Which ethics for science and public policy?

The problem of inaccurate, misapplied or fraudulent scientific data could be addressed by government regulations, or by self‐regulation from within science itself. To many, self‐regulation implies the grounding of research activities in some “neutral”; standard of “ethics”; acceptable in a “pluralistic”; society. Yet, there is no such thing as a “neutral ethics”; and many “contemporary”; theories contain such serious theoretical deficiencies and contradictions that they are practically inapplicable. As a viable alternative to these theoretical and practical problems, an objectively based realistic framework of ethics is considered, and used to ground both the individual scientific and the collective public policy decision making processes. This is an ethics of properly integrated relationships. It is then applied to an analysis of many of the causes of incorrect scientific data, as well as of many of the internal and external pressures and abuses often experienced by scientists today. This approach respects the integrity of each decision maker as a human being and a moral agent—which in turn better insures the integrity of the protocol, the data, and the public policy decisions which follow—and ultimately, the integrity of the scientific enterprise itself. The alternative is government regulations.     

Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg

The Condorcet Jury Theorem formalises the “wisdom of crowds”: binary decisions made by majority vote are asymptotically correct as the number of voters tends to infinity. This classical result assumes like-minded, expected utility maximising voters who all share a common prior belief about the right decision. Ellis (Theor Econo 11(3): 865–895, 2016) shows that when voters have ambiguous prior beliefs—a (closed, convex) set of priors—and follow maxmin expected utility (MEU), such wisdom requires that voters’ beliefs satisfy a “disjoint posteriors” condition: different private signals lead to posterior sets with disjoint interiors. Both the original theorem and Ellis’s generalisation assume symmetric penalties for wrong decisions. If, as in the jury context, errors attract asymmetric penalties then it is natural to consider voting rules that raise the hurdle for the decision carrying the heavier penalty for error (such as conviction in jury trials). In a classical model, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (Am Politi Sci Rev 92(1):23–35, 1998) have shown that, paradoxically, raising this hurdle may actually increase the likelihood of the more serious error. In particular, crowds are not wise under the unanimity rule: the probability of the more serious error does not vanish as the crowd size tends to infinity. We show that this “Jury Paradox” persists in the presence of ambiguity, whether or not juror beliefs satisfy Ellis’s “disjoint posteriors” condition. We also characterise the strictly mixed equilibria of this model and study their properties. Such equilibria cannot exist in the absence of ambiguity but may exist for arbitrarily large jury size when ambiguity is present. In addition to uninformative strictly mixed equilibria, analogous to those exhibited by Ellis (Theor Econo 11(3): 865–895, 2016), there may also exist strictly mixed equilibria which are informative about voter signals.

     

The Use of Program: Review and Update

SUMMARY

This paper focuses on what has been thought of in social group work as “program”—program skills, program content, program media, or use of program—and what is now known as nonverbals, exercises, simulations or games, or expressive therapy. Certain dilemmas of the past, e.g., process vs. product (content), talking vs. doing, social work vs. recreation, are reviewed as obstacles to the integration of doing-oriented activities within the major theoretical approaches to group work in social work. Such obstacles have been less encumbering to other professions which have presently assumed the dominant theoretical leadership in this area. Some recent developments in knowledge, technology, and social-cultural forces are described which have contributed to a present milieu that places increased value of diverse modes of expressiveness. The paper concludes with seven future-oriented proposals that theory, practice. and research in this area demand.     

Revisiting demand,politicization and externalization in authoritarian political regimes: policy advisory system in Russian practices

ABSTRACT

This study contributes to debate on three related questions in Policy Advisory System research. Is the Policy Advisory System concept applicable in countries other than developed democracies? How does it function in a state-centred authoritarian regime? How does the authoritarian environment affect tendencies such as “politicization” and “externalization”? These questions are addressed using materials on the current Russian governance structure and advisory practices, focusing on two broadly defined “governance subsystems” in the Presidential Administration of Russia, “Political Bloc” and “Economic Bloc”, both acting as regular customers for advisory communities. One finding is the phenomenon of “Dual Demand” from the same centre of power—“stability” for “Political Bloc” and “innovation” for “Economic Bloc”—which contributed to creation of two different clusters of policy advisory agencies with different statuses. Other findings include transformation of “politicization” to policy control mechanisms and attempted “externalization” turning into the reverse—“internalization”—bringing independent advisory organizations under the supervision of government structures.     

Market uncertainty and the process of belief formation

Subjective or personal belief formation has been up to now grounded on axioms (e.g., the axioms of Savage) that can be described asintrospection axioms, for they bear only on judgments formed by the individual within himself (e.g., judgments on the ordering of the “acts” in Savage's contribution), excluding every reference to other, possibly external, sources of opinion formation. This current view, linked to the traditional concept ofinstrumental economic rationality, implicitly assumes cognitive capacities that are most of the time out of the reach of any individual. Therefore this view is little or improperly used in the practical world of economics and/or management. An alternative view of belief formation on a market is offered in this article, grounded on a much more modest demand of cognitive capacities from the individual and on a different concept of economic rationality known ascognitive rationality. The model introduces to this end the global concept of market psychology as well as the concept of regular revision of the sets of opinions. Belief formation then appears as a process of deliberation between the individual and the market, rationality emerging within this process as deeply intertwined with the way the individual revises his opinions during the process. The rational treatment of beliefs in view of reaching a decision can consequently be carefully distinguished from their rational formation process.     

Comprehensive audits for use in evaluating scientific research

Calls for new arrangements to deal with problems involving the integrity of results reported from scientific research have generally taken the form of investigations into data quality and the research methods utilized. Alternatives to proposed government regulation of scientific research have included suggestions for using accounting type audits of the kind used for attesting to the representations of management in corporate financial reports. Here a different type of audit is suggested for the advantages it offers in dealing with the situations in science—which are much less structured and not restricted to situations like those to which financial accounting audits are directed. A broadening from “accounting”; to “accountability”; is thereby achieved. Experimentation with the use of such audits is suggested which can simultaneously help to improve scientific processes and accommodate the interests of the public in responding to the results of scientific research. A beginning is also suggested in the form of “GAO type”; (U.S. General Accounting Office) audits of research activities undertaken (or to be undertaken) at laboratories such as Los Alamos, Livermore and Sandia as they are being redirected from military to civilian type research. It is also suggested that GAO type audits be extended from audits of management activities to examination and evaluation of the validity and significance of the research that has been, or is to be, undertaken.     

Deliberate Trust and Intuitive Faith: A Dual‐Process Model of Reliance

Drawing on the dual process framework from social and cognitive psychology, this paper reconciles two distinct conceptualizations of trust prevalent in the literature: “rational” calculative and irrational “affective” or normative. After critically reviewing previous attempts at reconciliation between these distinctions, we argue that the notion of trust as “reliance” is the higher order category of which “deliberate trust” and “intuitive faith” are subtypes. Our revised approach problematizes the conflation of epistemic uncertainty with phenomenological uncertainty while providing sound footing for a key sociological insight: that reliance on the routine social order is both the cognitive default and based on substantial practical evidence. We develop two broad suggestions for future research from these implications: (1) sociological research should examine the role of intuitive faith—as opposed to deliberate trust—in late modern societies, and (2) analysts should challenge the role of deliberate trust as the “modal” form of reliance in contemporary research.     

Best Practice to Order Authors in Multi/Interdisciplinary Health Sciences Research Publications

Misunderstanding and disputes about authorship are commonplace among members of multi/interdisciplinary health research teams. If left unmanaged and unresolved, these conflicts can undermine knowledge sharing and collaboration, obscure accountability for research, and contribute to the incorrect attribution of credit. To mitigate these issues, certain researchers suggest quantitative authorship distributions schemes (e.g., point systems), while others wish to replace or minimize the importance of authorship by using “contributorship”—a system based on authors’ self-reporting contributions. While both methods have advantages, we argue that authorship and contributorship will most likely continue to coexist for multiple ethical and practical reasons. In this article, we develop a five-step “best practice” that incorporates the distribution of both contributorship and authorship for multi/interdisciplinary research. This procedure involves continuous dialogue and the use of a detailed contributorship taxonomy ending with a declaration explaining contributorship, which is used to justify authorship order. Institutions can introduce this approach in responsible conduct of research training as it promotes greater fairness, trust, and collegiality among team members and ultimately reduces confusion and facilitates resolution of time-consuming disagreements.     

National Identity,Citizenship and Immigration: Putting Identity in Context

In this paper we suggest that there is a need to examine what is meant by “context” in Social Psychology and present an example of how to place identity in its social and institutional context. Taking the case of British naturalisation, the process whereby migrants become citizens, we show that the identity of naturalised citizens is defined by common‐sense ideas about Britishness and by immigration policies. An analysis of policy documents on “earned citizenship” and interviews with naturalised citizens shows that the distinction between “elite” and “non‐elite” migrants is evident in both the “reified” sphere of policy and the “common sense” sphere of everyday identity construction. While social representations embedded in lay experience construct ethno‐cultural similarity and difference, immigration policies engage in an institutionalised positioning process by determining migrants' rights of mobility. These spheres of knowledge and practice are not disconnected as these two levels of “managing otherness” overlap—it is the poorer, less skilled migrants, originating outside the West who epitomise difference (within a consensual sphere) and have less freedom of mobility (within a reified sphere). We show that the context of identity should be understood as simultaneously psychological and political.     

Inferring beliefs as subjectively imprecise probabilities

We propose a method for estimating subjective beliefs, viewed as a subjective probability distribution. The key insight is to characterize beliefs as a parameter to be estimated from observed choices in a well-defined experimental task and to estimate that parameter as a random coefficient. The experimental task consists of a series of standard lottery choices in which the subject is assumed to use conventional risk attitudes to select one lottery or the other and then a series of betting choices in which the subject is presented with a range of bookies offering odds on the outcome of some event that the subject has a belief over. Knowledge of the risk attitudes of subjects conditions the inferences about subjective beliefs. Maximum simulated likelihood methods are used to estimate a structural model in which subjects employ subjective beliefs to make bets. We present evidence that some subjective probabilities are indeed best characterized as probability distributions with non-zero variance.     

Science,policy, and politics in judicial review of regulations

Perhaps the most effective control on the exercise of administration is to subject final decisions to evaluation by a reviewing institution capable of vetoing the initiative or remanding it to the agency for further work. All three branches of government—Congress, the executive branch and the judiciary—perform this review function to some degree, but the judiciary plays a uniquely powerful role in American government. During the last two decades, Congress has vested in regulatory agencies like the environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) broad authority to promulgate standards and regulations to protect citizens from the unintended adverse consequences of a modern industrial society. These powerful agencies must necessarily rely heavily upon scientific data in carrying out their responsibilities. They must interpret scientific studies and draw inferences on the basis of “scientific judgment.”; When the nature of the administrative task is so highly technical in nature, and especially when the agencies are working on the “frontiers of scientific knowledge,”; as they frequently are in scientific rulemaking, the value of review by a court composed of three lawyers with minimal scientific training is open to legitimate discussion. How the courts go about performing their review function in the context of scientific rulemaking is a critical question for American administrative law.     

Development of the Distinction Among the "Desirable", Morality, and Personal Preference

Israeli children of grades 1, 4, and 7 were asked, with respect to nine types of behavior, whether such behavior is bad, whether a child should be brought up to behave otherwise (and why), whether a child should be required to behave otherwise, and whether such behavior should be punished. Analysis of their responses and the reasons they provided supports the hypothesized distinction between three categories of behaviors or reasons for action—morality, “the desirable” and personal preferences—in terms of two dimensions: desirability and obligatoriness. Specifically, moral norms were perceived as both desirable and strictly obligatory, and were justified in terms of inherent goodness/badness and the welfare of others. Behaviors in the category of “the desirable” were perceived as desirable but not obligatory, and were justified in terms of self-development and long-term utility. Behaviors in the category of personal preferences were perceived as non-obligatory and neither desirable nor undesirable, and were justified in terms of personal choice. This distinction was less sharp among first graders, who exhibited some tendency to view desirables and preferences, as well as moral behavior, as obligatory. In light of these findings, it is suggested that the young child's “intuitive morality” relates only to the dimension of desirability and not to that of obligatoriness, which seems to develop somewhat later.     

Integrating the Emic (Indigenous) with the Etic (Universal)—A Case of Squaring the Circle or for Adopting a Culture Inclusive Action Theory Perspective

The dualism of emic and etic plays a crucial role in the emergence of three culturally informed approaches of psychology: cross‐cultural psychology (CCP), cultural psychology (CP) and indigenous psychologies (IPs), a distinction largely accepted nowadays. Similarities and/or differences between these positions are usually discussed either on the level of phenomena (data) or theory. In this paper, however, the discussion takes place on a meta‐theoretical or epistemological level, which is also emerging elsewhere. In following several earlier papers of the author, first, four perspectives are distinguished that underlie present day psychology. Second, these are used as a framework for linking them to the three “camps”. This analysis will show that these perspectives are characterized by different underlying worldviews, interests as well as methodical preferences. Third, it is claimed that this level of discussion is quite fruitful for the ongoing discourse on the three camps, but also helps one to understand, why the duality between emic and etic approaches is—implicitly or explicitly—at the core of these discussions, because their relevance turns out to differ in the three camps. In that sense, the emic/etic duality is used here as a “litmus test” to exemplify these deeper differences between the camps, thereby highlighting them. Fourth, in order to overcome not only the dilemma between the unique and general in psychology, but also to clarify the relation between the individual and culture it is proposed that psychology should take human action as its unit of analysis, thereby connecting historically to the early beginnings of psychology at the end of the 19^th century. It will be argued that a culture inclusive action theory may overcome this tension and may help to integrate western and other indigenous psychologies, and hence it could be advantageous to integrate CP and IPs as well. This is possible because the proposed theory hopefully provides a universal framework for psychological concepts, yet allows for their culture specific expression.     

A synaptic common sense? McLuhan’s tactility and electronic media rhythms

In Understanding Media, Marshall McLuhen proposed that tactility would eventually become a determining factor in electronic media, leading to the formation of a new kind of “common sense.” This article investigates whether by exploring this idea we are able to arrive at an alternative theoretical framework for understanding tactility, a framework that avoids the tactile-optic distinction and the understanding of tactility as a sensation primarily innervated through the bodily part of the hand. McLuhan’s notions of “acoustic space” and “contraction” are directly related to this breakthrough. It is further argued that the resulting theoretical framework can be enriched when considered in conjunction with social analyses of rhythms and used to account for the differentiation and customization or individualization of media use in the digital age. In this way, tactility is treated as embedded within rhythmic signals and fluctuations in media, allowing us to rethink McLuhan’s “common sense” in a singularly illuminating way.     

Social Representations Theory: A Progressive Research Programme for Social Psychology

The study “Psychoanalysis—its image and its public” intimates that common sense is increasingly informed by science. But common sense asserts its autonomy and, in turn, may affect the trajectory of science. This is a process that leads to many differentiations—in common sense, in scientific innovation and in political and regulatory structures. Bauer and Gaskell's toblerone model of triangles of mediation provided a distillation of their reading of “La Psychanalyse.” Here it was argued that representations are multi‐modal phenomena necessitating the use of multiple methodologies (comparative and longitudinal; qualitative and quantitative). In this paper we briefly summarise these arguments and elaborate ways in which social representation theory can be considered a progressive research programme. “Progressive” because as the theory has developed it has extended the range and depth of its conceptual basis; it provides a new synthesis for the social scientific understanding of the phenomena of common sense and of representation; it acts as an antidote to the reductionism of public opinion and, finally, it is a stimulus to depart from disciplinary silos. However, there remain unresolved issues: how to segment the relevant social milieus and how to close the feedback loop from common sense to science?     

Enlightenment and Its Fortunes in China’s Modernization

Abstract

The central concept of Western Enlightenment is scientific reason. It catalyzed the development of modernity, but itself contains a series of paradoxes: between “ought” and “is,” between necessity and freedom, between universality and historicity, and so on. The impact of Enlightenment reason on China was negative in that it generated a superstitious belief in the omnipotence of scientific method and in Western experience and political principles. Consequently, Chinese liberals were unable to handle the relationship between modern Western culture and traditional local culture and the relationship between the ideals of Enlightenment modernity and the objective requirements of real-life politics. At the same time, they were unable to identify the rational and non-rational elements in Western modernity or to develop what was useful and discard what was not. The real value of the Enlightenment lies in its spirit of reflective criticism. It is, therefore, an unfinished business in terms of eliminating superstition and dogma.     

Kurt Lewin's Leadership Studies and His Legacy to Social Psychology: Is There Nothing as Practical as a Good Theory?

This paper re‐examines Kurt Lewin's classic leadership studies, using them as a concrete example to explore his wider legacy to social psychology. Lewin distinguished between advanced “Galileian” science, which was based on analysing particular examples, and backward “Aristotelian” science, which used statistical analyses. Close examination of the way Lewin wrote about the leadership studies reveals that he used the sort of binary, value‐laden concepts that he criticised as “Aristotelian”. Such concepts, especially those of “democracy” and “autocracy”, affected the way that he analysed the results and the ways that later social scientists have understood, and misunderstood, the studies. It is argued that Lewin's famous motto—“there is nothing as practical as a good theory”—is too simple to fit the tensions between the leadership studies and his own views of what counts as good theory.     

Goals of Action and Emotional Reasons for Action. A Modern Version of the Theory of Ultimate Psychological Hedonism

In this paper we present a modern version of the classic theory of “ultimate psychological hedonism” (UPH). As does the UPH, our two‐dimensional model of metatelic orientations also postulates a fundamentally hedonistic motivation for any human action. However, it makes a distinction between “telic” or content‐based goals of actions and “metatelic” or emotional reasons for actions. In our view, only the emotional reasons for action, but not the goals of action, conform to the UPH. After outlining our model, we will elucidate the similarities and differences between our model and classic UPH. In this context we will clarify several basic misconceptions regarding classic UPH. In a next step, two major criticisms of the theory of ultimate psychological hedonism will be discussed, that is (1) the statement that the hedonistic principle has no motivating effect at all and (2) the argument that the hedonistic motivation is only one of many motivations of human actions. We believe that both of these arguments can be refuted. Finally, we will discuss the compatibility of our model with evolutionary theory.