Ideology and welfare in the UK: the implications for the voluntary sector

The UK has, over recent years, moved from a welfare state to a more market-oriented system of welfare. But the extent of this change has varied considerably according to the ideological position of local government in different parts of the country. This makes it possible within one country to assess the implications for the voluntary sector of different models of welfare. This article develops a framework for looking at different welfare ideologies and the values they espouse, with reference both to the UK and to the models that exist in other countries. It then takes four examples of UK local authorities which demonstrate the different models and examines the implications for the voluntary sector. In doing so, it examines the prospects for the voluntary sector to deliver both service and political pluralism in the future.     

Quality of life assessment and human dignity: against the incompatibility-assumption

Only in recent years have the German bioethical and biopolitical debates begun to decline due to rationalization concerning stem cell research or the pre-implantation diagnosis related to the ethical status of the beginning of human life. This is due to the fact that in these contexts we have to ask whether quality of life assessment is ethically acceptable in principle. A fundamental premise in the current debate is that quality of life assessment and human dignity are incompatible. In this paper four different standards of quality of life assessment are distinguished (the naturalistic, the social, the interpersonal and the personal standard). Then an interpretation of human dignity is developed which rests on the essential feature of human beings to develop the capacity for personal autonomy. Finally it is argued that human dignity in this sense is compatible with quality of life assessments based on the personal and the interpersonal standard.

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Zusammenfassung  Seitdem in Deutschland im Kontext der Stammzellforschung oder der Präimplantationsdiagnostik um den ethischen Status des beginnenden menschlichen Lebens gestritten wird, ist das in den letzten Jahren gewonnene Rationalitätspotenzial der deutschen bioethischen und biopolitischen Debatte rückläufig. Dies liegt daran, dass in diesen Kontexten die Frage nach der ethischen Zulässigkeit von Lebensqualitätsbewertungen unumgänglich wird. Eine basale Prämisse in der gegenwärtigen Diskussion stellt die Annahme dar, dass Lebensqualitätsbewertungen und Menschenwürde miteinander unvereinbar sind. In diesem Beitrag werden vier verschiedene Standards der Lebensqualitätsbewertung (der naturalistische, der soziale, der interpersonale und der personale Standard) und konkurrierende Deutungen des Prinzips der Menschenwürde unterschieden. Anschließend wird eine für säkulare und pluralistische Gesellschaften angemessene Deutung des Prinzips der Menschenwürde, welche auf der für Menschen charakteristischen Fähigkeit zur Entwicklung personaler Autonomie gründet, entwickelt. Abschließend wird gezeigt, dass ein so verstandenes Prinzip der Menschenwürde mit einem personalen und einem interpersonalen Standard von Lebensqualitätsbewertung verträglich ist.

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Résumé  Depuis quen Allemagne, dans le contexte de la recherche sur les cellules souches ou du diagnostic préimplantatoire, la controverse bat son plein sur le statut éthique des débuts de la vie humaine, le potentiel de rationalisme quavait atteint le débat allemand sur la bioéthique et la biopolitique perd à nouveau du terrain. Ceci sexplique par le fait que dans ces domaines, la question de ladmissibilité éthique des évaluations qualitatives de la vie est incontournable. Une prémisse de base dans la discussion actuelle est le postulat selon lequel lévaluation qualitative de la vie et la dignité humaine ne sont pas compatibles. Dans cette contribution, on distingue quatre standards dévaluation qualitative de la vie et des interprétations concurrentes du principe de la dignité humaine (standard naturaliste, social, interpersonnel et personnel). Larticle élabore pour conclure une interprétation du principe de la dignité humaine adaptée aux sociétés séculières et pluralistes, qui se fonde sur la capacité typiquement humaine à développer une autonomie personnelle. Larticle montre enfin quune dignité humaine ainsi comprise est compatible avec un standard personnel et interpersonnel de lévaluation qualitative de la vie.Wir reden also über Muster im Lebensteppich. Ludwig Wittgenstein

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Head movement during listening turns in conversation

In five subjects, head movement during conversation was monitored by polarised light goniometry, and recorded alongside speech and a signal proportional to peak amplitude of sound waves (peak loudness). Kinematic properties of listeners' head movements, such as amplitude, frequency and cyclicity, differentiated various conversational functions. That is, they were function-specific: symmetrical, cyclic movements were employed to signal yes, no or equivalents; linear, wide movements anticipated claims for speaking; narrow linear movements occurred in phase with stressed syllables in the other's speech (ynchrony movements); and wide, linear movements occurred during pauses in the other's speech. That, it is argued, bears upon the relation between thesignalling of communicative intentions and the synchronisation of interactional rhythm. Thus, the former appears to determine the timing and tempo of responses such as yes and no, while the latter determines the regulation of synchrony movements. The manner in which these factors interact in other conversational functions and their theoretical implications are discussed.     

Interactive technology assessment of paediatric cochlear implantation

Interactive technology assessment is a novel approach to evaluating (health) technology, which philosophically draws from the works of Rawls and Habermas. That is, it seeks to organise a practical setting for discursive ethics in order to find a legitimate basis for policy to be pursued when the technology under scrutiny features a moral controversy. Interactive technology assessment involves a cycle of interviews with all stakeholders, who are explicitly asked to respond (anonymously) to the concerns and issues raised by other participants. This cycle is completed repeatedly, so that a process of vicarious learning develops. This process aims at identifying issues agreed and disagreed upon, on the basis of which widely endorsed policy recommendations can be formulated. This chapter involves an interactive technology assessment of paediatric cochlear implantation. The rationale, the design, and the results are explained, as well as the main ethical aspects of the procedure.

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Zusammenfassung Interactive technology assessment (interaktive Technologiefolgenabschätzung) ist ein neuer Ansatz zur Bewertung von (Medizin-)Technologie, der in philosophischer Hinsicht auf Arbeiten von Rawls und Habermas zurückgreift, das heißt, sie versucht eine praktische Situation für diskursive Ethik zu organisieren, um eine legitime Grundlage für eine Politik zu finden, die zu verfolgen ist, wenn die betreffende Technologie durch eine moralische Kontroverse gekennzeichnet ist. Zur interaktiven Technologiefolgenabschätzung gehört ein Zyklus von Befragungen aller Interessengruppen, die explizit gebeten werden, sich zu den Bedenken und Fragen anderer Teilnehmer (anonym) zu äußern. Dieser Zyklus wird mehrmals wiederholt, sodass sich ein Prozess mittelbaren Lernens entwickelt. Dieser Prozess hat das Ziel, Punkte zu identifizieren, in denen Übereinstimmung herrscht, und Punkte, über die die Teilnehmer sich nicht einigen können. Auf dieser Basis können dann allgemein gebilligte Politikempfehlungen formuliert werden. Dieses Kapitel befasst sich zum Beispiel mit der interaktiven Bewertung der Technologie der Cochlea-Implantation in Kindern. Es erklärt die Begründung, den Entwurf und die Ergebnisse der Prozedur sowie ihre wichtigsten ethischen Aspekte.

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Résumé Lévaluation technologique interactive est une nouvelle approche pour évaluer les technologies (médicales), qui tire son origine des travaux de Rawls et Habermas. Cela signifie quelle tente de dorganiser une configuration pratique pour léthique discursive, afin de trouver une base légitime aux politiques à suivre lorsque la technologie examinée fait lobjet dune controverse morale. Lévaluation technologique interactive implique un cycle de sondages auprès de tous les groupes concernés, auxquels il est explicitement demandé de sexprimer (anonymement) sur les préoccupations et les questions soulevées par dautres participants. Ce cycle est répété à plusieurs reprises, de sorte quun processus dapprentissage indirect se développe. Cette démarche vise à identifier les points suscitant laccord ou le désaccord, sur la base desquels des recommandations politiques approuvées par une large majorité peuvent être formulées. Ce chapitre porte sur lévaluation technologique interactive dans le cas des implants cochléaires en pédiatrie. Il présente le raisonnement, la conception et les résultats de la démarche de même que ses principaux aspects éthiques.

     

Addiction to fruit machines: A preliminary study among young males

Although most sources treat gambling as an adult phenomenon, adolescent gambling is more widespread than is generally recognized, and in some cases may even be pathological. This paper outlines a preliminary study of eight adolescents addicted to playing and gambling on coin-in-the-slot machines (more commonly known as fruit machines). Factors involved in the onset of fruit machine playing are examined along with their alternative gambling activities and associated problems. The role of skill and excitement components in persistent playing are also discussed.The author would like to thank the United Kingdom Economic and Social Research Council for funding this work through a research studentship.     

Factors Contributing to Parents’ Preparation For Special-Needs Adoption

Three hundred and sixty-eight parents shared their perceptions of special-needs adoption preparation. Utilizing both quantitative and qualitative data to determine and understand what factors contribute to preparation, this study found that 12 child, family, and agency variables were correlated with perceived preparation, and that parents perceived level of preparation was predicted by the childs ability to attach, by the parents relationship with the agency, by the duration of the adoption, and by the parents ages at the time of adoption. Implications of these findings are discussed, as they relate to supporting parents, children, and families in special-needs adoptive placements.     

Brief Communications: Treating Problem Gamblers: A Residential Therapy Approach

The Gordon House Association (GHA) is the UK's only specialist and dedicated residential facility for problem gamblers. This paper describes the GHA therapeutic programme which is centred round a nine-month period of residency. Progression through the programme is described by overviewing each of the phases. These are initial assessment and five distinct phases comprising coping with today (Phase One), coping with yesterday (Phase Two), coping with change (Phase Three), coping with tomorrow (Phase Four), and coping on my own (Phase Five). These phases are themselves underpinned within the GHA core therapeutic approach which is also described.     

Health technology assessment: trying to bring empirical and ethical inquiry together

A comprehensive assessment of a health technology requires that a wide variety of questions are addressed. These range from whether the use of a technology results in achievement of its intended effects (e.g., better tumour control, pain relief, improved mobility, etc.) at acceptable costs and without incurring undue risks to the patient, to whether its use may challenge existing social arrangements and values (e.g., individual responsibility for preserving good health, the value of human life, etc.). Clearly, this is a major challenge, since it requires the use of quite different methods of inquiry. In the past decades, we have rarely witnessed assessments where both types of questions were addressed in a balanced way. Rather, a wide gap exists between inquiries with a strong empirical focus and an almost complete neglect of underlying normative issues, and inquiries which are largely discursive, but with a serious disregard of relevant empirical data. The complex interplay between normative frameworks and empirical data in the assessment of health technologies is illustrated in two case studies: the assessment of surgical management of children with glue ears, and the assessment of Extra Corporeal Membrane Oxygenation in neonates.

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Zusammenfassung Die unfassende Beurteilung einer Medizintechnologie erfordert das Angehen einer Vielfalt ganz verschiedener Fragen. Das Spektrum reicht von der Frage, ob der Einsatz einer Technologie die angestrebten Ergebnisse zeitigen wird (z. B. verbesserte Tumorkontrolle, Schmerzlinderung, bessere Beweglichkeit etc.), ob dies zu akzeptablen Kosten möglich ist, und ohne übermäßige Risiken für den Patienten, bis zu der Frage, ob ihr Einsatz bestehende gesellschaftliche Übereinkünfte und Werte bedroht (z. B. die Verantwortung des Individuums für die Erhaltung seiner Gesundheit, der Wert menschlichen Lebens etc.). Dies ist offenbar eine große Herausforderung, da die Beantwortung dieser Fragen den Einsatz verschiedenster Untersuchungsmethoden erfordert. In den vergangenen Jahrzehnten ist nur selten eine Beurteilung erschienen, in der beide Fragentypen auf ausgewogene Weise berücksichtigt waren. Das Bild ist eher das einer weiten Kluft zwischen in hohem Maße empirisch orientierten Studien, in denen die zugrunde liegenden normativen Fragen fast vollkommen vernachlässigt bleiben, und solchen, die weitgehend diskursiv gestaltet sind, dabei jedoch die relevanten Erfahrungsdaten sträflich missachten. Das komplexe Zusammenspiel zwischen dem normativen Rahmen und empirischen Daten in der Beurteilung von Medizintechnologien wird anhand zweier Fallstudien dargestellt: die Beurteilung des chirurgischen Managements von Kindern mit Mittelohrentzündung und die Beurteilung der extrakorporalen Membranoxygenation in Neugeborenen.

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Résumé Lévaluation complète dune technologie de la santé exige daborder un grand nombre de questions. Celles-ci vont de la question de savoir si la mise en oeuvre dune technologie aboutira aux résultats escomptés (p. ex. meilleure maîtrise des tumeurs, atténuation de la douleur, meilleure mobilité, etc.), à des coûts acceptables et sans risques excessifs pour le patient, à la question de savoir si son utilisation menace le consensus et les valeurs sociales (p. ex. responsabilité de lindividu pour la préservation de sa santé, valeur de la vie humaine, etc.). Ceci est certes un défi de taille, qui exige différentes méthodes détude. Au cours des décennies écoulées, nous avons rarement assisté à des évaluations dans lesquelles ces deux types de questions étaient pris en compte de façon équilibrée. Au contraire, il existe plutôt un profond fossé entre les études mettant fortement laccent sur les aspects empiriques et négligeant presque entièrement les questions normatives sous-jacentes, et les études largement discursives, mais qui ignorent superbement les données empiriques pertinentes. Linteraction complexe entre cadres normatifs et données empiriques dans lévaluation des technologies médicales est illustrée par deux études de cas : lévaluation de la gestion chirurgicale des enfants souffrant dotites, et lévaluation de loxygénation extracorporelle chez le nouveau-né (ECMO).

     

Inequality and welfare evaluation of heterogeneous income distributions

This paper establishes the principles that should govern the welfare and inequality analysis of heterogeneous income distributions. Two basic criteria – the equity preference condition and the compensation principle – are shown to be fundamentally incompatible. The paper favours the latter, thereby vindicating the traditional method of dealing with heterogeneous samples. However, inequality and welfare comparisons will usually be well defined only if equivalent incomes are obtained using constant scale factors; and researchers will need to distinguish clearly between inequality of nominal incomes and inequality of living standards. Furthermore, household observations must always be weighted according to family size.     

Welfarist-consequentialism,similarity of attitudes,and Arrow’s general impossibility theorem

Two features of Arrows social choice theory are critically scrutinized. The first feature is the welfarist-consequentialism, which not only bases social judgements about right or wrong actions on the assessment of their consequences, but also assesses consequences in terms of peoples welfare and nothing else. The second feature is a similarity of peoples attitudes towards social outcomes as a possible resolvent of the Arrow impossibility theorem. Two extended frameworks, one consequentialist and the other non-consequentialist, are developed. Both frameworks are shown to admit some interesting resolutions of Arrows general impossibility theorem, which are rather sharply contrasting with Arrows own perspective.     

KNOWING TOO MUCH ABOUT OTHERS: MODERATORS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAVESDROPPING AND RAPPORT IN SOCIAL INTERACTION

This study examined the association between a partners ability to eavesdrop on nonverbal cues and an actors feelings of rapport during interaction, as well as neuroticism and self-monitoring as moderators of this effect. Eavesdropping ability was defined as lower sensitivity to cues of the face, a source of overtly displayed emotions, relative to sensitivity to cues of the body, a source of leakage of covert or hidden emotions. Results showed that actors felt less rapport the higher their partners eavesdropping. High neuroticism actors were especially likely to feel worse about their interaction and themselves when their partners were good at eavesdropping. In both instances, the eavesdroppers nonverbal behavior seems to have mediated the associations to a small degree.Both authors contributed equally to this paper. This research was supported by a Mary Switzer Research Fellowship to Tickle-Degnen from the National Institutes of Disability and Rehabilitation Research of the US Department of Education, a Sargent College of Boston University Accelerated Research Grant, and funding from the American Occupational Therapy Association, Inc., the American Occupational Therapy Foundation, and Boston University through the Neurobehavioral Rehabilitation Research Center for Scholarship and Research.     

Neurophysiology and freedom of the will

In the first two sections of the paper, some basic terminological distinctions regarding freedom of the will as a philosophical problem are expounded and discussed. On this basis, the third section focuses on the examination of two neurophysiological experiments (one by Benjamin Libet and one by William Grey Walter), which in recent times are often interpreted as providing an empirical vindication of determinism and, accordingly, a refutation of positions maintaining freedom of the will. It will be argued that both experiments fall short in this respect, and that in general—for methodical reasons—the prospects of ever deciding the dispute about freedom of the will through empirical research are rather poor.

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Zusammenfassung  In den ersten beiden Teilen dieses Beitrags werden einige grundlegende terminologische Unterscheidungen bezüglich Willensfreiheit als philosophisches Problem erläutert und diskutiert. Auf dieser Grundlage befasst sich der dritte Teil mit der Untersuchung zweier neurophysiologischer Experimente (eines von Benjamin Libet, das andere von William Grey Walter), die in jüngerer Zeit gern als empirische Bestätigung des Determinismus und damit als Widerlegung von Positionen interpretiert werden, die eine Freiheit des Willens behaupten. Wir argumentieren, dass beide Experimente in dieser Hinsicht mangelhaft sind und dass allgemein die Aussichten, den Disput über Willensfreiheit durch empirische Forschung zu lösen, aus methodischen Gründen eher gering sind.

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Résumé  Les deux premières sections de larticle exposent et discutent certaines distinctions terminologiques concernant le « libre arbitre » en tant que problème philosophique. Sur cette base, la troisième section se concentre sur lexamen de deux expériences neurophysiologiques (lune par Benjamin Libet et lautre par William Grey Walter), souvent interprétées ces derniers temps comme fournissant une justification au déterminisme et, par conséquent, une réfutation des positions affirmant la liberté de la volonté. Largumentation fait ressortir que les deux expériences ne parviennent pas à leur but à cet égard et que de façon générale, pour des raisons méthodologiques, les perspectives de trancher la question du libre arbitre par la recherche empirique sont plutôt mauvaises.

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Participation as a means of enhancing the legitimacy of decisions on technology? A sceptical analysis

The legitimacy of technology as a whole, of individual fields of technology, and of concrete decisions on technology has become problematic. Traditional methods and elements for the legitimization of technological development and of the application of technology have been increasingly called into question since the 1980s. There are great expectations in participatory procedures to improving the legitimization of technology decisions. Those expectations, however, might not be justified. In the paper, the hypothesis is proposed that legitimacy can be brought about through participation only under conditions that require the fulfillment of a number of preconditions, which often cannot be regarded as fulfilled. The unavoidable separation between internal communication among the participants and external communication with the nonparticipants turns out to be the fundamental structural characteristic hindering naïve expectations of improving legitimacy by participation.

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Zusammenfassung Die Legitimität von Technik als Ganzem, von einzelnen Technikfeldern und von konkreten Technikentscheidungen ist heute problematisch. Traditionelle Methoden und Elemente für die Legitimierung technischer Entwicklungen und der Anwendung von Technik werden seit den Achtzigerjahren immer mehr in Frage gestellt. Nun setzt man große Erwartungen in partizipatorische Prozeduren, die die Legitimierung von Technikentscheidungen verbessern sollen, Erwartungen, die jedoch möglicherweise nicht gerechtfertigt sind. In diesem Beitrag stellen wir die Hypothese zur Diskussion, dass Partizipation nur unter Umständen zu Legitimität führen kann, die voraussetzen, dass bestimmte Vorbedingungen erfüllt sind, was jedoch oft nicht der Fall ist. Die unvermeidliche Trennung zwischen interner Kommunikation unter den Teilnehmern und externer Kommunikation mit den Nichtteilnehmern erweist sich als das grundlegende strukturelle Merkmal, das der Erfüllung naiver Erwartungen hinsichtlich einer erhöhten Legitimität durch Partizipation im Weg steht.

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Résumé La légitimité de la technologie en tant que tout, de domaines technologiques particuliers et de décisions technologiques concrètes est aujourdhui problématique. Les méthodes et les éléments traditionnels de légitimation des développements technologiques sont depuis les années quatre-vingts de plus en plus remis en question. On fonde à présent de grands espoirs dans les procédures participatives, qui doivent améliorer la légitimation des décisions technologiques, un espoir qui nest cependant peut-être pas justifié. Dans cet article, nous discutons lhypothèse selon laquelle la participation ne peut mener à la légitimité que dans des conditions impliquant à leur tour que certains préalables soient remplis, ce qui nest souvent pas le cas. La séparation inévitable entre la communication interne entre participants et la communication externe avec les nonparticipants savère une caractéristique structurelle fondamentale faisant obstacle à laccomplissement dattentes naïves pour ce qui est dune légitimité accrue par la participation.

     

A quantitative theory of preferences: Some results on transition functions

We investigate a general theory of combining individual preferences into collective choice. The preferences are treated quantitatively, by means of preference functions (a,b), where 0(a,b) expresses the degree of preference of a to b. A transition function is a function (x,y) which computes (a,c) from (a,b) and (b,c), namely (a,c)=((a,b),(b,c)). We prove that given certain (reasonable) conditions on how individual preferences are aggregated, there is only one transition function that satisfies these conditions, namely the function (x,y)=x·y (multiplication of odds). We also formulate a property of transition functions called invariance, and prove that there is no invariant transition function; this impossibility theorem shows limitations of the quantitative method.Research supported in part by the National Science Foundation.     

The Dodgson ranking and its relation to Kemeny’s method and Slater’s rule

In this paper we provide a binary extension of Dodgsons non-binary preference aggregation rule. This new aggregation rule is then compared to two other rules which, as Dodgsons rule, are also explicitly based on distance functions, namely Kemenys and Slaters rule. It is shown that the alternative which is top ranked by any of those rules can occur at any position in the Dodgson ranking.I am very grateful to Nick Baigent, Daniel Eckert and the participants of the CEPET 2002 Workshop in Udine and the Graz University Research Seminar for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. It goes without saying that any remaining errors are exclusively the authors responsibility.     

The instability of robust aggregation

Levis robust aggregation suggests a generalization of the standard ex ante mode of aggregating individuals expected utilities into a social choice function. This generalization applies some social choice rule not only to the actual individuals but also to hypothetical individuals with all possible combinations of the actual individuals probabilities and utilities. We show that robust aggregation can lead to preference reversals in the social choice when the very same decision situation is described with different degrees of detail, thus violating a desirable stability condition. We also show that any stable robust social choice rule must collapse back into the ex ante mode without recourse to hypothetical individuals. Under sufficient conditions, such as strong Pareto optimality, robust aggregation even leads to an infinite series of reversals in group choices. By contrast, stability is ubiquitous in the standard ex ante mode and is closely related to independence of irrelevant alternatives.I wish to thank Christs College, Cambridge and the California Institute of Technology for their generous financial and academic support. I am grateful to three anonymous referees for their helpful comments. I am much indebted to Isaac Levi, Philippe Mongin and Teddy Seidenfeld for their help and encouragement.     

Council of Europe regulations relevant to intervening in psychic capacities

The paper highlights the need to clarify the definition of psychic capacities and the difficulty in distinguishing between improved capacity and improved functioning. Before considering whether it is legally permissible to undertake an intervention on psychic capacities, and if so under what conditions, it is necessary to consider whether such an intervention is ethically appropriate. If the intervention is ethically appropriate, whether it is legally permissible according to the instruments of the Council of Europe will depend on the persons status (for example, whether the person is an adult or a child, or able or not able to give consent), the type of intervention proposed, and in certain cases the type of material used in the intervention. The paper discusses the regulations that are relevant to these different situations.

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Zusammenfassung  Dieser Beitrag unterstreicht die Notwendigkeit, die Definition des Begriffs psychische Fähigkeiten zu klären, und die Schwierigkeit, zwischen verbesserten Fähigkeiten und verbesserter Funktion zu unterscheiden. Bevor wir erörtern, ob ein Eingriff in psychische Fähigkeiten rechtlich zulässig ist und, wenn ja, unter welchen Bedingungen, müssen wir überlegen, ob eine solche Intervention ethisch angemessen ist. Wenn das der Fall ist, hängt die rechtliche Zulässigkeit, entsprechend den Instrumenten des Europäischen Rates, vom Status der betroffenen Person ab (zum Beispiel, ob es sich um einen Erwachsen oder ein Kind handelt), von der Art des Eingriffs, der zur Debatte steht, und in bestimmten Fällen dem Material, das bei diesem Eingriff benutzt wird. Der Beitrag behandelt die Vorschriften, die in diesen unterschiedlichen Situationen zum Tragen kommen.

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Résumé  Cet article met en lumière le besoin de clarifier la définition des « capacités psychiques » et la difficulté à faire la différence entre capacité améliorée et fonctionnement amélioré. Avant de décider sil est légalement licite dintervenir sur les capacités psychiques, et si oui, dans quelles conditions, il est nécessaire de se demander si une telle intervention est justifiée du point de vue éthique. La question de savoir si une intervention est appropriée du point de vue éthique et si elle est légalement licite en vertu des instruments du Conseil de lEurope, dépend du statut de la personne (si la personne est un adulte ou un enfant, si elle est capable ou non de donner son consentement, etc.), du type dintervention envisagé, et dans certains cas du type de matériel utilisé pour lintervention. Larticle examine les réglementations qui sappliquent à ces différentes situations.

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All opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the author.

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Choice,freedom, and freedom of choice

This paper argues in favour of a distinction between freedom and freedom of choice – a distinction that economists and political philosophers have so far either ignored or drawn wrongly. Drawing the distinction correctly may help to resolve a number of disputes in contemporary political philosophy and non-welfarist normative economics regarding the so-called preference-based account of freedom and the relevance, to judgements about freedom, of degrees of similarity between agents options. The paper begins by setting out three much discussed axioms for the measurement of freedom (of choice?) originally put forward by Pattanaik and Xu. It is suggested that the problems these axioms give rise to can be solved by distinguishing correctly between freedom and freedom of choice. The paper then sets out definitions of freedom, choice and freedom of choice, justifying these in philosophical terms and arguing their superiority to alternative definitions. Finally, on the basis of these definitions and with reference to Pattanaik and Xus axioms, it is shown that an agent can enjoy freedom without enjoying freedom of choice, and that she can enjoy an increase in one of these without enjoying an increase in the other. For their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I should like to thank Keith Dowding, Martin van Hees, Matthew Kramer, Marco Negri, Serena Olsaretti, Olof Page, Mario Ricciardi, Alan Ritter, Hillel Steiner, Kotaro Suzumura and audiences at seminars in Manchester, Palermo, Pavia and Oxford. I am grateful to the Italian Ministry for Higher Education (MURST) and the Italian National Research Council (CNR) for funding that facilitated the completion of the paper.     

Doubling vs. Constant Bets as Strategies for Gambling

Some gamblers use a doubling strategy as a way of improving their chances of coming home a winner. This paper reports on the results of a computer simulation study of the doubling strategy and compares the short term and long term results of doubling to gambling with a constant sized bet. In the short term players using a doubling strategy were more likely to win, then lose, however in the long term, the losses suffered by doublers were much greater than that suffered by constant bettors. It is argued that the use of a doubling strategy is related to an incomplete conceptualization of random events sometimes known as the law of averages. A second simulation examined the fate of doubling in an ideal world in which the law of averages was actually true. In this ideal world, doublers were much better off than constant bettors. The relationship of the results to a naive conceptualization of random events is discussed.     

The Effect of a Family Policy Reform on Mother’s Pay: A Natural Experiment Approach

All parents in Norway with children aged one to three, who do not attend publicly subsidised day care, are entitled to a cash-for-care (CFC) subsidy. Studies have shown that the reform has reduced mothers labour supply. In this paper we analyse wage effects of the reform. We put forward a framework for evaluating reforms when reforms are uniformly and equally accessible nation-wide. First, running a simple Difference in differences (DD) analysis, results suggest that the CFC reform has reduced the mothers wages. However, after controlling for the age of the child effect, by running a triple difference approach, we no longer find any evidence of negative wage effects.This revised version was published online in May 2005 with corrections to the authors name and to the heading of table A2.