The effect of residence in enclaves on civic concern: An initial exploration

Will those residing in urban enclaves—enclosed socially homogenous residential communities protected by private security—have a lower level of civic concern as compared to those who do not reside in such enclaves? Reich's (1991) work suggests that this is to be expected. To conduct an empirical test, two random samples were drawn from two areas of New York City, one a residential enclave—Battery Park City—the other a non-enclave—Chelsea. The analysis establishes that those who do not live in the enclave have a statistically significant higher level of civic concern. Sample respondent years of education, age, income, gender, and career (arts/business) differences were employed as control variables; after having introduced each control variable independently, the main research hypothesis was sustained.     

Rank- and sign-dependent linear utility models for finite first-order gambles

Finite first-order gambles are axiomatized. The representation combines features of prospect and rank-dependent theories. What is novel are distinctions between gains and losses and the inclusion of a binary operation of joint receipt. In addition to many of the usual structural and rationality axioms, joint receipt forms an ordered concatenation structure with special features for gains and losses. Pfanzagl's (1959) consistency principle is assumed for gains and losses separately. The nonrational assumption is that a gamble of gains and losses is indifferent to the joint receipt of its gains pitted against the status quo and of its losses against the status quo.Reprints may be obtained from either author. Luce's work was supported, in part, by the National Science Foundation grant IRI-8996149 to the University of California, Irvine.     

Common Consequence Conditions in Decision Making under Risk

We generalize the Allais common consequence effect by describing three common consequence effect conditions and characterizing their implications for the probability weighting function in rank-dependent expected utility. The three conditions—horizontal, vertical, and diagonal shifts within the probability triangle—are necessary and sufficient for different curvature properties of the probability weighting function. The first two conditions, shifts in probability mass from the lowest to middle outcomes and middle to highest outcomes respectively, are alternative conditions for concavity and convexity of the weighting function. The third condition, decreasing Pratt-Arrow absolute concavity, is consistent with recently proposed weighting functions. The three conditions collectively characterize where indifference curves fan out and where they fan in. The common consequence conditions indicate that for nonlinear weighting functions in the context of rank-dependent expected utility, there must exist a region where indifference curves fan out in one direction and fan in the other direction.     

Probabilities and beliefs

Choice-theoretic definitions of subjective probabilities originated with the work of Ramsey and de Finetti and attained their definitive form in the work of Savage. These probabilities are intended to provide a numerical representation of a decision maker's beliefs regarding the likely realization of alternative events. In this article, I argue that the choice-theoretic definitions of subjective probabilities involve a tacit convention—namely, state-independent utility functions—that is not implied by the axioms, and, as a consequence, choice-theoretic subjective probabilities, even when they exist, do not necessarily represent the decision makers' beliefs.     

A note on deriving rank-dependent utility using additive joint receipts

Luce and Fishburn (1991) derived a general rank-dependent utility model using an operation ⊕ of joint receipt. Their argument rested on an empirically supported property (now) calledsegregation and on the assumption that utility is additive over ⊕. This note generalizes that conclusion to the case where utility need not be additive over ⊕, but rather is of a more general form, which they derived but did not use in their article. Tversky and Kahneman (1992), conjecturing that the joint receipt of two sums of money is simply their sum, criticized that original model because ⊕=+ together with additive utility implies the unacceptable conclusion that the utility of money is proportional to money. In the present generalized theory, if ⊕=+, utility is a negative exponential function of money rather than proportional. Similar results hold for losses. The case of mixed gains and losses is less well understood.     

The Favorite-Longshot Bias in Sequential Parimutuel Betting with Non-Expected Utility Players

This paper analyzes a model of sequential parimutuel betting described as a two-horse race with a finite number of noise bettors and a finite number of strategic and symmetrically informed bettors. For generic objective probabilities that the favorite wins the race, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized. Additionally, two explanations for the favorite–longshot bias—according to which favorites win more often than the market's estimate of their winning chances imply—are offered. It is shown that this robust anomalous empirical regularity might be due to the presence of transaction costs and/or to strategic bettors' subjective attitude to probabilities.     

On Primary Commodity Prices: The Impact of Macroeconomic/Monetary Shocks

The hypothesis of a long-run quantifiable relationship between non-oil primary commodity prices and macroeconomic/monetary variables—focusing industrial production and effective exchange rate of the US dollar—is tested by cointegration technique using quarterly data for 1970q2–93q3. This confirmed equilibrium adjustment explains the origin of the observed coincidence of commodity price variations with the fluctuations of macroeconomic/monetary variables. An error correction specification, including interest rate, is therefore applied to estimate the observed disequilibrium prices of commodities in the context of steady-state solutions. This instantaneous adjustment explains why commodity prices have fluctuated more strongly over the last 2 decades than before.     

Lottery-Dependent Utility via Stochastic Benchmarking

The possibility to interpret expected and nonexpected utility theories in purely probabilistic terms has been recently investigated. Such interpretation proposes as guideline for the Decision Maker the comparison of random variables through their probability to outperform a stochastic benchmark. We apply this type of analysis to the model of Becker and Sarin, showing that their utility functional may be seen as the probability that an opportune random variable, depending on the one to be evaluated, does not outperform a non-random benchmark. Further, the consequent choice criterion is equivalent to a sort of probability of ruin. Possible interpretations and financial examples are discussed.     

Generalized Disappointment Models

Blessed is he who expects nothing, for he shall never be disappointed—Benjamin FranklinBased on our risk-value framework, this paper presents extensions for the disappointment models that were originally proposed by Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986). We provide explicit functional forms for modeling the effect of disappointment on risky choice behavior that generalizes Bell's work and lends tractability to the efforts of Loomes and Sugden. Our generalized disappointment models can explain a number of decision paradoxes, and offer additional insights into nonexpected utility preferences based on the intuitive notions of disappointment and risk-value tradeoffs.     

Subjective expected utility theory revisited: A reductio ad absurdum paradox

A paradox is posed and analyzed in which people reverse their preferences for information on probabilities versus prizes once the range of the unknown probabilities is sufficiently narrowed. This reversal is shown to be incompatible with both objective expected utility (EU) as well as subjective versions in which the same probability transformation applies to all random variables. Experimental data are presented showing that the reversals occur with small, medium and large payoffs.The present paradox is compared with those of Allais and Ellsberg, and found to differ in substantive ways. It raises further questions about the normative status of expected utility theory, especially its treatment of probability and value. The paradox specifically calls into question EU's substitution and compound probability axioms.     

On Elements of Chance

One aspect of the utility of gambling may evidence itself in failures of idempotence, i.e., when all chance outcomes give rise to the same consequence the `gamble' may not be indifferent to its common consequence. Under the assumption of segregation, such gambles can be expressed as the joint receipt of the common consequence and what we call `an element of chance', namely, the same gamble with the common consequence replaced by the status quo. Generalizing, any gamble is indifferent to the joint receipt of its element of chance and a certain consequence, which is called the `kernel equivalent' of the gamble. Under idempotence, the kernel equivalent equals the certainty equivalent. Conditions are reported (Theorem 4) that are sufficient for the kernel equivalents to have the kind of utility representation first discussed by Luce and Fishburn (1991), including being idempotent. This utility representation of the kernel equivalents together with the derived form of utility over joint receipts yields a utility representation of the original structure. Possible forms for the utility of an element of chance are developed.     

Separating marginal utility and probabilistic risk aversion

This paper is motivated by the search for one cardinal utility for decisions under risk, welfare evaluations, and other contexts. This cardinal utility should have meaningprior to risk, with risk depending on cardinal utility, not the other way around. The rank-dependent utility model can reconcile such a view on utility with the position that risk attitude consists of more than marginal utility, by providing a separate risk component: a probabilistic risk attitude towards probability mixtures of lotteries, modeled through a transformation for cumulative probabilities. While this separation of risk attitude into two independent components is the characteristic feature of rank-dependent utility, it had not yet been axiomatized. Doing that is the purpose of this paper. Therefore, in the second part, the paper extends Yaari's axiomatization to nonlinear utility, and provides separate axiomatizations for increasing/decreasing marginal utility and for optimistic/pessimistic probability transformations. This is generalized to interpersonal comparability. It is also shown that two elementary and often-discussed properties — quasi-convexity (aversion) of preferences with respect to probability mixtures, and convexity (pessimism) of the probability transformation — are equivalent.     

INCREASING INCREMENT GENERALIZATIONS OF RANK-DEPENDENT THEORIES

Empirical evidence from both utility and psychophysical experiments suggests that people respond quite differently—perhaps discontinuously—to stimulus pairs when one consequence or signal is set to `zero.' Such stimuli are called unitary. The author's earlier theories assumed otherwise. In particular, the key property of segregation relating gambles and joint receipts (or presentations) involves unitary stimuli. Also, the representation of unitary stimuli was assumed to be separable (i.e., multiplicative). The theories developed here do not invoke separability. Four general cases based on two distinctions are explored. The first distinction is between commutative joint receipts, which are relevant to utility, and the non-commutative ones, which are relevant to psychophysics. The second distinction concerns how stimuli of the form (x, C; y) and the operation of joint receipt are linked: by segregation, which mixes stimuli and unitary ones, and by distributivity, which does not involve any unitary stimuli. A class of representations more general than rank-dependent utility (RDU) is found in which monotonic functions of increments U(x)-U(y), where U is an order preseving representation of gambles, and joint receipt play a role. This form and its natural generalization to gambles with n > 2 consequences, which is also axiomatized, appear to encompass models of configural weights and decision affect. When joint receipts are not commutative, somewhat similar representations of stimuli arise, and joint receipts are shown to have a conjoint additive representation and in some cases a constant bias independent of signal intensity is predicted.     

Rational behaviour: A comparison between the theory stemming from de Finetti's work and some other leading theories

We present some interesting features of de Finetti's decision theory; then we extended the theory. The extended theory has a normative character and is of the expected utility kind, but it is also very adaptable. By comparing it with some leading theories, we find that our theory is compatible with consideration of the whole probability distribution — it can even accommodate Allais' paradox -, while it is not generally compatible with probability weighting. We are mainly interested in the normative point of view.     

Aspects of a new world development strategy II: Factors affecting the long-term prospects of developing nations

This paper explores some quantitative dimensions of the interdependence of rich and poor regions in the context of the United Nations World Model. It extends the original work on that model in three ways: (1) by updating some of the key parameters and exogenous variables in the light of recent data; (2) by developing a “control” solution to be used as a point of reference in policy simulations; and (3) by exploring the sensitivities of each of two groups of regions— developed and developing—to changes in one another's growth rates. Goals of closing the income gap between developed and developing regions and of increasing income levels in the latter are discussed.     

Stakeholder behavior and legislative influence: A case study of recreational water rights in Colorado

Colorado water law is based on 150 years of legal, constitutional, and administrative precedent. Much of this precedent encourages traditional consumptive uses of water and impedes non-consumptive uses. Throughout Colorado’s history, the water law system has evolved to include new codified uses of water. This paper analyzes the behavior of stakeholder groups that drove legislative changes in the Colorado General Assembly in the most recent example of this evolution—the inclusion of non-consumptive recreational in-channel water rights as a codified use of water. Using a qualitative case study research method, this study finds that collaboration among formerly disenfranchised stakeholders explains their legislative success despite the lesser degree of influence these groups have over water rights in Colorado.     

Towards a more precise decision framework

The terms negative utility of gambling and risk aversion conflate three things: