Leadership’s Role in Process Safety: An Understanding of Behavioral Science Among Managers and Executives Is Needed

ABSTRACT

A recent prevalence of high visibility catastrophic events has garnered increased attention to process safety issues. While the use of Behavior-Based Safety interventions demonstrate a reduction in workplace injuries by targeting employee behavior, we believe that process safety requires a greater focus on the behavior of leaders (e.g., creating and executing strategy). One effective method to begin targeting leader behavior for the improvement of process safety is to teach leaders about the principles of behavior, including ways by which the science may be applied within their own organizational models.     

Psychosocial factors and safety behaviour as predictors of accidental work injuries in farming

Abstract

Farming is one of the most hazardous occupations in terms of the incidence and seriousness of accidental injuries. Research with other occupational groups has drawn attention to the role of psychosocial factors and stress. Such research needs to be extended to agriculture. Since stress may be a problem faced by farmers, there is a particular need to investigate the associations between farm accidents and work stressors and stress reactions. Using multivariate logistic regression analyses, this study aimed to uncover the best psychosocial predictors of injury, while controlling for exposure-related confounders. From a randomly selected sample of 794 farms, 10% of all farms in Ringkoebing County, Denmark, 393 farmers completed completed weekly accident registration over 12 months. The study sample consisted of 310 farmers who also completed questionnaires on psychosocial factors. Results indicated that farm stressors (including perceived economic problems), stress symptoms, and safety behaviour were predictors of occupational farm accidents. Higher levels of stressors and stress symptoms and poor safety behaviour were all associated with an elevated risk of injury. In the case of stress symptoms, the relation with accidents occurred via an interaction with safety behaviour. The combination of high levels of stress symptoms and poor safety behaviour was associated with a particularly high accident risk.     

Human and organizational factors in offshore safety

The role of human and organizational factors in predicting accidents and incidents has become of major interest to the UK offshore oil and gas industry. Some of these factors had been measured in an earlier study focusing on the role of risk perception in determining accident involvement. The current study sought to extend the methodology by focusing on perceptions of organizational factors that could have an impact on safety. A self-report questionnaire was developed and distributed to 11 installations operating on the UK Continental Shelf. A total of 722 were returned (33% response rate) from a representative sample of the offshore workforce on these installations. The study investigated the underlying structure and content of offshore employees' attitudes to safety, feelings of safety and satisfaction with safety measures. Correlations and step-wise regression analysis were used to test the relationships between measures. The results suggest that 'unsafe' behaviour is the 'best' predictor of accidents/near misses as measured by self-report data and that unsafe behaviour is, in turn, driven by perceptions of pressure for production.     

Task Analysis for Industrial Work Process from Aspects of Human Reliability and System Safety

In the design, development, and manufacturing stage of industrial products, engineers usually focus on the problems caused by hardware or software, but pay less attention to problems caused by human error, which may significantly affect system reliability and safety. Although operating procedures are strictly followed, human error still may occur occasionally. Among the influencing factors, the inappropriate design of standard operation procedure (SOP) or standard assembly procedure (SAP) is an important and latent reason for unexpected results found during human operation. To reduce the error probability and error effects of these unexpected behaviors in the industrial work process, overall evaluation of SOP or SAP quality has become an essential task. The human error criticality analysis (HECA) method was developed to identify the potentially critical problems caused by human error in the human operation system. This method performs task analysis on the basis of operation procedure. For example, SOP, analyzes the human error probability (HEP) for each human operation step, and assesses its error effects to the whole system. The results of the analysis will show the interrelationship that exists between critical human tasks, critical human error modes, and human reliability information of the human operation system. To identify the robustness of the model, a case study of initiator assembly tasks was conducted. Results show that the HECA method is practicable in evaluating the operation procedure, and the information is valuable in identifying the means to upgrade human reliability and system safety for human tasks.     

Fishermens blues: Factors related to accidents and safety among Newfoundland fishermen

Abstract

The fisheries is one of the most dangerous industries in Canada. Possible contributory causes of the high rate of injuries are a fatalistic attitude to accidents and safety, and a high level of anxiety and worry among fishermen. These characteristics would be expected to lead to less attention to safety procedures and a consequent greater risk of accidents. The purpose of this study was to explore fishermen's levels of fatalism and anxiety; to consider the relationship of these factors to the frequency of accidents and extent of safety precautions; and to explore fishermen's explanations of and suggested solutions to the high rate of injuries at sea. The study was conducted among a sample of inshore fishermen who fished in the waters around Newfoundland. Fifty-five fishermen completed a questionnaire that requested basic demographic details, information on injuries obtained, safety precautions taken, perceived locus of control over accidents, anxiety, worries and explanations for accidents and possible measures to reduce them. Analysis of their replies revealed that the fishermen reported a high level of anxiety and that those who reported most anxiety reported more injuries and fewer safety precautions.     

Risk Management and Decision Rules for Light Water Reactors

A quantitative approach to risk management for accidents in light water nuclear power reactors is proposed to serve as one focus for discussion. In this proposal risk management is divided into two major tasks: the predominantly social and political task of setting the safety goals and the technical task of estimating the risks and deciding whether the safety goals have been met. The proposed safety goals include limits on the following: risk to the individual of early death or delayed cancer death; overall societal risk of early or delayed death; and the frequency of core melt accidents as well as the frequency of containment failure, given a core melt. Also included are a small element of risk aversion and an "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA) approach with a cost-effectviness criterion which includes both economic and health effects.     

Safety climate and safety outcomes: A meta-analytic comparison of universal vs. industry-specific safety climate predictive validity

Previous research has demonstrated that safety climate is a robust predictor of safety-related outcomes. However, there is little consensus about the optimal strategy to measure safety climate. One of the main issues has been whether safety climate measures should be universal or industry-specific. As such, this study was designed to examine the criterion-related validity of universal and industry-specific safety climate measures by conducting a meta-analytic comparison of their relationships with a variety of safety-related outcomes (i.e. safety behaviour, risk perceptions, accidents and injuries, and other adverse events). With 120 independent samples (N?=?81,213), we found that the industry-specific safety climate measures displayed better predictive power when predicting safety behaviour and risk perceptions than the universal safety climate measures. On the other hand, the universal safety climate measures displayed better predictive power when predicting other adverse events (but not accidents and injuries) than the industry-specific safety climate measures. We discuss these findings in light of the intended use of organisational safety climate surveys.     

Safety Does Not Happen by Accident: Antecedents To A Safer Warehouse

On a daily basis, thousands of employees suffer from severe occupational accidents worldwide. These accidents not only lead to negative consequences for the physical and mental health of employees, but also to high costs for companies and the society as a whole. A large share of these accidents take place in warehouses. Prior research has demonstrated the critical role of leadership, and especially safety‐specific transformational leadership (SSTL), in reducing warehouse accidents. Yet several important questions concerning SSTL remain: What effects does SSTL have on outcomes other than safety, and what determines whether leaders display SSTL behaviors? To answer these questions, this research studies the relationship between SSTL of warehouse managers and not only occupational accidents, but also quality and productivity. Moreover, it investigates the managers who are most likely to display SSTL. Data from 87 warehouse managers and 1233 employees were used to test the conceptual model. The results suggest that the dispositional prevention focus of the manager (one of two possible motivational strategies that people deploy) positively relates to SSTL, and that SSTL negatively relates to occupational accidents. Furthermore, SSTL and its identified negative relationship with occupational accidents does not appear to have detrimental impact on productivity or quality. These results extend existing models of SSTL and safety, and can help companies to reduce the number of accidents and the associated costs by selecting and developing safety‐specific transformational leaders.     

Causes of accidents and the time of day

Abstract

The relationship between accidents and the time of day is not entirely clear. Although there is considerable evidence that performance is poorest in the early morning hours compared to at all other times, the degree to which this is translated into accidents is not understood. In this study work-related fatal accidents were analysed to determine whether the causes of these accidents vary with time. The analysis used a classification and coding system devised to describe the wider circumstances of the causes of fatalities. In terms of absolute numbers, fatalities were most common in the late morning or early afternoon. When these results were expressed in terms of the estimated number of workers at work, the proportion of fatal accidents occurring at night was more than double that occurring during the day. Behavioural factors were the most common cause of fatalities at all times, but most common in the early hours of the morning. Further analysis of the nature of the behavioural involvement showed that errors in automatic processing (skill-based errors) were the most common types of error and did not vary much with time of day. Rule-based errors were most common during the day whereas knowledge-based errors occurred mainly in the afternoon and night shifts. These results cast some doubt on the assumption that there is a direct relationship between the previously observed variations in performance across time and the ultimate safety outcome.     

Participatory analysis of accidents and incidents as a tool for increasing safety behaviour in fishermen. A pilot intervention study

Abstract

Although occupational accidents are common in fishery, safety work is often not given priority by the fishermen. The aims of this study were to test a group-based intervention for increased activity in safety work through group discussion of accident/incident experience; to study occurred incidents/accidents and how such events were managed; and to study intervention effects on activity in safety work, risk acceptance and perceived manageability of risks. A sample of men from five crews (11 men) of Swedish fishermen participated. The study had a one group pre-test–post-test design for questionnaire data. The emphasis was on qualitative information collected during the intervention and interviews. The results indicated that accident causes could be appraised as being unmanageable even when technical solutions were possible. Psychological factors may cause incidents not to be documented or discussed. Incident experience seldom leads to preventive measures. Interaction between structural, social and psychological factors seemed to explain this. Questionnaires, observations and interview data suggested that some increase in safety work took place during the intervention. After the discussions the participants perceived risks to be less manageable. The study indicated that, although sensitive to dropout, participative safety interventions in fishery are feasible and may be effective. A longer or more intensive intervention may be necessary in order to progress from problem orientation to action orientation.     

Human Factors Analysis for Maritime Accidents Based on a Dynamic Fuzzy Bayesian Network

Human factors are widely regarded to be highly contributing factors to maritime accident prevention system failures. The conventional methods for human factor assessment, especially quantitative techniques, such as fault trees and bow-ties, are static and cannot deal with models with uncertainty, which limits their application to human factors risk analysis. To alleviate these drawbacks, in the present study, a new human factor analysis framework called multidimensional analysis model of accident causes (MAMAC) is introduced. MAMAC combines the human factors analysis and classification system and business process management. In addition, intuitionistic fuzzy set theory and Bayesian Network are integrated into MAMAC to form a comprehensive dynamic human factors analysis model characterized by flexibility and uncertainty handling. The proposed model is tested on maritime accident scenarios from a sand carrier accident database in China to investigate the human factors involved, and the top 10 most highly contributing primary events associated with the human factors leading to sand carrier accidents are identified. According to the results of this study, direct human factors, classified as unsafe acts, are not a focus for maritime investigators and scholars. Meanwhile, unsafe preconditions and unsafe supervision are listed as the top two considerations for human factors analysis, especially for supervision failures of shipping companies and ship owners. Moreover, potential safety countermeasures for the most highly contributing human factors are proposed in this article. Finally, an application of the proposed model verifies its advantages in calculating the failure probability of accidents induced by human factors.     

AGAPE-ET: A Methodology for Human Error Analysis of Emergency Tasks

This article introduces a human error analysis or human reliability analysis methodology, AGAPE-ET (A Guidance And Procedure for Human Error Analysis for Emergency Tasks), for analyzing emergency tasks in nuclear power plants. The AGAPE-ET method is based on a simplified cognitive model and a set of performance-influencing factors (PIFs). At each cognitive function, error-causing factors (ECF) or error-likely situations have been identified considering the characteristics of the performance of each cognitive function and the influencing mechanism of the PIFs on the cognitive function. Then, a human error analysis procedure based on the error analysis factors is organized to cue or guide the analyst in conducting the human error analysis. The method can be characterized by the structured identification of weak points of the task required to be performed and by the efficient analysis process such that the analyst has only to carry out the analysis with the necessary cognitive functions. Through the application, AGAPE-ET showed its usefulness, which effectively identifies the vulnerabilities with respect to cognitive performance as well as task execution, and that helps the analyst directly draw specific error reduction measures through the analysis.     

Managing the Fukushima Challenge

The Fukushima Daiichi accident raises a fundamental question: Can science and technology prevent the inevitability of serious accidents, especially those with low probabilities and high consequences? This question reminds us of a longstanding challenge with the trans‐sciences, originally addressed by Alvin Weinberg well before the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents. This article, revisiting Weinberg's issue, aims at gaining insights from the accident with a special emphasis on the sociotechnical or human behavioral aspects lying behind the accident's causes. In particular, an innovative method for managing the challenge is explored referring to behavioral science approaches to a decision‐making process on risk management; such as managing human behavioral risks with information asymmetry, seeking a rational consensus with communicative action, and pursuing procedural rationality through interactions with the outer environment. In short, this article describes the emerging need for Japan to transform its national safety management institutions so that these might be based on interactive communication with parties inside and outside Japan.     

Effects of Process and Human Performance Improvement Strategies

Abstract

Organizational performance is a function of many variables, two of which are work process factors and human performance factors. Our study compared the effects of changing a work process versus human performance improvement techniques and the combined effects of combing both techniques. A 2 (manual vs. electronic process) X 2 (with vs. without behavioral intervention) between-subjects design with stratified random assignment was employed. Forty-eight participants performed a word processing task where their minutes-in-possession and error rate were recorded. Results revealed a main effect for process type and a main effect for behavioral intervention. The largest effects were observed with the context of a combined intervention. The implications of using a combined approach and topics for future researchers are discussed.     

Psychosocial factors and safety behaviour as predictors of accidental work injuries in farming

Farming is one of the most hazardous occupations in terms of the incidence and seriousness of accidental injuries. Research with other occupational groups has drawn attention to the role of psychosocial factors and stress. Such research needs to be extended to agriculture. Since stress may be a problem faced by farmers, there is a particular need to investigate the associations between farm accidents and work stressors and stress reactions. Using multivariate logistic regression analyses, this study aimed to uncover the best psychosocial predictors of injury, while controlling for exposure-related confounders. From a randomly selected sample of 794 farms, 10% of all farms in Ringkoebing County, Denmark, 393 farmers completed completed weekly accident registration over 12 months. The study sample consisted of 310 farmers who also completed questionnaires on psychosocial factors. Results indicated that farm stressors (including perceived economic problems), stress symptoms, and safety behaviour were predictors of occupational farm accidents. Higher levels of stressors and stress symptoms and poor safety behaviour were all associated with an elevated risk of injury. In the case of stress symptoms, the relation with accidents occurred via an interaction with safety behaviour. The combination of high levels of stress symptoms and poor safety behaviour was associated with a particularly high accident risk.     

Experimental Evidence Against the Paradigm of Mortality Risk Aversion

This article deals with the question of how societal impacts of fatal accidents can be integrated into the management of natural or man‐made hazards. Today, many governmental agencies give additional weight to the number of potential fatalities in their risk assessments to reflect society's aversion to large accidents. Although mortality risk aversion has been proposed in numerous risk management guidelines, there has been no evidence that lay people want public decisionmakers to overweight infrequent accidents of large societal consequences against more frequent ones of smaller societal consequences. Furthermore, it is not known whether public decisionmakers actually do such overweighting when they decide upon the mitigation of natural or technical hazards. In this article, we report on two experimental tasks that required participants to evaluate negative prospects involving 1–100 potential fatalities. Our results show that neither lay people nor hazard experts exhibit risk‐averse behavior in decisions on mortality risks.     

Measuring impact of Lean implementation on construction safety performance: a structural equation model

Abstract

The construction industry is a risky endeavour. Therefore, it is essential to develop significant safety measures for lowering risks and ensuring safety during projects. However, current safety applications are yet to be developed given the increasing number of workplace accidents. Among these, Lean applications have the potential to improve safety standards and enhance safety performance. Within this context, this study develops components for Lean implementation and construction safety performance, and it presents a conceptual framework to study the relationship between them. A questionnaire was designed and given to Lean practitioners to quantify the impact of the components. Structural Equation Modelling was used to analyse the framework and validate the relationship between Lean implementation and safety performance. The results of the study indicate that there is a significant relationship between Lean implementation and safety performance. The findings also imply that firms that perform well in implementing Lean practices achieve better safety performance. The primary contribution of this research is to prove that Lean practices are closely related to safety performance, with the aim of encouraging construction practitioners to work in a safer environment by using well-established Lean practices. Moreover, the study aims to expand the use of Lean practices to achieve better safety performance by revealing the strong ties between safety and Lean. Finally, this study can guide construction practitioners to adopt Lean techniques and apply them in their projects to enhance safety performance.     

A Game‐Theoretical Model to Improve Process Plant Protection from Terrorist Attacks

The New York City 9/11 terrorist attacks urged people from academia as well as from industry to pay more attention to operational security research. The required focus in this type of research is human intention. Unlike safety‐related accidents, security‐related accidents have a deliberate nature, and one has to face intelligent adversaries with characteristics that traditional probabilistic risk assessment techniques are not capable of dealing with. In recent years, the mathematical tool of game theory, being capable to handle intelligent players, has been used in a variety of ways in terrorism risk assessment. In this article, we analyze the general intrusion detection system in process plants, and propose a game‐theoretical model for security management in such plants. Players in our model are assumed to be rational and they play the game with complete information. Both the pure strategy and the mixed strategy solutions are explored and explained. We illustrate our model by an illustrative case, and find that in our case, no pure strategy but, instead, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists.     

Complacency in Process Safety: A Behavior Analysis Toward Prevention Strategies

ABSTRACT

Complacency inhibits safe behaviors of workers and managers. This is of concern to industries where process safety is needed to reduce the chance of catastrophic events such as fires and explosions. A behavioral definition of complacency is offered as trending behavioral variation that eventually exceeds safety boundaries. Behavioral processes that contribute to these patterns of variability are discussed and analyzed, including habituation, extinction, unprogrammed reinforcement, the avoidance paradox, rule-governed behavior, and competing contingencies of production. Solution strategies are suggested that address this analysis of behavioral variance, including pinpointing behavioral variation related to safety, changing training design, strengthening positive reinforcement for process-related behaviors of workers and management, reducing sources of unprogrammed reinforcement for dangerous variation, strengthening rule-governed behavior, and changing contingencies for managers and executives whose decisions affect behavior and process safety at many levels in the company.     

Human and organizational factors in offshore safety

The role of human and organizational factors in predicting accidents and incidents has become of major interest to the UK offshore oil and gas industry. Some of these factors had been measured in an earlier study focusing on the role of risk perception in determining accident involvement. The current study sought to extend the methodology by focusing on perceptions of organizational factors that could have an impact on safety. A self-report questionnaire was developed and distributed to 11 installations operating on the UK Continental Shelf. A total of 722 were returned (33% response rate) from a representative sample of the offshore workforce on these installations. The study investigated the underlying structure and content of offshore employees' attitudes to safety, feelings of safety and satisfaction with safety measures. Correlations and step-wise regression analysis were used to test the relationships between measures. The results suggest that 'unsafe' behaviour is the 'best' predictor of accidents/near misses as measured by self-report data and that unsafe behaviour is, in turn, driven by perceptions of pressure for production.