Demographic Changes in North Korea: 1993–2008

Given the scarcity of population data, few demographic analyses have been conducted on population trends in North Korea. Using the 1993 and 2008 population and housing census data, we prospectively reconstruct population change in the country during the 15 intercensal years. Reconstruction of the population trends of North Korea enables us to assess the consistency of the available demographic evidence and to assess the demographic impact of the famine in the 1990s. According to the results of the population reconstruction and our counterfactual population projections, the famine caused between 240,000 and 420,000 total excess deaths—lower than the previous estimate of 600,000–1 million; and the human costs of the deteriorating living conditions between 1993 and 2008 may be estimated as 600,000 to 850,000 total excess deaths attributable to economic decline in the post‐Cold war era. The reconstructed population trends mirror the continuing deterioration of the living conditions in North Korea since the early 1990s.     

The demographic transition in the Korean peninsula, 1910-1990: South and North Korea compared

North and South Korea have both experienced demographic transition and fertility and mortality declines. The fertility declines came later in North Korea. In 1990, the population was 43.4 million in South Korea and 21.4 million in North Korea and the age and sex compositions were similar. This evolution of population structure occurred despite differences in political systems and fertility determinants. Differences were in the fertility rate and the rate of natural increase. The total fertility rate was 2.5 children in North Korea and 1.6 in South Korea. The rate of natural increase was 18.5 per 1000 in North Korea and 9.8 in South Korea. Until 1910, the Korean peninsula was in the traditional stage characterized by high fertility and mortality. The early transitional stage came during 1910-45 under the Japanese annexation. Health and medical facilities improved and the crude birth rate rose and then declined. With the exception of the war years, population expanded as a function of births, deaths, and international migration. Poor economic conditions in rural areas acted as a push factor for south-directed migration, migration to Japan, and urban migration. Next came the chaotic stage, during 1945-60. South Korean population expanded during this period of political unrest. Repatriation and refugee migration constituted a large proportion of the population increase. Although the war brought high mortality, new medicine and disease treatment reduced the mortality rate after the war. By 1955-60, the crude death rate was 16.1 per 1000 in South Korea. The crude birth rate remained high at 42 per 1000 between 1950-55. The postwar period was characterized by the baby boom and higher fertility than the pre-war period of 1925-45. Total fertility was 6.3 by 1955-60. The late transitional stage occurred during 1960-85 with reduced fertility and continued mortality decline. By 1980-85, total fertility was 2.3 in the closed population. The restabilization stage occurred during 1985-90, and fertility declined to 1.6. In North Korea, strong population control policies precipitated fertility decline. In South Korea, the determinants were contraception, rising marriage age, and increased use of abortion concomitant with improved socioeconomic conditions.     

Demographic Trends in Ukraine: Past,Present, and Future

Ukraine, during the first half of the twentieth century, underwent a series of man‐made demographic catastrophes—World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, the 1932/33 famine linked to land collectivization, the massive deportations and executions of Stalin's Great Terror, and World War II. This article assembles estimates of the demographic impact of these deadly events. In their absence, it is estimated that Ukraine's hypothetical population would have been 87 million on the eve of independence in 1991, instead of its actual 52 million. Pre‐independence demographic losses were episodic and driven by external forces. By contrast, since independence in 1991, Ukraine has experienced a sustained demographic crisis of its own making. Ukraine's population declined from 52 million in 1990 to 45 million by 2013. Fertility, while it has recovered from its lowest point, remains at a TFR of about 1.5—far below replacement. Emigration, although the greatest hemorrhage of young people in the 1990s is over, is still of concern. The loss of Crimea and the unsettled state of affairs in Southeastern Ukraine give further cause for concern.     

Demographic consequences of the 1984–1985 Ethiopian famine

This article analyzes demographic responses to the 1984-1985 Ethiopian famine and compares them with Bongaarts and Cain's (1982) hypothesized responses. After briefly describing the data collection, I estimate the age distribution and the age-specific mortality and fertility rates of Ethiopian famine victims in a resettlement area and compare these with mortality estimates for the 1972-1973 Bangladesh famine and with fertility estimates from the 1981 Ethiopian demographic survey. The results show that the mortality rate among Ethiopian famine victims was about seven times higher than the rate among the Bangladesh victims and that the Ethiopian famine-related mortality was general and not a function of household socioeconomic variables. The data also show a 26 percent lower total fertility rate among famine victims.     

Famine Mortality in Nineteenth-Century Japan: The Evidence from a Temple Death Register

Economic and demographic historians who have studied Japan's early modern period argue that preventive checks to fertility were the primary cause of Japan's stationary population in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and that the role of ‘positive’ checks was negligible. This paper presents evidence and a claim that mortality crises – famines in particular – also played an important role in checking population growth during this period. It analyses data from the death register of Ogen-ji, a Buddhist temple in the Hida region of central Japan. These data provide a remarkably detailed picture of the short-term demographic consequences of Japan's last great famine, the Tenpō famine of the 1830s. ‘Normal’ mortality patterns, by age and sex, are compared with patterns of mortality during the famine. Mortality of males rose considerably more than that of females, with the greatest rise occurring among young boys aged 5–14 and adult men aged 30–59. A surprising finding was that mortality at ages 0–4 rose relatively little, in part a consequence of a marked fall in the number of births during the famine. The Tenpō subsistence crisis was not the sole cause of population stagnation in the Ogen-ji population, but it was a prominent feature of the ‘high mortality regime’ that this population experienced during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.     

The Effects of Intrauterine Malnutrition on Birth and Fertility Outcomes: Evidence From the 1974 Bangladesh Famine

This article uses the Bangladesh famine of 1974 as a natural experiment to estimate the impact of intrauterine malnutrition on sex of the child and infant mortality. In addition, we estimate the impact of malnutrition on post-famine pregnancy outcomes. Using the 1996 Matlab Health and Socioeconomic Survey (MHSS), we find that women who were pregnant during the famine were less likely to have male children. Moreover, children who were in utero during the most severe period of the Bangladesh famine were 32 % more likely to die within one month of birth compared with their siblings who were not in utero during the famine. Finally, we estimate the impacts of the famine on subsequent pregnancy outcomes. Controlling for pre-famine fertility, we find that women who were pregnant during the famine experienced a higher number of stillbirths in the post-famine years. This increase appears to be driven by an excess number of male stillbirths.     

The impact of war, famine, and economic decline on marital fertility in ethiopia

We examine recent fertility trends in Ethiopia for evidence of short- and long-term responses to famine, political events, and economic decline. We use retrospective data on children ever born from the 1990 National Family and Fertility Survey to estimate trends in annual marital conception probabilities, controlling for women's demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The results of our analysis provide evidence of significant short-term declines in conception probabilities during years of famine and major political and economic upheaval. In the longer term, marital fertility in both urban and rural areas declined in the 1980s after increasing moderately in the 1970s.     

The UN Population Division on Replacement Migration

The most salient demographic trend pictured by the influential set of population projections prepared by the Population Division of the United Nations (a unit in the UN's Department of Economic and Social Affairs) is the continuing substantial increase—albeit at a declining rate—of the global population during the coming decades. According to the “medium” variant of the most recent (1998) revision of these projections, between 2000 and 2050 the expected net addition to the size of the world population will be some 2.85 billion, a figure larger than that of the total world population as recently as the mid‐1950s. All of this increase will occur in the countries currently classified as less developed; in fact, as a result of their anticipated persistent below‐replacement levels of fertility, the more developed regions as a whole would experience declining population size beginning about 2020, and would register a net population loss of some 33 million between 2000 and 2050. A report prepared by the UN Population Division and released on 21 March 2000 addresses some of the implications of the changes in population size and age structure that low‐fertility countries will be likely to experience. The 143‐page report, issued under the eyecatching title Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?, highlights the expected magnitude of these changes by the imaginative device of answering three hypothetical questions. The answer to each of these questions is predicated on the assumption that some specified demographic feature of various country or regional populations would be maintained at the highest level that feature would exhibit, in the absence of international migration, in the United Nations' medium population projections (as revised in 1998) during the period 1995–2050. The selected demographic features are total population size, the size of the working‐age population (15–64 years), and the so‐called potential support ratio: the ratio of the working‐age population to the old‐age population (65 years and older). The illustrative device chosen for accomplishing the specified feats of preserving the selected demographic parameters (i.e., keeping them unchanged up to 2050 once their highest value is attained) is international migration. Hence the term “replacement migration.” Given the low levels of fertility and mortality now prevailing in the more developed world (and specifically in the eight countries and the two overlapping regions for which the numerical answers to the above questions are presented in the report), and given the expected future evolution of fertility and mortality incorporated in the UN population projections, the results are predictably startling. The magnitudes of the requisite compensatory migration streams tend to be huge relative both to current net inmigration flows and to the size of the receiving populations; least so in the case of the migration needed to maintain total population size and most so in the case of migration needed to counterbalance population aging by maintaining the support ratio. Reflecting its relatively high fertility and its past and current record of receiving a large influx of international migrants, the United States is a partial exception to this rule. But even for the US to maintain the support ratio at its highest—year 1995—level of 5.21 would require increasing net inmigration more than tenfold. The country, the report states, would have to receive 593 million immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or a yearly average of 10.8 million. The extreme case is the Republic of Korea, where the exercise calls for maintaining a support ratio of 12.6. To satisfy this requirement, Korea, with a current population of some 47 million, would need 5.1 billion immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or an average of 94 million immigrants per year. (In the calculations, the age and sex distribution of migrants is assumed to be the same as that observed in the past in the main immigration countries. The fertility and mortality of immigrants are assumed to be identical with those of the receiving population.) The “Executive Summary” of the report is reproduced below, with the permission of the United Nations. Chapters of the full report set out the issues that prompted the exercise; provide a selective review of the literature; explain the methodology and the assumptions underlying the calculations; and present the detailed results for the eight countries and two regions selected for illustrative purposes. A brief discussion of the implications of the findings concludes the report. As is evident even from the figures just cited, immigration is shown to be at best a modest potential palliative to whatever problems declining population size and population aging are likely to pose to low‐fertility countries. The calculations, however, vividly illustrate that demographic changes will profoundly affect society and the economy, and will require adjustments that remain inadequately appreciated and assessed. The criteria specified in the UN calculations—maintenance of particular demographic parameters at a peak value—of course do not necessarily have special normative significance. Past demographic changes, with respect notably to the age distribution as well as population size, have been substantial, yet they have been successfully accommodated under circumstances of growing prosperity in many countries. But the past may be an imperfect guide in confronting the evolving dynamics of low‐fertility populations. As the report convincingly states, the new demographic challenges will require comprehensive reassessments of many established economic and social policies and programs.     

Famine,social disruption,and involuntary fetal loss: Evidence from chinese survey data

Relying on half a million pregnancy histories collected from Chinese women in the late 1980s, we studied nearly a quarter century of self-reported miscarriages and stillbirths in China. Our results suggest that these two forms of involuntary fetal loss are affected not only by biological and demographic factors, such as the mother's age, pregnancy order, and pregnancy history, but also by the mother's social characteristics and the larger social environment. In this article, we focus on how two social and economic crises--the Great Leap Forward famine and the Cultural Revolution--resulted in elevated risks of miscarriage and stillbirth in the Chinese population.     

The boundaries of genocide: Quantifying the uncertainty of the death toll during the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia (1975–79)

The range of estimates of excess deaths under Pol Pot's rule of Cambodia (1975–79) is too wide to be useful: they range from under 1 to over 3 million, with the more plausible estimates still varying from 1 to 2 million. By stochastically reconstructing population dynamics in Cambodia from extant historical and demographic data, we produced interpretable distributions of the death toll and other demographic indicators. The resulting 95?per cent simulation interval (1.2–2.8 million excess deaths) demonstrates substantial uncertainty over the exact scale of mortality, yet it still excludes nearly half of the previous death-toll estimates. The 1.5–2.25 million interval contains 69 per cent of the simulations for the actual number of excess deaths, more than the wider (1–2 million) range of previous plausible estimates. The median value of 1.9 million excess deaths represents 21?per cent of the population at risk.

Supplementary material for this article is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2015.1045546     

Mortality From the Influenza Pandemic of 1918–1919: The Case of India

Estimates of worldwide mortality from the influenza pandemic of 1918-1919 vary widely, from 15 million to 100 million. In terms of loss of life, India was the focal point of this profound demographic event. In this article, we calculate mortality from the influenza pandemic in India using panel data models and data from the Census of India. The new estimates suggest that for the districts included in the sample, mortality was at most 13.88 million, compared with 17.21 million when calculated using the assumptions of Davis (1951). We conclude that Davis' influential estimate of mortality from influenza in British India is overstated by at least 24%. Future analyses of the effects of the pandemic on demographic change in India and worldwide will need to account for this significant downward revision.     

Obituary

The demographic consequences of the First World War in Britain have never been fully assessed partly on account of the lack of reliable mortality data on soldiers and civilians in the years 1914–18. In this paper, the extent of British military losses is determined and estimates of their age structure are given on the basis of the mortality experience in 1913–17 of the approximately five million men whose lives were insured by the Prudential Assurance Company. An examination of male mortality at ages 16–49 of this primarily working-class population shows both the age-incidence of war-related deaths and an improvement in life expectation for men too old for active service or combat. This latter phenomenon is related to a rising standard of living for the working class during the 1914–18 war.     

The Courbage-Fargues method of indirect measurement of mortality: adequacy and inadequacy of the case of Togo in 1971

This study tests the validity of an indirect method of estimating mortality from inaccurate data from demographic investigations conducted in Togo in 1971. The method yields good results for Togo where life expectancy at birth is estimated at 40.51 years for males and 43.12 years for females. The article responds to the request of participants of the Colloquim of Abidjan and then corrects the mortality level of Togo in 1971 derived from the biased demographic investigation in Togo in 1971. OCDE tables were used to support estimates of mortality. A hypothesis of the method was that the deaths of the last 12 months are underreported in a constant proportion. A 2nd hypothesis was that the mortality of the country is related to a mortality pattern according to age. This method of Courbage-Fargues has produced satisfactory results. Certain demographers believe that the undercount rates are probably differentials according to age, particularly among those who die in the 1st few years of life. Others believe that knowledge of deaths that occur in the later years lacks certainty. Mortality data in Africa are not adequate enough to utilize as bases for estimates. For Togo, in particular, the application of other indirect measures of mortality is hoped for to allow comparisons.     

The demographic impact of Partition in the Punjab in 1947

We use data from the 1931, 1941, and 1951 censuses of India and the 1951 census of Pakistan to examine the demographic consequences of Partition in the Punjab in 1947. Had growth rates for the period 1931–41 for the Punjab as a whole continued to 1951, the population of the Punjab would have been 2.9 million larger than that recorded in 1951. Population losses from migration and mortality above age 20 were approximately 2.7 million greater between 1941 and 1951 than would have been predicted by loss rates between 1931 and 1941. We estimate a net Partition-related population movement out of the combined Punjab of about 400,000. We conclude from several lines of analysis that Partition-related population losses in the Punjab, either from deaths or unrecorded migration, were in the range 2.3–3.2 million. Partition was also marked by a dramatic religious homogenization at the district level.     

On the Demography of South Asian Famines Part II

Part I of this paper (published in the last issue) was focused on demographic responses to three major famines which occurred in late nineteenth-century India. Part II deals with the 1943–44 famine in Bengal and the 1974–75 famine in Bangladesh. The paper presents important and hitherto unanalysed demographic data on the Bengal famine. Drawing on the analysis of Part I, it argues that because of flaws in the data which have been used, there is a need to reconsider some of the judgements which have been made about the demographic consequences of both the 1943–44 and 1974–75 famines. It is contended that some serious misconceptions have arisen concerning short-term demographic responses to famine. Finally, possible implications for famines in other parts of the world are discussed.     

The demographic impact of Partition in the Punjab in 1947

We use data from the 1931, 1941, and 1951 censuses of India and the 1951 census of Pakistan to examine the demographic consequences of Partition in the Punjab in 1947. Had growth rates for the period 1931-41 for the Punjab as a whole continued to 1951, the population of the Punjab would have been 2.9 million larger than that recorded in 1951. Population losses from migration and mortality above age 20 were approximately 2.7 million greater between 1941 and 1951 than would have been predicted by loss rates between 1931 and 1941. We estimate a net Partition-related population movement out of the combined Punjab of about 400,000. We conclude from several lines of analysis that Partition-related population losses in the Punjab, either from deaths or unrecorded migration, were in the range 2.3-3.2 million. Partition was also marked by a dramatic religious homogenization at the district level.     

Cigarette Use and the Narrowing Sex Differential in Mortality

What explains the recent reversal in many countries of century‐long trends toward a growing female advantage in mortality? And might the reversal indicate that new roles and statuses of women have begun to harm their health relative to men? Using data on 21 high‐income countries that separate smoking deaths from other deaths, this study answers the first question by showing that the reversal in the direction of change in the sex differential results from increased levels of smoking among women relative to men. Using additional cross‐national data on cigarette consumption and indicators of gender equality, this article answers the second question in the negative by showing that the declining female advantage in smoking mortality results from patterns of the diffusion of cigarette use rather than from improvements in women's status. Evidence of continued improvement in the female mortality advantage net of smoking deaths, and the likely decline of smoking among women in the future, imply that the recent narrowing of the differential will reverse.     

Aging in Japan: population policy implications

This article was prepared for the International Conference on Aging in the East and West in 1995. The focus is on trends in aging in Japan and demographic determinants and consequences. Findings are presented from a 1990 study conducted by the Institute of Population Problems on acceptance of alternative population policies aimed to slow population aging in Japan. Japan is the seventh most populous country in the world, and the current growth rate is around 0.3%. Declines in fertility and mortality have contributed to the low growth rate. Population aging accelerated over the decades. The present share of aged population is 14.1%. The aged population is expected to continue to increase from 14.9 million in 1990 to 32.7 million in 2020 (25.8% in 2025). Decreases in the aged population are not expected until after the mid-2040s. The proportion of very old (ages 75 years and older) will dramatically increase to 14.5% in 2025. The primary demographic determinant of population aging and fertility decline is identified as the higher proportion of never-married and the higher age at marriage. One of the consequences of population aging is the increase in the age dependency ratios and the aged-child ratios. The proportion of intergenerationally extended households declined over time, but the pace of decline has slowed recently. The proportion of aged in one person or couple only households has risen but not to the same extent as the West. The majority of older old still live with a married child. Logistic analysis of 1985 survey data reveal that the custom of the elderly living with the eldest child remains. The 1985 survey also revealed much indecision about a pronatalist policy or a fertility policy. Logistic analysis of 1990 public opinion survey data shows acceptance of immigration as a policy alternative to slowing population aging. Acceptance varied by socioeconomic, demographic, and regional factors. A pronatalist policy received stronger acceptance. However, reference is made to Kojima's literature review, which suggests that indirect policies on fertility and a comprehensive family policy would be more effective in raising fertility than a population policy.     

Family Life History and Late Mid‐Life Mortality in Norway

Using data on all Norwegians born 1935–68, we analyze the associations between mortality and a combined indicator of fertility and marital or partnership status and history. The focus is on ages 40–73 and the years 1980–2008 (30 million person‐years of observations and 117,000 deaths). Among men in first marriages, the childless have 36 percent higher mortality than those with two or more children. The corresponding figure for women is 61 percent. The never‐married have higher mortality and are differentiated even more by parenthood status. Thus, childless never‐married men and women have mortality three times as high as those who are married and have two or more children. The apparent advantage associated with having at least two children is smallest among men who divorced before their oldest child's tenth birthday. Having step‐children has no association with mortality for those without natural children but is associated with higher mortality among the parous.     

Relative cohort size: source of a unifying theory of global fertility transition

Using United Nations estimates of age structure and vital rates for 184 countries at five‐year intervals from 1950 through 1995, this article demonstrates how changes in relative cohort size appear to have affected patterns of fertility across countries since 1950—not just in developed countries, but perhaps even more importantly in developing countries as they pass through the demographic transition. The increase in relative cohort size (defined as the proportion of males aged 15–24 relative to males aged 25–59), which occurs as a result of declining mortality rates among infants, children, and young adults during the demographic transition, appears to act as the mechanism that determines when the fertility portion of the transition begins. As hypothesized by Richard Easterlin, the increasing proportion of young adults generates a downward pressure on young men's relative wages (or on the size of landhold‐ings passed on from parent to child), which in turn causes young adults to accept a tradeoff between family size and material wellbeing, setting in motion a “cascade” or “snowball” effect in which total fertility rates tumble as social norms regarding acceptable family sizes begin to change.