Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets

We study sequential bargaining in many-to-one matching markets. We show that there is an advantage to entering late in the market, and that the last agent to enter the market will receive his or her best partner in a stable matching, extending the results of Blum and Rothblum (J Econ Theory 103(2):429–443, 2002) and Cechlárová (Randomized matching mechanism revisited. Mimeo, Safarik University, 2002) for the marriage model. We also discuss the relation between sequential bargaining and a possible alternative formulation based on the NTU Shapley value. We thank Peter Biró and Utku ünver for their advice on the related literature. We also thank an anonymous referee for comments.     

Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket

In this paper, we study many-to-one matching (hospital–intern markets) with an aftermarket. We first show that every stable matching system is manipulable via aftermarket. We then analyze the Nash equilibria of capacity allocation games, in which preferences of hospitals and interns are common knowledge and every hospital determines a quota for the regular market given its total capacity for the two matching periods. Under the intern-optimal stable matching system, we show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist. Common preferences for hospitals ensure the existence of equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies whereas unlike in games of capacity manipulation strong monotonicity of population is not a sufficient restriction on preferences to avoid the non-existence problem. Besides, in games of capacity allocation, it is not true either that every hospital weakly prefers a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to any larger regular market quota profiles.     

An impossibility theorem for matching problems

This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems. Alcalde and Barberá (Econ Theory 4:417–435, 1994) and Sönmez (Econ Des 1:365–380, 1994) show that efficient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing efficiency to the weaker condition of respect for unanimity. First, we prove that a strategy-proof rule exists that is individually rational and respects unanimity. However, this rule is unreasonable in the sense that mutually best pairs of agents are matched on only rare occasions. In order to explore the possibility of better matching rules, we introduce a natural condition of “respect for 2-unanimity.” Respect for 2-unanimity states that a mutually best pair of agents should be matched, and an agent wishing to being unmatched should be unmatched. Our second result is negative. Secondly, we prove that no strategy-proof rule exists that respects 2-unanimity. This result implies Roth (Math Oper Res 7:617–628, 1962; J Econ Theory 36:277–288, 1985) showing that stable rules are manipulable.     

Lies and slander: truth-telling in repeated matching games with private monitoring

Incentives for cooperation may be enhanced substantially if a player can rely on the entire community to punish a partner who failed to cooperate. The ability of a player to report a defection to others can constitute a strong deterrent against defection if this report triggers a punishment imposed by the whole community. This paper studies the truth-telling problem in such a context. The paper presents a sequential equilibrium that supports cooperation in which a player unilaterally reports the play of a partner with strict incentives for truth-telling. It is shown, however, that desirable properties of equilibria described in the previous literature that assume truth-telling no longer exist. The implications of the results for practical examples, such as trading on eBay, are discussed.     

Measuring the effect of matching problems on unemployment

This article shows how matching problems reduce employment figures – and hence also raise those for unemployment – by creating a gap between labour demand and employment. It also shows how this gap can be measured by unfilled jobs (unmet demand) as distinct from job vacancies (recruitment processes) and reports results from the Swedish vacancy survey which measures both. In fact, while a shift of the matching function indicating longer recruitment times suggests increasing matching problems, this can only be verified by measuring unfilled jobs, which also quantifies the effect on unemployment.     

Mixed integer programming formulations for clustering problems related to structural balance

In this work, we study graph clustering problems associated with structural balance. One of these problems is known in computer science literature as the correlation-clustering (CC) problem and another (RCC) can be viewed as its relaxed version. The solution of CC and RCC problems has been previously used in the literature as tools for the evaluation of structural balance in a social network. Our aim is to solve these problems to optimality. We describe integer linear programming formulations for these problems which includes the first mathematical formulation for the RCC problem. We also discuss alternative models for the relaxed structural balance and the solution of clustering problems associated with these new models. Numerical experiments are carried out with each formulation on a set of benchmark instances available in the literature.     

An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems

In this article, we study the incompatibilities for the properties on matching rules in two-sided many-to-one matching problems under responsive preferences. We define a new property called respect for recursive unanimity. This property requires that if every agent matches with its first choice among its really possible choices that are based on a recursive procedure like the well-known top trading cycles algorithm, then we should respect it. More precisely, given a matching problem, we exclude the agents whose first choices are satisfied without any discrepancy among them, and consider the restricted matching problems of the remaining agents. If we reach a state in which all agents are excluded by repeating this procedure, then we should respect the outcome. This property is weaker than stability and is stronger than respect for unanimity (that is also known as weak unanimity). We show that there are no strategy-proof matching rules that respect recursive unanimity.     

Therapist-worldview matching: not as important as matching to clients

In this essay, we respond to Simon's article (2012). We discuss our view that therapy works best when therapists can match therapeutic interventions to the worldview of clients. We see this matching to client worldview as rooted in research evidence, and we suggest that therapists can practice authentically and effectively using more than one divergent therapy approach. We conclude the paper by pointing out points of disagreement we have with Simon's use of Davis and Piercy's (Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 2007a; 33, 298; Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 2007b, 32, 515) study, a study Simon uses to ground his arguments.     

Alcohol prevention strategies on college campuses and student alcohol abuse and related problems

This study examined the relationship between colleges' alcohol abuse prevention strategies and students' alcohol abuse and related problems. Alcohol prevention coordinators and first year students in 22 colleges reported whether their schools were implementing 48 strategies in six domains, and students (N = 2041) completed another survey concerning their use of alcohol and related consequences. Colleges were most likely to prevent alcohol use in public places on campus and the delivery and use of kegs. Four alcohol prevention domains were inversely associated with at least one of five outcomes related to student alcohol abuse or related consequences, and the alcohol policy and enforcement domain was inversely associated with all outcomes. Colleges should pay particular attention to strategies related to policy and enforcement.     

Rationalizable solutions to pure population problems

In pure population problems, a single resource is to be distributed equally among the agents in a society, and the social planner chooses population size(s) and per-capita consumption(s) for each resource constraint and set of feasible population sizes within the domain of the solution. This paper shows that a weak condition regarding the possible choice of a zero population is necessary and sufficient for the rationalizability of a solution by a welfarist social ordering. In addition, solutions that are rationalized by critical-level generalized utilitarianism are characterized by means of a homogeneity property. Received: 1 December 1997/Accepted: 26 February 1998     

Determining skill transferability of action games as a method to reduce in-vehicle phone distractions

Distracted driving has been shown to be a safety issue in numerous studies. To combat this problem, in-vehicle technology, legislation, media interventions, and other methods have been proposed and attempted. However research indicates that the drivers themselves may circumvent, ignore, or not be able to react in time for these interventions to be effective. Therefore research into training programs for drivers may improve reaction time under distraction. Research indicates that action game players have faster reaction times and more attentional resources than non-players on paper-based tests. However, transferability to driving has not been studied yet. This paper outlines a study to determine if action game players perform better at a driving task based on frequency of game-play. Participants will be placed into two groups of play (high vs. low) and tested against two levels of distraction (none vs. phone conversation). It is expected that participants who play higher frequency of action games will perform better under distraction than lower frequency players. Driver performance, conversation recall, frequency and durations of eye fixations will be analyzed based on previous research which has validated those variables as a measure of distraction and higher workload.     

Job matching and return to work: Occupational rehabilitation as the link

Return to work after injury or illness is important for the worker and the employer. Medical providers manage and treat the worker with the illness or injury. Except in cases of focused specialists, the medical professional's role is to take care of a patient, rather than empower a worker. As much as there is promotion of the workers compensation health care system to be similar to sports medicine, there are significant dissimilarities. One major barrier is that the medical caregivers do not know the demands of jobs as they would know the details of sports. Thus, there is a gap in returning a worker to function as the medical professional cannot accurately match the worker to specific jobs. A new model of job function matching, based on research and skills of occupational rehabilitation professionals, is proposed to bridge the gap between the medical community, the employers and the workers.     

A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof

We study one-to-one matching problems and analyze conditions on preference domains that admit the existence of stable and strategy-proof rules. In this context, when a preference domain is unrestricted, it is known that no stable rule is strategy-proof. We introduce the notion of the no-detour condition, and show that under this condition, there is a stable and group strategy-proof rule. In addition, we show that when the men’s preference domain is unrestricted, the no-detour condition is also a necessary condition for the existence of stable and strategy-proof rules. As a result, under the assumption that the men’s preference domain is unrestricted, the following three statements are equivalent: (i) a preference domain satisfies the no-detour condition, (ii) there is a stable and group strategy-proof rule, (iii) there is a stable and strategy-proof rule.     

The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters

We analyze the propensity to approve a random proposal of a large committee that makes decisions by weighted voting. The approach is a generalized version of James Coleman’s “power of a collectivity to act”. Throughout the paper it is assumed that the voters are of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of “major” (big) voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of “minor” (small) voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain that asymptotically many minor voters act like a modification of the quota for the vote among major voters. The paper estimates the rate of convergence which turns out to be very high if the weight distribution among the small voters is not too skewed. The results obtained are illustrated by evaluating the decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU for various scenarios of EU enlargement. I wish to thank Matthew Braham, Sidartha Gordon, Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Leading collective action to address wicked problems

The alleviation of wicked problems requires collective action because these issues are characterized by significant uncertainty and complexity. This research extends prior work by examining how conveners' use robust action to navigate wicked problems' defining characteristics in the mobilization process. It provides a longitudinal study of a health care nonprofit attempting to engage other stakeholders in addressing the high costs and inadequate quality of health care in a region of the United States. Specifically, the convener sought to address this wicked problem by developing a health information exchange. The findings relate five robust action tactics through which the convener advanced collective action.     

城市土地经营存在的问题与对策

土地是城市发展不可缺少的资源．是城市存在和发展的载体,科学管理与合理利用土地资源是城市可持续发展的保证。中国的城市土地市场改革开始于1980年末．在此之前中国几乎不存在土地市场．土地的分配和开发严格受国家控制。1988年以后．土地使用权商业化．土地市场开始发育。1991年实施《中华人民共和国城镇国有土地使用权出让和转让暂行条例》,     

Use of propensity score matching to evaluate a national smoking cessation media campaign

Sustained mass media campaigns have been recommended to stem the tobacco epidemic in the United States. Propensity score matching (PSM) was used to estimate the effect of awareness of a national smoking cessation media campaign (EX) on quit attempts and cessation-related cognition. Participants were 4,067 smokers and recent quitters aged 18-49 in targeted U.S. media markets. Controlling for potential confounders through PSM and regression analysis, confirmed awareness of EX was not significantly associated with either outcome at 6-month follow-up. Matched analyses excluding 217 quitters resulted in a significant effect of EX on both outcomes.     

Estimating the extent and degree of Gambling related problems in the Australian population: A national survey

A stratified random doorknock method was used to interview 2744 respondents in four state capitals in Australia. The interview was in 3 parts with the latter two only administered to regular, once per week or more often gamblers (N=290). The measures completed by this group included the South Oaks Gambling Screen and a range of psychological measures. A conservative interpretation of the results was that problem gamblers, defined in terms of a range of personal and interpersonal gambling-related costs, comprised 1.16% (±0.34%) of the Australian population. It was estimated that problem players losses may account for about one quarter of all expenditures on gambling.