Weekly Feedback vs. Daily Feedback

Abstract

Two experiments were conducted in a retail setting to (a) assess the effectiveness of a multi-component performance management intervention and (b) compare the effectiveness of weekly and daily feedback. During the first experiment, a multiple baseline design was used to evaluate the effectiveness of task clarification, goal setting, access to preferred items contingent upon goal attainment, and weekly graphic feedback on the completion of routine maintenance tasks in a framing and art store. During phase 1 of the second experiment, an AB design was used to replicate the effects of this intervention on similar tasks in a new store location with the same participants. During phase 2 of the second experiment, a multiple baseline design was used to assess the effectiveness of the intervention when daily feedback replaced weekly feedback. Results indicate that the multi-component intervention was effective in both experiments, and that daily feedback may have enhanced the effectiveness of the intervention.     

正面反馈的盛名综合症效应：正向激励何以加剧绩效报酬对创造力的抑制？

正面反馈通常被认为是一种低成本且行之有效的正向激励手段,但结果如何不甚明了。根植于本土"面子"文化,基于反馈加工过程模型,从反馈效价、反馈情境以及反馈接收者特质三方面出发,构建了一个嵌套被中介调节效应的三项交互模型,通过设计3项研究,旨在探讨绩效激励下的正面反馈反应机制。研究1结果显示,正面反馈调节绩效报酬对创造力的倒"U"型影响,且调节效应因员工胜任感知不同而存在差异,即在高激励强度下提供高的正面反馈反而加剧绩效报酬对个体尤其是低胜任感知个体创造力的抑制。研究2探索了上述负效应的成因,揭示了盛名综合症的中介作用。研究3进一步揭示,由于低胜任感知诱发的盛名综合症,强化了正面反馈对表现目标导向的引导作用,从而加剧绩效报酬对创造力的抑制。     

Improving Closing Task Completion in a Drugstore

A within-subject ABAB reversal design was utilized to investigate the effects of graphic feedback and goal setting on employee closing task completion. Goal setting was contingent upon baseline performance and graphic feedback was posted weekly. It was found that goal setting and graphic feedback improved employee closing task completion.     

Increasing Physical Therapy Equipment Preparation Using Task Clarification,Feedback and Environmental Manipulations

The purpose of this study was to increase completion of tasks related to morning preparation procedures among 2 full-time and 4 part-time employees at a physical therapy clinic. A functional assessment was conducted to aid in the development of the treatment package consisting of graphic feedback, task clarification, and equipment manipulations. Later, graphic feedback was replaced with verbal feedback from the manager to facilitate maintenance of the intervention by the manager. During baseline, the mean checklist completion percentage was 18.4% and 56.5% for the therapy area and the hygienic activity area, respectively. This improved to 82.1% and 90.3% during the first intervention phase and remained above baseline levels at 75.6% and 100% during the second intervention phase. The results of this study suggest that the package intervention derived from the assessment was effective at increasing preparation task completion. Performance maintained above baseline levels at a three-month follow-up observation for the therapy area (50%) and the hygienic activity area (83.3%). According to the treatment acceptability assessment, graphic and verbal feedback were viewed as favorable by employees.     

The Effects of Individual Monetary Incentives With and Without Feedback

Abstract

This study examined the effects of an individual monetary incentive system with and without feedback to determine if feedback would supplement the effects of incentives. Participants were seven college students who performed a computerized task called SYNWORK. SYNWORK presented four sub-tasks concurrently: memory, arithmetic, visual monitoring and auditory monitoring. Participants earned points for correct responses. The dependent variable was the number of points earned. An ABAC design was used with A = individual monetary incentives without feedback, B = individual monetary incentives with feedback, and C = hourly pay with feedback. Sessions were 90 minutes, and there were 5 to 10 sessions per phase. The point scores of six of the seven participants increased when feedback was added to the incentive system but stabilized or continued to increase when feedback was removed. The feedback intervention was staggered in time across participants, and performance increased when feedback was added, hence the data suggest that feedback enhanced the effects of the incentives. One possible reason for the reversal failure is that feedback evoked higher levels of performance that were then maintained by the additional incentives. Because performance did not reverse, however, the results must be viewed cautiously.     

Relative Effects of Daily Feedback and Weekly Feedback on Customer Service Behavior at a Gas Station

The relative effects of daily and weekly feedback on customer service behavior at a gas station were assessed using an ABC within-subjects design. Four critical service behaviors were identified and measured daily. After baseline (A), weekly feedback (B) was introduced, and daily feedback (C) was introduced in the next phase. The results indicated that the service behaviors improved when the weekly feedback was introduced and improved further when the daily feedback was introduced.     

The Relative Effects of Different Frequencies of Feedback on Work Performance

Abstract

This laboratory simulation examined the relative effects of two frequencies of feedback on work performance under hourly pay and incentive pay. The study had four experimental conditions: feedback delivered after every session under hourly pay and under incentive pay, and feedback delivered after every fourth session under hourly pay and under incentive pay. Thirty-five college students were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. Each participant attended 24 thirty-minute sessions. Participants performed a simulated work task on the computer that consisted of computer-related activities such as dragging, clicking, and typing. The dependent variable was the number of correctly completed units of work. An analysis of covariance was conducted to analyze the data using pretest scores as a covariate. Participants who received feedback every session completed significantly more work units than participants who received feedback every fourth session. In addition, an interaction between feedback frequency and pay systems was found: Feedback delivered every session was more effective than feedback delivered every fourth session under the incentive pay system, but not under the hourly pay system. The results suggest that the relative effects of feedback frequency may depend upon the extent to which feedback is correlated with differential consequences for performance.     

“双随机、一公开”产品质量监管模型研究

在市场监管领域全面推行“双随机、一公开”监管，是党中央、国务院作出的重大决策部署，是市场监管理念和方式的重大创新。本文首次构建“双随机、一公开”产品质量监管的理论模型，理清“双随机”与“一公开”及各参与主体之间的作用关系，分析市场主体名录库和执法检查人员名录库中抽查企业与检查人员的群体行为演化机理，得出针对“双随机、一公开”监管的激励机制。研究发现：通过“双随机”抽取检查人员和抽查企业并“公开”产品质量信息，需配以恰当的激励机制才能有效制约抽检企业的假冒伪劣行为和检查人员的无效抽检行为；当公开声誉较高时，对检查人员实施质检激励或对抽查企业实施质量激励均可以使得系统良性演化，但如果公开声誉较低，需同时对检查人员和抽查企业实施质检与质量双重激励；质检激励机制设计时需对标准质量和假冒伪劣对应的检查人员分别给予质检激励，质量激励机制设计时需对有效抽检和无效抽检对应的抽查企业分别给予质量激励；质检激励和质量激励下系统稳定点的演化轨迹存在很大差异，质检激励先使得检查人员演化到有效抽检，然后通过公开声誉带动抽查企业演化到标准质量，而质量激励先使抽查企业演化到标准质量，然后通过公开声誉带动检查人员演化到有效抽检，如果公开声誉较低，这种传动机制会被阻断导致系统不会演化到理想状态。最后本文为完善和创新“双随机、一公开”监管提出了针对性的政策建议。     

The Interaction Effects of Frequency and Specificity of Feedback on Work Performance

ABSTRACT

This study investigated the interaction effect between specificity (specific vs. global) and frequency of feedback (frequent vs. infrequent) on the quality of work performance. Eighty participants were recruited and randomly assigned to one of the four groups: specific and frequent feedback, global and frequent feedback, specific and infrequent feedback, and global and infrequent feedback. A 2 × 2 factorial design was adopted. Participants were asked to work on a simulated order-fulfilling task and attended 24 sessions. The dependent variable was the error rate of the completed tasks. The results showed that more frequent feedback was more effective and specific feedback was more effective than global feedback in improving the quality of performance. Furthermore, an interactive effect between feedback frequency and specificity was found. Specific feedback was more effective than global feedback when the feedback was infrequent, but global feedback was comparable to specific feedback when it was frequent.     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

The board advisory tasks in small firms and the event of crises

In this article we examine what affects the board of directors’ involvement in the advice to management, with emphasis on the influence of crises on the board advisory tasks performance. Based on a survey of 881 small Norwegian firms, we analyse responses from CEOs in order to determine whether and to what extent the board is actively involved in the governance process during crises through providing advice. The study has two major contributions to board research in general and research of into small firms in particular. The first is the go beyond the “usual suspects” of board size, CEO duality, and board independence when looking for determinants of board involvement in advice. The second contribution is a clearer understanding of board involvement during crises. Our results show that board member diversity becomes particularly important during crises, since this provides the CEO and firm access to a more diverse pool of competences and experiences. We also find that crises moderate the effects of incentive on the board’s involvement in advice. This evidence sheds new light on the determinants of directors’ involvement in board tasks, suggesting that directors’ incentive to perform certain board tasks vary according to the contingent situation the firm is experiencing.     

Improving Staff Performance through the Use of Task Checklists

Analysis of a checklist system suggested that it may be a useful method of improving staff performance. Three features were considered important components of a checklist system: task definitions, recording responses on checklists, and periodic supervisor review. A checklist system incorporating these features was developed for an administrative staff in a large instructional system. A multiple-baseline across-subjects design and one reversal were used with three small groups of front-line staff, whose task completion was determined by permanent products left by the tasks. The percent of tasks completed improved by 28.8% when the checklist system was in effect. This study indicated that checklists may be a worthwhile method of managing worker performance.     

The Impact of a Task Clarification and Feedback Intervention on Restaurant Service Quality

Customer service is a key aspect of restaurant success, as performance has shown a reliable positive relationship with customer retention. However, waitstaff performance may deteriorate, as income from gratuities is often unrelated to service quality. The present study investigated the effectiveness of an intervention consisting of task clarification and task-specific feedback on restaurant service tasks and observed the relationship between task completion and gratuities. Three adult women servers participated during their regular working shifts at a local dine-in restaurant. Initially customer service task completion was low (36% on average across participants). Performance increased immediately following the introduction of the intervention, and all participants maintained 87.5%–100% task completion. Correlational analyses found that gratuities were unrelated to performance and may thus pose a problem for performance maintenance. Implications relating to feedback and payment schedules are discussed.     

Reducing Electricity Use on Campus: The Use of Prompts,Feedback, and Goal Setting to Decrease Excessive Classroom Lighting

Energy conservation is an important factor in both sustainability programs and operating costs faced by organizations. The current study used visual prompts, performance feedback, and goals setting to reduce unnecessary classroom lighting on a college campus. A package intervention was applied weekly over a semester using a multiple baseline design across three units, with one unit serving as a baseline-only control. Signs were hung in classrooms and updated weekly. The signs asked users to conserve energy by turning off the lights when the room is not in use, and indicated progress toward a goal for the current room as well as the building overall. The combined treatment successfully reduced unnecessary classroom lighting and generated interest in campus sustainability programs.     

公司治理的监督机制与激励机制间的替代效应——基于中国上市公司EVA绩效的实证研究

利用沪深两市1 250家上市公司2004~2007年的数据,研究了公司治理的监督机制、激励机制与公司价值的关系,特别注重研究这两大机制存在替代作用及对经济增加值(EVA)的影响。研究结果表明,公司治理机制存在替代作用,可以通过两大治理机制的组合提高公司价值。     

Abusive supervisory reactions to coworker relationship conflict

This study extends research on abusive supervision by exploring how supervisor reports of conflict with their coworkers are related to abusive behaviors and resulting outcomes. We utilize research on displaced aggression, conflict, and leader–member exchange (LMX) theory to formulate our hypotheses. Results from two samples of 121 and 134 matched supervisor–subordinate dyads support the idea that supervisors experiencing coworker relationship conflict are likely to engage in abusive behaviors directed toward their subordinates and that LMX quality moderates this relationship. Additionally, abusive supervision was associated with decreased work effort and organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB). Results also indicate that in both samples abusive supervision mediates the relationships between supervisor reports of coworker relationship conflict and OCB, and in one sample mediates the association between supervisor-reported coworker relationship conflict and work effort.     

Team incentives,task assignment,and performance: A field experiment

The performance of a work team commonly depends on the effort exerted by the team members as well as on the division of tasks among them. However, when leaders assign tasks to team members, performance is usually not the only consideration. Favouritism, employees' seniority, employees' preferences over tasks, and fairness considerations often play a role as well. Team incentives have the potential to curtail the role of these factors in favor of performance — in particular when the incentive plan includes both the leader and the team members. This paper presents the results of a field experiment designed to study the effects of such team incentives on task assignment and performance. We introduce team incentives in a random subsets of 108 stores of a Dutch retail chain. We find no effect of the incentive, neither on task assignment nor on performance.     

Increasing Staff Completion of Civil Commitment Forms Through Instructions and Graphed Group Performance Feedback

ABSTRACT

A three-leg multiple baseline design across behaviors was used to assess the effects of an instruction-andfeedback package on correct completion of three required civil commitment forms by psychiatric emergency room personnel. The forms were for notices of rights, imminent harm applications, and witness lists. The intervention program consisted of an individualized training component and weekly group feedback via graphs. The instruction-and-feedback package produced immediate and significant increases in correct completion of all three commitment forms; the effects were maintained across six months of follow-up data collection. Discussion addressed the effectiveness of the package, the effects of participant drop-out, the functions of the instruction and feedback components of the package, and ethical concerns.     

转轨时期国有企业激励机制的沿革与经营者行为的选择

本文是以转轨时期国有企业激励机制的演化与国有企业经营者行为的选择为分析对象.研究发现:国有企业激励机制的演化是一个渐变过程,当一个"旧"的激励机制无法满足国家的支付,政府不得不被动地修正自己的策略,机制的沿革是"渐进式的帕累托改进".这是理性的政府和国有企业经营者在不完全信息条件下进行动态博弈的必然结果.帕累托改进主要体现在企业的激励机制上.提高外部市场环境的效率和完善经营者选择机制是今后激励机制改革的方向.