Financial Reporting,Private Disclosure and the Corporate Governance Role of Financial Institutions

This paper explores how large UK financial institutions (FIs) pursued a private corporate governance agenda with their portfolio companies. It also investigates the role of financial reporting in private and public corporate governance. The case financial institutions argued that the limited quality of public information, especially in financial reports, was a major constraint on their ability to act in fund management and corporate governance roles. However, the financial reporting cycle determined a private institutional and company meeting cycle and this created opportunities for private information collection and for governance influence by FIs. In addition, the perceived limitations of public governance mechanisms such as voting encouraged private governance approaches. As a result, the case financial institutions had the incentive and the means to improve the quality of their sources of corporate information and to obtain a competitive edge over other financial institutions and the market through their direct contact with companies. Despite the limitations of public information, the paper reveals how public disclosure in financial statements and the financial reporting cycle played a central role in corporate governance. Public sources of information were combined with private sources to create a financial institutional knowledge advantage. The institutions used this knowledge to diagnose problem areas in strategy, management quality, and the effectiveness of the board, and their impact on financial performance. The financial reporting cycle meant that the quasi insider financial institution had the access opportunity and the joint public/private insight to influence companies across a wide corporate governance agenda and in a range of corporate circumstances. The case institutions exploited these private access and knowledge advantages for investment purposes and for Cadbury style corporate governance purposes. Thus, the private governance process was critically dependent on the FI knowledge advantage, which in turn relied on both financial reports and private disclosure. This wide ranging governance behaviour by institutions corresponds to recommendations subsequently made by the Hampel report in 1998 concerning UK corporate governance. The paper ends by exploring how the private institutional and company meeting agenda can suggest new directions for financial reporting and public disclosure and how this can further improve public and private corporate governance.     

多元化战略、高管持股分布设计与公司治理

多元化战略实施过程中高管持股作为一种长期激励机制其设计是否合理将直接影响企业战略收益的实现,在文献回顾的基础上分析高管持股利益趋同效应对多元化战略成功实施的积极意义以及公司治理强弱对高管持股效应的影响.对沪深两市2005年674家上市公司的数据进行实证分析,结果表明提高高管持股激励强度能有效改善多元化战略的实施效果,但高管持股分布设计差异影响利益趋同效应的发挥.公司治理作为企业战略实施的保障机制,可以有效地避免高管持股的壕沟防御效应.企业应该从高管持股分布设计和公司治理等多个维度同步建设入手,为多元化战略的成功实施创造条件.     

上市公司治理因素与财务困境关系的实证研究

对中国上市公司治理因素与财务困境的关系进行了实证研究。以1998~2005年被ST(special treatm ent)的公司及其配对样本共计528家作为研究样本,通过使用二元Log istic回归分析方法,发现大股东持股比例、H-10股权集中指数、股权制衡度、国家股比例、最终控制人类型、独立董事持股比例以及审计意见与公司发生财务困境的可能性显著负相关,管理者代理成本显著提高了公司陷入财务困境的危险性。而高管持股比例、董事会规模以及CEO的双职合一对困境发生的概率无显著影响。     

When Financial Intermediaries are Corporate Owners: An Agency Model of Institutional Ownership

Increasingly, the equity investments of individual investors are being channeled through financial institutions. This article posits that the role of institutional owners as financial intermediaries, and the resulting complexity that institutions bring to ownership, distinguish institutional ownership from individual ownership. I develop a model of institutional ownership, referred to as the nexus agency model (NAM), which reflects this complexity. The model provides a framework for identifying the potential additional agency costs to beneficial owners that are associated with owning via financial institutions. The degree to which owning via institutions benefits individual owners depends on the adequacy of the legal and regulatory environment and governance mechanisms in protecting individual owners' interests. The applicability of the nexus model to different institutional owner types is then demonstrated in a discussion of U.S. public and private pension plans and mutual funds, leading to the generation of a NAM-based research agenda for each type and across the types. The article ends with discussion of the model's applicability to non-U.S. institutional environments.     

Corporate Management,Industry Competition and the Sustainability of Firm Abnormal Profitability

This paper models the sustainability of firmabnormal profitability and uses theeffectiveness of corporate managementcapabilities as a test to examine its impact onthe sustainability of firm abnormalprofitability. The role of industry competitionas a moderator between the effectiveness ofcorporate management capabilities and thesustainability of firm abnormal profitabilityis also examined. Consistent with theresource-based view of the firm, we found thatthe effectiveness of corporate managementcapabilities positively influence thesustainability of firm abnormal profitability.This implies that corporate managementcapabilities are important contributors to theentire bundle of firm-specific resources andcapabilities which enable some firms togenerate competitive advantages that aresustainable. The effectiveness of corporatemanagement capabilities has a larger influenceon the sustainability of firm abnormalprofitability for firms in lowly competitive ormonopolistic industries than firms in highlycompetitive industries. The findings supportthe notion that not only do firm capabilitiesyield sustainable competitive advantages andabnormal profitability, but also industrycompetition reinforces the impact of firmcapabilities in yielding sustainable abnormalprofitability.     

管理者代理行为、公司过度投资与公司治理——基于企业生命周期视角的实证研究

通过建立企业生命周期新的划分指标,从企业发展的动态层面研究管理者代理行为与公司过度投资之间关系随企业生命周期的演变,并检验公司治理机制随企业生命周期的治理效果。结果表明,我国上市公司管理者代理行为随企业生命周期动态变化,其对公司过度投资的影响随企业生命周期发展不断减弱。不同公司治理机制的治理效果随企业生命周期也发生变化,其中董事长总经理兼任在成长阶段能够有效抑制公司过度投资,而独立董事在成熟阶段及大股东在衰退阶段均显著没有发挥应有的监督作用。成长阶段中的公司监事会能够对代理行为引致的过度投资起到显著的监督作用,而董事长总经理兼任则显著加剧代理行为引致的过度投资,成长阶段中管理层持股、成熟阶段中独立董事与外部机构持股以及衰退阶段中大股东均显著没有起到应有的治理作用。     

上市公司股权结构、多元化经营与公司绩效问题研究

公司股权结构与多元化经营是理论界颇具争议的问题.研究表明,公司多元化经营虽可获得显著收益但也会产生显著成本,这些成本可能会随着多元化程度提高而侵蚀公司利益,进而影响到公司绩效.结合代理成本假设,利用复回归模型探讨股权结构对多元化程度的影响以及多元化对公司绩效的影响.     

民营企业治理转型、政治联系与公司业绩

基于系统理论,从治理结构视角构建以实际控制人、董事长、CEO、监事会主席为核心的政治联系指数,以2003年～2007年持续经营的234家中国民营上市公司为样本,采用回归分析方法,检验治理转型视角下民营企业的政治联系程度对公司业绩的影响.研究结果表明,对总样本而言,民营企业的政治联系指数逐年降低,验证了治理转型的观点;公司规模越大、第一大股东持股比例越高,政治联系程度越强,政治联系指数与资本负债率、长期负债率正相关;具有政治联系的民营企业,政治联系指数越高其财务业绩、市场业绩、资产周转率越差,高政治联系公司的政治联系指数与长期投资比率正相关.民营企业的政治联系既有优惠的融资收益,又面临公司业绩下降的风险,在政治联系对民营企业业绩双重影响的背景下,建议民营企业实现政治联系合规,推进公司治理转型.     

基于随机效应logistic模型的中小企业财务失败预警研究

logistic模型是研究企业财务失败和信用违约的主流方法,但它不能很好地控制模型之外的因素对违约事件的影响。针对这一问题,本文引入截面数据的随机效应logistic模型,并对2005-2010年我国沪深两市中小上市企业的财务失败风险进行实证检验。结果表明,随机效应logistic模型相比logistic模型具有更高的样本内判别效果和样本外预测效果,而且在财务指标基础上加入公司治理指标能进一步提升模型的预警能力。研究结论对中小企业信用风险评估等具有一定的参考价值。     

Operational Productivity,Corporate Social Performance,Financial Performance,and Risk in Manufacturing Firms

We examine the relationship between Operational Productivity (OP), Corporate Social Performance (CSP), Financial Performance (FP), and risk. Our sample frame comprises 476 firms in nine US manufacturing industries during the period 1999–2009. We employ DEA‐based measures for OP and CSP, two operationalizations for FP to reflect current profitability and market value, and two operationalizations for risk to reflect bankruptcy risk and stock price volatility. We confirm that OP is essential for good financial performance and reduced risk (as expected), but the main effects of CSP are mixed. Importantly, we find that OP moderates the CSP–FP and CSP–risk relationships. Specifically, if OP is poor, CSP is of limited benefit to FP or risk. However, at or above a threshold level of OP, firms can use CSP to build upon it to yield further improvements in FP and reductions in risk. We discuss the implications of our findings for theory and practice.     

融资结构与企业投资：理论分析及经验证据

本文首先从理论上剖析了负债的代理成本和相机治理机制.然后,以我国上市公司数据为样本,分别利用OLS的混合数据回归、GLS的随机效应和固定效应模型检验了融资结构与企业投资规模之间的关系.实证结果支持了负债代理成本假说,却未发现负债治理机制有效的证据.     

终极控制股东两权偏离、替代效应与公司价值

基于2004～2006年中国上市公司截面数据,在实证检验不同治理机制间替代效应的基础上,系统分析了终极控制、公司治理与企业价值间的互动关系,验证了公司治理的中介效应。结果显示:1.董事会治理与其它治理机制间存在显著的替代效应。第一大股东持股比例的增加会强化董事会治理与股权制衡度、监事会治理之间的替代效应,而会弱化董事会治理与管理层激励、信息披露之间的替代效应;2.终极控制股东两权偏离对公司价值具有显著的负面效应;3.公司治理对公司价值具有显著的正向效应,其在终极控制对公司价值的作用机制中具有显著的中介效应,中介效应占总效应的比例超过50%。基于实证分析结果,最后为优化中国终极控制型公司治理提出了相应的政策建议。     

基于财务绩效视角的企业从事慈善活动研究

依据利益相关者理论和权变管理思想,深入考察企业捐赠行为对财务绩效的影响机制,并利用2007 ～ 2012年我国沪深两市A股上市公司的数据进行检验.研究表明,慈善捐赠通过改善利益相关者关系能够显著提升企业的财务绩效,由于企业在发展阶段和可见性方面的差异导致企业处理利益相关者关系的能力和机会不同,从而决定了企业从慈善捐赠中获益程度的大小,在成熟企业和高可见性企业中,慈善捐赠对财务绩效的正面影响更强.     

企业社会责任信息披露、媒体关注度与企业财务绩效关系研究

基于我国A股上市公司发布的企业社会责任报告,在探究中国情境下企业社会责任信息披露、媒体关注度与企业财务绩效的相互关系后,发现企业社会责任信息披露与企业财务绩效之间存在相互制约和相互促进的关系。此外,验证了媒体关注度在社会责任信息披露和企业财务绩效的交互关系中存在中介效应。     

Governance Structures,Multidimensional Efficiency and Firm Profitability

Using a panel data set of 361 German corporations for the period 1991–1996 we test the hypothesis that firms with more efficient governance structures have higher profitability. To determine efficiency we compare firms with respect to ownership concentration, the identity of owners, capital structure, investment and firm growth by a multi-input/multi-output Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). This non-parametric linear programming technique considers both multiple in- and out- puts. Based on the concept of pareto efficiency, it computes an efficiency score where the associated weights of the inputs and outputs are determined endogenously. The DEA efficiency scores are then used as explanatory variables in panel data regressions of profitability. Our main finding is that the efficiency scores indeed contribute significantly to explaining profitability differences between firms, even after controlling for industry effects and unobserved systematic firm effects.     

Ownership Structure,Corporate Value and Firm Investment: A Simultaneous Equations Analysis of Spanish Companies

This paper is concerned with the set of mutualrelationships between firm valuation andinvestment, and with the possible endogeneityof ownership structure. In order to deal withthem properly, we aim to test the mutual impactof investment, corporate value and ownership bybroadening the usual framework with asimultaneous equations approach. Using a sampleof 140 Spanish listed companies for the1991–1997 period, we have found that,consistent with previous research, thealignment and entrenchment hypotheses seem tobe confirmed by the estimation of aone-equation model. However, when analyzed bymeans of a system of simultaneous equations inwhich a set of mutual relationships isintroduced, quite different results wereobtained. Although valuation and investment offirms are determined by managerial ownership,we have found that ownership structure may alsobe influenced both by investment and value.Consequently, it is not completely right toinfer that ownership structure determines firmvalue unidirectionally; however the benchmarkshould be broadened so as to take an explicitaccount of the mutual links between firm value,investment and ownership.     

公司治理的政府介入结构分析

针对当前我国股份公司治理机制的现状,本文构造了一个相应的模型,应用博弈论方法证明,政府过度介入公司治理将严重影响公司运行效率,认为国有资产应当尽快退出产业部门,以此消除国有企业改革的产权障碍,并且指出这应是当前最为急迫的一项任务。     

私营企业的企业家背景、多元化战略与企业业绩

本文运用"高阶理论"考察了私营企业的企业家背景、多元化战略选择以及企业业绩之间的关系.研究发现,与低学历的、年长的、创业前没有"企业负责人"经历的企业家相比,高学历的、年轻的以及创业之前曾担任过"企业负责人"的企业家更倾向于选择多元化战略.研究也发现,高学历、低年龄、"企业负责人"经历与高的销售额、资产额、资产增长率和净资产增长率正相关;多元化战略能够带来更大的资产规模、更高的资产增长率和净资产增长率,但对利润率没有显著的影响.同时,企业家的背景与多元化战略的交互作用同样影响着企业的业绩.创业前有过"企业负责人"经历的企业家采用多元化战略可以带来更好的业绩,而没有这种经历的企业家则会收到负面的效果.有意思的是,高学历和低学历的企业家采用多元化战略都提高了企业的销售额、资产额和净资产增长率,而中等学历的企业家采取多元化战略则带来了相反的效果.本文最后对该现象的可能原因进行了探讨.     

多元化、公司业绩与总经理变更

总经理变更是公司内部治理的重要手段,其业绩敏感性受到多种因素的影响,以2002年～2007年沪深两市702家A股上市公司的数据为样本,探讨多元化经营对总经理变更绩效敏感性及其业绩改进效应的影响,为公司经营模式对公司治理效率的影响提供经验证据,利用传统的Logistic回归、边际效应分析以及面板数据随机效应回归对多元化和总经理变更的关系进行研究。实证结果表明,多元化降低了总经理变更的业绩敏感性,多元化公司总经理变更的概率与资产收益率代表的多元化公司业绩变化没有显著的关系,即使在公司业绩下降的条件下,股东替换总经理的动机也弱于集中化公司;多元化公司总经理变更后的资产重组行为规模显著弱于集中化公司,带来的业绩改进也小于集中化公司。