Self-Solicited Feedback: Effects of Hourly Pay and Individual Monetary Incentive Pay

The frequency of feedback solicitation under hourly pay and individual monetary incentive pay conditions was examined. A between-subjects design was used with 30 college students in the two groups. Participants attended three experimental sessions and entered the cash value of simulated bank checks presented on a computer screen. Performance was higher for individuals who were paid incentives; however, participants who were paid incentives did not self-solicit feedback more than those who were paid hourly. Rather, participants in both groups solicited feedback quite frequently. Additionally, performance was not related to feedback solicitation. These results suggest that the incentives did not make feedback more reinforcing even though the incentives were functional rewards and the feedback was correlated with the amount of pay earned: the better the feedback, the more pay participants earned. The results also support the position that it may be necessary to pair objective feedback with an evaluative component to enhance performance.     

A Supervisory System for Accomplishing Long-Range Projects

This article describes a supervisory system designed to help people maintain a steady rate of work, toward the accomplishment of long-range goals. The main features of the system are: (a) written task specification, b) weekly subgoals or deadlines, (c) weekly monitoring, (d) weekly feedback, and (e) added incentives. We applied this system to the supervision of MA thesis research, using a BAB reversal design, to investigate the effects of an incentive system consisting of performance-based points toward a letter of recommendation combined with weekly feedback. This incentive system produced a high and steady rate of completion of the weekly research tasks when it was present, while the rate of completion was considerably lower during the baseline phase, when the incentive system was absent. Twelve of the 15 individual subjects and five of the seven research tasks showed these results. In a subjective evaluation, the participants approved of this type of supervising system. This system may be applicable to the supervision of many long-term projects.     

A Comparison of the Effects of a Linear and an Exponential Performance Pay Function on Work Productivity

This study examined how work productivity was affected by the way in which individual monetary incentives were related to performance. Two types of relationships, or performance pay functions, were compared: a linear function in which a specific per piece incentive was provided for each piece completed in excess of a performance standard and an exponential function in which the amount of the per piece incentive accelerated as productivity increased. Forty college subjects were randomly assigned to one of the two pay conditions. Each subject participated in 15 forty-five minute sessions. Subjects performed a computerized work task that simulated the job of a proof operator at a bank, entering the cash values of simulated bank checks using a computer keyboard. The dependent variable was the number of correctly complcted checks. Productivity was comparable for subjects exposed to the linear and exponential performance pay functions, even though subjects exposed to the exponential function earned significantly more money than the subjects exposed to the linear function. The results suggest that, within certain parameters that have yet to be determined, differences in the way in which monetary incentives are related to performance may not differentially affect performance.     

The Relative Effects of Different Frequencies of Feedback on Work Performance

Abstract

This laboratory simulation examined the relative effects of two frequencies of feedback on work performance under hourly pay and incentive pay. The study had four experimental conditions: feedback delivered after every session under hourly pay and under incentive pay, and feedback delivered after every fourth session under hourly pay and under incentive pay. Thirty-five college students were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. Each participant attended 24 thirty-minute sessions. Participants performed a simulated work task on the computer that consisted of computer-related activities such as dragging, clicking, and typing. The dependent variable was the number of correctly completed units of work. An analysis of covariance was conducted to analyze the data using pretest scores as a covariate. Participants who received feedback every session completed significantly more work units than participants who received feedback every fourth session. In addition, an interaction between feedback frequency and pay systems was found: Feedback delivered every session was more effective than feedback delivered every fourth session under the incentive pay system, but not under the hourly pay system. The results suggest that the relative effects of feedback frequency may depend upon the extent to which feedback is correlated with differential consequences for performance.     

Work Productivity as a Function of the Percentage of Monetary Incentives to Base Pay

In many individual monetary incentive systems workers receive an hourly base pay and can earn incentives when productivity exceeds a specified standard. The total amount that can be earned in incentives is often expressed as a percentage of base pay. This study examined the effects of different percentages of incentive pay to base pay on work productivity. Seventy-five college students were randomly assigned to one of five incentivebase pay conditions: 0% (no incentives), l0%, 30%. 60% or 100%. Subjects participated in 15 forty-five minute sessions during which they assem: bled parts made from bolts, nuts and washers. Subjects received a base pay amount for assembling a minimum of 50 quality parts per session and a per piece incentive for parts over 50. If subjects assernbled 120 quality parts, the production maximum, the total amount they could earn in incentives equaled 0%, l0%, 30%, 60% or 100% of their base pay. Results indicated that the productivity of subjects in the l0%, 30%, 60% and 100% groups was significantly greater than that of subjects in the 0% incentive group; however, the productivity of subjects in the l0%, 30%, 60% and 100% incentive groups did not differ.     

The Interaction Effects of Frequency and Specificity of Feedback on Work Performance

ABSTRACT

This study investigated the interaction effect between specificity (specific vs. global) and frequency of feedback (frequent vs. infrequent) on the quality of work performance. Eighty participants were recruited and randomly assigned to one of the four groups: specific and frequent feedback, global and frequent feedback, specific and infrequent feedback, and global and infrequent feedback. A 2 × 2 factorial design was adopted. Participants were asked to work on a simulated order-fulfilling task and attended 24 sessions. The dependent variable was the error rate of the completed tasks. The results showed that more frequent feedback was more effective and specific feedback was more effective than global feedback in improving the quality of performance. Furthermore, an interactive effect between feedback frequency and specificity was found. Specific feedback was more effective than global feedback when the feedback was infrequent, but global feedback was comparable to specific feedback when it was frequent.     

Using Public Feedback and Competitive Rewards to Increase the Safe Driving of Pizza Deliverers

Abstract

This study investigated the effects of a safe driving competition facilitated by publicly-posted individual feedback. The turn-signal use, safety-belt use, and complete intersection stopping of 82 pizza deliverers were observed at two experimental and three control stores, as well as among the civilian population. After baseline observations, pizza deliverers received posted weekly individual feedback on their turn-signal use (at Store A) or complete intersection stops (at Store B). The deliverers' safe driving scores were posted individually on a vertical scale along with their names. Each week the deliverer with the highest average performance was rewarded with a free vehicle-maintenance coupon. Turn-signal use among drivers at Store A (n= 24) increased 22 percentage points from baseline to the intervention phase which was maintained into the withdrawal phase. Complete intersection stopping among drivers at Store B (n= 21) increased 17 percentage points from baseline to the intervention phase and was maintained into the withdrawal phase. Although the winners of the weekly competitions had the greatest increase in performance, non-winners also increased their instances of safe driving during the competition.     

A Comparison of the Effects of Incentive and Penalty Procedures on Work Performance: A Simulation

This study compared the effects of incentive and penalty on work performance. In Experiment 1, participants in the incentive group could earn 50 won (approximately 5 cents) for correctly completing each task and those in the penalty group could lose 50 won for incorrectly completing each task. The incentive and penalty did not exert differential impacts on work performance. In Experiment 2, participants were randomly assigned to one of six experimental groups: incentive, penalty, and no reward groups under two different consequence delivery schedules. Under the continuous condition, the payment was determined in the same way as in Experiment 1. Under the VR 5 condition, 250 won was either added or deducted based on a VR 5 schedule. The effects of the incentive and penalty were comparable under the continuous condition. However, the incentive was more effective than the penalty under the VR 5 condition.     

Evaluating Preference for Graphic Feedback on Correct Versus Incorrect Performance

The current study evaluated preferences of undergraduate students for graphic feedback on percentage of incorrect performance versus feedback on percentage of correct performance. A total of 108 participants were enrolled in the study and received graphic feedback on performance on 12 online quizzes. One half of participants received graphic feedback on percentage of correct performance on the first four online quizzes and then received feedback on percentage of incorrect performance on the following four quizzes. The order was reversed for the other half of participants. Participants were then asked whether their feedback on the final four quizzes should depict percentage of correct or incorrect performance. Participants who completed the study overwhelmingly preferred feedback on correct performance. The type of feedback students received for the first four quizzes did not affect subsequent quiz performance, and feedback preference was not related to performance on quizzes.     

The Effects of Social Comparison and Objective Feedback on Work Performance Across Different Performance Levels

This study investigated the interaction effects of feedback content type (social comparison feedback vs. objective feedback) and two different performance levels (high vs. low) on work performance. One hundred fifty participants were recruited and asked to perform a simulated work task in a preliminary session. Based on their performance, the upper 40% (high performance) and lower 40% (low performance) groups were selected for the main experiment. Participants in each group were randomly assigned to the two different experimental conditions: objective feedback and social comparison feedback. For the participants in the objective feedback condition, information on the number of correctly completed work tasks was provided. For the participants in the social comparison feedback condition, rank information on their performance was provided. The results indicated that social comparison feedback was more effective than objective feedback for the high performers, but was less effective for the low performers.     

Team incentives,task assignment,and performance: A field experiment

The performance of a work team commonly depends on the effort exerted by the team members as well as on the division of tasks among them. However, when leaders assign tasks to team members, performance is usually not the only consideration. Favouritism, employees' seniority, employees' preferences over tasks, and fairness considerations often play a role as well. Team incentives have the potential to curtail the role of these factors in favor of performance — in particular when the incentive plan includes both the leader and the team members. This paper presents the results of a field experiment designed to study the effects of such team incentives on task assignment and performance. We introduce team incentives in a random subsets of 108 stores of a Dutch retail chain. We find no effect of the incentive, neither on task assignment nor on performance.     

Using tri-reference point theory to evaluate risk attitude and the effects of financial incentives in a gamified crowdsourcing task

Crowdsourcing has rapidly developed as a mechanism to accomplish tasks that are easy for humans to accomplish but are challenging for machines. However, unlike machines, humans need to be cajoled to perform tasks, usually through some type of incentive. Since participants from the crowd are typically anonymous and have no expectation of an ongoing work relationship with a task requester, the types of incentives offered to workers are usually short-term monetary bonuses, which have had an inconclusive impact on crowdsourcing worker quality. In this paper, we explore the notion that the risk attitude of crowdsourcing workers may play an important role in the effectiveness of incentives on task accuracy. Traditional utility theories, such as prospect theory, depend on decisions made relative to a singular reference point, whereas the tri-reference point (TRP) theory (Wang and Johnson, J Exp Psychol Gen 141:743–756, 2012) holds that three reference points impact decision making. Using the TRP theory as a guide, we develop a game that provides workers with three reference points and subsequently explores the role of multiple reference points on worker risk aversion and task accuracy.     

The effect of outside directors’ and auditors’ incentives on managers’ ability to manage cash bonuses

This paper investigates the impact of outside directors’ and auditors’ monetary incentives on the association between discretionary accounting and managers’ cash bonuses in a two-tier system. For a sample of German stock corporations from 2005 to 2007 we expect and find that outside directors who receive compensation based on accounting income and auditors who receive high non-audit fees have the incentive to tolerate managers’ bonus-increasing accounting choices. More specifically, we show that positive discretionary accruals are more strongly associated with managers’ cash bonuses than negative discretionary accruals if outside directors receive accounting-based compensation and/or if auditors receive high non-audit fees. Our results suggest that executives’ ability to manage their cash bonuses depends on the monitoring institutions’ monetary incentives.     

Effects of Feedback Delivery Requirements on Accuracy of Observations

ABSTRACT

Feedback is often used in Organizational Behavior Management to improve employee performance. Accurate feedback results in greater improvements in performance and accurate observations enable accurate feedback. However, employees may find providing feedback to peers aversive. The present study contrived a method to evaluate whether instructing individuals to deliver feedback following observations impacted the accuracy of those observations. Five college-aged participants were exposed to a counterbalanced ABAB design. In the observation-only condition (Condition A) participants conducted observations of confederate posture, scoring whether the confederate’s feet and back were “safe” or “at risk.” In the required-feedback condition (Condition B) participants observed and collected data identically to phase A, but were additionally instructed to deliver feedback regarding confederate postures following each session. The results show that all five participants demonstrated higher accuracy of observations in the observation-only condition. Factors potentially influencing lower accuracy when feedback was required are discussed.     

Examining the Effects of Feedback Accuracy and Timing on Skill Acquisition

ABSTRACT

Feedback involves providing information about past performance and indicating how to improve future performance. Although the literature contains numerous examples of feedback as an effective method for improving performance across a range of organizational settings, much remains unknown about the specifics of how feedback acts to change behavior. This study evaluated the combined effects of feedback accuracy (100%, 80%, 20%) and timing (feedback following each trial or after a block of 25 trials) on skill acquisition in undergraduate students when presented with a computerized match-to-sample task that required participants to learn the names of shapes. Results reveal that feedback accuracy had a significantly greater effect on performance than the timing of the feedback.     

An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of an Automated Observation and Feedback System on Safe Sitting Postures

This study evaluated the effectiveness of an automated observation and feedback system in improving safe sitting postures. Participants were four office workers. The dependent variables were the percentages of time participants spent in five safe body positions during experimental sessions. We used a multiple-baseline design counterbalanced across participants to test the system's effectiveness in delivering two types of feedback. For two participants, delayed/low-density feedback was introduced after baseline and immediate/high-density feedback was added in the next phase. For the other two participants, the sequence of implementing the feedback types was reversed. Results indicated that both delayed/low-density feedback and immediate/high-density feedback consistently improved participant postures and that immediate/high-density feedback was more effective than delayed/low-density feedback. The benefits of the automated system of postural data collection are discussed.     

Effects of Accurate and Inaccurate Feedback on Work Performance: The Role of the Awareness of Inaccuracy

ABSTRACT

This study compared the effects of accurate (i.e., contingent) and inaccurate (i.e., non-contingent) feedback on work performance under two different work conditions. Under one work condition, participants could clearly see the outcome of their performance (i.e., visible condition). Under the other condition, they could not clearly see the outcome of their performance (i.e., non-visible condition). One hundred and twenty participants were randomly assigned to four experimental conditions (i.e., accurate/visible, inaccurate/visible, accurate/non-visible, and inaccurate/non-visible) and asked to perform a simulated work task. The results indicated that inaccurate feedback was as effective as accurate feedback under the non-visible condition, but inaccurate feedback was less effective than accurate feedback under the visible condition.     

An Examination of Reward Probability and Delivery Delays on Employee Performance

ABSTRACT

The effects of delay to delivery of earned monetary rewards were evaluated in program support employees. During study 1, an immediate reward delivery condition was implemented. During study 2, employees were exposed to increasing delays to reward delivery (i.e., 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, and 32 days). Employees continued to respond at high levels up to a 32-day delay. Study 3 held the 32-day delay constant but also evaluated three different probabilities of receiving the rewards: 1.0, .5, and .1. Employees continued to respond during delays but decreased responding when the probability of receiving the rewards decreased.     

Tolerance for Failure and Incentives for Collaborative Innovation

Most organizations employ collaborative teams to manage innovation projects. Although the use of collaborative innovation teams is a good starting point, an organization's ability to innovate can be enhanced by managing risk‐taking behavior through monetary incentive schemes and through an organizational culture that tolerates failure. This article reports the results of two controlled experiments aimed at understanding how tolerance for failure and incentives impact the decisions of individuals engaged in a collaborative innovation initiative. A key element of our experiments is the notion of endogenous project risk, which we define as the explicit link between resources allocated to a project and the likelihood of project success. We observe that when penalties are low, the amount of risk an individual assumes is fairly insensitive to the rewards that are offered. In an analogous result, when individuals make decisions alone (rather than collaboratively), higher tolerance for failure does little to increase the amount of risk an individual is willing to take. Taken together, these results highlight the importance of implicit incentives that are created as a result of project and organizational characteristics.