On the economic foundations of decision theory

Theory and Decision - Economics bases the choice theory on the mental experiment that introduces the choice correspondence, which associates to every set of possible actions the subset of preferred...     

Coherent decision analysis with inseparable probabilities and utilities

This article explores the extent to which a decision maker's probabilities can be measured separately from his/her utilities by observing his/her acceptance of small monetary gambles. Only a partial separation is achieved: the acceptable gambles are partitioned into a set of belief gambles, which reveals probabilities distorted by marginal utilities for money, and a set of preference gambles, which reveals utilities reciprocally distorted by marginal utilities for money. However, the information in these gambles still enables us to solve the decision maker's problem: his/her utility-maximizing decision is the one that avoids arbitrage (i.e., incoherence or Dutch books).     

Nontransitive preferences in decision theory

Intransitive preferences have been a topic of curiosity, study, and debate over the past 40 years. Many economists and decision theorists insist on transitivity as the cornerstone of rational choice, and even in behavioral decision theory intransitivities are often attributed to faulty experiments, random or sloppy choices, poor judgment, or unexamined biases. But others see intransitive preferences as potential truths of reasoned comparisons and propose representations of preferences that accommodate intransitivities. This article offers a partial survey of models for intransitive preferences in a variety of decisional contexts. These include economic consumer theory, multiattribute utility theory, game theory, preference between time streams, and decision making under risk and uncertainty. The survey is preceded by a discussion of issues that bear on the relevance and reasonableness of intransitivity.     

On probabilities and loss aversion

This paper reviews the most common approaches that have been adopted to analyze and describe loss aversion under prospect theory. Subsequently, it is argued that loss aversion is a property of observable choice behavior and two new definitions of loss averse behavior are advocated. Under prospect theory, the new properties hold if the commonly used utility based measures of loss aversion are corrected by a probability based measure of loss aversion and their product exceeds 1. It is shown that prominent parametric families of weighting functions, while successful in accommodating empirical findings on probabilistic risk attitudes, may not fit well with the theoretical implications of the new loss averse behavior conditions.     

A multiattribute decision time theory

In this study, we analyze choice in the presence of some conflict that affects the decision time (response time), a subject that has been documented in the literature. We axiomatize a multiattribute decision time (MDT) representation, which is a dynamic extension of the classic multiattribute expected utility theory that allows potentially incomplete preferences. Under this framework, one alternative is preferred to another in a certain period if and only if the weighted sum of the attribute-dependent expected utility induced by the former alternative is larger than that induced by the latter for all attribute weights in a closed and convex set. MDT uniquely determines the decision time as the earliest period at which the ranking between alternatives becomes decisive. The comparative statics result indicates that the decision time provides useful information to locate indifference curves in a specific setting. MDT also explains various empirical findings in economics and other relevant fields.     

On the axiomatisation of subjective probabilities

This paper essentially makes two remarks that are pertinent to many of the axiomatisations of subjective probability. First, the auxiliary experiment used to quantify qualitative feelings of relative likelihood is essentially distinct from the field of events of actual interest and may be kept so in the axiomatisation. Second, all theories of subjective probability agree that beliefs are conditional on the present state of knowledge and on the present mood and attitude of the individual concerned. As the individual moves through time this conditioning set, his knowledge and psychological state, change. This ever present change has implications for the conditions under which Bayes' Theorem may be invoked to prescribe how the individual should rationally update his beliefs in the light of a particular observation.     

Experimental evidence on case-based decision theory

This paper starts out from the proposition that case-based decision theory (CBDT) is an appropriate tool to explain human decision behavior in situations of structural ignorance. Although the developers of CBDT suggest its reality adequacy, CBDT has not yet been tested empirically very often, especially not in repetitive decision situations. Therefore, our main objective is to analyse the decision behavior of subjects in a repeated-choice experiment by comparing the explanation power of CBDT to reinforcement learning and to classical decision criteria under uncertainty namely maximin, maximax, and pessimism-optimism. Our findings substantiate a predominant significantly higher validity of CBDT compared to the classical criteria and to reinforcement learning. For this reason, the experimental results confirm the suggested reality adequacy of CBDT in repetitive decision situations of structural ignorance.     

A decision theory of clergy political behavior

Studies of clergy political behavior have used one of two empirical lenses to explain clergy actions—ideology and contextual influences. The first lens generally supposes that clergy behave according to their sincerely held preferences; the second takes personal ideology into account, but suggests that clergy are also subject to influence from the environment in which they serve. While both approaches have received adequate attention, there has been no attempt to develop a systematic decision theory outlining when and why clergy might elect to follow their ideological preferences in some cases, and respond to contextual influence in others. This research note proposes a decision theory based on work in the congressional behavior scholarship. It outlines the conditions under which clergy use their sincere preferences and reference group cues to determine their political behavior. It then tests these propositions using data from two national surveys of American clergy.     

On games under expected utility with rank dependent probabilities

Expected utility with rank dependent probabilities is a generalization of expected utility. If such preference representations are used for the payoffs in the mixed extension of a finite game, Nash equilibrium may fail to exist. Set-valued solutions, however, do exist even for those more general utility functions. But some set-valued solutions may have certain conceptual shortcomings. The paper thus proposes a new set-valued solution concept, called fixed sets under the best reply correspondence. All set-valued solution concepts are robust to perturbations of the expected utility hypothesis.     

On some aspects of decision theory under uncertainty: rationality,price-probabilities and the Dutch book argument

Theory and Decision - Choice under uncertainty is treated in economics by different approaches. We can distinguish three of them, two of which concern individual choice, while the third frames...     

Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory

Theory and Decision - Poverty is associated with a wide range of counterproductive economic behaviors. Scarcity theory proposes that poverty itself induces a scarcity mindset, which subsequently...     

Bayesian decision theory,rule utilitarianism,and Arrow's impossibility theorem

The first part of this paper reexamines the logical foundations of Bayesian decision theory and argues that the Bayesian criterion of expected-utility maximization is the only decision criterion consistent with rationality. On the other hand, the Bayesian criterion, together with the Pareto optimality requirement, inescapably entails a utilitarian theory of morality. The next sections discuss the role both of cardinal utility and of cardinal interpersonal comparisons of utility in ethics. It is shown that the utilitarian welfare function satisfies all of Arrow's social choice postulates avoiding the celebrated impossibility theorem by making use of information which is unavailable in Arrow's original framework. Finally, rule utilitarianism is contrasted with act utilitarianism and judged to be preferable for the purposes of ethical theory.     

Medicine and the paradigm of Neo-pragmatism a contribution to medical decision theory

Summary The epistemological paradigm of Systematic Neo-Pragmatism, supported by the author, is closely connected with the (semiotic-) pragmatical notion of model. The latter is expounded, and the models in medicine are characterised on the basis of flow charts and correlation-diagrams of the process of diagnosis. Furthermore, the neo-pragmatic concept of medicine is developed and it is shown how medicine is to be defined as a science of action. Finally, a holistic notion of reality in medicine is presented for which the interaction of subject and object as well as the unity of knowledge and action is important.This article is the revised version of a lecture delivered by the author at a symposium held at the Medizinische Universitätsklinik (university hospital), Cologne, 1 October 1982. The lecture has been published in German in Modelle und Realitäten in der Medizin, ed. R. Gross (Stuttgart-New York: Schattauer, 1983, pp. 7–22). For the present publication, the material has been brought up to date. I wish to thank Professor Gross, the editor of Modelle und Realitäten and the publishing house of Schattauer for their kind permission to reprint translated passages from this volume.     

A paradox in decision theory and some experimental results: The relative nature of decisions

A simple two-choice single outcome valued decision under risk is presented which should show up the limitations in the classical approach of von Neumann, its extensions and its alternatives. An empirical testing of this hypothesis strongly supports this criticism. A rationale for explaining the apparent irrational decision is put forward and the case is made for understanding the relative nature of decision choices especially when multi-criteria are involved.     

On the foundations of decision making under partial information

We show how to model incompleteness in the decision maker's judgements, within a Bayesian context, providing axioms which lead us to work with families of values or probabilities and utilities. The proper solution concepts are suggested. On the whole, we provide a more robust decision theory, based on a weaker set of axioms, but embodying coherence, since it essentially implies carrying out a family of coherent decision analyses.