REDISTRIBUTION,PORK, AND ELECTIONS

Why might citizens vote against redistributive policies from which they would seem to benefit? Many scholars focus on ‘wedge’ issues such as religion or race, but another explanation might be geographically‐based patronage—or pork. We examine the tension between redistribution and patronage with a model that combines partisan elections across multiple districts with legislation in spatial and divide‐the‐dollar environments. The model yields a unique equilibrium that describes the circumstances under which poor voters support right‐wing parties that favor low taxes and redistribution, and under which rich voters support left‐wing parties that favor high taxes and redistribution. The model suggests that one reason standard tax and transfer models of redistribution often do not capture empirical reality is that redistributive transfers are a less efficient tool for attracting votes than are more targeted policy programs. The model also underlines the central importance of party discipline during legislative bargaining in shaping the importance of redistribution in voter behavior, and it describes why right‐wing parties should have an advantage over left‐wing ones in majoritarian systems.     

DO TRANSFER TAXES REDUCE INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS?

We estimate the effect of taxes on intergenerational transfers by exploiting a sequence of Italian reforms culminating with the abolishment of transfer taxes. We use the Surveys of Household Income and Wealth from 1993 to 2006, which have data on real estate transfers, and information on potential donors and recipients. Difference‐in‐differences estimates indicate that the abolition of transfer taxes increases the probability of high‐wealth donors making a transfer by two percentage points and increases the area transferred by 9.3 square meters relative to poorer donors.     

基于拍卖机制的资源转移时间型动态分布式多项目调度

实践中,企业并行实施地域上分散的多个项目时,资源在各子项目之间的转移时间是影响多项目整体进度的关键因素,同时在动态多项目环境下,新项目不断到达且到达时间不可预知使得制定多项目调度计划遭遇更大困难。本文在动态环境下对资源转移时间型分布式多项目调度问题进行建模和求解,基于多代理系统建立分布式多项目调度问题的动态模型,并将拍卖理论引入其中,设计一种基于时间窗拍卖机制的分布式多代理系统(DMAS/ATW),在动态环境和资源转移时间约束下为多项目配置全局资源。通过一个具体的分布式多项目示例详细分析DMAS/ATW算法的动态调度过程,并基于MPSPLIB中的分布式多项目算例开展数值实验。实验结果表明：无资源转移时间约束时,DMAS/ATW算法求得的平均项目延迟同比相关文献中的DMAS/RIA算法最多减少42%,平均减少26%;有资源转移时间约束时,DMAS/ATW算法对1/3算例集的求解结果优于DMAS/RIA算法在无资源转移时间约束时的结果,验证了本文DMAS/ATW算法求解效果的优异性。对算例规模和全局资源利用系数的实验分析还表明,DMAS/ATW算法对不同规模和资源约束紧张程度的算例都具有良好的适应性。     

A New Creation or an Image and Likeness? The Maltese Experience of Establishing Local Government in a Centralized Micro-State

Small states vary among themselves as to whether they have significant local government systems. While government in Malta has been historically a very centralized activity, a network of local councils was established in the early 1990s as part of a more general public sector reform movement. Unlike some other small states, Malta has strong political parties, and they have played an important part in the affairs of the local councils as well as of the central government. Their establishment has therefore done little to reduce political polarization or promote decentralist values, as was hoped when they were first established.     

Wird die Relevanz von Ertragsteuern für die Unternehmensrechnung nach rechtlichen oder ökonomischen Kriterien beurteilt? Kommentar zum Beitrag von Franz W. Wagner und Reinhard Sill

Wagner/Sill investigate analytically and empirically whether income taxes are integrated in cost accounting (CA) and whether the German local business tax (LBT) is different from other income taxes from a CA perspective. Using a contribution margin model, they show that neither the LBT nor other income taxes are crucial. By contrast, the empirical study reveals that businesses and industry associations perceive the LBT quite differently. The theoretical irrelevance of income taxes is a consequence of the simplified contribution margin model. Using a multi-period cost definition would induce time effects of taxation and hence the relevance of income taxes. In the empirical analysis, it is not clear what the authors mean by “integration” of taxes and which type of CA they have in mind. Since regulation is an important issue for CA, it would be helpful to distinguish between regulated and non-regulated industries in the questionnaire.     

Decentralization,Partisan Politics,and National Development in Ghana

Public Organization Review - This study examines the relationship between decentralization reforms and political parties from the perspective of citizens. It is based on a national sample survey of...     

Paying for growth: The impacts of rapid growth

Fiscal Impact Analyses (FIA's) are the quantification of the expected public-sector fiscal effects (revenues and expenditures) generated by a project. FIA's are exerting greater influence on recent engineering projects and developments than previously experienced. The federal government as well as many state and local governments are requiring FIA's before making decisions on engineering projects. FIA 's in today's engineering environment need to be flexible and capable of assessing the impact resulting from changes in the project's scope or timing without extensive revisions or time delays. A microcomputer-based FIA model is an effective way of meeting these needs. Engineer managers should be aware of the capabilities of a microcomputer-based FIA model and how it can assist them during the project approval process, when negotiating impact payments and payments in lieu of taxes, and in setting development fees.     

The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation

Why do both left and right political parties typically propose progressive income taxation schemes in political competition? Analysis of this problem has been hindered by the two-dimensionality of the issue space. To give parties a choice over a domain that contains both progressive and regressive income tax policies requires an issue space that is at least two-dimensional. Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the standard two-party game, whose players have complete preferences over a two-dimensional policy space, generically fails to exist. I introduce a new equilibrium concept for political games, based on the fact of factional conflict within parties. Each party is supposed to consist of reformists, militants, and opportunists: each faction has a complete preference order on policy space, but together they can only agree on a partial order. Nash equilibria of the two-party game, where the policy space consists of all quadratic income tax functions, and each party is represented by its partial order, exist, and it is shown that, in such equilibria, both parties propose progressive income taxation.     

Public-Private Partnerships,Dividing Operational Stage,and Optimal Governance Structures

Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) include various governance structures which distribute tasks and ownership of facility differently. Many earlier theoretical studies using the incomplete contracts theory assume two tasks, building and operation, for the projects of public services. This may be too simple, however, to consider complicated projects such as prisons. Critics argue that those studies could not fully explain the reality. In addition, Those models are not suitable for comparing different PPP approaches such as Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and private management. The present paper divides the task of operation into two (maintenance and security). This enables us to compare four relevant governance structures in a single framework, and to suggest the conditions for successful PPP prison projects. The main findings are that the tasks of maintenance and security should be conducted by different parties (private consortium and civil servant) under certain conditions, while unbundling construction and operation stages is desirable in other cases.     

SHADES OF BROWN AND GREEN: PARTY EFFECTS IN PROPORTIONAL ELECTION SYSTEMS

In proportional representation (PR) systems, political power is typically shared across several political parties. Many parties are small and focused on specific policies, such as environmental policy and immigration. Do these small parties matter for policy? I provide the first systematic evidence for this by developing the first regression discontinuity design tailored specifically for PR systems. With this method, which can be applied in all countries with PR systems, I estimate the causal effect of party representation on immigration policy, environmental policy and tax policy using data on Swedish municipalities. The results show that party representation has a large effect on the first two policies, but not on the tax policy.     

A Suggested Approach to Overcome California''s Inability to Permit Urban Resource Recovery Facilities

The premature political termination of the permit reviews of five urban resource recovery projects in California may indicate a deficiency in the process under which project health risk assessments are performed and policy biases of the public agencies that control the contents of the assessments. This article examines the permitting process that separates project health risk assessments from environmental impact reports and the anti-resource-recovery goals and policies of the state and local agencies that guide the preparation of project health risk assessments. Also examined are two independent studies made of the informational adequacy of the LANCER project documents. The article concludes that it is only by merging the risk assessment process with the environmental review process that control of the agencies can be loosened and project proponents be able to prepare project risk assessments for urban California resource recovery projects that will offer the projects any likelihood of being able to complete the permitting process.     

IMMIGRATION,WAGES, AND COMPOSITIONAL AMENITIES

There is strong public opposition to increased immigration throughout Europe. Given the modest economic impacts of immigration estimated in most studies, the depth of anti‐immigrant sentiment is puzzling. Immigration, however, does not just affect wages and taxes. It also changes the composition of the local population, threatening the compositional amenities that natives derive from their neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces. In this paper we use a simple latent‐factor model, combined with data for 21 countries from the 2002 European Social Survey (ESS), to measure the relative importance of economic and compositional concerns in driving opinions about immigration policy. The ESS included a unique battery of questions on the labor market and social impacts of immigration, as well as on the desirability of increasing or reducing immigrant inflows. We find that compositional concerns are 2–5 times more important in explaining variation in individual attitudes toward immigration policy than concerns over wages and taxes. Likewise, most of the difference in opinion between more‐ and less‐educated respondents is attributable to heightened compositional concerns among people with lower education.     

OLIGARCHIC VERSUS DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

This paper develops a model to analyze economic performance under different political regimes. An “oligarchic” society, where political power is in the hands of major producers, protects their property rights but also tends to erect significant entry barriers against new entrepreneurs. Democracy, where political power is more widely diffused, imposes redistributive taxes on producers, but tends to avoid entry barriers. When taxes in democracy are high and the distortions caused by entry barriers are low, an oligarchic society achieves greater efficiency. Because comparative advantage in entrepreneurship shifts away from the incumbents, the inefficiency created by entry barriers in oligarchy deteriorates over time. The typical pattern is one of rise and decline of oligarchic societies: An oligarchic society may first become richer, but later fall behind a similar democratic society. I also discuss how democracies may be better able to take advantage of new technologies, how within‐elite conflict in oligarchies might cause a transition to democracy, and how the unequal distribution of income may keep inefficient oligarchic institutions in place. (JEL: P16, O10)     

Political Economy of Mechanisms

We study the provision of dynamic incentives to self‐interested politicians who control the allocation of resources in the context of the standard neoclassical growth model. Citizens discipline politicians using elections. We show that the need to provide incentives to the politician in power creates political economy distortions in the structure of production, which resemble aggregate tax distortions. We provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run. If the politicians are as patient as the citizens, the best subgame perfect equilibrium leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear. In contrast, when politicians are less patient than the citizens, political economy distortions remain asymptotically and lead to positive aggregate labor and capital taxes.     

DO PARTIES MATTER FOR ECONOMIC OUTCOMES? A REGRESSION‐DISCONTINUITY APPROACH

A long‐standing issue in political economics is to what extent party control makes a difference in determining fiscal and economics policies. This question is very difficult to answer empirically because parties are not randomly selected to govern political entities. This article uses a regression‐discontinuity design, namely, party control changes discontinuously at 50% of the vote share, which can produce “near” experimental causal estimates of the effect of party control on economic outcomes. The method is applied to a large panel data set from Swedish local governments with a number of attractive features. The results show that there is an economically significant party effect: Left‐wing governments spend and tax 2–3% more than right‐wing governments. Left‐wing governments also have 7%lower unemployment rates, which is partly due to that left‐wing governments employ 4% more workers than right‐wing governments. (JEL: C21, D72, D78, H71, H72)     

Financing Liabilities Under Superfund

One of the more critical environmental risk areas involves the financing of cleanup costs associated with past improper disposal of hazardous wastes. These costs will run into the tens of billions of dollars. The federal Superfund program and related state programs are the driving forces for cleaning up hazardous waste. Under Superfund, the government collects taxes and coordinates cleanup strategies, and searches for potentially responsible parties (generators, disposers, transporters) to assist in financing the cleanup. To lessen the financial impact, responsible parties are looking to their liability insurers to provide coverage under old general liability insurance policies. Insurance companies contend that Superfund liabilities are not covered under liability policies. The paper examines the various financing methods and liabilities produced by Superfund. Particular emphasis is placed on developments in the courts which are resulting in a significant shift in the financial responsibilities to the insurance industry. Broad estimates of the financial impact of Superfund liabilities are developed. Finally, several public policy issues, which are raised by the topics exmained in this paper, are discussed.     

Wird die Relevanz von Ertragsteuern für die Unternehmensrechnung nach rechtlichen oder ökonomischen Kriterien beurteilt?

Textbooks in the areas of Management Accounting, Finance and Valuation treat taxes very differently. Finance and Valuation increasingly consider tax effects. Management Accounting considers taxes only if they meet certain legal “cost” criteria. These criteria follow tax law rules, but not economic rules and primarily consider tax effects of the local business tax only. This view is also reflected in recent cost accounting regulations. We present evidence from a survey of managers and chambers of commerce, according to which practitioners’ views of whether the local business tax is a cost are heterogeneous. The majority of managers do not consider the local business tax as a cost and do not pass it on to customers. The chambers of commerce however still consider the local business tax as a cost.     

A DRAWBACK OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION

In most major democracies there are very few parties compared to the number of possible policy positions held by voters. We provide an efficiency rationale for why it might be appropriate to limit the proliferation of parties. In our model, the larger the number of parties, the greater the inefficiency of the outcome of electoral competition. The reason is that, when the number of parties increases, electoral incentives push each party to focus its electoral promises on a narrower constituency, and then special interest policies replace more efficient policies that have diffuse benefits. The analysis provides a possible explanation for the existence of institutional features that limit the extent of electoral competition: thresholds of exclusion, runoff electoral systems, and majoritarian two‐party political systems. (JEL: D82, L15)     

WHY IS FISCAL POLICY OFTEN PROCYCLICAL?

Fiscal policy is procyclical in many developing countries. We explain this policy failure with a political agency problem. Procyclicality is driven by voters who seek to “starve the Leviathan” to reduce political rents. Voters observe the state of the economy but not the rents appropriated by corrupt governments. When they observe a boom, voters optimally demand more public goods or lower taxes, and this induces a procyclical bias in fiscal policy. The empirical evidence is consistent with this explanation: Procyclicality of fiscal policy is more pronounced in more corrupt democracies. (JEL: E62, D73, D78)     

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION,POLITICAL INTEGRATION OR BOTH?

We study the effects of economic and political integration by presenting a model in which firms compete with each other in both an economic market—where they produce a good and compete for market share—and in a political (rent seeking) market—where they compete for transfers from the government. Growth is driven by firms’ cost‐reducing innovation activity and economic and political integration affect firms’ incentive to innovate differently. In this setting, economic and political integration can be seen as complementary. Economic integration, when not accompanied by political integration, can lead to less innovation and slower growth as firms respond to increased competition in the economic market by focusing more on rent‐seeking activity. When economic integration is accompanied by political integration, innovation and growth will be stronger and welfare higher.