Bargaining with set-valued disagreement

It is arguable that in many-two person bargaining situations disagreement leads to a set of possible payoffs with no probabilities attached to the elements of the set. Axioms are developed for bargaining games of this kind and solution concepts are derived from these axioms. Particular attention is paid to what are here called the max-max and rectangular general solutions. The latter can be applied to an important sub-class of bargaining games where the disagreement set is equal to the feasible set.A part of this work was done while I was a visitor at the University of Stockholm. For valuable discussions and comments I am grateful to T.C.A. Anant, Salvador Barbera, Bhaskar Dutta, Efe Ok, Jorgen Weibull and an anonymous referee of this journal. The paper also benefited from a presentation at the Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi.     

A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings

We consider the problem of choosing a subset of a finite set of indivisible objects (public projects, facilities, laws, etc.) studied by Barberà et al. (1991). Here we assume that agents preferences are separable weak orderings. Given such a preference, objects are partitioned into three types, goods, bads, and nulls. We focus on voting rules, which rely only on this partition rather than the full information of preferences. We characterize voting rules satisfying strategy-proofness (no one can ever be better off by lying about his preference) and null-independence (the decision on each object should not be dependent on the preference of an agent for whom the object is a null). We also show that serially dictatorial rules are the only voting rules satisfying efficiency as well as the above two axioms. We show that the separable domain is the unique maximal domain over which each rule in the first characterization, satisfying a certain fairness property, is strategy-proof. I am grateful to Professor William Thomson for helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank Professor John Duggan, Christopher Chambers, and seminar participants in Department of Economics, University of Rochester. I thank anonymous referees for their detailed comments and suggestions that helped me a great deal to develop the earlier version of this paper. All remaining errors are mine.     

Disagreement point monotonicity,transfer responsiveness,and the egalitarian bargaining solution

This paper provides an axiomatization of the egalitarian bargaining solution. The central axiom used (together with some standard properties of bargaining solutions) in this characterization is a transfer responsiveness condition. First, it ensures that no transfer paradox can occur if bargaining power is transferred from one agent to another by decreasing one agent's and increasing the other agent's component of the disagreement point. Second, the extent of external effects of such a transfer is limited by requiring that agents not involved in the transfer neither gain more than the winner nor lose more than the loser of the transfer. Journal of Economic Literature Classification No.: C78.I thank William Thomson whose comments on an earlier version led to substantial improvements.     

Interpersonal utility theory

A triangulation strategy is sketched for constructing an empirical testable theory of interpersonal comparisons of utility units. Bargaining theory and the theory of the utility curves of money are tentatively suggested as triangulation points.During 1981–82, I presented these ideas in talks at Chicago, Michigan, Oberlin, Princeton, Stanford and Yale. I have benefitted from the comments I received then as well as from comments of the referees.     

The Nomothetic-Idiographic Issue: Some Roots and Recent Trends

A review of the history of the nomothetic-idiographic issue suggests that the problem of the uniqueness of the individual is secondary in this context to that of the right approach to the study of the human person. Idiographic approaches emphasize the need for an unmutilated conceptualization of psychological processes. The requirements of this unmutilated kind of research need to be integrated with those of nomothetic science asking for the controlled gaining and analyzing of information regarding psychological processes. One form of such a kind of integration is represented by biographical studies based on semistructured interviews and a systematic qualitative and quantitative analysis of their contents. Findings from such research as especially related to developmental and personality psychology are reported here by summarizing a series of studies conducted at the University of Bonn.     

Social choice in economic environments with dimensional variation

An argument for welfarist social evaluation is presented that replaces the independence axiom with a consistency axiom for social-evaluation functionals in economic environments. This axiom (consistency across dimension or COAD) requires that, if two allocations contain suballocations in common, and if individual utility functions are projected down to the smaller economy where allocations change, then these small allocations must be ranked in the same way that their ancestral allocations were.The basic result is applied to different information environments and a variety of ethical axioms appropriate to economic environments is investigated.We are indebted to Charles Blackorby, Erwin Diewert, Ed Morey, Bill Schworm and John Weymark for helpful discussions, and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Killiam Foundation and the National Science Foundation, for research support.     

Durkheim'sdivision of labor in society

The source of social life, according to Durkheim, is the similitude of consciousnesses and the division of labor. The former is best evident among primitive societies where a mechanical solidarity, evidenced by repressive law, prevails; the latter in advanced societies where populations evidence greater dynamic density, and juridical rules define the nature and relations of functions. In combating individualism and basing the existence of societies on a consensus of parts, Durkheim refutes his positivistic emphasis which denies the relevance of ends to a scientific study of society. In his discussion of social ends is a latent anti-mechanistic trend. The theory of unilinear development is established on deficient ethnographic data. It assumes the absence of division of labor among primitive societies and of any mechanical solidarity among modern societies. Repressive and restitutive law Durkheim seeks to use as indexes of mechanical and organic solidarity, but he does not establish with any precision the perfect associations which he assumes obtain between his types of solidarity and of law.Reproduced from theAmerican Journal of Sociology, Vol. 40 (1934), pp. 319–328. (© 1934 by the University of Chicago. All rights reserved.)     

Alternative theory and utopian models

A theoretical model of human systems is presented based on the basic paradigms upon which families, groups, and social systems can be organized. Four fundamentally distinct paradigms are described and the interrelationships among them explored, with special consideration given to the social evolution of systems organized on these paradigms. Implications for the study of alternative lifestyles and utopian societies are discussed.Portions of this paper are based on a presentation at the Fifth Annual Conference on Utopian Studies, Pennsylvania State University, 11 October 1980. The author wishes to thank Rich Erlich, Barry Singer, and Kersti Yllo for valuable comments on earlier versions. Inquiries to the author: 22 Bulette Road, Acton, Massachusetts 01720.     

Making Minorities: Cultural Space,Stigma Transformation Frames,and the Categorical Status Claims of Deaf,Gay, and White Supremacist Activists in Late Twentieth Century America

This article compares the efforts of movement activists in three dissimilar groups to replace a stigmatized status with a valued one by portraying their groups as resembling established minorities (claims of contiguity in cultural space) and as differing from groups stigmatized as deviant (claims of distance). The most common claims assert similarity to African Americans, and frequently incorporate civil rights themes (exemplifying frame diffusion). Tactically, these minority status claims exploit both the resonance of cultural pluralism and state recognition of minorities. Strategically, minority status framing enables stigmatized groups to claim legitimacy without changing — simultaneously asserting both normality and difference.     

Role distancing: Differentiating the role of the elderly from the person

Elderly participants in an extended care class at a senior citizen's center were observed to determine if some of them could continually distance themselves from the client role. Although earlier research suggests that people can use role distancing techniques to disassociate themselves successfully fromoccasionally played roles or certain aspects of a role, it is unclear whether or how people successfully disassociate themselvescontinually from enacted roles. Using a symbolic interactionist's definition of role, this paper attempts to 1) classify the circumstances which give rise to both occasional and continual role distancing; 2) specify the conditions under which disassociation from continually enacted roles may be successful; and 3) suggest the relevance of the data to studies on low-status occupations, deviance, and role theory.I am especially grateful to Melvin Seeman (UCLA) for his critical comments and extensive editorial advice and to Ralph H. Turner (UCLA) for his helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also would like to thank Shulamit Reinharz for editorial assistance.     

A derivation of the money Rawlsian solution

We study the set of envy-free allocations for economies with indivisible objects and quasi-linear utility functions. We characterize the minimal amount of money necessary for its nonemptiness when negative distributions of money are not allowed. We also find that, when this is precisely the available amount of money, there is a unique way to combine objects and money such that these bundles may form an envy-free allocation. Based on this property, we describe a solution to the envy-free selection problem following a pseudo-egalitarian criterion. This solution coincides with the Money Rawlsian Solution proposed by Alkan et al. (1991).I am indebted to I. Gilboa for his valuable suggestions and his patience during the elaboration of the final version. I also wish to thank S. Barbera for his guidance in an earlier version and M. Boldrin, H. Moulin, Z. Neeman, W. Thomson and the referees for their comments. Financial support from FPU-MEC (Spain) is gratefully acknowledged.Northwestern University.     

Sociology of “primitive societies,” evolutionism,and Africa

Sociology of primitive societies has revised its earlier views about kinship, lineage, or lineage mode of production. It attempts now to show that lineage did not pervade African precolonial societies and that other relations, such as capitalist and class relations, were also present. This article seeks to reestablish, contrary to the revisionist view, the centrality of lineage in African precolonial societies to allow for a paradigmatic shift that repudiates evolutionism and brings precolonial societies back to the center of the African debate. Because in such a reoriented debate Africa ceases to be marginalized and on the fringes of other historical experiences, the shift allows, paradoxically, the integration of scholarship on Africa into universal social theory.     

On intra- and interpersonal utility comparisons

In this paper, it is suggested to formulate assumptions on the comparability of individual utilities in terms of meaningful statements rather than using the usual way of defining such assumptions by means of certain sets of admissible transformations. Various assumptions involving intra- and interpersonal comparisons of utility levels and utility differences are introduced in terms of meaningful statements and compared to their traditional counterparts. It is shown that these two approaches are, in general, not equivalent. In a social choice framework, it is demonstrated that the difference between these approaches can be quite substantial: replacing the usual cardinal unit comparability assumption by a condition involving comparisons of utility differences which is similar in spirit turns a well-known characterization of the utilitarian social welfare functional into an impossibility theorem.I am indebted to Charles Blackorby, David Donaldson, Michel Le Breton, and John Weymark for very helpful discussions and comments on an earlier version of the paper. The suggestions of two anonymous referees enabled me to improve the paper considerably.     

Institutional constraints on executive greed: stratification systems in American art museums

This paper examines the stratification systems of over 200 organisations, individually represented by the internal income distributions of each organisation, in turn seen as products of executive decision-making. As a first principle, I assume that in any decision-making situation in which organisational leaders must choose between their own welfare and the welfare of their employees, they will almost always select the selfish course of action. In accordance with this axiom of executive greed, the majority of intra-organisational income distributions exhibit a substantial positive or right skew (that is, many people in the lower income levels and very few in the highest). Yet there is sufficient variation to suggest that there are forces which constrain executive greed. Combining the new structuralist perspective on stratification with resource dependency and organisational fields models, the paper examines hypotheses which maintain that the shape of internal distributive systems is affected by: (i) organisational properties, such as size and structural complexity, which empower the employee in labour relations with management; and (ii) highly-institutionalised resource dependencies which constrain income disbursement decisions. Data are taken from a US sample of art museums. The results of the analyses seriously contradict the new structuralist's empowerment accounts of the effects of size and structural complexity on stratification, and suggest that their propositions have been posed at a level which may be far too general. Certain highly-institutionalised resource dependencies are found to promote equality in internal distributive systems.I thank Ann Rotchford, Charles Perrow, Helmut Anheier and three anonymous reviewers for the useful comments that they provided on an earlier version of this paper. I am grateful to Ann Rotchford for her help in preparing the Appendix.     

Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications

We identify general domain properties that induce the non-existence of efficient, strategy-proof, and non-dictatorial rules in the 2-agent exchange economy. Applying these properties, we establish impossibility results in several restricted domains; for example, the intertemporal exchange problem (without saving technology) with preferences represented by the discounted sum of a temporal utility function, the risk sharing problem with risk averse expected utility preferences, the CES-preference domain, etc. None of the earlier studies applies to these examples. I am grateful to Professor William Thomson for helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank seminar participants in University of Rochester, John Duggan, and François Maniquet. I thank two anonymous referees for their detailed comments, which were very helpful in revising the earlier version. All remaining errors are mine.     

The roots,significance, value and legislation of gambling

In this highly personal account, Reverend Moody traces his exploration for over three decades of many facets of the underlying nature of gambling in society and in human nature. He makes the case that much of the appeal of gambling comes from the excitement of playing with chance, and discusses how different types of gambling — lotteries, wagering, and continuous betting — meet a variety of needs and pose diverse levels of risk to gamblers. He notes distinctions between controlled and uncontrolled gamblers, and the tendency for controlled gamblers to play on the edge and risk loss of control. He notes difficulties in preventing the excesses that can occur to individuals who gamble. He points out the problems with legislatures legalizing gambling for ulterior purposes, such as to raise tax revenue, rather than to cater to the demand for gambling from punters. This can lead to situations where commercial gaming interests are not directed to act in the best interests of the general public because potential problems that may arise with available gambling are ignored or deemphasized. Finally, he points out the tensions amongst various interest groups who deal with gambling and notes those forums which have evolved in recent years that provide greater opportunities for dialogue among the various entities who deal with gambling and public policy issues.Gordon Moody was ordained a Minister of the Methodist Church in 1942. In recognition of his work on gambling, he was awarded the M.B.E. (Member of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire) by the Queen in 1969. In 1980, the Open University conferred on him the Honorary Degree of Master of Arts. (See obituary, pp. 3–7). This issue is dedicated to his memory.     

The equity-efficiency trade-off reconsidered

Envy-free and Pareto optimal allocations never exist in large economies with production, if there is enough variation with respect to preferences and innate abilities of the agents. If distributional equity is given priority only second best envy-free allocations may be considered. Those allocations are characterised in finite and continuum economies. In continuum economies envy-free allocations are type-egalitarian, i.e. agents with the same preferences but different abilities obtain the same consumption-labour bundle. Regarding implementation envy-free allocations can only be implemented by a tax depending on labour and income.I would like to thank two anonymous referees and the editor in charge of this paper for very helpful comments.     

The Use of Peer-Pairing in Schools to Improve Socialization

Being socially isolated is a painful experience for many children, one that can profoundly affect the development of their self concepts. Peer-pairing is a model of treatment designed to address this problem by promoting social relationships. It offers many of the benefits of more traditional friendship groups in a less stimulating environment. Peer-pairing is especially appropriate for children who have difficulty with impulse control, hyperactivity, anxiety and poor self-esteem. The school setting affords the opportunity to make friends within the child's natural social environment while social skills are being taught.     

Chicanas modernize domestic service

The shift from live-in to day work was a step in the modernization of domestic service because it limited the length of the working day and reduced the psychological exploitation involved in the interpersonal relationship between domestics and mistresses. Even the shift to an hourly wage did not end the extraction of emotional labor, however. Interviews with Chicanas employed as private household workers reveal the next step in the evolution of domestic services. The current development is away from wage work, in which labor time is sold, selling a service in which a job is exchanged for a specified amount of money. Chicanas are defining themselves as expert cleaners hired to do general housework. Most supervision and personal services are thus eliminated from the job. Mistress-servant relations are being transformed into customervendor relations, reducing the personalism and asymmetry of employer-employee relationships.An earlier draft of the paper was presented at the 1986 National Association for Chicano Studies, El Paso, Texas. This research was made possible by a grant from the Business and Professional Women's Foundation and a University of California President's Fellowship. I wish to thank Frances Kleinman and Eric Margolis for their helpful comments on this paper     

Social compromise and social metrics

In the context of constitutional design, a committee of citizens' representatives proposes (social choice) axioms. The outcome should not necessarily be the aggregation rule, or rules, satisfying each of the axioms. Alternative procedures are recommended for aggregating a set of axioms into a single summary axiom. The summary axiom generates a single social decision function when a social metric is applied.