Durkheim and individualism

Durkheim endorses moral and rejects methodological individualism. But he arrives at this ‘general position’via a particular development of it that runs into serious sociological, apart from any philosophical, trouble. It depends on an ethical relativism that in turn depends on an idea of society qua harmonious system, generating more or less practical aspirations, and a single appropriate, ‘normal’ morality. Yet modern society generates ideals quite unrealisable in it, and continuing, fundamental conflicts between moral doctrines and beliefs. To uphold central humanist, individualist ideals, we cannot rely on Durkheim's particular sociology or on his ethical relativism, and to defend his general position must unhook it from both.     

Durkheim's cult of the individual as civil religion: Its appropriation by Erving Goffman

The purpose of this article is to provide a systematic analysis of the place of Durkheim's “cult of the individual” in Erving Goffman's sociology.¹ I have reviewed the most pertinent aspects of Durkheim's sociology of religion. This article discusses and/or analyzes the development of the cult of the individual primarily within the context of Durkheim's (1951) monograph on suicide; Durkheim's notions of sacred, profane, and ritual; Goffman's two‐pronged intellectual heritage; and Goffman's “Communication Conduct in an Island Community” (1953) with respect to several key Durkheimian concepts. Also discussed are several important secondary analyses—primarily those of Jurgen Habermas and Stanford Lyman—which help to further delineate the conditions of the Durkheim‐Goffman link. The final section applies Goffman's sociology to the case of Evangelicalism and “political civility.”     

Durkheim and The Structure of Social Action*

The analysis of Durkheim in The Structure of Social Action is integral to Parsons's discussion of the utilitarian-positivist tradition and the emergence of a voluntaristic theory of action from it. The four “stages” of theoretical argument in Durkheim can be related directly to the four defining elements of the “utilitarian dilemma,” namely empiricism, rationality, atomism, and the randomness of ends. The most questionable aspect of Parsons's argument is the alleged stubbornness of Durkheim's empiricism. On the other hand, much of the criticism of Parsons's argument, by Pope in particular, although also by Scott and Warner, Is either misdirected or itself questionable. The development and conclusions of Durkheim's moral sociology are as Parsons claims, and form a viable basis for a non-positivist theory of action.     

Searching for the Starting Points of Scientific Inquiry: Durkheim's Rules of Sociological Method and Schopenhauer's Philosophy*

Durkheim's methodological classic is frequently read from Kantian, positivistic, or other Enlightenment contexts despite the fact that Durkheim criticizes these doctrines. Durkheim also tends to be read as a deductive analyst. Using Schopenhauer's philosophy as an alternative starting point in reading the Rules, it is demonstrated that Schopenhauer and Durkheim agree that perceptual, inductive knowledge of “things” is superior to conceptual, deductive knowledge; that causal explanations are merely phenomenal; and that the one, well-designed experiment is sufficient for the establishment of scientific laws. Durkheim's distinction between the normal and the pathological is also addressed in this context. The implications of Durkheim's focus on induction are discussed with regard to its similarity to the works of Claude Bernard, Florian Znaniecki, and Max Weber, as well as current epistemological crises in sociology.     

Sex,Sacredness, and Structure: Contributions to the Sociology of Collective Dreams

The article starts with a metaphoric and rhetorical use of the dream concept and then deals with collective dreams. Borrowing ideas from Freud, Durkheim, and Levi-Strauss, concepts are developed to describe collective dreams, for example, the American Dream. I demonstrate that binary oppositions, such as Durkheim's “sacred versus profane” distinction, structure collective dreams. Different forms of symbolic operation are described.     

The positive science of ethics in France: German influences onDe la division du travail social

What was Durkheim doing—in the sense of an intended social action—in writing De la Division du travail social? At least a part of the answer is that Durkheim's project was linguistic—i.e., he was attempting to replace an outworn vocabulary of Cartesian metaphysics with a more Germanic lexicon—one in which simplicity gave way to complexity, the abstract to the concrete, the ideal to the real, deduction to induction, rationalism to empiricism, and so on. To some extent, this was motivated by the superiority—widely acknowledged among intellectuals of the Third Republic—of German science and Protestant scientific education. But an additional motivation was Durkheim's belief that only a real, concrete entity—society as a “thing” (chose)—could provide an object worthy of the veneration of the “new man” of the Republic. Durkheim's attempt to construct a science of social facts was therefore itself subsidiary to another, “higher” purpose—i.e., the construction of a moral authority (real, concrete, complex) adequate to the needs of the Third French Republic. Rather than an end in itself, Durkheim's sociology should thus be seen as a means to other ends—i.e., the “construction” of a particular kind of “fact”—within a specific social and historical context.     

Emotion,Rationality, and Everyday Life in the Sociology of Emile Durkheim

Durkheim's emphasis on the role of emotion in social life has been influential in the development of the sociology of emotions. Others have analyzed Durkheim's distinctly social conception of reason and rationality. However, the interconnections between “emotion” and “reason” in his thinking have seldom been directly and systematically addressed. These interconnections deserve further explication and development, particularly as they apply to the level of language and action—i.e., “practical reason”—in everyday life. Seeing the collective emotional basis of “social facts,” in general, and “logic,” “reason,” and the basic “categories of the understanding,” in particular, opens up new applications for Durkheim's broader theoretical framework.     

Theorizing the social: Émile Durkheim's theory of force and energy

This paper offers a new interpretation of Émile Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) as the basis for reconsidering the Tarde–Durkheim debate of 1903 and the distinctions between a theory of social force and a theory of social assemblage. Resisting traditional interpretations of Durkheim's scientism, this essay traces how concepts of force and energy are centrally developed in Elementary Forms to draw new lines between epistemology to ontology for twentieth-century theory. I argue that Durkheim develops an ‘energetic epistemology’ that conceives of the human capacity for shared meaning as a product of invested energy in the form of continually enacted and evolving material practice, thought, and attention. According to Durkheim, when a member of a collective perceives a god or feels belief, he or she actually perceives the accumulated energy of on-going creation and maintenance of objects and ideas by members of a collective. Sacred objects, images, and ideas bear the trace of collective energy the more they are carefully crafted, maintained in spaces that are specially arranged, and written into behavioural codes. This reading of Durkheim allows us to consider him in a lineage of social constructivists and, particularly, in relation to Ludwik Fleck, who has been largely confined to different theoretical discussions when his contributions to sociology have been acknowledged at all. By reconsidering Durkheim, we have occasion to rethink his sociology and understand how he redrew the lines between thought and action, between epistemology and ontology, through the material framework of energy and force.     

Suicide and Homo Duplex an Interpretation of Durkheim's Typology of Suicide*

The four types of suicide that Durkheim distinguished are implicit in his concept of homo duplex and the view of socialization this entailed. The individual requires both repression of his passions and direction toward society; too much or too little of either of these two processes leads to suicide and each of the four types represents one type of such failure in socialization. Internal evidence from Suiciae is used to show that Durkheim did in fact derive the suicide typology from his view of man. From the standpoint of this interpretation, those by Parsons and Douglas and by commentators who equate the anomic and egoistic suicide types are reviewed and their misunderstandings noted. Finally, the interpretation given is used to shed light on other aspects of Durkheim's thought, especially some that are disputed in the secondary literature.     

Retheorising Emile Durkheim on society and religion: embodiment,intoxication and collective life

In this paper we argue that Emile Durkheim's sociology contains within it a theory of society and religion as a form of embodied intoxication that is implicit in his writings on effervescent assemblies but has not yet been explicated or developed fully by subsequent commentators. This holds that for social or religious collectivities to exist, the bodies of individuals must be both marked by insignia, customs and techniques that facilitate the possibility of culturally normative patterns of recognition, interaction and action, while also being excited, enthused or intoxicated sufficiently to be inhabited as collective rather than egoistic beings. Our paper begins by investigating the central features of Durkheim's theory – including his interest in the ritual steering of these processes – as developed most fully in his last major study, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. We then develop our own analysis of Durkheim's concern that modernity has stimulated a rise in ‘abnormal’ forms of embodied intoxication that fail to attach individuals to the wider societies in which they live, and demonstrate the utility of our analytical framework by employing it to assess the recent resurgence of charismatic Christian revivalism.     

Reconsidering Durkheim's Assessment of Tarde: Formalizing a Tardian Theory of Imitation,Contagion, and Suicide Suggestion

Emile Durkheim summarily rejected Gabriel Tarde's imitation thesis, arguing that sociology need only concern itself with social suicide rates. Over a century later, a burgeoning body of suicide research has challenged Durkheim's claim to a general theory of suicide as 4 decades worth of evidence has firmly established that (1) there is a positive association between the publicization of celebrity suicides and a spike in the aggregate suicide rate, (2) some social environments are conducive to epidemic‐like outbreaks of suicides, and (3) suicidal ideas or behavior spreads to some individuals exposed to a personal role model's suicidal behavior—for example, a friend or family member. Revisiting Tarde, the article examines why Tarde's theory deserves renewed attention, elucidates what he meant by imitation, and then formalizes his “laws” into testable theses, while suggesting future research questions that would advance the study of suicide, as well as other pathologies. Each “law” is elaborated by considering advances in contemporary social psychology as well as in light of its ability to supplement Durkheim's theory in explaining the “outlier” cases.     

Durkheim,Schopenhauer and the Relationship Between Goals and Means: Reversing the Assumptions in the Parsonian Theory of Rational Action*

Scholars have approached Durkheim's thought primarily from the starting point that he was a positivist. Although Schopenhauer's philosophy is not generally invoked in Durkheim's work, it appears that Schopenhauer's philosophy supplanted Comte's positivism at the turn of the century and that Durkheim was enamored with Schopenhauer's philosophy. In this essay Schopenhauer's influence upon Durkheim is traced, and the implications of this influence are discussed in terms of their effect upon sociology. By applying this starting point to Durkheim's thought and the Parsonian-Mertonian goals-means schema, it is demonstrated that Durkheim, like Schopenhauer, assumed the opposite of the Enlightenment belief that human reason could dominate passion. Implications for interpreting Durkheim's work are also discussed.     

Stjepan Metrović and Michel Maffesoli's 'implosive' defence of the Durkheimian tradition: theoretical convergences around Baudrillard's thesis on the 'end' of the social

This paper critically examines Metrovi? and Maffesoli's attempt to understand postmodernity through Émile Durkheim's nonrational link between society, religion and morality. Metrovi? (1991, 1997) and Maffesoli's (1996) work draws upon this emotional element when attempting to refute Baudrillard's (1983) cognitively focused, if implicit, critique of the Durkheimian tradition. Despite their best intentions, Metrovi? and Maffesoli still fail to exploit the partialities of Baudrillard's critique to the full. While both have some appreciation of the link between emotion and religion as found in Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) they, nevertheless, fall short of grasping its full conceptual importance. This leads them to an implicit acceptance of Baudrillard's thesis on the ‘end’ of the social. This pitfall could have been avoided if Metrovi? and Maffesoli had built their respective analyses of the postmodern condition on a closer reading of The Elementary Forms. Reading this text alongside those other insights on emotion and social life as contained within Durkheim and Mauss's Primitive Classification (1903) and Talcott Parsons's subsequent writings on the sociological problem of religion, would have helped to distance the work of Metrovi? and Maffesoli from that of Baudrillard, and allowed them to offer a stronger and more comprehensive defence of the said tradition.     

Durkheim's Response to Spencer: An Essay Toward Historicism in the Historiography of Sociology*

Merton has made an important distinction between the “history” any “systematics” of sociological theory, and outlined the valuable functions of the former. Most histories of sociology, however, have been “presetist” or “Whiggish” in perspective; we propose an “historicist” alternative. Within this perspective, Durkheim's response to Spencer is analyzed in three areas: (1) the relation between “individual” and “society;” (2) evolution and social change; and (3) the scope and method of sociology. In these areas, Durkheim's critical style reveals a repetitive theme which is termed “inversion.” The essay concludes by re-affirming Merton's distinction and urging that the “historicist” perspective is the most valid and useful approach to the history of sociology.     

René Maunier (1915), Les idées sociologiques d’un philosophe arabe/The sociological ideas of an Arab philosopher in the 14th century

René Maunier (1887-1951) is usually considered to be the “founder” of “colonial sociology” in France. Much closer to the anthropologist Marcel Mauss than to the latter's uncle, Emile Durkheim, Maunier's academic career was largely connected to Arab countries like Egypt, and Algeria in particular, where he would teach for more than twenty years. Maunier's inclusion of Ibn Khaldûn into the history of sociology needs to be understood in line with the fact that at the time this article was published, the young Egyptian student Taha Hussein was beginning a thesis in France under the joint supervision of Durkheim and of the orientalist Paul Casanova. Defended in January 1918, three months after Durkheim's death, it was entitled Etude analytique et critique de la philosophie sociale d'Ibn Khaldoun (Analytic and critical study of Ibn Khaldoun's social philosophy).     

Moral theory based on the ‘heart’versus the ‘mind’: Schopenhauer's and Durkheim's critiques of Kantian ethics

Schopenhauer criticized Kant's moral theory on the grounds that it was non-empirical and inadequate, because it attempted to establish morality on the basis of reason and duty. Contrary to Kant, Schopenhauer argued that genuine morality is irrational, based on compassion, and a human product, hence that it could be studied empirically. Schopenhauer established the ‘science of morality’which occupied the attention of a host of turn of the century precursors of the social sciences, especially Durkheim. Durkheim's version of the science of moral facts is compared and contrasted with Schopenhauer's critique of Kant, and it is demonstrated that Durkheim tends to follow Schopenhauer's lead. Problems with Durkheim's and Schopenhauer's critiques of Kantian ethics are also discussed.     

The Dialectic of Pronouns: A Critical Assessment of the Folk-Urban Tradition in Sociology

Abstract

This article challenges the folk-urban evolutionary tradition that is exemplified by Toennies' Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft and supported by Durkheim's concepts of mechanical and organic solidarity. I argue that the relationship between these dichotomous concepts is essentially dialectical. Hence, in modern industrial systems, Gemeinschaft (the thesis, symbolized by the pronoun “I”) and Gesellschaft (the antithesis, symbolized by “we”) ultimately transform into a qualitatively different system (the synthesis, symbolized by “they”). I conclude by briefly reassessing the contributions of Durkheim and Toennies to modern sociology.     

Moral Reflexivity and Dramaturgical Action in Social Movement Activism: The Case of the Plowshares and Animal Rights Sweden

Drawing on Durkheim's sociology of morality, which identifies ideals and norms as the key components of morality, this article outlines a theoretical model for understanding how social movements can bring about legitimate social change. Social movement activists, we propose, can be conceptualized as followers and pursuers of sacred ideals. As such, they frequently come into conflict with existing norms in society. To manage this dilemma, activists must downplay their role as norm breakers while emphasizing their identity as followers of ideals. This in turn requires moral reflexivity in the staging of collective action. The article shows how dramaturgical control (Goffman) is exercised towards this end among activists engaged in two social movements in Sweden: the Plowshares peace movement and Animal Rights Sweden. The article further examines the internal stratification, or ‘moral hierarchies’, within the two activist groups in the light of the proposed model. The closer the activists were able to adhere to the sacred ideal, the higher the social status they enjoyed within the group.     

The social world as will and idea: Schopenhauer's influence upon Durkheim's thought

The starting-point for this analysis is a remark made by André Lalande. that Durkheim was so enamoured with Schopenhauer's philosophy that his students nicknamed him ‘Schopen’. The intellectual context shared by Schopenhauer and Durkheim is explored, especially with regard to the opposition between the id-like ‘will’ and the mind. Schopenhauer's influence upon Durkheim's contemporaries is examined briefly. Then, this new context for apprehending Durkheim's thought is applied to selected problems in Durkheimian scholarship, problems that have to do with the dualism of human nature, perception, the unconscious and the unity of knowledge relative to the object-subject debate. The implications for sociological theory are also discussed.