Sex preference for children in German villages during the fertility transition

In the past, parents' sex preferences for their children have proved difficult to verify. This study used John Knodel's German village genealogies of couples married between 1815 and 1899 to investigate sex preferences for children during the fertility transition. Event history analyses of couples' propensity to progress to a fifth parity was used to test whether the probability of having additional children was influenced by the sex composition of surviving children. It appears that son preference influenced reproductive behaviour: couples having only girls experienced significantly higher transition rates than those having only boys or a mixed sibset. However, couples who married after about 1870 began to exhibit fertility behaviour consistent with the choice to have at least one surviving boy and girl. This result represents a surprisingly early move towards the symmetrical sex preference typical of modern European populations.     

Family limitation and the fertility transition: Evidence from the age patterns of fertility in Europe and Asia

Summary The age patterns of marital fertility levels and decline in modern Asia and historical Europe are analysed in order to answer two questions: (1) How closely do the age patterns of marital fertility in both areas prior to a systematic fertility decline conform to the age pattern of natural fertility? (2) How similar are the age patterns of the fertility transition experienced in Europe in the past, and the age pattern of fertility decline now under way in a number of Asian populations? The answers have important implications for our understanding of the fertility transition. They suggest that modern family limitation (i.e. parity-specific fertility control) was largely absent prior to a secular decline in marital fertility in both Europe and Asia. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that once the practice of family limitation starts to spread among the broader strata of the population, it seems almost inevitably to increase until it becomes a common behavioural norm. In this respect, the modern fertility transition appears to result from the spread of innovative behaviour and cannot be viewed simply as an adjustment to new socio-economic circumstances based on previously established behavioural mechanisms.     

Differential fertility and family limitation in an urban community of Uttar Pradesh

The study relates to an investigation of the fertility pattern of a sample of 1018 wives drawn from Lucknow and Kanpur, the two biggest cities of Uttar Pradesh. The sample is stratified with respect to religion and caste, and income. It reveals significant inter-community differences, Muslims and low-caste Hindus showing nearly equal fertility, and high-caste Hindus and Christians showing comparatively lower levels. The proportion of small families (three children or less) is obviously higher in groups with lower fertility, but there is a wide measure of dispersion in each group. Fertility is seen to decline with a rise in income, but not until we cross the income level of Rs 300 per month. Consistent with the differential trends in fertility, striking variations are also observed in the extent of contraceptive practice in different groups. Groups with lower fertility also show a higher frequency of birth control. Birth controllers have lower fertility than the non-controllers, and birth control appears to play a not inconsequential rôle in causing differential trends in fertility.     

The recent rise in malay fertility: A new trend or a temporary lull in a fertility transition?

Period fertility rates show a recent rise in the fertility of the Malay population of Peninsular Malaysia that became evident in the late 1970s, after more than fifteen years of slow but steady declines. Detailed analysis of age-parity-specific fertility rates suggests that the recent rise is largely due to a “making up” of lower order births (first, second, and third) that had been postponed by a rapid increase in age at marriage. The period trend in higher order births and cohort trends of cumulative fertility from census data point to a continued reduction in completed Malay fertility. Regional analysis shows several states on the east coast with persistent high fertility, although the revolution in marital postponement is national in scope.     

Infant mortality and fertility in three Bavarian villages: An analysis of family histories from the 19th century

Abstract Family history data derived from the records of three parishes in Bavaria provide evidence for several important demographic questions when analysed in conjunction with information concerning the prevalent breast-feeding practices. The results suggest strongly that breast feeding can prolong birth intervals substantially. The evidence concerning the independent influence of infant deaths on subsequent birth intervals is inconclusive. It is clear, however, that even if such an influence did exist it was relatively small, compared to the effect of lactation. In addition the results do not lend support to the hypothesis that couples experiencing low child mortality practised family limitation more than couples experiencing high child mortality. In all three parishes, however, fertility appeared to influence infant mortality. Infants born after short intervals were subject to considerably higher mortality risks than infants following longer intervals.     

Quantitative aspects of marriage,fertility and family limitation in nineteenth century America: Another application of the coale specifications

This paper deals with three aspects of the decline in the fertility of white women in the United States from 1800 to 1920. The first concerns the portion of the secular decline in the total fertility rate which was due to changes in marriage rates and the portion due to decreases in marital fertility rates. The second concerns the fraction of couples in the nineteenth century who acted effectively to reduce their fertility and the third deals with the importance of abortion as a family-limiting practice among white couples in the nineteenth century.     

Social status and fertility: A study of a town and three villages in Northwestern Iran

Studies of the relationship between social status and fertility in developing societies have shown diverse results. This study suggests that such findings result in part from problems in the conceptualization of social stratification and social status. In developing societies such as Iran the differentiation of modern and traditional cultural (and occupational) groups within social classes has resulted in the emergence of a dual hierarchy. Measures of social status must therefore reflect these conceptually distinct hierarchies, rather than be limited to linear scales. Figures from a study in a town and three villages in northwest Iran undertaken in 1973 are analyzed. Findings indicate that for women in towns, as social status increases within both traditional and modern occupational hierarchies (husband's occupation) and as measured by income, education and index of modern items, there is a general and almost monotonic decrease in the number of living children, children ever-born, and ideal number of children, with an increase in age at marriage and contraceptive use. The social and cultural homogeneity of the village sample is reflected in the relatively small variations in fertility-related behaviour and attitudes; however, fertility differences between landed and landless villages appear similar to the pattern found in the urban samples. The differences in the fertility behaviour of village and urban women of similar income and educational status indicate that fertility behaviour is related partially to class and partially to status distinctions between urban and rural communities.     

Social status and fertility: A study of a town and three villages in Northwestern Iran

Summary Studies of the relationship between social status and fertility in developing societies have shown diverse results. This study suggests that such findings result in part from problems in the conceptualization of social stratification and social status. In developing societies such as Iran the differentiation of modern and traditional cultural (and occupational) groups within social classes has resulted in the emergence of a dual hierarchy. Measures of social status must therefore reflect these conceptually distinct hierarchies, rather than be limited to linear scales. Figures from a study in a town and three villages in northwest Iran undertaken in 1973 are analyzed. Findings indicate that for women in towns, as social status increases within both traditional and modern occupational hierarchies (husband's occupation) and as measured by income, education and index of modern items, there is a general and almost monotonic decrease in the number of living children, children ever-born, and ideal number of children, with an increase in age at marriage and contraceptive use. The social and cultural homogeneity of the village sample is reflected in the relatively small variations in fertility-related behaviour and attitudes; however, fertility differences between landed and landless villages appear similar to the pattern found in the urban samples. The differences in the fertility behaviour of village and urban women of similar income and educational status indicate that fertility behaviour is related partially to class and partially to status distinctions between urban and rural communities.     

Bargaining over family size: The determinants of fertility in Brazil

Understanding how households make fertility decisions is important to implementing effective policy to slow population growth. Most empirical studies of this decision are based on household models in which men and women are assumed to act as if they have the same preferences for the number of children. However, if men and women have different preferences regarding fertility and are more likely to assert their own preferences as their bargaining power in the household increases, policies to lower fertility rates may be more effectively targeted toward one spouse or the other. In this paper, we test the relevance of the single preferences model by investigating whether men and women's nonwage incomes have the same effects on the number of children in the household. We find that while increases in both the man and woman's nonwage income lower the number of children in the household, an equivalent increase in the woman's income has a significantly stronger effect than the man's. In addition, we find that increases in women's nonwage transfer income have the strongest effects on the fertility decisions of women with low levels of education. The most important policy implication of our results is that policies aimed at increasing the incomes of the least-educated women will be the most effective in lowering fertility rates.     

Birth spacing and fertility limitation: a behavioral analysis of a nineteenth century frontier population

Our analysis of changing birth interval distributions over the course of a fertility transition from natural to controlled fertility has examined three closely related propositions. First, within both natural fertility populations (identified at the aggregate level) and cohorts following the onset of fertility limitation, we hypothesized that substantial groups of women with long birth intervals across the individually specified childbearing careers could be identified. That is, even during periods when fertility behavior at the aggregate level is consistent with a natural fertility regime, birth intervals at all parities are inversely related to completed family size. Our tabular analysis enables us to conclude that birth spacing patterns are parity dependent; there is stability in CEB-parity specific mean and birth interval variance over the entire transition. Our evidence does not suggest that the early group of women limiting and spacing births was marked by infecundity. Secondly, the transition appears to be associated with an increasingly larger proportion of women shifting to the same spacing schedules associated with smaller families in earlier cohorts. Thirdly, variations in birth spacing by age of marriage indicate that changes in birth intervals over time are at least indirectly associated with age of marriage, indicating an additional compositional effect. The evidence we have presented on spacing behavior does not negate the argument that parity-dependent stopping behavior was a powerful factor in the fertility transition. Our data also provide evidence of attempts to truncate childbearing. Specifically, the smaller the completed family size, the longer the ultimate birth interval; and ultimate birth intervals increase across cohorts controlling CEB and parity. But spacing appears to represent an additional strategy of fertility limitation. Thus, it may be necessary to distinguish spacing and stopping behavior if one wishes to clarify behavioral patterns within a population (Edlefsen, 1981; Friedlander et al., 1980; Rodriguez and Hobcraft, 1980). Because fertility transition theories imply increased attempts to limit family sizes, it is important to examine differential behavior within subgroups achieving different family sizes. It is this level of analysis which we have attempted to achieve in utilizing parity-specific birth intervals controlled by children ever born.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Completing the fertility transition in the developing world: The role of educational differences and fertility preferences

This study summarizes patterns of educational differentials in wanted and unwanted fertility at different stages of the fertility transition. The data are from Demographic and Health Surveys in 57 less developed countries. As the transition proceeds, educational differentials in wanted fertility tend to decline and differentials in unwanted fertility tend to rise. An assessment of fertility patterns in developed and less developed countries with low fertility concludes that these differentials are likely to remain substantial when less developed countries reach the end of their transitions. This conclusion implies that the educational composition of the population remains a key predictor of overall fertility in late transitional countries and that low levels of schooling can be a cause of stalling fertility.     

Completing the fertility transition in the developing world: The role of educational differences and fertility preferences

This study summarizes patterns of educational differentials in wanted and unwanted fertility at different stages of the fertility transition. The data are from Demographic and Health Surveys in 57 less developed countries. As the transition proceeds, educational differentials in wanted fertility tend to decline and differentials in unwanted fertility tend to rise. An assessment of fertility patterns in developed and less developed countries with low fertility concludes that these differentials are likely to remain substantial when less developed countries reach the end of their transitions. This conclusion implies that the educational composition of the population remains a key predictor of overall fertility in late transitional countries and that low levels of schooling can be a cause of stalling fertility.     

The family planning work in Yiyang prefecture as suggested by part of the data of the sample fertility survey]

The National Committee on Family Planning conducted a sample survey of fertility in the Yi-yang area in September 1982. The survey was focused on the marriage and fertility status of women between the ages of 15 and 67. Results from this survey show that early marriage is still very popular. Only 40% of those surveyed delayed their marriage to a later age. There is a need to educate the people on the benefits of late marriage. In addition, statistics show that the average fertility rate for a woman was 6.8 children in 1970 and 2.35 children in 1982. This recent figure is still too high when compared with the under 1.2 figure suggested by the central government. Among the total number surveyed, only 77% have taken birth control measures, and the other 23% still have not taken any birth control measures. The phenomenon shows that popular education on late marriage and having children at a later age is still urgently needed in order to further reduce the fertility rate. Married couples of childbearing age should be taught effective birth control measures and knowledge of eugenics with better education for the next generation. In this way, the masses may participate actively and positively in the national family planning campaign.     

The impact of family policies on fertility in industrialized countries: a review of the literature

This paper examines the theoretical propositions and empirical evidence linking policies and fertility. More specifically, the analysis presented in this paper draws attention to the complex mechanisms that theoretically link policies and demographic outcomes: mechanisms that involve imperfect information and decisions that are rationally bound by very specific circumstances. As to the empirical evidence, studies provide mixed conclusions as to the effect of policies on fertility. While a small positive effect of policies on fertility is found in numerous studies, no statistically significant effect is found in others. Moreover, some studies suggest that the effect of policies tends to be on the timing of births rather than on completed fertility.

Abortion and family building models: Fertility limitation in Hungary

This paper demonstrates how family-building models can be used for checking the quality of abortion data. A family-building model, called FERMODA, is presented and used to check whether the available data on abortion for Hungary are consistent with Hungarian data on other aspects of family building. Model cohorts are generated, using in FERMODA the proportions of women married and the birth and abortion rates of two selected Hungarian cohorts. The estimates obtained from the simulated cohorts concerning use of contraception are compared with the information available on contraception, and, on the basis of this comparison, a judgment is made about the quality of abortion data for Hungary.     

The transition to lower fertility in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: evidence from recent surveys

Using recent data from three national-level surveys conducted in 1995, 2000, and 2004, we provide evidence that Palestinian fertility rates in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, historically among the highest in the world, began to slow especially in the West Bank, but stalled in Gaza during the recent Intifada. The TFR in the early 2000s was 4.6 per woman, down from 6.2 a decade earlier. However, most of the decline in Gaza’s fertility appears to have taken place during the early 1990s, before the onset of the second Intifada. In Gaza, the TFR decreased from 7.4 to 5.7 during the 1990s, but changed only slightly to 5.6 during the second Intifada period. Surprisingly, contraceptive prevalence has not changed during these years, and the transition to lower fertility was mainly due to changes in nuptiality. Demand for children remains high, although there is evidence of unmet need for contraception. The continuing conflict and worsening economic situation provide clues to the persistence of high fertility among Palestinian women.

Characteristics of fertility transition in China]

Since 1949 and in particular the 1970s, China's fertility rate has undergone rapid and continuous change. This is a direct reflection of China's success in population control. The decline in China's fertility rate regulated the speed of population growth, altered the population structure, and brought population development to be in line with economic development. Data used in this article are from the National 1/1000 Random Sample of Fertility (1982), the 10% Sample of the 1982 Population Census, 1981, 1983 and 1984 statistical yearbooks, and other data from the Statistics Bureau. China's fertility rate dropped an annual average of 2.5/1000 from 1950-81. However, this time, the fertility rate fluctuated, depending on political, social and economic factors. As the nation prospered, the fertility rate remained stable and high; as China suffered severe economic losses, the fertility rate dropped. A steady decline was evident beginning in 1970 as the government began to propagandize the merits of smaller families. Between 1971-83 the average yearly rate of growth was 1.6%. The number of years a woman was fertile was similar for both urban and rural women in 1964 and 1981; moreover, in 1981 both groups showed a sharp drop in fertility between the ages of 27-35. The 1 child rate for urban women rose from 21.9% in 1964 to 86.6% in 1981. Urban women tend to be more receptive to late marriage, late births, and fewer children. This change in the 1 child rate contributed to the drop in the birth rate of 31.1/1000 in 1964 to 20.9/1000 in 1981.