Corporate governance and market performance of parent firms following equity carve-out announcements

Using the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick corporate governance index on a sample of 158 parent firms, this study demonstrates that firms with a superior governance rating have a higher short-term market reaction to carve-out announcements relative to firms with an inferior governance rating. Although the data supports previous evidence regarding negative long-term market reaction that parent firms typically experience following equity carve-outs, the results show that well-governed firms marginally outperform others. The findings also confirm that the dynamic effects related to improvements in corporate governance positively affect the long-term market outcome of parent firms; this relation is more significant in well-governed parent firms. Finally, the study shows evidence that corporate governance helps mitigate the agency problems related to the financing hypothesis, which results in better short and long-term market reactions following carve-out announcements.     

The Stock Market Reaction to Investment Decisions: Evidence from Italy

Based on a study of new investment announcements from 1989 to 1995 by Italian firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange, we find a positive stock price reaction to new investment decisions. The stock price reaction is larger for joint venture announcements. The market response is also larger for non-state owned companies and when the announcement is released in a period of rising stock prices. The announced investment has no impact on the non-voting shares but increases the voting shares' market price through a significant revaluation of their vote-segment. We find some evidence that new investments lead to management's private benefits rather than towards firm value. This is consistent with the typical Italian corporate governance structure, where a majority shareholder safely controls a listed company while having only a fractional claim on the firm's cash flows.     

Revisiting corporate governance through the lens of the Spanish evidence

The purpose of this study is to illustrate the characteristics of the Spanish corporate governance system and especially describe the diffusion of each mechanism among listed firms, in comparison with other industrialized countries. In doing so, we identify idiosyncratic traits of the Spanish corporate governance model that points up how the dichotomy between outsider- and insider-oriented models is simplistic and does not fit with the Spanish context. We argue, instead, that corporate governance has evolved in Spain towards a hybrid model that is situated in an intermediate position between the two aforementioned systems. The result of this hybridization is a system characterized by a new role for the state as a regulator, the presence of large blockholders, and a higher free float of capital on the stock market. Still, it is a very weak market for corporate control, and has reduced incorporation of Anglo-Saxon practices such as information transparency, board independence, or variable compensation packages for the management.     

Why do firms decide to stop their share repurchase programs?

We explore the distinguishing characteristics of firms that completed or ended share repurchase programs. Our findings help further understanding of the economic reasons for cancelling such programs. Based on a U.S. sample of 457 completed and 79 non-completed repurchase programs, we find a significant drop in systematic risk around completed buybacks. This suggests a response to deteriorating investment opportunities. In contrast, the systematic risk of non-completers decreases prior to the announcement, followed by an increase that peaks during the event period. This suggests that firms cancel their repurchase intentions when growth options move into the money.     

The influence of corporate governance on changes in risk following the global financial crisis: evidence from the Portuguese stock market

This paper examines the influence of corporate governance characteristics on changes in total, market and idiosyncratic risk in the Portuguese capital market following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. We aim to address corporate practices, while determining if corporate governance characteristics can help predict future variations of the risk associated with a certain security and, in this sense, if these characteristics may be used to help monitor or forecast risk of an existing portfolio of securities over time. We find positive and significant changes in total and idiosyncratic risk for non-financial firms listed on Euronext Lisbon, consistent with increases in investor uncertainty during the crisis period. Our results suggest that changes in risk measures over a shorter-term and a longer-term period vary with governance characteristics. The capital market rewarded companies with a greater proportion of non-executive directors and directors that exercise (on average) management roles in more companies or institutions. On the other hand, the capital market punished companies with a greater proportion of independent directors and greater ownership concentration.     

Corporate Governance and Director Accountability: an Institutional Comparative Perspective*

This paper examines the role of boards of directors in light of institutional contingencies and recent best practice governance guidelines and regulation such as the United Kingdom Higgs Review and the United States Sarbanes‐Oxley Act 2002. Particular attention is paid to discussing the role of independent directors across countries, and the implications for corporate governance innovation. It concludes by posing questions about recent corporate governance transformations and providing suggestions for future research.     

Board of directors and insider trading with share repurchase programs

This study examines the relationship between insider trading and board of directors’ characteristics around stock repurchase announcements. It is hypothesized that information disparity between insiders and shareholders from share repurchases announcements creates opportunities for insiders to time their trading. However, there is little evidence on whether board characteristics reduce the probability of insider trading with repurchase announcements. Using data from firms listed on Forbes 500 between 1998 and 2004, we found that insider trading is related to share repurchase announcements. In order to focus on board of directors’ role, we controlled for board characteristics that may change the repurchase decision. Our results provide corroborative evidence of insider net selling around repurchase announcements and the advantages of board characteristics to offset insider trading. In particular, the results suggest that board tenure, directors’ ownership and board directorship change positively insider trading around repurchase announcements. Hence, Securities and Exchange Commission should consider rigorous restrictions on share repurchase announcements and be aware of potential influence of the corporate governance device.     

Corporate divestiture and performance: an institutional view

In this study, we investigate how the institutional environment affects shareholders’ reaction to a firm’s announcement of divestitures. Traditionally, divestiture research has adhered to a financial economics perspective, in which shareholders anticipate certain economic outcomes from corporate divestitures and react accordingly. However, this research has not delivered a distinct understanding of the performance effects of corporate divestitures. To structure and integrate previous work, we apply a neo-institutional perspective of the stock market. We argue that at certain times, the institutional support for corporate diversification is relatively low. During these periods, there is a high rate of divestitures. The high divestiture activity legitimizes this corporate action and leads to a positive reaction of the stock market to new divestiture announcements. This means that individual evaluations of the possible performance outcomes of divestments are not the only factor determining the stock market reaction to a corporate divestiture announcement. Rather, investors might consider the perceived institutionalization of this corporate action when making their purchasing decisions. Using a meta-analytical technique, we find support for our prediction that different performance effects of divestitures, as revealed by previous studies, can be attributed to different conditions of the macro-economic environment. We discuss the implications of this result for research and management practice.     

基于联立方程模型的公司治理溢价研究——兼谈如何检验公司治理评价指标的有效性

公司治理溢价研究可以揭示公司治理与企业价值之间的互动机理,不仅有助于深化和丰富公司治理理论,为上市公司优化公司治理指明方向和重点,而且有助于投资者全面评估企业价值.而对公司治理的客观评价是公司治理溢价研究中的关键问题,本文在以往研究成果基础上,以上证公司治理板块的评选结果为参照样本,给出了检验公司治理评价指标有效性的科学方法,进而验证了以DEA方法构建的公司治理效率值指标的有效性;在此基础上利用联立方程模型对公司治理溢价进行研究,解决了公司治理与企业价值之间可能存在的内生性问题;以2007年中国沪市578家A股公司为样本对联立方程模型进行估计.结果表明,中国股票市场存在公司治理溢价,公司治理效率值每增加0.1,流通盘市场附加值就会有37.2%的溢价.     

公司治理质量与盈余质量——基于中国治理指数(CCGINK)的初步证据

本文依据南开大学公司治理研究中心公开的中国治理指数数据选择高治理质量公司,并根据自行计算的治理指数选择低治理质量公司,研究了公司治理高低对盈余质量的影响.基于收益-盈余模型,使用2002年和2004年的数据,本文发现(1)公司治理质量显著影响到了盈余质量,高治理质量公司的盈余反应系数显著高于低治理质量公司;(2)高治理质量公司的盈余变化较之低治理质量公司的盈余变化具有更为显著的价值相关性.     

Product Design Awards and The Market Value of The Firm

Product design has increasingly been recognized as an important source of competitive advantage. This study empirically estimates the impact of effective design on the market value of the firm. We use a firm's receipt of a product design award as a proxy for its design effectiveness. Based on data from 264 announcements of design awards given to commercialized products between 1998 and 2011, we find that award announcements are associated with statistically significant positive stock market reactions. Depending on the benchmark model used to estimate the stock market reaction, the market reaction over a two‐day period (the day of announcement and the preceding day) ranges from 0.95% to 1.02%. The market reaction is more positive for smaller firms and for firms whose award winning products are consumer goods. However, a firm's growth potential, industry competitiveness, and whether a firm is a first time or repeated award winner do not significantly affect the market reaction.     

The Effect of Product Development Restructuring on Shareholder Value

This article examines the effect of product development restructuring (PDR) on shareholder value. The results are based on a sample of 165 announcements made during 2002–2011. PDR announcements are associated with an economically and statistically significant positive stock market reaction. Over a two‐day period (the day of the announcement and the day preceding the announcement), the mean (median) market reaction is 1.63% (0.87%). The market reaction is generally positive regardless of the PDR purpose or action. Although the market reaction is more positive for higher R&D intensity firms, it is not directly affected by the firm's prior financial performance or whether the firm's primary PDR objective is to increase revenues or cut costs. However, the interaction between the firm's prior financial performance and its primary PDR objective is significant. For firms that are financial outperformers, the market reaction is more positive if the firm's primary PDR objective is to increase revenues. For financial underperformers, the market reaction is more positive if the firm's primary PDR objective is to cut costs.     

聚焦活动与企业价值之关系——从公司治理机制探讨

本研究系探讨企业聚焦活动宣告对股票报酬之影响,采用1993年至2002年间33家台湾上市上柜公司宣告聚焦活动为研究对象,并以事件研究法市场模型为分析工具,同时以复回归方法从公司治理角度去探讨影响累积异常报酬之因素。研究结果发现,企业聚焦之宣告可获得显著且正向累积异常报酬;而董事会规模、上一年多角化程度以及研究发展费用等因素与累积异常报酬呈正相关。然而,大股东持股比率与累积异常报酬呈负相关。     

Determinanten der Vorstandsvergütung

Using a novel, hand-collected data set covering all German non-financial firms listed in the Prime Standard of FWB (Frankfurt Stock Exchange), we examine determinants of executive compensation in German listed firms. We distinguish three potential determinants: firm characteristics, firm performance, and corporate governance characteristics. While we find that simple firm characteristics like size and industry affiliation together with time effects explain more than 60 % of variation in overall compensation, performance characteristics are economically inconsequential for the explanation of compensation levels. When we distinguish between widely held firms and firms with a large blockholder, we find that the latter grant compensation packages that are smaller, less sensitive to the firm’s stock market performance but more sensitive to the firm’s operating performance. Finally, we confirm that supervisory board characteristics also affect the level of executive compensation in German firms. Overall, our findings suggest that although the corporate governance environment in Germany has changed dramatically during the last decade, German listed firms are still exposed to high agency costs.     

Health‐care Nonprofits: Enhancing Governance and Public Trust

Nonprofits are a major part of the U.S. economy and they are not immune from corporate malfeasance controversies. Even Congress has expressed concern about the crisis in nonprofit governance. The nonprofit response to Congress has been a historic initiative recognizing critical challenges to nonprofit governance. In contrast to their for‐profit counterparts, nonprofits are committed to missions serving the public benefit and not to shareholder profits. Accordingly, their missions and financial resources are intrinsic to their very existence, which is built upon the public trust. That trust is rooted in fiduciary responsibility and reflected in best practices. This article traces the history of the nonprofit public trust and fiduciary standards and examines principles of Sarbanes–Oxley and other best practices as they apply to nonprofits. The authors sampled 80 health‐care nonprofit corporation web sites from eight asset classes to determine compliance with Sarbanes–Oxley and identification of fiduciary duty, ethical values, and other best practices. Among the very largest health‐care nonprofits, many comply with Sarbanes–Oxley and identify fiduciary duty, ethical values, and other best practices. However, there are substantial deficiencies in such compliance and identification among all remaining seven asset classes ranging from 99.9 million to less than 100,000. The results appear to corroborate the urgent necessity for reform articulated by the Congress and the nonprofit sector. Nonprofit governance has entered a new era where best practices must be implemented to sustain the public trust.     

“Good” corporate governance and the quality of internal auditing departments in Italian listed firms. An exploratory investigation in Italian listed firms

One of the most important issue relating to corporate governance reports refers to their ability to provide users with a complete set of information regarding the effective ability of an entity to achieve oversight objectives by the compliance to corporate governance practices required by a specific law or industry code. In addition, other features, such as the quality of the internal auditing function or the sensitivity of top management to issues relating to corporate internal controls and risk management, can also be taken into account when formulating a judgment on the quality of corporate governance practices. Is there an association between the compliance to codes and internal controls effectiveness? We propose to assess the quality of corporate governance through a proxy that considers several characteristics of internal audit departments and combines them to determine an Internal Audit Departments global quality index—IAD Index. To define IAD global quality we consider the effectiveness of an internal audit function analysing its operational aspects. The IAD Index is based on several signalling elements that previous literature assumed as proxies for quality of IADs which are grouped into four pillars: a formal quality index; a static quality index; an activity-related quality index; and a performance-linked quality index. We then test the IAD index on a sample of Italian listed firms and conclude that there are significant associations (positive and negative) between the degree of compliance to some corporate governance regulations for listed firms and the IAD Index for the sample being considered.     

Does the market value corporate response to climate change?

Motivated by the controversial debate on mandatory reductions of greenhouse gases in the U.S., this study explores whether the market values corporate response to tackle carbon dioxide emissions. We measure corporate responses using the measure of media tone based on the positive and negative words in each news article. Our results show that the market reacts favorably to the negative media exposure of corporate response to climate change over the announcement period and the one-year period, which implies that the socially responsible action to tackle climate change is costly. We further find that the positive response is less pronounced for firms from polluting industries and firms with poor environmental performance.     

Delistings and the costs of governance: a study of European stock exchanges 1996–2004

In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in delistings from stock exchanges in the US and Europe, and this trend has been partly attributed to increasing administrative costs in listed companies. Has corporate governance regulation gone too far? We examine delistings from European stock exchanges 1996–2004 and find that standard corporate governance regulation—like investor protection and corporate governance codes—is associated with more delistings and in particularly going private transactions. In contrast, the tendency to go private is found to be lower, when the quality of overall governance is high. The results continue to hold when we take into consideration that governance policy may be endogenous.     

Evaluating the Evaluators: Should Investors Trust Corporate Governance Metrics Ratings?

Companies are under increasing pressure to have their corporate governance rated by an independent corporate governance metrics firm, such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) or Governance Metrics International (GMI). These rating firms claim to be able to determine how effective and responsive a company’s board is. Institutional investors have begun using these board governance ratings when deciding which firms to include in their stock portfolios. This paper considers whether investors, many of whom claim to be socially responsible, should be relying upon board governance metrics. We find that these metrics are not good indicators of either the quality of a firm’s earnings or of its ethics.     

融资融券对上市公司治理影响的研究

以融资融券机制推出为背景, 运用我国内地A股市场上市公司为样本, 研究了融资融券对上市公司治理水平的影响.回归结果显示, 成为融资融券标的后, 上市公司高管离职与高管薪酬对于公司绩效的黏性均有提高, 表明融资融券可以作为外部公司治理机制.机制检验显示融资融券是通过促进公司信息释放而提升公司治理水平的.进一步分析显示, 当公司面临行业竞争压力较小或面临财务约束时, 融资融券对于公司治理的促进作用更加明显.最后, 将融资和融券分开分析, 发现融资机制和融券机制均对公司治理有提升作用.证明了融资融券机制可以提高资本市场对企业的监督, 促进企业信息释放, 从而提高上市公司治理水平.