World population growth and the food supply]

The general trend in the last several hundred years has been that the speed of growth in the food supply exceeds the speed of the population growth. For the time being, 2 major problems still exist. The 1st problem is that food production is still influenced by natural conditions. For example, abnormal weather conditions may cause regional food shortages. The 2nd problem is the imbalance of food consumption by the world population. This phenomenon exists between different social classes as well as between developed and developing countries. According to statistics released by the World Bank, 1 billion suffer from malnutrition today and most of them are in developing countries. In developed countries, about half of their increase in the food supply is for feed grains, and those countries follow the policy of reducing farm land for the purpose of maintaing stabl e grain prices. Up to the present time, grain prices have been unstable, and this has become a rather heavy economic burden for numerous developing countries. Many developing countries are trying to increase grain production by increasing their arable land and promoting their cultivating techniques. However, these countries are facing the problems of finding and adequate water supply, fertilizer, and pesticides. In addition, a rapid population growth in these countries has offset their endeavors in agriculture. In recent years, these counties have realized the necessity of birth control. The world population growth rate has decreased from 2% to about 1.7% in 1981. Birth control and an increase in the food supply will bring new hope to the world's problems of overpopulation and food supply.     

Adolescent fertility: worldwide concerns

There is growing concern over the adverse health, social, economic, and demographic effects of adolescent fertility. Morbidity and mortality rates ar significantly higher for teenage mothers and their infants, and early initiation of childbearing generally means truncated education, lower future family income, and larger completed family size. Adolescent fertility rates, which largely reflect marriage patterns, range from 4/1000 in Mauritania; in sub-Saharan Africa, virtually all rates are over 100. In most countries, adolescent fertility rates are declining due to rising age at marriage, increased educational and economic opportunities for young women, changes in social customs, increased use of contraception, and access to abortion. However, even if fertility rates were to decline dramatically among adolescent women in developing countries, their sheer numbers imply that their fertility will have a major impact on world population growth in the years ahead. The number of women in the world ages 15-19 years is expected to increase from 245 million in 1985 to over 320 million in the years 2020; 82% of these women live in developing countries. As a result of more and earlier premarital sexual activity, fostered by the lengthening gap between puberty and marriage, diminished parental and social controls, and increasing peer and media pressure to be sexually active, abortion and out-of-wedlock childbearing are increasing among teenagers in many developed and rapidly urbanizing developing countries. Laws and policies regarding sex education in the schools and access to family planning services by adolescents can either inhibit or support efforts to reduce adolescent fertility. Since contraceptive use is often sporadic and ineffective among adolescents, family planning services are crucial. Such programs should aim to reduce adolescents' dependence on abortion through preventive measures and increase awareness of the benefits of delayed sexual activity. Similarly, sex education should seek to provide a basis for intelligent, informed decision making. Programs tailored to reach teenagers in schools, recreational centers, and the workplace have particular potential.     

Population and Resources: An Exploration of Reproductive and Environmental Externalities

This article identifies four types of social externalities associated with fertility behavior. Three are shown to be pronatalist in their effects. These three are exemplified by the way theories of economic growth treat fertility and natural resources, the way population growth and economic stress in poor countries are seen by environmental and resource economists, and the way development economists accommodate environmental stress in their analysis of poverty. It is shown that the fourth type of externality, in which children are regarded as an end in themselves, can even provide an invidious link between fertility decisions and the use of the local natural‐resource base among poor rural households in poor countries. The fourth type is used to develop a theory of fertility transitions in the contemporary world; the theory views such transitions as disequilibrium phenomena.     

经济转轨以前俄罗斯人口贫困状况及原因

人口贫困是一个内涵十分广泛和深刻的社会历史范畴,究其实质而言,这是一种能力贫困。中国和俄罗斯等转轨国家在改革前存在许多共同的特征,更为重要的是,社会主义制度不是建立在高度发达的资本主义社会基础之上,这就注定了贫困与反贫困问题必然要成为这些国家面临的共同课题。所不同的是,苏联和当代俄罗斯的人口贫困主要表现为收入贫困,中国则主要是知识贫困。苏联时期人口贫困的主要原因有经济绩效的递减趋势、国家经济发展战略的错误、所有制结构的单一、收入分配机制中的平均主义。     

An analysis of the fertility transition in developing countries]

Most developing countries are in the demographic stage of early mortality, high birth rates and high rates of natural population increase. A characteristic of developing countries is that after World War ii, particularly since the 1960s fertility rates are on the decline, even though they still remain high. The fertility rate of developed countries fell from a 1950 rate of 22.9/1000 to 15/1000 in 1982, a decrease of 34.5%, whereas the fertility rate of developing countries hovered around 43/1000 between 1930-1950, 40.6/1000 during the 1960s and 33/1000 in 1982. Between 1950 and 1982 there was a decrease of 24.8%. But the main reason for this decrease is the decline in the last 20 years of the fertility rates of China and India, whose rates fell 34.9% from 1960-1980. Changes in fertility rates are influenced by the age structure of a country, as seen in the changing age structure of developing countries from 1960-80. For example, an increase in fertility rates was 1 consequence of an increase in the number of fertile women aged 15-45 from 42.6% in 1960 to 44.4% in 1980. Nevertheless, there exists some sort of birth control, whether conscious or subconscious, because the number of births per fertile woman is 3-4 fewer than the 14-15 children a woman can theoretically bear. The reason for changes in fertility rates in developing countries can be traced to marriage and family customs, and even more important, to social and economic factors. For example, Asian, African and Latin American cultures tend to support early marriages. When the fertility rates of developed and developing countries are looked at for a comparable period, then the rate of decrease for developing countries is slower than developed countries. But, if the comparison is made for a transitional period (i.e., industrialization), then the rate of decrease for developing countries is faster than for developed countries. Currently there are 25 developing countries that have attained a fertility rate of 25/1000 or lower, and 52 developing countries with a rate of 35/1000.     

On the scale of global demographic convergence, 1950-2000

The second half of the twentieth century saw global demographic change of unprecedented magnitude, with pronounced falls in both mortality and fertility in many developing countries. This article assesses the extent to which these changes have led to the convergence of demographic patterns around the world. It considers not just the levels of fertility and mortality in each country at different points in time, but also the size of each population. It also disaggregates China and India into their constituent provinces and states in order to provide estimates for units more typical of the size of the populations of other countries. The note presents proportions of the world's population according to the levels of life expectancy and total fertility they experienced in the early 1950s, the late 1970s, and around 2000. The graphs and tables thus produced give a convenient and novel way to view the scale and nature of demographic convergence over the last 50 years.     

Our population predicament: a new look

Issued to mark the Population Reference Bureau's 50th anniversary, this issue updates the story of world population presented in its popular predecessor of 1971, "Man's Population Predicament." Estimated at 1/2 billion in 1650, world population reached about 2 billion in 1930, 4 billion in 1975, and is projected to be about 6 billion in 2000. Most of today's rapid growth is occurring among the 3/4 of the world's peoples living in less developed countries where the post-World War II gap between high birth rates and falling death rates has only recently begun to narrow. This growth, coupled with high consumption in developing countries, is putting tremendous pressures on the Earth's resources, environment, and social fabric. New evidence on Europe's population transition and from China, Indonesia, and Thailand in the 1970s suggests that well-designed family planning programs can speed fertility decline but rapid worldwide attainment of replacement level fertility will also require special development efforts and measures that go beyond family planning. Current projections of the world's ultimate peak population range from 8 billion in the mid 21st century to 11 billion in about 2125, depending on when replacement-level fertility is reached. China's drive for a drastic birth rate reduction and the oil crisis might change fertility behavior more rapidly than most demographers have heretofore thought likely.     

Irrational international economic order is an obstacle

China is a socialist and developing country. As the most populous country in the world, China has a population now of over 1 billion, making up more than 1/5 of the total world population. However, China has a rather poor economic and educational foundation to start with. This is particularly true in the rural areas, where 80% of the total population lives. The problem of population increase and decrease in arable land has grown more acute. Hence, the Chinese Government has been promoting family planning since the 1970s. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China explicitly stipulates that "the state promotes family planning so that population growth may fit the plan for economic and social development." Thanks to the implementation of the basic state policy of family planning, the blind population growth is turning into a planned one. It is estimated by the fertility rate of the 1970s that 200 million births have been averted during the last 16 years. Thus, China has made contributions to the stability of the world's population. Were China to allow its population to grow blindly instead of having practiced family planning over the past 10 years, the world population would be substantially over 5 billion by the middle of this year.     

Views and concepts relating to population problems in the Netherlands 1918–1939

The problem of the possibility of overpopulation in the Netherlands has never been a subject of debate. The tempo of decline of fertility in this densely populated country was, however, much slower than elsewhere. Discussion started only after 1919, when economic problems relating to a rapidly expanding population were studied. The object of this article is to trace the development of such discussion in the Netherlands between the two world wars. The article is intended to make a contribution to explaining the exceptional situation of the Netherlands during the last hundred years in respect of population.     

A tentative discussion on the objective necessity of the socialist population plan]

In a socialist system a new problem being encountered is whether or not to implement planned management in human reproduction, and whether or not it is possible. Marx and Engels foresaw that human reproduction would undergo basic changes. In following Marx, Socialist China has brought about for the first time in history planned management in human reproduction. According to the author, the objective necessity of the population plan stems from public ownership of the means of production, is compatible with planned development of material production and conforms to Socialist economic laws. 3 main general points are made: 1) the public ownership of the means of production supplies the objective conditions for population planning; population reproduction in a system of private ownership is the basis for class opposites, but the public ownership of the means of production erases this type of opposites; 2) population planning is an important integral part of national economic planning; man, the unification of production and consumption, is the primary element in economic activity; 3) population planning embodies the demands of basic socialist economic laws. Basic socialist economic laws determine the character of social production and hence determines the character of population production.     

Social Development Trends in Europe, 1970–1994: Development Prospects for the New Europe

The European region is undergoing dramatic social change. Among other regional and international forces, these changes are rooted in: the collapse of the former Soviet Union; the sudden appearance of a large number of “new” – mostly poor and politically unstable – European nations; and, the emergence of economic trading blocs in North America and Asia. At the same time, the majority of “established” European nations are experiencing sluggish rates of economic growth, moderate to high levels of inflation, high unemployment, escalating demands on public social services, and low fertility in combination with high rates of population aging and immigration from developing countries. Despite the seriousness of the dilemmas confronting the region, European development accomplishments of the past 25 years suggest that the region's leaders already possesses the resources required to solve its complex, social, political, and economic challenges.     

D. V. Glass on the Problems of a Declining Population

During the past quarter century fertility has dropped below replacement levels in many parts of the world. According to United Nations estimates, in 2005 this was the case in 65 countries, comprising 43 percent of the world's population. In many cases, most notably in Europe and East Asia, the shortfall of fertility from the level that would be necessary in the long run to sustain a stationary population is substantial. In Europe, for example, the average total fertility rate for the period 2000–2005 was 1.4. Indefinite maintenance of such a level implies a shrinkage of the total population by one‐third over a generation–roughly every 30 years. Accompanying that rapid decline of total numbers would be an age structure containing a preponderance of the elderly, posing extreme adjustment difficulties for the economic and social system. Societies that wish to avoid radical depopulation would have to engineer a substantial rise infertility–if not to full replacement level (slightly more than two children per woman), then at least to a level that would moderate the tempo of population decline and make population aging easier to cope with. An additional counter to declining numbers, if not significantly to population aging, could come from net immigration. This is the demographic future assumed in the UN medium‐variant projections for countries and regions currently of very low fertility. Thus, for example, in Europe over the period up to 2050 fertility is assumed to rise to 1.85 and net immigration to amount to some 32 million persons. The UN projections also anticipate further improvement in average life expectancy–from its current level of 74 years to 81 years. This factor slows the decline in population size but accelerates population aging. Under these assumptions, Europe's population would decline from its present 728 million to 653 million by 2050. At that time the proportion of the population over age 65 would be 27.6 percent, nearly double its present share. Demographic change of this nature is not a novel prospect. It was envisioned in a number of European countries and in North America, Australia, and New Zealand in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Concern with the possible economic and social consequences generated much discussion at that time among demographers and social scientists at large and also attracted public attention. Possible policy measures that might reverse the downward trend of fertility were also debated, although resulting in only hesitant and largely inconsequential action. The article by D. V. Glass reproduced below is an especially lucid and concise treatment of demographic changes under conditions of low fertility and their economic and social implications. It appeared in Eugenics Review (vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 39–47) in 1937 when the author was 26 years old. Glass's line of argument is broadly representative of the main focus of demographic analysis in the mid‐1930s on aspects of population dynamics, applying the then still novel analytical tool of the stable population model. It also echoes the work of economists then witnessing the great difficulties capitalist economies faced in adjusting to structural changes in consumer demand and labor supply. While Glass addresses these issues primarily with reference to England and Wales, he sees the issues as affecting all industrialized countries. The Malthusian problem of relentless population growth he persuasively declares to be irrelevant for these countries. The Western world faces the opposite problem: population decline, a trend only temporarily masked by the effects of an age distribution that still has a relatively high proportion of women in the child‐bearing ages, reflecting the higher fertility level of the past. A stationary population, Glass cogently argues, is to be welcomed, and he considers the absolute size at which zero growth would be achieved relatively unimportant. In contrast, a continuous population decline would have “thoroughly disastrous” results in an individualist civilization and in “an unplanned economic system.” And, he concedes, somewhat quaintly, that sustained below‐replacement fertility would pose a great problem “even in a country in which the means of production were owned communally.” Glass's conclusions about the reversibility of low fertility are as pessimistic as those of most informed observers today. Still, he sees hope in a future “rationally planned civilization” that would “produce an environment in which high fertility and a high standard of life will both be possible.” In this context, high fertility means the level necessary to sustain the population in a stationary state. By present‐day standards the level Glass calculates as needed for long‐term zero growth is indeed fairly high: 2.87 children per woman. But that figure reflects the fact that, when he wrote, mortality up to age 50 was still fairly high and fertility occurred almost wholly within marriage; it also assumes zero net immigration. In the last 70 years much has changed in each of these three components of population dynamics, both in England and Wales and in the rest of Europe. Still, Glass's commentary remains highly relevant to the discussion of the problems of low fertility today. David Victor Glass (1911–78) was associated with the London School of Economics throughout much of his scientific career. He followed R. R. Kuczynski as reader in demography in 1945 and became professor of sociology in 1948. His work on demography, population history, and population policy had already made him one of the most influential demographers in pre‐World War II Britain. After the war he rose to international prominence through pioneering work on the Royal Commission of Population; through his research on historical demography, the history of demographic thought, and social mobility; and through founding, in 1947, the journal Population Studies, which he edited until his death.     

Why Is Fertility Lower in Wealthier Countries? The Role of Relaxed Fertility‐Selection

Lower fertility in wealthier countries can be explained in evolutionary terms by three key factors: (i) higher fertility in poorer countries—an evolutionary consequence of many generations of intense “fertility‐selection” favoring innate behaviors promoting high fertility, especially in males; (ii) the empowerment of women in wealthier countries that serves to reduce fertility directly—an evolutionary consequence of selection favoring an inherent preference for lower fertility in females, combined with release from the evolutionary effects of a long history of male control over female fertility; and (iii) offspring access in wealthy countries to public health care, welfare, and other social services, which combined with inherited wealth for offspring, virtually eliminates competition between families for the resource needs of offspring. The combined consequences of (ii) and (iii) mean that the fertility‐selection so prevalent in poor countries is relaxed in wealthy countries, thus allowing random genetic drift to produce an increased relative frequency of innate behaviors promoting low fertility and discontentment with high fertility.     

Persistent efforts must continue to be made

Evidence has continuously suggested that population growth in a particular country is closely related to its social stability and economic development. Statistics show that the population growth in the developing countries accounts for 90% of the world's total increase, and the growth rate in those countries is the highest. Therefore, the population problem is of a more serious nature to the developing countries. Unless this problem is solved or at least alleviated, it would be extremely difficult for many developing countries to shed poverty, develop their national economies, and raise standards of living. On the other hand, the trend of growth of the world population and the high rate of population growth in the developing countries will inevitably have grave consequences affecting, directly or indirectly, the economic stability and development of developed countries. These consequences would also affect world peace. The population problem is therefore both a national and an international issue. While each country should take the problem seriously and work hard to tackle it according to its own conditions, all countries in the world should come together to address the problem and make joint efforts for its settlement or alleviation. It is inspiring that the "Day of 5 Billion" has caught global attention and is being observed throughout the world with massive support.     

Population policy: Personal notes

Abstract These are the population years: throughout the world, in both developing and developed countries, there has been a growing debate on population policy. In this paper population policy refers to governmental actions that are designed to alter population events, or that do alter them. The concern with policy seems to center in the relationships between four demographic variables (size, rates, distribution, composition) and four 'quality of life' categories as both determinants and consequences (comprehended here as economic, political, ecological/environmental, social). As to policy means, they can be seen as being five in number (information, voluntary programmes, change in social institutions, incentives and disincentives, and coercion) with the potential of affecting the three factors of fertility, mortality, and migration. The relationships and effects of these conceptual cross tabulations are illustrated.     

Study on Standard of Population Aging

Do an increase in ageing in developed countries and"getting old before getting rich"in developing countries indicate that f luctuations in the population age structure have produced a qualitative change?What is a qualitative change and what is a quantitative change?Here we propose a new concept of Shadow Population,then establish a new standard for evaluating population age structure,finally present a typical five stage population age structure type transition model.The model simulation shows that all world regions are still in the adult stage and that population ageing belongs to the category of quantitative change.However,sustained low fertility will lead to a qualitative change in the ageing population.The current pressure of population aging in the adult stage placed on the pension security system shows that this system is truly not a sustainable system,Gradually raising the retirement age and Long-term stability in replacement fertility is the key to solving the socioeconomic development dilemma presented by future population ageing in low fertility regions or countries,but the latter is more urgent.     

俄罗斯移民问题及其发展趋势

俄罗斯作为世界人口大国之一和中国的一个重要邻国,在世界性的经济联系和人口流动背景下,出现了被称为“西方的漂移”以及吸纳被迫移民和发展中国家劳动力的外迁与内迁移民潮双向涌动的趋势。移民成为当代俄罗斯社会的一个重要特征,也使处在人口负增长阴影下的俄罗斯国家的移民政策在当前比历史上任何一个时期尤显迫切和重要。中国作为世界劳动力资源最丰富的国家,如何解决城市化过程中的剩余劳动力问题,是坚持科学发展的重要课题。俄罗斯移民问题给中国带来了多方面的启示。     

On some theoretic issues about planned control of population]

There are basic differences between Marxian and Malthusian population thought: 1) For Marx, population is a social phenomenon--human reproduction belongs to social production and population laws are social laws influenced by the means of production. Marx recognized that human reproduction had both a natural and a social relationship, but Malthus population theory only acknowledges the natural relationship of human reproduction. Malthus believed that if population grows without interference, it will double every 25 years, or geometrically. It is evident Malthus substituted biological possibilities for the objective inevitability of population evolution, and natural population laws for social population laws. 2) Marx believed that social production is the unification of material production and human reproduction. Material production is controlled and necessitates control of human reproduction. For Malthus, the growth of the means of subsistence never catches up with the growth of the population, but Marx said that even though land is limited, the development of production forces is limitless. Marxist theory postulates that man is basically a producer, but that population must be planned because not everyone is a producer (e.g., children and the unskilled). 3) Malthus believed that in capitalistic countries unemployment, famine, and poverty stem from too many births by the laboring class, i.e., population determines the economy. The only solution to population problems is to have fewer children. For Marx, economics determines population problems.     

Family limitation among the Old Order Amish

Summary This paper shows that the Indiana Amish, a high-fertility Anabaptist population, regulate their marital fertility according to their family finances. We linked demographic data from the Indiana Amish Directory with personal property tax records at 5, 15 and 25 years after marriage and found fertility differences by occupation and wealth. Correlations between family size and wealth at the beginning, middle and end of childbearing years were positive. Wealthier women exhibited higher marital fertility, had longer first birth intervals, were older at the birth of their last child, and had larger families than poorer women. Over the past 30 years, marital fertility has remained constant among older women; but birth rates among younger women have been rising rapidly.     

The demography of words: The global decline in non-numeric fertility preferences, 1993–2011

This paper examines the decline in non-numeric responses to questions about fertility preferences among women in the developing world. These types of response—such as ‘don’t know’ or ‘it’s up to God’—have often been interpreted through the lens of fertility transition theory as an indication that reproduction has not yet entered women’s ‘calculus of conscious choice’. However, this has yet to be investigated cross-nationally and over time. Using 19?years of data from 32 countries, we find that non-numeric fertility preferences decline most substantially in the early stages of a country’s fertility transition. Using country-specific and multilevel models, we explore the individual- and contextual-level characteristics associated with women’s likelihood of providing a non-numeric response to questions about their fertility preferences. Non-numeric fertility preferences are influenced by a host of social factors, with educational attainment and knowledge of contraception being the most robust and consistent predictors.