Rational Choice Theory or Pretense? The Claims,Equivalences, and Analogies of the “Economic Approach to Human Behavior”

The article argues and demonstrates that classical–neoclassical economics generally does not pretend or claim that its principles apply to domains beyond the economy, specifically wealth, and does not equate the economic and the noneconomic, and the rational and the nonrational. By contrast, the “economic approach to human behavior” or “rational choice theory” precisely does this to legitimize itself by invoking classical–neoclassical economics as supreme authority and its representatives as venerable precursors. The article reveals the economic approach to human behavior as a set of grand theoretical and methodological claims, equivalences, and analogies from the standpoint of conventional economics itself, as well as sociology and other social sciences. It identifies and examines certain indicative instances of such tendencies. The article aims to contribute to understanding better the relations—or rather lack thereof—between conventional economics and contemporary economic and sociological rational choice theory. The economic approach to human behavior is not new, even outside the market sector. The rational choice model provides the most promising basis presently available for a unified approach to the analysis of the social world by scholars from different social sciences. — Gary Becker With respect to those parts of human conduct of which wealth is not even the principal object, to these political economy does not pretend that its conclusions are applicable. — John S. Mill But economy does not treat of all human motives. There are motives nearly always present with us, arising from conscience, compassion, or from some moral or religious source, which economy cannot and does not pretend to treat. These will remain to us as outstanding and disturbing forces; they must be treated, if at all, by other appropriate branches of knowledge. — William Jevons A science, therefore, based on the hypothesis (of universal rationality) would yield a general form of the social phenomenon having little or no contact with reality … — Vilfredo Pareto     

TRENDS IN POLITICAL TOLERANCE

Some researchers find a substantial increase in political tolerancesince the 1950s, while others find the increase to be "illusory"—thepublic is more tolerant now of leftists, but has simply foundother targets on which to vent its intolerance. Reanalysis andthe addition of more extensive trend data from 1940 to 1985suggest that the shift does seem primarily to reflect increasedtolerance of leftists, but that the public has not found othergroups to be intolerant of. Measured tolerance has fluctuatedgreatly over the period, reflecting mainly changes in perceptionsof threat from putatively subversive groups, especially domesticCommunists. Also, the public's grasp of, and selfinterestedconcern about, civil liberties seems so minimal that one mightargue not that the public is substantially tolerant or intolerant,but that it has no really tangibly measurable "attitude" onthe subject one way or the other.     

Fragments of development: Nation, gender, and the space of modernity

Imagine any process of economic development. How do the social,political, and economic interact in your imaginary development?Who is active and who is passive? What stands in the way? Howis success or failure measured? Who is then credited or blamed?The ways that we think about development are at least partiallyreflective of essentialist constructions that have been producedby societal and theoretical discourses. Bergeron has examinedboth mainstream and critical bodies of literature and emergedwith a powerful set of observations regarding these constructions. The discursive analyses in Fragments of Development demonstrate     

ON LEGITIMALAISE IN THE UNITED STATES:

This article argues that Weberian principles of rational/legal legitimacy do not presently support American political institutions effectively. Instead, these institutions are characterized by "legitimalaise," a condition that Weber himself foresaw. This article provides evidence to support this thesis. It then discusses the distinctive political consequence of legitimalaise, that is, structural innovation, or the more or less permanent reform of American political institutions. It concludes with doubt that structural innovation will establish rational/legal legitimacy anew or that new forms of political legitimacy will emerge in the twenty-first century.     

Fragments of development: Nation, gender, and the space of modernity

Imagine any process of economic development. How do the social,political, and economic interact in your imaginary development?Who is active and who is passive? What stands in the way? Howis success or failure measured? Who is then credited or blamed?The ways that we think about development are at least partiallyreflective of essentialist constructions that have been producedby societal and theoretical discourses. Bergeron has examinedboth mainstream and critical bodies of literature and emergedwith a powerful set of observations regarding these constructions. The discursive analyses in Fragments of Development demonstrate     

Economic development and the transition to democracy a formal model

In this essay, we have developed a rational choice model to study the transition to democracy. Such a model implies that the change or maintenance of a political system is the result of rational decisions by individuals, interest groups, and political parties under specific constraints. Our analysis shows that political systems are critically dependent upon the level of economic development. If a nation is at the lower stage of economic development, and, particularly, if its citizenry is poorly educated, the nation would lean toward choosing a dictatorship. As the nation accumulates more and more reproducible capital, it will tend to move toward democracy. Similarly, the model shows that, as the cost of democracy becomes lower and lower over time, a democratic system is likely to be chosen as the political infrastructure for social and economic development. Received: 15 February 1995 / Accepted: 23 June 1997     

Robert M. Teeter, 1939-2004

Robert M. "Bob" Teeter—political pollster, key strategistin the campaigns of every Republican president from 1968 to1992, co-director with Peter Hart of the Wall Street Journal/NBCPoll, board member and consultant to major corporations—diedof cancer at his home in Ann Arbor, Michigan, on June 13. Hewas 65. "Teeter’s work with Hart evoked respect on both sidesof the political aisle," said Tim Russert, NBC News’sWashington bureau chief and host of Meet the Press. "You could always take Bob Teeter’s     

Masochism and the female sexual role

The present study compared the contraceptive risk‐taking behavior (CRT) of 35 white and 28 black, unwed, sexually active, young (ages 14 to 18) female outpatients in mental health clinics with a record of chronic contraceptive rejection, with that of a matched group of clinically unlabelled (normal) subjects. The subjects' offered CRT explanations were categorized by independent judges and subjected to multifactor contingency analyses and post‐hoc contrast procedures. The results indicated no differences between the clinical and normal subjects, but within groups, clinically‐oriented explanations tended to be more frequent than political‐economic explanations among white subjects, while the reverse held true for black subjects. In addition, 90 college students were asked to state what they considered a rational CRT response, as well as what CRT response they would expect from a hypothetical unwed, sexually active, 16‐year‐old female contraceptive rejector described as either white, or black, or not mentioned by race. The results indicated that clinically‐oriented CRT explanations were expected for the white contraceptive rejector, political‐economic CRT explanations were expected and seen as rational for the black contraceptive rejector, and situa‐tional CRT explanations were attributed most often when the race of the contraceptive rejector was not mentioned. The results are discussed in terms of clinical, rational, and social‐psychological models in current CRT research.     

The British Community Development Project: Lessons for today

This paper looks back at the experience of the first Britishpoverty programme, the national Community Development Project(CDP), which operated from 1969 to 1978. The "radical" projectswithin CDP comprehensively rejected the official governmentview of the nature and causes of, and solutions to, povertyand urban deprivation. The roots of the radical CDP perspectiveare to be located within the political character of the periodamong other factors. The paper offers a retrospective accountof the strengths and limitations of CDP.     

EXPERIMENTS WITH THE MIDDLE RESPONSE ALTERNATIVE IN SURVEY QUESTIONS

A series of experiments shows (1) that people are significantlymore likely to select the middle response alternative on anissue when it is explicitly offered to them as part of the questionthan when it is omitted; (2) that merely mentioning that thereis a middle alternative, in the preface to the question, makesit more likely that respondents will select it, even thoughit is not offered to them as an explicit choice; (3) that theorder in which the middle alternative is presented in the question—inthe middle or last position—can make a significant differencein the results, but that a "recency bias" does not occur invariably,or consistently; and (4) that people who select a middle responsealternative when it is offered would not necessarily answerthe question in the same way as other respondents if forcedto choose sides on the issue.     

Community development in the west of Ireland: twenty years on in the Killala area

This research returns to a 1986 Community Development Journalarticle, which highlighted the unique and successful locallydriven community development efforts in Killala, western Ireland.Since then, a variety of social, economic, and political changeshave taken place, which have reshaped Ireland and the capacityfor local community action. Twenty years on, this communitywas revisited with the goal of assessing the changes, as wellas to determine community characteristics that have persisted.This article seeks to provide an update on local conditions,presents an in-depth exploration of local grassroots efforts,and builds on the previous case study by providing an empiricalexploration of the factors shaping local community agency –a mixed-method framework consisting of extensive key informantinterviews, focus groups, and household survey data.     

Reexamining economic sociology: Beyond rational choice reductionism

The article aims at reexamining the origins and character of economic sociology by comparison with rational choice within the history of economic and social ideas, particularly neoclassical economic and classical sociological theory. Some suggestions for a rational choice approach to economic sociology are particularly curious in that they tend to conflate the distinct characters and origins of these two disciplines throughout this history and have in turn provided an impetus for this reexamination. Modern rational choice theorists display a predilection for reducing economic (and, all) sociology into an economic approach to human behavior, with many economic sociologists evincing some degree of lenience or benevolence vis-à-vis such tendencies. Both tendencies do not seem justified in light of the different nature and origin of economic sociology and rational choice in the history of social and economic ideas. Since the current literature lacks coherent attempts at specifying the nature and historical roots of economic sociology versus those of rational choice, the article contributes toward filling in this hole.     

The question of mathematical social theory revisited: Some methodological considerations

Methodologically, the most advanced social science discipline is considered economics, especially its neoclassical version. A number of practitioners in the other social sciences, especially sociology and political science, perceive economics as a scientific exemplar in methodological (and theoretical) terms. This methodological exemplar has been, particularly in the last decades, attempted to emulate by some of these social scientists. The outcome of this emulation, by adopting and extending its methods, of neoclassical economics in parts (but not all) of sociology, political science, and elsewhere has been rational choice theory as a general social paradigm. This paper tries to show that many misapplications of the methodology of neoclassical economics in rational choice theory have ensued from such methodological emulation. That neoclassical economics does not necessarily contain or lead to a mathematical rational choice model is the core argument of this paper. The paper fills in a gap created by the current literature’s focus on the methodological bases of mathematical rational choice theory in neoclassical economics.     

Theoretical Implications of Regional Effects

Local economic institutions (systems of property rights and rules of land use) influenced the course of economic change in European history, as well as state formation and religious change. In this paper, I outline the theoretical implications of these regional effects. None of our existing macrolevel theories and explanations of the "rise of the West" can adequately incorporate them, so I present an alternative theory, based on rational choice premises. Yet the existence of these regional effects also highlights the deficiencies of a rational choice theoretical approach. First, the approach is unable to explain historical contexts, institutional legacies, or the effects of timing, which were vital for outcomes of social change but that lie outside the model itself. Second, although it can be very useful, the model of the actor motivated by material self-interest often proved inadequate in historical situations. Solutions are suggested.     

ATTITUDINAL SOURCES OF PROTEST BEHAVIOR IN FRANCE: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BEFORE AND AFTER MEASUREMENT

Analyses of the attitudinal origins of political protest thatrely on surveys conducted after the behavior has occurred assumethat the attitudes expressed were also present before the behavioroccurred, and ignore the possibility that postprotest attitudesare the result, rather than the cause, of protest behavior.This article addresses two central questions: (1) How differentlymay the same protest movement be interpreted, depending on whetherthe presumed causal attitudes are obtained before or after theprotest took place? (2) What kinds of attitudinal transformationsare the participants and nonparticipants in protest behaviorlikely to experience? The data derive from a panel study conductedin France, the first wave of which took place in the springof 1967, more than a year before the famous May 1968 mass protestoccurred, and the second wave of which took place in the summerof 1968, soon after the upheaval, at which time reports of protestbehavior were obtained. Identical measures of protest-relatedattitudes were obtained at each wave. Both the methodologicaland substantive implications of the differences between "before"and "after" measures of protest-related attitudes are discussed.     

Stratification and Ethnic Groups

Ethnic stratification is compared with other forms of stratification, particularly those based on economic class. Using "ethnic" in its broadest sense, it is clear that such groups are most likely to move toward creation of their own separate nation-state. As a consequence, there are certain outcomes of ethnic stratification that cannot be accounted for in a general theory of stratification or one based solely on economic dimensions. An ethnic stratification system will also affect other forms of stratification in the society. For example, class alliances will be weaker if a given economic level is occupied by different ethnic strata. The added proliferation of statuses in a society with ethnic stratification compounds the political process. Other ways are also considered in which the presence of an ethnic hierarchy in the nation interacts with and affects age, sex, and economic stratification.     

Fear of the "Alien Other": Cultural Anxiety and Opinions about Japan

American public opinion toward Japan grew more negative coincident with 1980s "Japan-bashing" media messages. Two theories of opinion formation provide explanations for this. Democratic representation theory understands opinions as rational responses to new information. Cultural interpretation theory holds that public opinion is based on one's receptiveness to media discourse. Opinion is neither a rational response to information nor the passive acceptance of elite dictates. People differentially interpret media messages and form opinions in a process that is shaped by media attentiveness and their subjective cultural anxieties. Survey data permit an indirect test of the two theories applied to anti-Japan opinion. OLS regression analysis performed on GSS for four time periods reveals that anti-Japan opinion is rooted less in "rational" responses to personal economic insecurity or fear of increased global competition than in racial attitudes and domestic social-cultural concerns. America's negative opinion toward Japan in the 1990s is better understood as domestic anxieties that are redirected toward a symbolic target that the mass media has highlighted.     

Middle classes,democratization, and class formation

Conclusions This analysis of the South Korean case demonstrates the importance of the historical context for understanding the political role of the middle classes. In late industrialization, as occurred in South Korea and other East Asian countries, the new middle class has emerged as a significant social class, before the capitalist class established its ideological hegemony and before industrial workers developed into an organized class. Neither of these two major classes was able to offer an ideological or organizational leadership to the middle classes. In this context, the middle class can act as more than merely a dependent variable. In South Korea, the minjung movement led by an intellectual segment of the middle class played a critical role in the formation of the working class, by providing an opposition ideology, new politicized languages, organizational networks, and other resources.The Korean experience also highlights the significant role of the state in class formation. The predominant role of the state in economic and social development puts it at the center of major social conflicts. Social tensions and conflicts that emerge in rapid industrialization are directly and indirectly related to the character of the state and the economic policies it implements. A high level of politicization among Korean middle-class members, not only among intellectuals but also among a large number of white-collar workers, is the product of the authoritarian regimes of Park and Chun and their repressive control of civil society. Both the nature of Korean middle-class politics and its relationship with the working-class formation have been shaped by the nature of state politics.The role of the middle class in the South Korean democratization process has been complex and variable, in part because of its internal heterogeneity and in part because of shifting political conjunctures in the transition to democracy. It would not make much sense, therefore, to characterize the Korean middle class as progressive or conservative, because different segments of it were inserted into the shifting conjunctures of political transition differently. At the same time, it would be also unsatisfactory to characterize middle-class politics as simply inconsistent or incoherent, because there exists some definite pattern in their behaviors.This analysis suggests that political behaviors of different segments of the middle class can be explained in terms of their locations within the broad spectrum of middle-class positions between capital and labor and by the changing balance of power between the two major classes. This is to acknowledge the fact that capital-labor relations constitute the primary axis of conflict and that middle-class politics must be understood ultimately in terms of this principal mechanism of class struggle. This is, however, not to assume that middle-class politics is simply a terrain of struggle between the capitalist and the working classes, as many Marxist theorists do. To repeat, in certain historical contexts middle-class politics can have an independent effect on the formation of the two major classes and the outcomes of struggles between the two.     

What next? Volume 1. Setting the context. Special issue of development dialogue

In 1976, the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation sponsored a symposiumresulting in the publication titled What Now? Another Developmentthat presented diverse, authoritative, critical perspectiveson the ways countries, organizations, and individuals in theindustrialized world could foster social and economic developmentin less wealthy countries, most of them in the South. The suggestionswere striking for their emphasis on large development projects,encouragement of development of civil society and democratizationof societies, and centralized interventions. The present volumeprovides a follow-up on this first effort thirty years later. One of the most striking ‘findings’ of the presentvolume is how misguided the earlier volume seems from the standpointof a similar panel of experts today. What Now? was built ona model of exporting social, political, and