考虑质量不确定的竞争企业预售策略分析

近年来，越来越多的企业在向市场推出新产品时采用预售方式。本文研究企业在面对竞争时的预售策略，其中消费者对企业所销售的异质可替代产品的质量估值具有不确定性。在预售期消费者不了解产品的真实质量，而在现货期消费者可以根据预售期购买者提供的线上产品评论对产品质量进行贝叶斯更新。策略型消费者通过比较在预售期和现货期购买产品的期望效用，选择提前购买或推迟购买。研究结果表明，若产品评论信息精确度较低，当市场竞争强度处于中等水平时，竞争企业双方在预售策略上不一致；否则，企业双方均采取预售。若产品评论信息精确度较高，则市场竞争强度对系统的影响较弱，因此竞争企业双方均有更强意愿采取预售。由此可见，在市场竞争环境下，预售并不总是给企业带来利好。     

考虑产能约束的新产品与旧产品预售策略研究

预售商品种类繁多，可分为从未上市过的新产品和已经上市过旧产品。面对不同类型的产品，根据消费者效用理论，消费者可能做出不同的决策。研究在产能约束的前提下，零售商销售不同类型产品的最优预售策略问题。结果表明，新产品的最优预售策略取决于正常销售价格，旧产品的最优预售策略受正常销售价格与消费者构成的共同影响，且前者的影响作用大于后者。较低的正常销售价格或较大的高估值消费者比例增大了消费者在正常销售期购买的缺货风险，零售商应采取溢价预售策略，否则应采取折价预售策略。此外将新产品和旧产品的最优预售策略对比发现，利用消费者对产品估值的不确定性，新产品预售比旧产品预售更具优势。     

季节性易逝品预售与回购联合决策研究

基于季节性易逝品短销售期和短保质期的“双短”特性,其高额利润通常伴随着较大需求不确定性,而且一旦错过销售季节,其极低的残值将导致巨大经济损失与资源浪费.折价预售策略将鼓励消费者提前购买,经销商也可通过预售产品数量的获知来提升市场需求预测的准确性.但消费者在享受预购折价优惠的同时,也可能承担未见到实物产品即进行购买的期望价值损失.此时,经销商若采取回购,则是对消费者利益的直接保障,而在产生回购成本的同时,也可以通过提高预售价格与降低实物订货量等方式带来新增利润.考虑策略型消费者行为,对预售与回购联合策略和单一预售策略进行对比,构建两种策略下的经销商收益模型,并得出相应的最优预售价格与最优订购量.研究发现,当商品单位成本较大或回购价格较低时,预售与回购联合策略的实施能够使经销商获得更优收益,且最优预售价格高于单一预售策略,最优订货量则低于单一预售策略,从而为经销商营销策略选择进行决策支持.     

公开或隐藏未来市场价格对新品预售的影响研究

预售是新产品上市前，商家允许消费者提前预定产品的一种销售手段。本文以新产品预售为背景，建立了商家同时销售新旧两代产品时的预售模型，先对消费者最优购买策略进行了分析，在此基础上，分两种情况，即商家在预售阶段公开或隐藏新品未来市场价格，研究了商家最优预售价格折扣和最优订购量。最后，通过数值仿真分析了影响新品预售策略和商家收益的一些因素。结果表明，商家在预售阶段公开新品未来市场价格可以获得更高期望收益。     

基于期权的易逝品订购预售联合策略研究

由需求不确定所引起的库存过剩或产品脱销通常会给企业的正常运营带来极大风险，本文考虑一种运输时间影响损耗率的易逝品，在消费者估值不确定的情况下，从集成的角度出发，针对零售商的订购与预售联合策略展开研究。需求端零售商可通过批发价订购方式或组合订购方式采购易逝品，销售端可提供折扣预售和期权预售两种策略。通过模型构建详细分析了几种不同的订购预售联合策略，求解了不同策略下的最优订购量和最优预售价格以及不同策略的适用情形。研究发现柔性采购（组合订购方式）和期权预售联合决策可以有效降低需求波动带来的库存积压和产品短缺风险，且期权预售策略比折扣预售策略的应用范围更广。     

产品预售、退货策略和消费者无缺陷退货行为

本文研究了在产品需求和消费者产品估价均不确定的情况下,报童零售商的预售策略和无缺陷退货问题.零售商可以提供三种销售策略:不提供预售、提供部分退款退货服务的预售策略和提供全额退款退货服务的预售策略,所有预订产品在正常销售季节交付.研究发现,预订产品的全额退款退货策略和不提供退货策略都可能导致库存风险和估价不确定风险的不合理分摊,而最优的退货策略是部分退款退货策略,且最优退货价格为产品的残余价值.此外,全额退款和部分退款的退货策略只影响零售商的预售利润和销售季节退货量,并不影响零售商在正常销售季节的期望利润.研究还表明,预售需求和正常销售需求的相关性越高,预售优势越明显.     

考虑支付痛苦钝化的在线产品预售定价策略

在线产品定价是平台经济的重要研究领域,两阶段混合预售是线上销售的一种主流模式。顾客在线上购买过程中,支付方式和预售模式对消费者行为和产品定价具有重要的影响。基于两阶段混合预售模式,本文考虑支付痛苦钝化效应对消费者购买心理的影响,建立相应的产品定价模型,得到了在线产品的最优预售价格、最优销量和最优利润,分析了支付痛苦钝化对消费者行为和在线产品最优定价的影响机制。理论和数值分析表明,两阶段混合预售策略更有利于卖方收益最大化;受支付痛苦钝化效应影响,折扣预售并非一定是产品最优选择策略,痛苦钝化因子是影响产品预售策略的重要因素。本文成果将进一步丰富平台经济下的顾客行为和产品定价研究,为平台企业和商家制定预售和产品定价策略提供决策依据。     

在线评论对电商平台定价与消费者渠道选择的影响

本研究针对在线评论对电商平台定价决策以及消费者行为的影响问题,构建有无在线评论情形下电商平台与制造商之间的博弈模型,比较分析在线评论对系统均衡和消费者行为的影响。研究结果表明：电商平台的定价策略会受到在线评论的影响,当制造商直销渠道与电商平台自营渠道的竞争程度足够大,或者渠道竞争程度较小但在线评论有效性水平足够低时,电商平台才会实施低价策略;在线评论会导致利润在各企业间的重新分配,当渠道竞争程度适中时,在线评论对电商平台有利,对制造商的影响不确定。其次,在线评论的存在会影响消费者选择购买渠道,尤其是部分消费者放弃直销渠道而选择自营渠道购买产品;然而,如果在线评论有效性水平满足一定条件,则消费者参考在线评论可能会放弃购买产品,由此导致产品需求降低。此外,本文还拓展了原始模型,进一步考察电商渠道竞争问题。     

偏好市场下制造/再制造系统最优生产决策

从消费者对再制造产品和新产品有着不同的需求偏好入手,引入市场需求偏好函数,构建单一垄断生产商利润最大化的带约束生产决策模型,探讨偏好市场下的两期和无限期的最优产量-价格决策策略.此外,通过对再制造经济优化模型的数据模拟,分析消费者偏好系数对生产商利润、成本节约、产品价格的影响,为生产商的生产决策,以及政府如何影响消费者偏好决策提供指导建议.     

偏好市场下制造 /再制造系统最优生产决策

从消费者对再制造产品和新产品有着不同的需求偏好入手, 引入市场需求偏好函数, 构建单一垄断生产商利润最大化的带约束生产决策模型, 探讨偏好市场下的两期和无限期的最优产量 -价格决策策略.此外, 通过对再制造经济优化模型的数据模拟, 分析消费者偏好系数对生产商利润、成本节约、产品价格的影响, 为生产商的生产决策, 以及政府如何影响消费者偏好决策提供指导建议     

Advance Selling by a Newsvendor Retailer

Retailers often face a newsvendor problem. Advance selling helps retailers to reduce demand uncertainty. Consumers, however, may prefer not to purchase in advance unless given a discount because they are uncertain about their valuation for the product in advance. It is then unclear whether or when advance selling to pass some uncertainty risk to consumers is optimal for the retailer. This paper examines the advance selling price and inventory decisions in a two‐period setting, where the first period is the advance selling period and the second is the selling (and consumption) period. We find that an advance selling strategy is not always optimal, but is contingent on parameters of the market (e.g., market potential and uncertainty) and the consumers (e.g., valuation, risk aversion, and heterogeneity). For example, we find that retailers should sell in advance if the consumers' expected valuation exceeds consumers' expected surplus when not buying early by a certain threshold. This threshold increases with the degree of risk aversion but decreases with stock out risk. If the degree of risk aversion varies across consumers, then a retailer should sell in advance if the probability for a consumer to spot buy is less than a critical fractile.     

考虑策略型消费者的在线零售商库存信息披露及联合定价、库存决策模型

在两期销售环境下,研究了面向策略型消费者的在线零售商库存信息披露及联合定价、库存决策问题。考虑在线零售商库存信息共享和隐藏两种库存披露策略,构建了在线零售商两期销售利润模型。通过分析消费者的购买行为,讨论了在具有策略型消费者的市场中,在线零售商应如何选择库存信息披露策略,以及如何制定最优定价和库存决策。在此基础上,分析了相关参数对在线零售商决策及利润的影响。研究结果表明,在线零售商的最优定价及库存决策受消费者估值折扣系数和第二期定价策略的影响。特别地,当在线零售商选择第一期缺货时,更倾向于共享其库存水平信息;当在线零售商选择第二期缺货或者两期均不缺货时,消费者估值折扣系数存在一个阈值,当低于该阈值时,在线零售商会选择隐藏库存水平信息,当高于该阈值时,在线零售商会选择共享库存水平信息。     

Consumer return policies in presence of a P2P market

Retailers selling products with valuation uncertainty often offer return policies to consumers to stimulate demand. However, some products that do not meet consumers’ expectations cannot be returned to the retailers either because of retailers’ strict restrictions on returns or because of short trial period. With the development of e-commerce, consumers who cannot return their products to retailers can resell them directly to others through electronic peer-to-peer (P2P) second-hand goods markets. This paper examines the effect of the presence of a P2P market on a retailer’s optimal return policy when the consumers are strategic and uncertain about their valuations. As a benchmark, we first examine the retailer’s optimal return policy when there is only a retailer-run resale market. Then, we analyze the retailer’s optimal return policy in presence of both the retailer-run resale market and the P2P market. Theoretical and numerical results show that, first, the presence of the P2P market is detrimental to the retailer in most cases. The presence of the P2P market is beneficial to the retailer only when the unit purchasing cost is very high, the consumers’ acceptance of products in the P2P market is relatively high and the transaction cost in the P2P market is relatively low; second, the consumer surplus is improved by the presence of P2P market; third, when the retailer-run resale market is the only second-hand products market, returned products are sold out; while in presence of the P2P market, the retailer will hold some inventory when the unit purchasing cost is very low; fourth, the selling price of new products is increased and the selling price of second-hand products in the retailer-run resale market is decreased with the emergence of the P2P market while the refund amount is increased in most cases.     

不同市场能力下的“电商—平台—物流”在线销售系统的决策研究

近年来,随着互联网的快速发展,市场上衍生出了一些在线销售网站。考虑了一个包含电商卖家、电商平台和物流公司的在线销售系统模型,其中需求依赖于产品价格、平台和物流服务水平。研究了当物流、平台同时决策时,在线销售系统中电商卖家和平台、物流之间的不同市场能力结构问题。考虑了3种不同市场能力的分散决策模型:(1)物流-平台Stackelberg模型;(2)电商Stackelberg模型;(3)Nash模型。相关的均衡解和最优利润被得到。研究结果表明,在不同的市场能力结构下,当物流公司和平台同时决策时,即使他们的服务投入不相同,但最优收费相同。市场能力结构对在线销售成员和消费者有重要的影响。对电商而言,当市场能力较高时,会制定较低的零售价格,并获得最多的利润,同时能够提升消费者购买的积极性;当市场能力较低时,电商会制定较高的零售价格,并获得最少的利润。对平台和物流公司而言,当市场能力较高时,会制定比较高的收费,同时付出较少的努力,但并不能获得最高利润,同时会打击消费者的积极性;但是,当市场能力较低时,他们一定获得最少的利润。在Nash模型中,平台和物流公司会付出最大的努力,同时获得最大的利润,而整个在线销售系统的总利润也是最多。在物流-平台Stackelberg模型中,平台和物流公司付出的努力最少,而整个在线销售系统的总利润也最少。     

不同线上销售模式的产品定价策略研究

现售和预售是线上销售的主要模式。考虑不同模式下消费者对产品估值的差异,分析现售、预售和混合销售（同时开展现售和预售）三种模式下消费者购买决策过程,构建Stackelberg博弈和Nash均衡模型,得到三种模式的产品均衡定价及需求,并探讨开展不同销售模式对应的消费者估值差异阈值以及不同主导结构对供应链企业绩效的影响。结果表明：任意主导结构下,销售模式只会影响现售产品价格,对预售产品定价没有影响;任意销售模式下,制造商主导结构的产品定价和批发价更高,但产品销售量较低;消费者延迟收货敏感度增强使预售模式的供应链成员企业的利润降低,但混合销售模式可以有效防止由此引起的损失,且制造商主导可以同时实现供应链成员企业的利益最大化。     

Using Contingent Markdown with Reservation to Profit from Strategic Consumer Behavior

We examine a contingent price markdown (CM) mechanism with guaranteed reservation under which a retailer sells multiple units to forward‐looking consumers who arrive over time according to a Poisson process. During the early part of the selling season, each arriving consumer can either purchase a unit by paying the regular price or reserve a unit at the discount price. Reserved units can only be claimed later when the number of guaranteed reservations meets a pre‐specified threshold, or at the end of the selling season, whichever comes first. Immediately after the number of guaranteed reservations meets the pre‐specified threshold, the retailer will reduce its selling price to the discount price so that all subsequent arriving consumers can take immediate possession by paying the low price. We study the consumer purchasing behavior in equilibrium when the retailer adopts such a selling mechanism, and compare the performance of our mechanism against two benchmarks: fixed price (FP) and pre‐announced discount (PD). Through an extensive numerical analysis, we identify market conditions under which CM dominates both FP and PD in terms of the retailer's revenue and consumer's surplus. Finally, through a fluid approximation to the stochastic model, we simplify the computation of the equilibrium strategy and the optimal revenues, and verify that the key insights obtained from the stochastic model still hold.     

Group Selling,Product Durability,and Consumer Behavior

Firms producing complementary goods often strategically form groups and jointly sell their products to better coordinate their decisions. For consumer durables, decisions about such collaboration might be complicated due to two factors. Because of their durability and presence of used goods markets, such products engender “future” price competition between new and used goods. On the other hand, consumers of such products might be forward‐looking and patient, both of which affect their purchasing behavior. In this study, we study how the above product and consumer characteristics interact to affect the group selling decisions of complementary firms. We do so through a two‐period model consisting of a value chain with two upstream manufacturers and a downstream retailer. When consumers are relatively impatient and reluctant to wait to buy later, group selling by manufacturers will take place only when the end product is relatively perishable, that is, product durability is low. However, if consumers are patient, that is, willing to wait, collaboration happens only when the end product is quite durable; for relatively perishable products the manufacturers sell their products separately. We also comment on how our results are affected by factors like manufacturers directly selling to end consumers or there being multiple opportunities to decide whether or not to use group selling strategy.     

基于制造商网络渠道选择的双渠道供应链定价 与服务决策研究

本文考虑由线下零售商实体销售与制造商网络销售构成的网络直销,以及由线下零售商实体销售与线上零售商网络销售构成的网络分销两种制造商双渠道模式,研究“搭便车”行为下制造商模式选择和供应链最优定价与服务决策。研究发现:制造商的渠道选择策略与“搭便车”行为程度、消费者偏好网络渠道程度、价格敏感系数等有关。尤其当消费者受到的服务且对价格的敏感性相同时,制造商会选择网络直销双渠道模式。进一步分析消费者“搭便车”行为和网络渠道偏好对制造商渠道选择和定价决策影响发现,制造商在消费者偏好网络渠道程度比较低时应选择网络分销双渠道模式,而当消费者网络渠道偏好和“搭便车”行为程度都比较高时,制造商应选择网络直销双渠道模式。消费者网络渠道偏好或“搭便车”行为程度越大,两种模式下批发价格应设置的更低。网络直销渠道模式下“搭便车”行为程度越大,网络渠道销售价格应设置的更低,而消费者网络渠道偏好程度越大,网络渠道销售价格应设置得更高。     

基于风险规避的双渠道制造商在线推介策略研究

研究了风险规避对双渠道制造商在线推介策略的影响。首先，以零售商、制造商风险中性为基准模型考察制造商推介策略，发现当推介市场规模较小时，制造商仅推介官方商城；当推介市场规模较大时，制造商选择都推介策略。然后，分别考察零售商或制造商风险规避特性对推介策略的影响，发现当推介市场规模居中时，若市场竞争强度较小，则随着风险规避程度的增大，制造商推介策略由仅推介官方商城转变为都推介；若市场竞争强度较大，则零售商风险规避情况下推介策略由都推介转变为仅推介官方商城，但制造商风险规避情况下推介策略不变。最后，通过算例形式分析了零售商和制造商都风险规避时制造商的推介策略。     

Pre‐Orders for New To‐be‐Released Products Considering Consumer Loss Aversion

Advance selling through pre‐orders is a strategy to transfer inventory risk from a retailer to consumers. A newsvendor retailer can have three strategies to choose from: no advance selling allowed (NAS), moderate advance selling with a moderate discount for pre‐orders (MAS), and deep advance selling with a deep discount for pre‐orders (DAS). This research studies how a retailer could design an advance selling strategy to maximize her own profits. We find some interesting results. For example, there exist two thresholds for the selling season profit margin and two thresholds for consumer's expected valuation. For products with higher profit margin than the high threshold on profit margin, a retailer should always use DAS. For products with medium profit margin within the two thresholds, a retailer should adopt MAS if consumer's expected valuation is lower than the high threshold and use DAS otherwise. For products with lower profit margin than the low threshold, a retailer should use NAS, DAS, or MAS, respectively, if consumer's expected valuation is lower than the low threshold, higher than the high threshold, or between the two thresholds, respectively. Through sensitivity analyses, we also show the effects of multiple consumer characteristics on a retailer's optimal advance selling strategy.