A Case Study Examining the Effectiveness and Cost of Incentive Programs to Reduce Staff Absenteeism in a Preschool

Most employers provide some number of paid sick leave days for their employees. If employees use their sick leave days by calling in sick on days they are feeling well, productivity (in terms of either goods or services) may be reduced. In this study, conducted at a preschool, productivity was defined as the number of children enrolled each month. In baseline, the 13 full-time employees were absent 4% of the time and 75 children were enrolled. The effectiveness and cost of two voluntary incentive programs designed to reduce employee absenteeism were examined for 4-½ years in a single case experimental design. The absenteeism of employees who volunteered to participate in the incentive program was .7% and overall absenteeism during the incentive programs was 2-½% while costs remained constant. Twenty-six percent more children were served. Employees preferred monetary to non-monetary incentives.     

Work Productivity as a Function of the Percentage of Monetary Incentives to Base Pay

In many individual monetary incentive systems workers receive an hourly base pay and can earn incentives when productivity exceeds a specified standard. The total amount that can be earned in incentives is often expressed as a percentage of base pay. This study examined the effects of different percentages of incentive pay to base pay on work productivity. Seventy-five college students were randomly assigned to one of five incentivebase pay conditions: 0% (no incentives), l0%, 30%. 60% or 100%. Subjects participated in 15 forty-five minute sessions during which they assem: bled parts made from bolts, nuts and washers. Subjects received a base pay amount for assembling a minimum of 50 quality parts per session and a per piece incentive for parts over 50. If subjects assernbled 120 quality parts, the production maximum, the total amount they could earn in incentives equaled 0%, l0%, 30%, 60% or 100% of their base pay. Results indicated that the productivity of subjects in the l0%, 30%, 60% and 100% groups was significantly greater than that of subjects in the 0% incentive group; however, the productivity of subjects in the l0%, 30%, 60% and 100% incentive groups did not differ.     

A Comparison of the Effects of Incentive and Penalty Procedures on Work Performance: A Simulation

This study compared the effects of incentive and penalty on work performance. In Experiment 1, participants in the incentive group could earn 50 won (approximately 5 cents) for correctly completing each task and those in the penalty group could lose 50 won for incorrectly completing each task. The incentive and penalty did not exert differential impacts on work performance. In Experiment 2, participants were randomly assigned to one of six experimental groups: incentive, penalty, and no reward groups under two different consequence delivery schedules. Under the continuous condition, the payment was determined in the same way as in Experiment 1. Under the VR 5 condition, 250 won was either added or deducted based on a VR 5 schedule. The effects of the incentive and penalty were comparable under the continuous condition. However, the incentive was more effective than the penalty under the VR 5 condition.     

Effects of Hourly,Low-Incentive,and High-Incentive Pay on Simulated Work Productivity: Initial Findings With a New Laboratory Method

The failures of previous studies to demonstrate productivity differences across different percentages of incentive pay may be partially due to insufficient simulation fidelity. The present study compared the effects of different percentages of incentive pay using a more advanced simulation method. Three payment methods were tested: hourly, low-incentive, and high-incentive (0%, 10%, and 100%) pay. Four participants performed a simulated work task for 30 6-hr sessions. Productivity under the 100% incentive condition was consistently higher than under the 10% condition for all participants. Productivity under the 10% condition was higher than under the 0% condition for two participants. Results suggest that different percentages of incentive pay may in fact produce productivity differences under more realistic simulated work conditions.     

Individual Performance as a Function of Group Contingencies and Group Size

The effects of small group incentive plans on the individual performance of a simple assembly task were studied in a simulated work environment. Subjects were 28 college students who worked under an individual monetaty incentive system, and then under a group incentive system in groups of two, four, five or nine. Following the group incentive condition, subjects again worked under the individual incentive system. Individual performance did not change significantly when subjects were exposed to the group incentive svstem nor did overall group productivitv differ as a function of group size. However, performance variability across individuals in the groups was dependent upon group size, with the greatest variability occurring in the groups of two, and the least variability occurring in the group of nine.     

A Comparison of the Effects of a Linear and an Exponential Performance Pay Function on Work Productivity

This study examined how work productivity was affected by the way in which individual monetary incentives were related to performance. Two types of relationships, or performance pay functions, were compared: a linear function in which a specific per piece incentive was provided for each piece completed in excess of a performance standard and an exponential function in which the amount of the per piece incentive accelerated as productivity increased. Forty college subjects were randomly assigned to one of the two pay conditions. Each subject participated in 15 forty-five minute sessions. Subjects performed a computerized work task that simulated the job of a proof operator at a bank, entering the cash values of simulated bank checks using a computer keyboard. The dependent variable was the number of correctly complcted checks. Productivity was comparable for subjects exposed to the linear and exponential performance pay functions, even though subjects exposed to the exponential function earned significantly more money than the subjects exposed to the linear function. The results suggest that, within certain parameters that have yet to be determined, differences in the way in which monetary incentives are related to performance may not differentially affect performance.     

Preventing suicide by educating general practitioners

An education program for GPs about treating patients with depressive disorders and panic disorders was implemented in one district in the year 1998. A neighboring district was used as a control. Although the educational program was followed by an increase in referrals for panic disorder in the target district, there was no impact on referrals for depressive disorders, the prescribing of antidepressants by the GPs, or the suicide rate.     

基于工期协调的项目公司与承包商收益激励模型

从项目公司和承包商双层角度,考虑项目公司通过显性收益激励契约手段与单一标段承包商之间就工期目标优化问题进行协调决策.假设决策过程是一个完全信息的动态博弈过程,基于博弈论并应用二层规划方法建立了以项目公司为主方、承包商为从方的Stackelberg主从递阶收益激励模型,采用逆向归纳法并引入拉格朗日函数对问题进行分情形讨论,设计了遗传算法求解该非线性规划问题的子博弈精练纳什均衡解.算例结果表明,项目公司通过提供一定的收益激励而非传统指令性手段促使承包商在可压缩范围内积极主动地去压缩项目工期,可以实现项目工期控制目标协调优化和双方收益目标的帕累托改善.     

Evaluating manufacturer's buyback policies in a single-period two-echelon framework under price-dependent stochastic demand

This paper attempts to model the profitability of a secondary market, in a newsvendor setting, to a profit-maximizing manufacturer, who is offering to the retailer a buyback policy for the unsold merchandise left at the end of the selling season. With a buyback agreement, the manufacturer shares the risks of demand uncertainty, thus inducing the buyer to place larger orders. The manufacturer's risk is mitigated to some extent by the availability of an extra market to dispose off the unsold merchandise. Both parties are risk-neutral profit-maximizers and both have the same information about the final demand for the product and its uncertainty. The manufacturer's decision is to arrive at an optimal wholesale price and the buyback price. Based on this offer, the retailer in turn sets the optimal amount of merchandise to purchase, as well as the unit selling price to meet a price-dependent uncertain demand for the merchandise in question. Due to the difficulty of obtaining analytical results, we have undertaken a numerical analysis to (i) compare the optimal policies across demand functions and error structures for three situations namely the no-incentive case and the buyback policies with and without a secondary market; (ii) indicate the conditions whereby the trade incentive is beneficial to both parties; (iii) assess the efficacy of the policies using two other performance indices (probability of achieving a target profit, and pass-through ratios) alternate to profit maximization; and (iv) conjecture the conditions for successful buyback policies and the nature of the benefits from the secondary market.     

The Relative Effects of Different Frequencies of Feedback on Work Performance

Abstract

This laboratory simulation examined the relative effects of two frequencies of feedback on work performance under hourly pay and incentive pay. The study had four experimental conditions: feedback delivered after every session under hourly pay and under incentive pay, and feedback delivered after every fourth session under hourly pay and under incentive pay. Thirty-five college students were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. Each participant attended 24 thirty-minute sessions. Participants performed a simulated work task on the computer that consisted of computer-related activities such as dragging, clicking, and typing. The dependent variable was the number of correctly completed units of work. An analysis of covariance was conducted to analyze the data using pretest scores as a covariate. Participants who received feedback every session completed significantly more work units than participants who received feedback every fourth session. In addition, an interaction between feedback frequency and pay systems was found: Feedback delivered every session was more effective than feedback delivered every fourth session under the incentive pay system, but not under the hourly pay system. The results suggest that the relative effects of feedback frequency may depend upon the extent to which feedback is correlated with differential consequences for performance.     

Self-Solicited Feedback: Effects of Hourly Pay and Individual Monetary Incentive Pay

The frequency of feedback solicitation under hourly pay and individual monetary incentive pay conditions was examined. A between-subjects design was used with 30 college students in the two groups. Participants attended three experimental sessions and entered the cash value of simulated bank checks presented on a computer screen. Performance was higher for individuals who were paid incentives; however, participants who were paid incentives did not self-solicit feedback more than those who were paid hourly. Rather, participants in both groups solicited feedback quite frequently. Additionally, performance was not related to feedback solicitation. These results suggest that the incentives did not make feedback more reinforcing even though the incentives were functional rewards and the feedback was correlated with the amount of pay earned: the better the feedback, the more pay participants earned. The results also support the position that it may be necessary to pair objective feedback with an evaluative component to enhance performance.     

Reducing Absenteeism and Rescheduling Among Grocery Store Employees With Point-Contingent Rewards

The purpose of this research was to evaluate a reward program designed to reduce absenteeism among staff (N = 38) at a grocery store. The intervention included public feedback and a credit reward system whereby participants got store dollars for attendance and authorized rescheduling of work assignments. Results showed that absenteeism decreased from a group mean of 8 shifts missed per week during baseline to 4.25 shifts missed per week during the intervention before increasing to 6.75 shifts missed per week during the reversal phase. The mean total rescheduling occurrences were reduced from a baseline average of 19.83 per week to 9.25 per week during the intervention and returned to 22.25 per week during the reversal. Employees were also less likely to leave early during the intervention period.     

The Effects of a Combined Goal Setting,Feedback and Incentive Intervention on Job Performance in a Manufacturing Environment

Abstract

Baked anodes are used in finished aluminum production. Employees of a large multinational aluminum smelter were responsible for the production of more than 3500 baked anodes per week. During a 74 week long baseline (A) condition, production of unusable anodes exceeded 300 per week or 8.6 percent of their nominal 3500 anode production requirement. A problem analysis suggested that this high rate of defective anodes might have been due to weak antecedents, inefficient work procedures and weak performance contingencies. An intervention package that included a combination of goal setting, performance feedback, and tangible rewards was designed to strengthen antecedents and consequences of job performance. A performance feedback system was introduced with and remained constant across the three types of performance contingent rewards and three successively higher goal levels. The three reward and goal combinations were introduced to “strengthen” antecedents and performance contingencies within an A-B1-B2-B3-A with reversal to baseline conditions design. Anode reject rates were lower (better performance) during the three intervention phases compared to both the pre- and post-intervention baseline phase data. A dramatic performance improvement (lowered rate of rejects) was observed during the B3 phase that included the highest performance goal. These data demonstrate that a treatment combination of specific goal setting, feedback and tangible rewards can “strengthen” antecedents and performance contingencies resulting in improved objective performance in a manufacturing environment.     

Selecting Cheap‐Talk Equilibria

There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford–Sobel (CS) model of strategic information transmission. This paper identifies a simple condition on equilibrium payoffs, called NITS (no incentive to separate), that selects among CS equilibria. Under a commonly used regularity condition, only the equilibrium with the maximal number of induced actions satisfies NITS. We discuss various justifications for NITS, including perturbed cheap‐talk games with nonstrategic players or costly lying. We also apply NITS to other models of cheap talk, illustrating its potential beyond the CS framework.     

基于可变风险偏好的知识型员工激励机制研究

本文研究了风险偏好与风险成本,分析了知识型员工风险偏好的特征,利用委托代理模型讨论了确定与不确定环境下员工风险偏好与企业激励强度之间的关系,并对如何协调两者的冲突以及知识型员工与企业间协调作用的特征进行了剖析.研究表明随着员工风险规避度的增大,企业应减小激励强度与风险分担;一定条件下企业和员工可协调对方的行为,但企业的激励措施居于主导地位;与一般员工相比,知识型员工的风险规避度较小且更具可变性,影响企业激励行为的能力更强,与企业间基于可变风险偏好的激励协调行为更可能发生.     

‘Environment’ Submissions in the UK's Research Excellence Framework 2014

There has been much debate about university research assessment exercises. In the UK, a major element of the 2014 Research Excellence Framework (REF2014) has been the research environment. Here we analyse 98 REF2014 ‘environment’ submissions in Business and Management Studies. We explore whether there are distinctive language‐related differences between submissions of high and low ranked universities and conclude that submission writers have a strong incentive to exaggerate strengths and conceal problems. In addition, innate biases such as the ‘halo’ and ‘velcro’ effects may distract the attention of assessors from a submission's strengths and weaknesses, since they are likely to influence their pre‐existing impressions. We propose several changes to improve how environment is evaluated. We also argue that the research environment would be more likely to be enhanced if the number of outputs submitted in future was an average of two and a maximum of four per academic, rather than the maximum of five currently being considered.     

A Behavioral Training Program for Managers in City Government

A management training program based on Organizational Behavior Management (OBM) principles was conducted for 32 first-level and upper-level managers in city government. Managers then conducted 19 different behavior change projects with their employees. Each project is described in terms of the number of subjects, dependent and independent variables, length, research design, reliability measures, and results. The overall program was evaluated in terms of behavior change, traineelmanager satisfaction with the training, and effectiveness. Twenty-nine change ratios were calculated by comparing the intervention performance mean with the baseline mean, and in all cases, the change ratio showed that productivity improved. In fourteen case's, productivity at least doubled. The results indicate that employee performance in a governmental organization can be enhanced significantly by use of OBM principles.     

基于历史排放参照的碳配额分配机制研究

将行业内企业按单位产品碳排放水平分为高排企业和低排企业两类,并将"共同但有区别的责任原则"引入行业内部,构建基于双寡头竞争市场的碳配额分配策略。通过建立基于分配策略的古诺模型,研究减排目标、分配策略和单位产品碳排放水平对企业的利润差、产量和碳排放的影响。研究结果表明,减排策略对单位产品碳排放水平具有较强的敏感性;当行业中的企业存在单位产品碳排放水平差异时,对低排企业宽松的碳配额分配策略具有更强的减排激励效用,利于企业主动实施低碳技术改造;阶段式递进减排机制对"共同但有区别责任原则"在行业内应用,企业低碳技术改造的激励效用以及减排政策的稳步推进有积极的作用;同时研究表明准确核实企业单位产品碳排放水平的重要性。     

Identifying Dangerous Trucking Firms

The paper develops a statistical procedure for predicting the safety performance of motor carriers based on characteristics of firms and results of two government safety enforcement programs. One program is an audit of management safety practices, and the other is a program to inspect drivers and vehicles at the roadside for compliance with safety regulations. The technique can be used to provide safety regulators with an empirical approach to identify the most dangerous firms and provide a priority list of firms against which educational and enforcement actions should be initiated. The government needs to use such an approach rather than directly observing accident rates because the most dangerous firms are generally small and, despite relatively high accident rates, accidents remain rare events. The technique uses negative-binomial regression procedures on a dataset of 20,000 firms. The definition of poor performance in roadside inspection is based on both the rate of inspections per fleet mile and the average number of violations found during an inspection. This choice was made because selection for inspection has both a random and nonrandom component. The results of the study suggest that both of the government's safety programs help identify the most dangerous firms. The 2.5% of firms that do poorly in both programs have an average accident rate twice that of the mean for all other firms.