政治关联与财务困境公司的政府补助——来自中国ST公司的经验证据

本文以2002-2007年沪深两市的ST公司为样本,实证研究了企业的政治关联对财务困境公司获取政府补助的影响.结果显示:(1)民营企业的政治关联对企业处于财务困境时获取政府补助有显著影响,但对国有企业作用不显著.(2)考虑企业所处的地区环境差异之后,本文发现民营企业的政治关联优势受到地区财政富余程度的显著影响,而地方政府干预要起作用也受到地区财政状况的制约.只有在地方财政有充足财力的情况下,民营企业才可能利用政治关联获得更多的政府补助.(3)从政府补助的效果来看,政府补助虽然可以在救助当年明显改善公司业绩,但对公司长期业绩的提升作用却因企业政治关联程度和企业性质的不同而存在差异:政治关联较弱的民营企业获得的政府补助对公司长期业绩的提高作用显著,但对于国有企业以及具有较强政治关联的民营企业作用则不显著,这在一定程度上说明政治关联导致了政府补助资金的低效运作.     

Inefficient Job Destructions and Training with Hold‐up

This paper develops an equilibrium search model with endogenous job destructions and where firms decide at the time of job entry how much to invest in match‐specific human capital. We first show that job destruction and training investment decisions are strongly complementary. It is possible that there are no firings at equilibrium. Further, training investments are confronted to a hold‐up problem making the decentralized equilibrium always inefficient. We show therefore that both training subsidies and firing taxes must be implemented to bring back efficiency.     

Improving sustainability: An international evolutionary framework

As emerging markets develop, foreign firms are being viewed less and less as providers of capital and/or technology, and more as integral parts of society in general, with much greater responsibilities that stem largely from their multinational roles. Recognizing these pressures and the increasing interaction between multinationals and societal institutions, we first briefly review the literature on role, stakeholder, and institutional theories, to develop a framework to improve our understanding of multinational sustainability. We next develop a three-stage model of the stages of societal development in general, and subsequently apply these stages to the development of China from 1978 to the present. We suggest that these changes have resulted in changing expectations of multinationals regarding their appropriate roles within China. We conclude by discussing lessons from our model for researchers, educators and practitioners.     

Analysing the Role of International Drivers for Eco-innovators

The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of several “international” drivers on firms developing or adopting eco-innovation (i.e., eco-innovators), with the help of a bivariate probit model with sample selection and using a database of Spanish innovators. We test how the eco-innovative behaviour of innovative firms is affected by international sources of funding, one international regulation (the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, EU ETS), customers in foreign markets, cooperation with international institutions and the presence of foreign equity in firms. Our results show that the influence of international factors on the eco-innovativeness of firms is modest. Public subsidies from international sources do not increase the likelihood of being an eco-innovator, although national sources of funding do. The EU ETS and cooperation with international actors positively and significantly affect eco-innovators. Firms with foreign equity are not more likely to eco-innovate and selling abroad does not increase the likelihood of being an eco-innovator.     

The Effect of Competition on the Efficient–Responsive Choice

In determining their operations strategy, a firm chooses whether to be responsive or efficient. For firms competing in a market with uncertain demand and varying intensity of substitutability for the competitor's product, we characterize the responsive or efficient choice in equilibrium. To focus first on the competitive implications, we study a model where a firm can choose to be responsive at no additional fixed or marginal cost. We find that competing firms will choose the same configuration (responsive or efficient), and responsiveness tends to be favorable when demand uncertainty is high or when product competition is not too strong. Intense competition can drive firms to choose to be efficient rather than responsive even when there is no additional cost of being responsive. In such a case, both firms would be better off by choosing to be responsive but cannot credibly commit. We extend the basic model to study the impact of endogenized production timing, multiple productions and product holdback (or, equivalently, postponed production). For all these settings, we find structurally similar results; firms choose the same configuration, and the firms may miss Pareto‐improvements. Furthermore, through extensions to the basic model, we find that greater operational flexibility can make responsiveness look less attractive in the presence of product competition. In contrast to our basic model and other extensions, we find it is possible for one firm to be responsive while the other is efficient when there is either a fixed cost or variable cost premium associated with responsive delivery.     

The Brazilian Multinationals' Approaches to Innovation

Brazilian multinationals, born in a country where the environment is non-conducive to the scientific breakthrough type of innovation so stimulated in other countries, are increasingly expanding in international markets, where innovativeness is an intrinsic component of competitiveness. Aiming to study Brazilian multinationals' approaches to innovation, a new analytical framework was developed assuming that the internationalization process relies on the firm's innovative capability. In turn, innovative capabilities are derived from core competences and competence formation at firm level is influenced by the characteristics of the national environment. A survey involving 61 Brazilian multinationals led to the identification of four approaches to innovation, the competences that enable each one of them and the country-of-origin effects over competence development. That led to the explanation of why firms that do not show the expected strength in R&D, but are able to combine skillfully their organizational competences, manage to develop innovative capabilities which allow them to internationalize successfully. The overall outcome suggests that the dynamic relationships among institutions – competences – innovation – internationalization are setting new grounds for the international expansion of Brazilian firms.     

Internationalization from Central and Eastern Europe: A systematic literature review

Economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has led to a dramatic increase in CEE firms' participation in international markets. This applies to different types of firms – from large emerging market multinationals to small international new ventures. In this paper, we systematically review the research on CEE outward internationalization, which we define as internationalization of CEE-based firms in the form of exporting or FDI, and contribute to literature by providing a complete picture of the state of the art and outlining potential avenues for future research. We find that while the CEE region has been described as a fruitful ground for developing new and testing existing theories, it heavily loads on the latter. We suggest that greater reliance on theories and concepts from the field of entrepreneurship and a stronger focus on internationalization decision processes might further enrich our understanding of internationalization from CEE.     

OPTIMAL TAXATION WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND AGGREGATE RETURNS TO SPECIALIZATION

In this article we explore the proposition that, in economies with imperfect competitive markets, the optimal capital income tax is negative and the optimal tax on firms' profits is confiscatory. We show that if the total factor productivity as well as the number of firms or varieties are endogenous instead of fixed, then the optimal fiscal policy can lead to different results. The government faces a trade‐off between the fixed costs that society pays for the introduction of a new firm and the productivity gains associated to the introduction of a new variety. We find that the optimal fiscal policy depends on the relationship between the index of market power, the returns to specialization, and the government's ability to control entry. (JEL: H21, H30, E62)     

Technology Choice and Capacity Portfolios under Emissions Regulation

We study the impact of emissions tax and emissions cap‐and‐trade regulation on a firm's technology choice and capacity decisions. We show that emissions price uncertainty under cap‐and‐trade results in greater expected profit than a constant emissions price under an emissions tax, which contradicts popular arguments that the greater uncertainty under cap‐and‐trade will erode value. We further show that two operational drivers underlie this result: (i) the firm's option not to operate, which effectively right‐censors the uncertain emissions price; and (ii) dispatch flexibility, which is the firm's ability to first deploy its most profitable capacity given the realized emissions price. In addition to these managerial insights, we also explore policy implications: the effect of emissions price level, and the effect of investment and production subsidies. Through an illustrative example, we show that production subsidies of higher investment and production cost technologies (such as carbon capture and storage technologies) have no effect on the firm's optimal total capacity when firms own a portfolio of both clean and dirty technologies, but that investment subsidies of these technologies increase the firm's total capacity, conditionally increasing expected emissions. A subsidy of a lower production cost technology, on the other hand, has no effect on the firm's optimal total capacity in multi‐technology portfolios, regardless of whether the subsidy is a production or investment subsidy.     

Outsourcing Competition and Information Sharing with Asymmetrically Informed Suppliers

This paper studies an outsourcing problem where two service providers (suppliers) compete for the service contract from a client. The suppliers face uncertain cost for providing the service because they do not have perfect information about the client's type. The suppliers receive differential private signals about the client type and thus compete under asymmetric information. We first characterize the equilibrium of the supplier competition. Then we investigate two of the client's information sharing decisions. It is shown that less information asymmetry between the suppliers may dampen their competition. Therefore, the client does not necessarily have the incentive to reduce information asymmetry between the suppliers. We characterize the conditions under which leveling the informational ground is beneficial to the client. We also find that under the presence of information asymmetry (e.g., when the suppliers have different learning abilities), sharing more information with both suppliers may enhance the advantage of one supplier over the other and at the same time increase the upper bound of the suppliers' quotes in equilibrium. Consequently, the suppliers compete less aggressively and the client's payoff decreases in the amount of shared information. The findings from this study provide useful managerial implications on information management for outsourcing firms.     

Policy Incentives for Dangerous (But Necessary) Operations

In industries where firms perform dangerous (but necessary) operations, liability costs—due to potential harm to third parties—can be significant. Firms may therefore find it optimal to exit the market, and this may lead to an inefficiently low number of incumbents. A social planner can discourage exit by offering appropriately designed subsidies. Ex ante subsidies defray the costs associated with making operations safer (e.g., funds to subsidize the purchase of safety equipment). Ex post subsidies mitigate the financial damages caused by an accident (e.g., funds to defray the cost of cleaning up a toxic spill). We consider a model where (i) firms have private information about their ability to improve reliability and (ii) reliability investments are unobservable. We demonstrate that when the social value of reliability outweighs the benefit of increased competition, it is optimal to offer ex ante subsidies alone (i.e., to subsidize the cost of making operations safer). Conversely, when the benefits of competition outweigh the benefits of reliability, a combination of ex ante and ex post subsidies is optimal (i.e., not only to subsidize safer operations, but also to share the costs of a potential accident).     

Headquarters′ monitoring mechanisms,subsidiaries’ financial slack,and the contingent role of subsidiaries′ external embeddedness

Within MNCs’ foreign subsidiaries financial slack, i.e., uncommitted financial resources in excess of those needed for current operations, may incur costs for headquarters. These costs may emanate from subsidiaries' decision to forego investment opportunities and stockpile cash instead, which, in turn, may lead to fewer resources being available for redistribution within the organization. From an agency theory perspective, headquarters can minimize these costs through monitoring mechanisms. While agency theory is considered theoretically appropriate for the study of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship, it reflects a rather undersocialized manifestation of human behaviour, which in turn limits its applicability. In this paper, we attempt to address this limitation by suggesting and empirically exploring that the effect of monitoring mechanisms is dependent (1) on the different types of monitoring used, and (2) on subsidiaries' external embeddedness. Drawing on empirical evidence from 94 subsidiaries of foreign multinationals operating in Greece, we provide some initial evidence on the differential impact of monitoring through expatriates and monitoring through bureaucratic processes. Most importantly, we show that subsidiaries' structural embeddedness moderates both associations. In doing so, we reveal that whether subsidiaries behave opportunistically or as good citizens is partially determined by the social context in which they are embedded. An unexpected finding concerns the positive effect of the origin of the CEO on subsidiaries' financial slack for expatriates compared to local managers. This finding underscores the importance of the CEO identity, and highlights the need for future research exploring its effect on subsidiaries' performance.     

Developing new innovation models: Shifts in the innovation landscapes in emerging economies and implications for global R&D management

Over the past two decades, there has been a substantial shift in the global innovation landscape. Multinationals from developed economies are increasingly globalizing their R&D activities and are developing an “open innovation” model to source innovations from outside the firm, including from emerging economies such as those in Asia. In addition, emerging economy firms, which traditionally have played a secondary role in the global innovation landscape, have now begun to catch up in developing their own innovative capabilities. This study explores the implications of this new innovation landscape for CEOs of multinationals and emerging economy firms, as well as for international management scholars and educators. While the multinationals might appropriate rents from their existing capabilities and source new ones in emerging economies, they may be threatened by weak intellectual property rights regimes and unintended knowledge spillovers to local firms, creating potential competitors. Firms in the emerging economies can learn from and catch up with investing multinationals, but to do so they need to develop their own innovative capabilities and move from a process to a product focus and from imitation to innovation.     

Investment in Shared Suppliers: Effect of Learning,Spillover, and Competition

We investigate the optimal strategies for firms to invest in their suppliers when the benefits of such investments can spillover to other firms who also source from the same suppliers. We consider two Bayesian firms that can invest in improving the quality of their shared supplier; the firms do not have complete information on the true quality of the supplier, but they update their beliefs based on the supplier's performance. We formulate the problem as an investment game and obtain Markov perfect equilibria characterized by the investment thresholds of both firms. The equilibrium investment strategies of the two firms are characterized by a region of preemption and a region of war of attrition. We also examine how the interplay between spillover, competition, and returns from the investment at shared suppliers affect the investment threshold and the time to the leader's investment, and identify the conditions under which competition delays or hastens the first investment in a shared supplier.     

DO HIRING SUBSIDIES REDUCE UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG OLDER WORKERS? EVIDENCE FROM NATURAL EXPERIMENTS

Abstract We estimate the effects of hiring subsidies for older workers on transitions from unemployment to employment in Germany. Using a natural experiment, our first set of estimates is based on a legal change extending the group of eligible unemployed persons. A subsequent legal change in the opposite direction is used to validate these results. Our data cover the population of unemployed jobseekers in Germany and was specifically made available for our purposes from administrative data. Consistent support for an employment effect of hiring subsidies can only be found for women in East Germany. Concerning other population groups, firms’ hiring behavior is hardly influenced by the program and hiring subsidies mainly lead to deadweight effects. (JEL: J64, H24, C31)     

Promotability of Host‐Country Nationals: A Cross‐Cultural Study

Drawing on person–environment fit and national identity theory, the article proposes that person–national culture fit is likely to influence the promotability of host‐country nationals in multinational firms. Focusing on fit with upward influence tactics, it suggests that the parent company's national culture influences managerial expectations of host‐country nationals in foreign subsidiaries. It argues that host‐country managers who demonstrate upward influence tactics that are culturally appropriate to the parent company's national culture will be more promotable than those who do not. Higher‐level supervisors were asked to assess the promotability of two direct subordinates, who were independently surveyed about the upward influence tactics they used. The study contrasted ingratiation, exchange of benefits and coalition, and directness influence tactics of host‐country nationals in domestic Ecuadorian firms with American and German multinationals in Ecuador. Compatible with our hypotheses, data from a sample of 79 firms suggest that exchange of benefits and coalition are more likely to be associated with promotability in German than in domestic Ecuadorian firms. In addition, upward‐appeal assertiveness is more likely to be associated with promotability in American than in domestic Ecuadorian firms.     

DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION

We study a search model with employment protection legislation. We show that if the output from the match is uncertain at the hiring stage, a discriminatory equilibrium may exist in which workers with the same productive characteristics are subject to different hiring standards. If a bad match takes place, discriminated workers will take longer to find another job, prolonging the costly period for the firm. This makes it less profitable for firms to hire discriminated workers, thus sustaining the discrimination. In contrast to Becker's model, the existence of employers with a taste for discrimination may make it more profitable to discriminate, even for firms without discriminatory preferences.     

Equilibrium Wage‐Tenure Contracts

In this study we consider a labor market matching model where firms post wage‐tenure contracts and workers, both employed and unemployed, search for new job opportunities. Given workers are risk averse, we establish there is a unique equilibrium in the environment considered. Although firms in the market make different offers in equilibrium, all post a wage‐tenure contract that implies a worker's wage increases smoothly with tenure at the firm. As firms make different offers, there is job turnover, as employed workers move jobs as the opportunity arises. This implies the increase in a worker's wage can be due to job‐to‐job movements as well as wage‐tenure effects. Further, there is a nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of initial wage offers that is differentiable on its support except for a mass point at the lowest initial wage. We also show that relevant characteristics of the equilibrium can be written as explicit functions of preferences and the other market parameters.     

Competition and The Operational Performance of Hospitals: The Role of Hospital Objectives

We examine the effect of a hospital's objective (i.e., non‐profit vs. for‐profit) in hospital markets for elective care. Using game‐theoretic analysis and queueing models to capture the operational performance of hospitals, we compare the equilibrium behavior of three market settings in terms of such criteria as waiting times and patient costs from waiting and hospital payments. In the first setting, a monopoly, patients are served exclusively by a single non‐profit hospital; in the second, a homogeneous duopoly, patients are served by two competing non‐profit hospitals. In our third setting, a heterogeneous duopoly, the market is served by one non‐profit hospital and one for‐profit hospital. A non‐profit hospital provides free care to patients, although they may have to wait; for‐profit hospitals charge a fee to provide care with minimal waiting. A comparison between the monopolistic and each of the duopolistic settings reveals that the introduction of competition can hamper a hospital's ability to attain economies of scale and can also increase waiting times. Moreover, the presence of a for‐profit sector may be desirable only when the hospital market is sufficiently competitive. A comparison across the duopolistic settings indicates that the choice between homogeneous and heterogeneous competition depends on the patients' willingness to wait before receiving care and the reimbursement level of the non‐profit sector. When the public funder is not financially constrained, the presence of a for‐profit sector may allow the funder to lower both the financial costs of providing coverage and the total costs to patients. Finally, our analysis suggests that the public funder should exercise caution when using policy tools that support the for‐profit sector—for example, patient subsidies—because such tools may increase patient costs in the long run; it might be preferable to raise the non‐profit sector's level of reimbursement.     

Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions that are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. The set of outcomes that can arise in equilibrium for some information structure is equal to the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with quadratic payoffs and normally distributed uncertainty in terms of restrictions on the first and second moments of the equilibrium action–state distribution. We derive exact bounds on how prior knowledge about the private information refines the set of equilibrium predictions. We consider information sharing among firms under demand uncertainty and find new optimal information policies via the Bayes correlated equilibria. We also reverse the perspective and investigate the identification problem under concerns for robustness to private information. The presence of private information leads to set rather than point identification of the structural parameters of the game.