Bridewealth and Birth Control: Low Fertility in the Indonesian Archipelago, 1500–1900

Before the onset of the present demographic transition, population growth in Indonesia had reached unprecedentedly high levels. This article demonstrates that such high levels were a recent phenomenon. Prior to 1900 rates of natural population increase were low to very low in most areas in Indonesia. This runs counter to expectations based on Hajnal's “Eastern marriage pattern,” which could imply high growth levels in extended family areas, such as most Indonesian regions outside Java in the past. Usually, the low population growth rates in Southeast Asia are attributed to high mortality owing to high levels of violent conflict. It is argued that other factors contributing to such high levels of mortality should receive more attention. In this article it is also argued that low fertility rates, too, played a role in generating low rates of natural increase. The article discusses the influence of marriage patterns, household structure, methods of birth control, adoption, and slavery on fertility.     

Thailand’s urban population reconsidered

In lieu of any official definition of “urban population” in Thailand, researchers and policy makers have generally used a simple urban-rural dichotomy, relying upon the administratively designated municipal areas as urban and the remainder of the kingdom as rural. For administrative purposes, however, a more refined set of residence categories is available: the “urban” segment is subdivided into three categories of municipal areas; within the “rural” group, units of population concentration classified as sanitary districts are distinguished from the remainder of the rural population. Data from a 1970 census sample tape have been used to analyze a number of socioeconomic characteristics, as well as migration and fertility, for each of these five residence categories separately in an attempt to determine if the formerly used rural-urban dichotomy is valid. For each of the characteristics and for migration and fertility, a clear urban-rural continuum emerges, with the sanitary districts generally resembling the smaller urban places more than they do the rural areas under which they are usually subsumed. The evaluation thus suggests the importance to research and policy either of using an urban-rural continuum or of grouping sanitary districts with municipal areas when a dichotomy must be used. Doing so should facilitate evaluation of the interrelations between urbanization and demographic and development factors.     

生育进度效应调整指标研究的新进展

随着经济和社会的不断发展,生育推迟现象在全世界范围内日益普遍。由于生育推迟所产生的进度效应会对生育水平造成影响,因此,如何测度生育进度效应便成了人口学界研究的重要内容。自Bongaarts和Feeney的去进度效应总和生育率提出以来,各种新的改进方法与指标不断出现。本文对生育进度效应调整指标的新进展及具体指标进行梳理与比较。从时期角度出发,主要包括方差效应调整后的TFR、PATFR*、调整后的TFRSUV_N和ITFR四种指标;从队列角度出发,主要包括TFRp*、TFR†和ACF三种指标,这些指标有各自的优缺点。研究发现:首先,由于不同去进度效应改进指标的假设、适用条件、研究角度、改进方向都不同,很难有一套数据同时适用于多种去进度方法,因此,生育进度效应的诸多改进指标并没有哪个指标“更好”,只有“更合适”;其次,绝对的去进度效应只能停留在理论层面,而实际上却很难做到,种种去进度方法都只是一种“相对的去”,而不是“绝对的去”。过去我们所熟悉的进度效应是生育推迟,而目前世界范围内生育推迟速度开始逐渐放缓,未来我们甚至不能排除生育推迟在某个时期或某些区域会发生逆转,届时可能会出现与目前影响方向相反的进度效应,这可能是下一步关于生育进度效应研究应该注意的新方向。     

The United Nations on World Population in 2300

The Population Division of the United Nations biennially issues detailed population estimates and projections covering the period 1950–2050. The most recent revision of these estimates and projections, the 2002 assessment, was released in February 2003. At irregular intervals, the Population Division also publishes long‐range projections. The most recent of these, covering the period up to 2150, was issued in 2000, based on the 1998 assessment. On 9 December 2003, the Population Division released the preliminary report on a new set of long‐range projections, dovetailing with the 2002 assessment, that extend over a much longer time span: up to 2300 ( http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange2/longrange2.htm ). Unlike previous long‐range projections, which, apart from China and In‐dia, were prepared for large regional groupings only, the new projections are elaborated separately for 192 countries. Given the enormous uncertainties of the character of demographic trends over such an extended period, the information content of these projections is somewhat elusive. However, they are expected to be used to provide the demographic input for long‐range models of global climate change. Long‐range population projections also serve to demonstrate the unsustainability of certain seemingly plausible assumptions as to the future course of particular demographic parameters. In the present case, for example, the high‐fertility projection, reflecting a sustained total fertility rate at the relatively modest level of 2.35, by 2300 would yield a population of some 32 billion in the countries now classified as less developed. Or, in a yet more extreme exercise 0/reductio ad absurdum, maintaining constant fertility at present rates would result in a population size of some 120 trillion in the countries now classified as least developed. Apart from the “high fertility” and “constant fertility” models just cited, the projections are calculated for three additional instructive variants: “low fertility,”“medium fertility,” and “zero growth.” Underlying each of the five variants is a single assumption on mortality change: expectation of life at birth creeping up, country‐by‐country, to a 2300 level ranging between 88 and 106 years. International migration is set at zero throughout the period 2050‐2300 in each variant. Thus the projections are unabashedly stylized and surprise‐free, providing a simple demonstration of the consequences, in terms of population size and age structure, of clearly stated assumptions on the future course of demographic variables. Reproduced below is the Executive Summary of the preliminary report on the UN long‐range projections presented to a UN technical working group on long‐range projections at its December 2003 meeting in New York and slightly revised afterward. A full final report on this topic by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat will be published later in 2004.     

Family size and the quality of children

If couples decide to have fewer children in order to achieve higher “quality” offspring, are they correct in assuming that the quality of children bears an important and inverse relation to family size? If they are correct, how does number of children operate to affect individual quality? This research (using U.S. whites primarily) takes educational attainment (among adults) and college plans (among youngsters) as the principal indicators of quality, but also directs some attention to measures of intelligence. The analysis supports the “dilution model” (on average, the more children the lower the quality of each child) and indicates that only children do not suffer from lack of siblings, and that other last-borns are not handicapped by a “teaching deficit.” Number of siblings (relative to other background variables) is found to have an important detrimental impact on child quality—an impact compounded by the fact that, when couples are at a stage in life to make family-size decisions, most background factors (however important to the quality of their children) are no longer readily manipulable. A special path analysis of college plans among boys uses a modification of Sewell’s Wisconsin Model as its base. The results show that number of siblings is a negative influence on intervening variables affecting college plans. In general, the research documents the unfavorable consequences for individual siblings of high fertility, even in a country that is (at least for whites) as socially, economically, and politically advantaged as the United States.     

A Population Policy Rationale for the Twenty‐First Century

I propose that the primary goal of twenty‐first‐century population policies should be to strengthen the human resource base for national and global sustainable development. I discuss the shortcomings of the three dominant twentieth‐century population policy rationales: acceptance of replacement‐level fertility as a demographic goal; realizing a “demographic dividend” from the changing age structure; and filling the “unmet need” for family planning. I demonstrate that in all three cases the explicit incorporation of education into the model changes the picture and makes female education a key population policy priority. Population policies under this new rationale could be viewed as public human resource management. I argue that 20 years after the Cairo ICPD the international community needs a new rationale for population policies in the context of sustainable development and that a focus on human capital development, in particular education and health, is the most promising approach.     

Low Fertility,Socioeconomic Development,and Gender Equity

While new empirical findings and theoretical frameworks provide insight into the interrelations between socioeconomic development, gender equity, and low fertility, puzzling exceptions and outliers in these findings call for a more all‐encompassing framework to understand the interplay between these processes. We argue that the pace and onset of development are two important factors to be considered when analyzing gender equity and fertility. Within the developed world, “first‐wave developers”—or countries that began socioeconomic development in the nineteenth/early twentieth century—currently have much higher fertility levels than “late developers.” We lay out a novel theoretical approach to explain why this is the case and provide empirical evidence to support our argument. Our approach not only explains historical periods of low fertility but also sheds light on why there exists such large variance in fertility rates among today's developed countries.     

2000年以来人口学研究国际前沿解读——基于CiteSpace对Web of Science数据库的文献计量

为探究国际人口学学科的文献特征与趋势,本文运用科学计量学的前沿研究方法,基于Web of Science数据库(2000—2018年)收录的人口学研究领域的文献数据,应用CiteSpace软件,就被引文献和主题词进行实证分析。结果表明,人口转变、国际移民、低生育率与生育行为是21世纪以来国际人口学最核心的学术研究分支;受教育程度、已婚女性、人口特征、年轻女性、年轻人、生殖健康等主题词是该领域的研究热点,具体来看,“代际问题”、“缓慢衰老”、“结婚与同居”、“生育意图和生育行为”、“移民融合”以及“女性雇佣和生育”等主题是近年来国际人口学界研究的前沿方向。     

D. V. Glass on the Problems of a Declining Population

During the past quarter century fertility has dropped below replacement levels in many parts of the world. According to United Nations estimates, in 2005 this was the case in 65 countries, comprising 43 percent of the world's population. In many cases, most notably in Europe and East Asia, the shortfall of fertility from the level that would be necessary in the long run to sustain a stationary population is substantial. In Europe, for example, the average total fertility rate for the period 2000–2005 was 1.4. Indefinite maintenance of such a level implies a shrinkage of the total population by one‐third over a generation–roughly every 30 years. Accompanying that rapid decline of total numbers would be an age structure containing a preponderance of the elderly, posing extreme adjustment difficulties for the economic and social system. Societies that wish to avoid radical depopulation would have to engineer a substantial rise infertility–if not to full replacement level (slightly more than two children per woman), then at least to a level that would moderate the tempo of population decline and make population aging easier to cope with. An additional counter to declining numbers, if not significantly to population aging, could come from net immigration. This is the demographic future assumed in the UN medium‐variant projections for countries and regions currently of very low fertility. Thus, for example, in Europe over the period up to 2050 fertility is assumed to rise to 1.85 and net immigration to amount to some 32 million persons. The UN projections also anticipate further improvement in average life expectancy–from its current level of 74 years to 81 years. This factor slows the decline in population size but accelerates population aging. Under these assumptions, Europe's population would decline from its present 728 million to 653 million by 2050. At that time the proportion of the population over age 65 would be 27.6 percent, nearly double its present share. Demographic change of this nature is not a novel prospect. It was envisioned in a number of European countries and in North America, Australia, and New Zealand in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Concern with the possible economic and social consequences generated much discussion at that time among demographers and social scientists at large and also attracted public attention. Possible policy measures that might reverse the downward trend of fertility were also debated, although resulting in only hesitant and largely inconsequential action. The article by D. V. Glass reproduced below is an especially lucid and concise treatment of demographic changes under conditions of low fertility and their economic and social implications. It appeared in Eugenics Review (vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 39–47) in 1937 when the author was 26 years old. Glass's line of argument is broadly representative of the main focus of demographic analysis in the mid‐1930s on aspects of population dynamics, applying the then still novel analytical tool of the stable population model. It also echoes the work of economists then witnessing the great difficulties capitalist economies faced in adjusting to structural changes in consumer demand and labor supply. While Glass addresses these issues primarily with reference to England and Wales, he sees the issues as affecting all industrialized countries. The Malthusian problem of relentless population growth he persuasively declares to be irrelevant for these countries. The Western world faces the opposite problem: population decline, a trend only temporarily masked by the effects of an age distribution that still has a relatively high proportion of women in the child‐bearing ages, reflecting the higher fertility level of the past. A stationary population, Glass cogently argues, is to be welcomed, and he considers the absolute size at which zero growth would be achieved relatively unimportant. In contrast, a continuous population decline would have “thoroughly disastrous” results in an individualist civilization and in “an unplanned economic system.” And, he concedes, somewhat quaintly, that sustained below‐replacement fertility would pose a great problem “even in a country in which the means of production were owned communally.” Glass's conclusions about the reversibility of low fertility are as pessimistic as those of most informed observers today. Still, he sees hope in a future “rationally planned civilization” that would “produce an environment in which high fertility and a high standard of life will both be possible.” In this context, high fertility means the level necessary to sustain the population in a stationary state. By present‐day standards the level Glass calculates as needed for long‐term zero growth is indeed fairly high: 2.87 children per woman. But that figure reflects the fact that, when he wrote, mortality up to age 50 was still fairly high and fertility occurred almost wholly within marriage; it also assumes zero net immigration. In the last 70 years much has changed in each of these three components of population dynamics, both in England and Wales and in the rest of Europe. Still, Glass's commentary remains highly relevant to the discussion of the problems of low fertility today. David Victor Glass (1911–78) was associated with the London School of Economics throughout much of his scientific career. He followed R. R. Kuczynski as reader in demography in 1945 and became professor of sociology in 1948. His work on demography, population history, and population policy had already made him one of the most influential demographers in pre‐World War II Britain. After the war he rose to international prominence through pioneering work on the Royal Commission of Population; through his research on historical demography, the history of demographic thought, and social mobility; and through founding, in 1947, the journal Population Studies, which he edited until his death.     

Black America in the 1980s

This Bulletin reviews recent demographic and socioeconomic trends in the US black population in order to assess changes in the status of blacks relative to whites since publication of the 1962 edition of Gunnar Myrdal's 1944 classic "An American Dilemma." Blacks numbered 26.5 million in 1980, 11.7% of the total population, with 85% residing in urban areas compared to 71% of whites. Some suburbanization is now occurring among blacks but the majority remain segregated in central cities. In the 1970s, more blacks moved into the South than moved out in a reversal of the historic pattern. Blacks have shared the baby bust since the mid-1960s but teenage and out-of-wedlock fertility remain much higher than for whites as well as overall fertility (2.3 compared to 1.8 births/woman in 1979). Black infant mortality is still double that of whites and life expectancy is 6 years shorter (68.3 vs. 74.4 years in 1979). Single parents (mostly mothers) with children now comprise 31% of black families compared to 10% for the general population. Divorce and separation have risen faster for blacks than whites. Many of these gaps are related to blacks' continuing socioeconomic disadvantages: median family income is 56% that of whites; the poverty rate is 3.5 times higher; unemployment is twice as high. Occupational status has improved for blacks and their educational attainment is now close to that of whites, but these gains may be slowed and income differentials unimproved if the current administration's reversal of socioeconomic policy remains unchanged. Blacks are also affected more than other groups by the recent surge in immigrants who compete directly for the low-level jobs on which many blacks must still rely. (author's).     

Neoclassical growth with endogenous age distribution. Poverty vs low-fertility traps as steady states of demographic transitions

Compared to other factors, the role of the age distribution of the population as a key endogenous determinant of economic growth trajectories has traditionally been overlooked. This is unrealistic, especially when dealing with major epochs of structural change, such as demographic transitions. We set up a model combining a simple representation of the economy, based on the neoclassical growth model of Solow, with a comprehensive representation of population dynamics. The model is used to investigate the structure of balanced growth states of the population and the economy in the presence of demographic transitions. The analysis shows that proper inclusion of age structure enriches the spectrum of the long-run equilibria of the neoclassical model, allowing up to five states of balanced growth, and shows the onset of “poverty” and “low-fertility” traps as different facets of fertility transitions. The role of different timing of fertility, mortality and savings transitions, and of more realistic demography of capital, is also considered.     

Poverty,Inequality, and Fertility: The Contribution of Demographic Change to Global Poverty Reduction

Global poverty has fallen dramatically over the past decades. In many developing countries, this transformation was accompanied by rapid improvements in demographic outcomes, such as falling child mortality and fertility. Yet, recent theorizing and empirical research into the causes of global poverty reduction has mostly omitted demographic factors. This paper aims to fill this gap by testing for effects of demographic variables on poverty. Using time series data for 140 countries, we document a strong effect of lagged fertility on country-specific poverty rates. This effect is robust across several specifications and data sets. It appears to be stronger in countries with larger fertility differentials, in the early transition stages. The proposed mechanism behind this result is a “Kuznets curve-type” expansion of fertility inequality at the onset of the demographic transition. We conclude by calling for a stronger inclusion of demographic variables in the distribution-sensitive analysis of global poverty.     

A Cohort Model of Fertility Postponement

We introduce a new formal model in which demographic behavior such as fertility is postponed by differing amounts depending only on cohort membership. The cohort-based model shows the effects of cohort shifts on period fertility measures and provides an accompanying tempo adjustment to determine the period fertility that would have occurred without postponement. Cohort-based postponement spans multiple periods and produces “fertility momentum,” with implications for future fertility rates. We illustrate several methods for model estimation and apply the model to fertility in several countries. We also compare the fit of period-based and cohort-based shift models to the recent Dutch fertility surface, showing how cohort- and period-based postponement can occur simultaneously.     

Migration Selection, Protection, and Acculturation in Health: A Binational Perspective on Older Adults

In this article, we test for four potential explanations of the Hispanic Health Paradox (HHP): the “salmon bias,” emigration selection, and sociocultural protection originating in either destination or sending country. To reduce biases related to attrition by return migration typical of most U.S.-based surveys, we combine data from the Mexican Health and Aging Study in Mexico and the U.S. National Health Interview Survey to compare self-reported diabetes, hypertension, current smoking, obesity, and self-rated health among Mexican-born men ages 50 and older according to their previous U.S. migration experience, and U.S.-born Mexican Americans and non-Hispanic whites. We also use height, a measure of health during childhood, to bolster some of our tests. We find an immigrant advantage relative to non-Hispanic whites in hypertension and, to a lesser extent, obesity. We find evidence consistent with emigration selection and the salmon bias in height, hypertension, and self-rated health among immigrants with less than 15 years of experience in the United States; we do not find conclusive evidence consistent with sociocultural protection mechanisms. Finally, we illustrate that although ignoring return migrants when testing for the HHP and its mechanisms, as well as for the association between U.S. experience and health, exaggerates these associations, they are not fully driven by return migration-related attrition.     

A Closer Look at the Second Demographic Transition in the US: Evidence of Bidirectionality from a Cohort Perspective (1982–2006)

Second demographic transition (SDT) theory posits that increased individualism and secularization have contributed to low fertility in Europe, but very little work has directly tested the salience of SDT theory to fertility trends in the US. Using longitudinal data from a nationally representative cohort of women who were followed throughout their reproductive years (National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 cohort, NLSY79), this study examines the role of several key indicators of the SDT (secularization, egalitarianism, religious affiliation, and female participation in the labor market) on fertility behavior over time (1982–2006). Analyses employ Poisson estimation, logistic regression, and cross-lagged structural equation models to observe unidirectional and bidirectional relationships over the reproductive life course. Findings lend support to the relevance of SDT theory in the US but also provide evidence of “American bipolarity” which distinguishes the US from the European case. Furthermore, analyses document the reciprocal nature of these relationships over time which has implications for how we understand these associations at the individual-level.     

“Dynamic Infertility”

Critical content analysis of eight years' of newspaper coverage of advanced reproductive technologies in Israel demonstrates that the public debate over assisted reproduction is largely characterized by personal narratives that accentuate, on the surface, a discourse of individualism. However, this study claims that beneath the surface, these women's “personal dreams,” are in fact realization of the “national dream” that promotes particular social values and demographic goals. The news coverage was found to promote a process we name “dynamic infertility,” in which women are encouraged not to accept physiological infertility but rather undergo as many fertility treatments as necessary, for as long as it takes, ultimately to bring their genetically related children into the world.     

Spatial Analysis of the Causes of Fertility Decline in Prussia

This article contributes to the geographic analysis of fertility decline in the demographic transition in Europe. We reanalyze Galloway, Hammel, and Lee's (1994) Prussian data with spatial analysis methods. Our multivariate analysis provides evidence of the predictive effect of both economic and cultural variables. Furthermore, even after all of the observable economic, social, and cultural variables have been controlled for, our findings show that a significant unexplained geographic clustering of fertility decline remains. We then specify spatial econometric models, which show that in addition to economic and cultural factors, socio‐geographic factors such as being adjacent to areas of sharp fertility decline are also needed to understand the pattern of fertility decline. These results provide new support for the role of social diffusion in the process, while allowing for the direct structural effects of economic change.     

An Empirical Assessment of Households Livelihood Vulnerability: The Case of Rural Ghana

The recent years witnessed a sharp drop in China’s demographic dividend; therefore, some reform measures about China’s fertility policy have been adopted to optimize population structures and to maintain demographic dividend. However, our simulation results reveal that the new two-child fertility policy cannot effectively deal with population ageing, and that China’s fertility policy needs further adjustment. Specifically, we find that the new two-child fertility policy will deteriorate demographic dividend before 2050, through combination of simulation results and formula derivation. Aiming to stabilize demographic dividend at ideal range all the time, we build nonlinear integer programming model to propose an appropriate reforming path for China’s fertility policy. Then, we simulate and compare demographic developments under the proposed reforming path with those under three possible fertility policies: one-child, two-child and no fertility restriction, verifying that the proposed reforming path has better performance on stabilizing demographic dividend than these three fertility policies have. Finally, sensitivity analysis of upper bound of research interval is conducted to evaluate the effect of the upper bound on proposed reforming path. Based on these results, we suggest that China should continue to execute current strict fertility policy before 2032, then begin to relax it gradually especially during 2036–2041, and completely cancel fertility policy after 2065.     

How economic development and family planning programs combined to reduce indonesian fertility

This paper examines the contributions of family planning programs, economic development, and women’s status to Indonesian fertility decline from 1982 to 1987. Methodologically we unify seemingly conflicting demographic and economic frameworks into a single “structural” proximate-cause model as well as controlling statistically for the targeted (nonrandom) placement of family planning program inputs. The results are consistent with both frameworks: 75% of the fertility decline resulted from increased contraceptive use, but was induced primarily through economic development and improved education and economic opportunities for females. Even so, the dramatic impact of the changes in demand-side factors (education and economic development) on contraceptive use was possible only because there already existed a highly responsive contraceptive supply delivery system.     

用孩次递进比模拟“全面二孩”政策调整初期的生育行为--以湖北省为例

以2014年湖北省卫生和计划生育委员会提供的包括“单独”、“双独”方面的数据为基础,描述了生育政策调整下被压抑的生育潜能释放的规律性和用孩次递进比的方法预测“全面二孩”政策调整初期的生育行为,与意愿分析方法相互比照,丰富了当下生育政策下生育行为预测研究。从分析结果可以看出,假定2016年“全面二孩”生育政策调整,湖北省第一年内会新增二孩出生量52621人,占湖北省2014年总出生量的7?41％;三年内最低会新增139262人的二孩生育量。城乡对比发现,农村新增二孩生育占到将近六成,且由抢生而导致的堆积主要集中在农村,40岁后的高龄抢生情况不严重。