Harre's Social Philosophy and Political Philosophy: A Social Scientific Critique

In his article, “Saving Critical Realism,” Harre (2009 ) relates his revised philosophy of science to a social philosophy concerning the nature of society, and to a political philosophy regarding the nature of freedom and reform. I argue that his social philosophy and political philosophy rest upon an individualistic sense of society and freedom. I demonstrate that his individualism is factually and politically untenable. (I shall not comment on his philosophy of science, although the errors in his social and political philosophies make it suspect.) I counterpose an alternative social philosophy and political philosophy that are based on a structural model of society, freedom, and social change. My critique demonstrates how social science can adjudicate claims of structuralist vs. individualist social and political philosophy. It also argues that social science must constitute the basis for formulating political ideals of freedom and social organization if these are to be viable.     

Rented Housing and Market Rents: A Social Policy Critique

The private rented sector of the British housing market has been in decline since the beginning of the present century; that decline has continued apace since the end of the Second World War. A proposed solution for the stemming of this demise is the removal of present rent controls and the substitution of free market conditions so that rents find their own market levels. This, so it is argued, would enable landlords to obtain a proper return on their housing investments and lead therefore to an increase in supply and an ending to the present disinvestment from this housing sector. This article disputes this thesis. In the first place it is argued that “market rent” is a problematic concept and raises complex issues of distributive justice and social policy — which its advocates ignore. Secondly, it is argued that a free market solution is ahistorical in that it takes no account of the past failure in Britain of privately rented housing; and similarly it ignores the complex web of historical circumstances behind its decline — attributing the decline to the single causal factor of rent control. Thirdly, it is suggested that a market solution is sociologically misconceived because it ignores the characteristics and needs of those social groups dependent upon this sector. Finally, on grounds of practicability it is proposed that a free market in rented housing may be quite inappropriate for the rump of housing stock remaining in the private rented sector; and that, given the current social and economic constraints operating in the housing market as a whole, any revival of this sector is unlikely even with enhanced rental inducements. It is thus concluded that a free market solution is misconceived and would merely serve to impose an ideological straightjacket upon the provision of a basic human need.     

批判恩斯特·布洛赫的"马克思主义"乌托邦

乌托邦社会的物质产品最大化必然要无限制地掠夺自然资源和能源,然而资源是有限的,对能源的无尽开采又会产生无法消除的污染.这些都会加速人类和地球的毁灭,因而恩斯特·布洛赫武的乌托邦是不可能的.与布洛赫勾勒的"积极闲暇的人间天堂"相反,人类自古就已达到了人性可能达到的高度,人性从来都是具有两面性的.     

A Political Critique of Kantian Ethics in Social Work

Correspondence to Stephen A. Webb, Department of Social Work, University of Dundee, DD1 4HN. Summary This paper addresses the Kantian theory of the subject whichis found in contemporary social work discourse on ethics andvalues. It is argued here that the Kantian idea of persons as(i) rational, (ii) autonomous, and (iii) ends-in-themselvesis wholly inadequate to the social work doctrine of ‘respectfor persons’. To show this, we counterpose a Foucauldianview of history, moral codes and theory of the person, and themeaning this can have in the social worker-client relation.This alternative reading claims that social work is essentiallya political practice which is constructed by various discursiveand institutional strategies of power. Therefore, it is suggestedthat social work needs a political reading of its own discourse.To this end we outline a Foucauldian micro-political analysisof the social work ‘subject’ or person as a pointwithin a field of discursive-knowledge based strategies.     

哈贝马斯新社会运动理论述评

哈贝马斯把新社会运动视为人的需要受到忽视的结果,通过参照"系统"与"生活世界"的分裂的观点,从"合法化"的角度来探讨新社会运动的命运。哈贝马斯认为新社会运动具有两大特点:一是这些运动能防止"生活世界殖民化",通过交往理性来维护规范共识;二是这些运动的本质要求是较少关注物质再生产,而更关注文化再生产、社会一体化和社会化。由于这些运动与传统的围绕分配而展开斗争的工人运动不同,哈贝马斯认为它们不可能被政党制度化或通过物质补偿而缓和。哈贝马斯的"新社会运动理论"对当下的和谐社会的构建具有启发意义,但其在有着理论解释力的同时也存有某些理论局限性。     

Progress in Behavioral Social Work:

No abstract available for this article.     

Behavioral insurance: Theory and experiments

“Risk and insurance” provides an illustrative set of decisions made in the presence of uncertainty. As behavioral models become more integrated into economics and finance, many of their effects are illustrated quite well within insurance markets. Especially noteworthy are the complementary roles of theory and experiments. This article reviews the interactive role of experiments and theory in analyzing insurance demand from a behavioral perspective. We pay special attention to several models of underinvestment in insurance or in other risk-mitigation markets.     

Questioning Consilience and Autonomy in Self-Determination Theory: A Critique and Hermeneutic-Phenomenological Alternative

This paper offers a theoretical analysis of Self-Determination Theory (SDT) and its claims regarding human autonomy. Self-determination theorists have advanced a form of self-regulated, engaged behavior (i.e., autonomy), founded upon on a consilient account of human motivation that assumes multiple, hierarchical levels of organization and causation (e.g., biological, psychological, and social). Autonomy, from this perspective, is taken to emerge from underlying biological mechanisms, but also able to exert its own causal effects in the world as a unique psychological phenomenon. We contend that in theorizing this way, self-determination theorists have invoked a mixed discourse of mechanism and autonomy that leaves important questions unanswered, perhaps most importantly those concerning how autonomy as a kind of volition can fit coherently in the mechanistic account of world that they advocate. We then offer an alternative perspective based upon the work of various hermeneutic-phenomenological thinkers in philosophy and psychology. This alternative perspective conceptualizes human phenomena such as autonomy and motivation in agentic terms, emphasizing meaningful participation in possibility-laden contexts of everyday practices.     

Social Representations Theory: A Progressive Research Programme for Social Psychology

The study “Psychoanalysis—its image and its public” intimates that common sense is increasingly informed by science. But common sense asserts its autonomy and, in turn, may affect the trajectory of science. This is a process that leads to many differentiations—in common sense, in scientific innovation and in political and regulatory structures. Bauer and Gaskell's toblerone model of triangles of mediation provided a distillation of their reading of “La Psychanalyse.” Here it was argued that representations are multi‐modal phenomena necessitating the use of multiple methodologies (comparative and longitudinal; qualitative and quantitative). In this paper we briefly summarise these arguments and elaborate ways in which social representation theory can be considered a progressive research programme. “Progressive” because as the theory has developed it has extended the range and depth of its conceptual basis; it provides a new synthesis for the social scientific understanding of the phenomena of common sense and of representation; it acts as an antidote to the reductionism of public opinion and, finally, it is a stimulus to depart from disciplinary silos. However, there remain unresolved issues: how to segment the relevant social milieus and how to close the feedback loop from common sense to science?     

The Not Altogether Social Construction of Emotions: A Critique of Harré and Gillett

Are emotions like sneezes, unwilled, mechanical, or are they like judgments; are they entirely social constructions? Harré and Gillett believe that emotions are exclusively judgments. We argue that their view misses something important. Imagine a person quaking in anger. Both we and Harré and Gillett believe that he is angry only if he has made an implicit judgment, such as I have been transgressed against. But it is the quaking, not the judgment, that gives authenticity and force to the expression of anger. The quaking does not clarify what the actor means but rather it clarifies the relation of the actor to the meaning of his display. What makes it a genuine expression of anger and not a joke or performance is that the quaking is beyond the will. Bodily displays are not necessary to make expressions authentic; anything that shows that the expression is beyond the will will do, for instance, obsessive thoughts, intrusions, or an inability to concentrate. For Harré and Gillett emotions both as displays and feelings do not merely embody judgments but are also speech acts. We argue that an expression, a feeling or flitting through the mind, cannot be a speech act since only the overt can fit into the convention, the strictures of a community. Nor is the display merely a speech act. Since for an emotional display to be genuine it must slip from the lips unbidden. Further, a speech act account makes the emotions arbitrary; they imply that the set of possible emotions is open. We think, on the other hand, that only some sorts of judgments can become part of an emotion; judgments that relate to things that are important enough in a particular culture that judgment display and feeling are linked together involuntarily.