers in less developed countries and young people's involvement in the revolutions that saw the end of communism in East-Central and South-East Europe in 1989. Conclusions from this review of the past are used in considering the likely significance of subsequent outbursts of political activism among young people: the ‘colour revolutions’ and other instances of youth mobilisation in former Soviet republics and other ex-communist countries; the Arab Spring and the series of movements that have challenged neo-liberalism – Anti-Globalisation, the Indignados and the Occupy movements. The paper notes that youth mobilisations that have led to the formation of new political generations that have changed their countries' politics then transformed the countries have typically extended over several decades, that initially youthful leaders have sometimes been middle-aged or older before achieving political power and that many of their actions on achieving power have been at variance with their youthful ideals. In conclusion, it is argued that it is still too early to tell whether any of the recent youth mobilisations signal the formation of new political generations.     

Political Stability After the Arab Spring

The task to reshape governments in the countries confronted with the Arab Spring prompts the question whether there are necessary conditions to realize a stable society that simultaneously seeks to eliminate the elements that have led to the uprisings. Acknowledging some constitutional rights seems indispensable in such a process. I argue that such a state of affairs is indeed the case, at least now that the “old” justifications to differentiate between people do not suffice anymore. That is not to say that the countries involved will have identical laws in each respect, but merely that a common basis has to be realized, manifested in political and legal equality, so this given does not derogate from the fact that each country's specific legislation needs to be shaped in the light of its own history. Such a basis has no “moral” character, but is a necessary condition to prevent sedition.     

Beyond the stereotypical implications of terrorism: a sociological investigation of Arab immigrants

Post 11 September 2001, terrorism has emerged as the defining stereotype of Arab immigrants. As a result, the study of Arab immigrants has become susceptible to stereotypes because in an era of unprecedented diversity sociological investigation has neglected spirituality. Among the various Arab populations spirituality is fundamental. Subsequently any investigation of Arab immigrants is impossible without acknowledgement of a spiritual dimension in the form of Islam. Moving beyond the stereotypical implications of terrorism will require Western sovereignties to be more informed about the Arab culture. Otherwise, their lack of effort will destine the uninformed to the stereotypical implications of terrorism that will not be limited to Arab immigrants but extend to other populations as well.     

The willingness to emigrate in six MENA countries: The role of post-revolutionary stress

This paper studies the determinants of emigration from six Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries in light of the Arab Spring of 2011. The aim is to determine if the economically unfortunate events which occurred as a result of the Arab Spring, resulted in a brain drain for many countries. The paper's analysis is conducted using the Arab Transformation Project dataset of the year 2014 by employing an ordered probit model. The paper's main conclusion is that sentiments of unhappiness appear to be the primary determinant of the willingness to emigrate. Other post-revolutionary feelings include lack of trust and political and democratic discontent, which highly encourage the willingness to emigrate. In addition, socio-economic factors, such as being young, male, and highly educated, contribute to the willingness to emigrate. However, married individuals are less likely to consider emigration.     

Qualitative computing--a methods revolution?

Qualitative computing is often described by enthusiasts as revolutionary, but in stark contrast, its methodological innovations are rarely discussed. Why is the debate missing? The paper charts some of the major developments in support for coding and theory-building, exploring the many reasons why these are either taken for granted or unrecognized and often unused. Whilst these tools had the potential to change methods, their adoption and their impact have been uneven, and they have been subjected to remarkably little sharp and critical debate. The paper concludes by asking what is required if researchers are to benefit from and drive this technological change.     

Lineages of the Islamic State: An International Historical Sociology of State (De-)Formation in Iraq

Existing accounts of the Islamic State (IS) tend to rely on orientalist and technicist assumptions and hence insufficiently sensitive to the historical, sociological, and international conditions of the possibility of IS. The present article provides an alternative account through a conjunctural analysis that is anchored in an international historical sociology of modern Iraq informed by Leon Trotsky's idea of ‘uneven and combined development’. It foregrounds the concatenation of Iraq's contradictory (post-)colonial nation-state formation with the neoliberal conjuncture of 1990-2014. It shows that the former process involved the tension-prone fusion of governing institutions of the modern state and the intermittent but steady reproduction, valorization, and politicization of supra-national (religious-sectarian) and sub-national (ethno-tribal) collective identities, which subverted the emergence of an Iraqi nation. The international sanctions regime of the 1990s transformed sectarian and tribal difference into communitarian tension by fatally undermining the integrative efficacy of the Ba’ath party's authoritarian welfare-state. Concurrently, the neo-liberal demolition of the post-colonial authoritarian welfare states in the region gave rise to the Arab Spring revolutions. The Arab Spring however elicited a successful authoritarian counter-revolution that eliminated secular-nationalist forms of oppositional politics. This illiberal neoliberalisation of the region's political economy valorised the religionisation of the domestic effects of the 2003 US-led destruction of the Iraqi state and its reconstruction on a majoritarian basis favouring the Shi’as and hence transforming sectarian tension into sectarian conflict culminating in IS. Thus, IS is, the paper demonstrates, the result of neither an internal cultural pathology nor sheerly external forces. Rather, it is the novel product of an utterly historical congealment of the intrinsically interactive and multilinear dynamics of socio-political change.