Hedging and accounting-based RPE contracts for powerful CEOs

Several firms prohibit their CEOs from trading in the stock of peer firms. This is puzzling since hedging by the CEO through private trading in the capital market can reduce the CEO’s exposure to systematic compensation risk. When the CEO’s incentive contract comprises relative performance evaluation, we find that the firm might want to disallow private hedging even though there are no technological interdependencies or strategic interactions to peer firms. In the analysis, we highlight two frequently observed characteristics of incentive contracts. First, the use of accounting benchmarks is widespread in compensation contracts for CEOs. Second, empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that powerful CEOs have influence on the process of designing their own compensation. We find that in the presence of a powerful CEO, the firm can benefit from disallowing private hedging. In particular, the firm’s decision to allow or to disallow private hedging depends on the characteristics of the accounting benchmarks and the characteristics of the peer firms.     

More Jobs Through Less Employment Protection? Evidence for West Germany

ABSTRACT: In reaction to growing criticism of the allegedly negative employment effects of job protection regulations (lay-off and dismissal restraints), the West German government in 1985 introduced new legislation facilitating the conclusion of temporary (i.e. fixed-term) work contracts in order to stimulate employment growth (‘Employment Promotion Act 1985‘AZPA). The research unit ‘Labour Market and Employment‘ at the WZB has evaluated the employment and labour market impact of the new legislation for the period 1985-1988, and apart from providing a detailed analysis of the socio-economic and institutional diversity of job arrangements covered by the category of temporary (i.e. fixed-term) employment, the project‘s focus has been on the impact of minor changes in the institutional frame- work as effected by the EPA on firms‘ employment policies, as well as on the overall level of employment. Results show that like in most other European countries the temporary work force in Germany has considerably grown over the past years in both absolute and relative terms, this increase, however, being largely due to cyclical factors as well as medium-term structural changes on the supply and demand side of the labour market rather than to changes in the regulatory framework as effected by the EPA. The impact of the new regulations on firms‘ hiring decisions and on the overall number of hirings in the total economy have to be regarded as rather modest, in fact amounting to not more than an estimated 25,000 additional hires per year or roughly 0.5|X% of all employment contracts concluded in the private sector. This marginal positive impact on firms‘ employment decisions, however, is counterbalanced by unintended substitution effects and an increase in involuntary quits arising from them when labour demand declines. Even under the overall positive employment development given in the period under investigation the net employment effects of the EPA temporary work legislation thus are shown to be at best marginal. In case of a deterioration of the overall economic situation, however, the increase in temporary job arrangements supported by the new legislation is likely to lead to accelerated workforce adjustments by firms and thus over time to result in a depression of the overall level of employment. From a theoretical point of view, the findings suggest that measures aiming at de-regulating labour relations such as the EPA largely fail to modify essential behavioral parameters of economic actors in economic environments which for decades have adjusted to a relatively high level of welfare state regulation, as has been the case in Western Germany.     

供应链核心企业订单分配下供应商群体减排行为演化

环保消费者认为供应链中的核心企业要对其供应商的环境表现负责。供应商群体的环境表现影响核心企业的市场吸引力,这驱动核心企业激励其供应商群体减排。本研究为供应链核心企业设计一种同时考虑供应商批发价格和减排量的订单分配方法。基于Multi-Agent思想构建了一个包含供应商群体、核心企业、消费者群体的计算实验模型,并借助计算机动态模拟多主体在多周期的决策和交互过程,从宏观角度探索供应商群体减排行为的演化路径,并从微观上剖析内在影响机理。实验结果显示,该订单分配方法能获得既激励供应商群体减排又提高核心企业自身收益的效果;当消费者群体环境意识的分布一定时,核心企业的激励作用有限;核心企业的订单分配是激励供应商群体减排的直接手段,环保消费者的购买行为是推动供应商群体减排的根本动力。这些结论对现实中供应链核心企业制定订单分配规则和政府制定环境政策具有一定的管理启示。     

Integrating Behavioural and Economic Concepts of Risk into Strategic Management: the Twain Shall Meet

This paper develops an integrated framework of risk management and strategic competitive advantage that incorporates behavioural and economic notions of risk. The resulting model argues for the importance of risk-taking to sustainable competitive advantage and ultimately to firm performance. The model integrates framing effects of attainment discrepancy, transaction costs from implicit contracts theory and capital costs from finance theory. The proposed model suggests that continuous risk-taking by firms may help sustain competitive advantage and thus lower firm risk. This, in turn, effectively increases market returns to shareholders by ensuring earnings growth while simultaneously reducing the risk premium discount attached to a firm’s future income stream.     

职工薪酬分配比例、产权性质与企业价值

随着现代企业的发展，职工在企业中扮演的角色越来越重要，职工激励问题对企业的重要性也不言而喻。已有研究主要集中于薪酬和期权等绝对激励，关于职工激励对企业的影响程度的研究则较少。 利用2003年至2013年中国上市公司数据，基于公平理论构建职工薪酬分配比例与企业价值关系的OLS模型，对职工薪酬分配比例对企业价值的影响进行实证检验。 研究结果表明，全样本中职工薪酬分配比例越高，企业价值越低；区分产权性质后，国有企业薪酬分配比例明显高于民营企业，继续提高国有企业薪酬分配比例会降低国有企业价值，民营企业薪酬分配比例仍有提升空间；行业收入较高会弱化提高薪酬分配比例带来的激励作用；劳动密集度会提高薪酬分配比例带来的激励作用；薪酬分配比例显著影响企业价值，产权性质、行业收入差距和劳动密集度影响薪酬分配比例与企业价值的关系。研究结论在用工具变量和外生事件考虑二者的内生性问题后仍然成立。 研究结果丰富了企业价值的影响因素和薪酬契约激励经济后果方面的研究，也为职工薪酬分配比例对企业价值的影响提供了新的经验证据，同时对上市公司制定合理的薪酬激励政策和中国当前提高劳动分配比例的政策具有重要的借鉴意义。建议监管者在制定薪酬管制政策时应根据公司的实际情况(如产权性质和非货币性福利等)对不同的公司进行监管，以促进企业发展。     

A Note on Job Tenure and Collective Contracts

Abstract. This paper analyses the relationship between individual tenure and the application of collective contracts at the firm level under the specific institutional settings in Germany. The empirical approach is based on a multilevel model and a linked employer–employee data set for the years 1990, 1995, and 2001. The main result is that elapsed tenure is longer in firms applying collective contracts than in companies with individual wage setting: workers in firms with collective contracts benefit not only from higher wages, but also from higher job stability. Furthermore, we find no significant changes in mean tenure during the 1990s as well as stable differences across wage‐setting regimes.     

An Anatomy of International Trade: Evidence From French Firms

We examine the sales of French manufacturing firms in 113 destinations, including France itself. Several regularities stand out: (i) the number of French firms selling to a market, relative to French market share, increases systematically with market size; (ii) sales distributions are similar across markets of very different size and extent of French participation; (iii) average sales in France rise systematically with selling to less popular markets and to more markets. We adopt a model of firm heterogeneity and export participation which we estimate to match moments of the French data using the method of simulated moments. The results imply that over half the variation across firms in market entry can be attributed to a single dimension of underlying firm heterogeneity: efficiency. Conditional on entry, underlying efficiency accounts for much less of the variation in sales in any given market. We use our results to simulate the effects of a 10 percent counterfactual decline in bilateral trade barriers on French firms. While total French sales rise by around $16 billion (U.S.), sales by the top decile of firms rise by nearly $23 billion (U.S.). Every lower decile experiences a drop in sales, due to selling less at home or exiting altogether.     

Shades of gray: effect of external work arrangements on firm performance under operational and strategic contingencies

This study builds on recent research on the external workforce by examining the effects of (1) temporary work (2) independent contracting, and (3) consulting on firm performance, considering the client firms’ tasks, the qualification requirements for carrying out these tasks, and its strategic context. The findings are based on a survey of 261 firms in the German manufacturing industry. At the operational level, the results indicate that the difficulty of the tasks to be performed by external workers influences their performance. Whilst temporary work and consulting are better suited for simple tasks with low qualification requirements, independent contracting increases firm performance when appointing individuals to perform complex tasks. At the strategic level we research effects by two strategic orientations; one generally increasing the internal innovation performance (innovation orientation), the other generally increasing the performance of external relationships (alliance orientation). The innovation orientation here reduces the negative effect of temporary work, whereas a high alliance orientation precipitates a positive effect of consulting on firm performance. This paper demonstrates that clients’ task requirements and their alignment towards innovation and alliances have a significant influence on the benefits to the firm conveyed by highly qualified externals.     

Effect of the board of directors and the audit committee on firm performance: a panel data analysis

This research examines the relationship between independent directors, the audit committee (AC), and firm performance, taking into account the impact of the chief executive officer’s powers and block shareholders. We use the maximum likelihood estimator, based on agency theory assumptions and cylindered panel data, to examine three models of firm performance. The results show that the independence of the board is reflected clearly by increased economic and equity performance of the firm. However, an AC that is fully independent or meets frequently is associated with lower firm performance. Unlike pension funds, institutional shareholders can be considered an effective control mechanism in the context of France. Our results development includes advanced explanations for market liquidity and shareholders’ portfolios. The study period ends before the European regulation on ACs came into effect in 2008. This allows for an appreciation of soft law in French corporate governance. It also lets us compare the data with the way firms operate their boards one decade later. The evidence provides useful guidelines on the supremacy of soft law in corporate governance and suggests that the composition and functioning of the board of directors should be moderated based on the firms’ context. The specificity of the cylindered panel data helps to better examine the impact of the board and AC’s independence and functioning in French corporate governance structure.     

From Temporary Competitive Advantage to Sustainable Competitive Advantage

Both industrial organization theory (IO) and the resource‐based view of the firm (RBV) have advanced our understanding of the antecedents of competitive advantage but few have attempted to verify the outcome variables of competitive advantage and the persistence of such outcome variables. Here by integrating both IO and RBV perspectives in the analysis of competitive advantage at the firm level, our study clarifies a conceptual distinction between two types of competitive advantage ? temporary competitive advantage and sustainable competitive advantage ? and explores how firms transform temporary competitive advantage into sustainable competitive advantage. Testing of the developed hypotheses, based on a survey of 165 firms from Taiwan's information and communication technology industry, suggests that firms with a stronger market position can only attain a better outcome of temporary competitive advantage whereas firms possessing a superior position in technological resources or capabilities can attain a better outcome of sustainable competitive advantage. More importantly, firms can leverage a temporary competitive advantage as an outcome of market position to improving their technological resource and capability position, which in turn can enhance their sustainable competitive advantage.     

Genesis of a research field: district,network, strategic network

This article summarizes the changes since the beginning of the 1980s in the scholarly approach to organizational and economic research on Italian firms. Beginning with the study of industrial districts, which sparked a major reconsideration of the conventional wisdom, most scholars focused primarily on the significance of firm geographical proximity while marginalizing issues related to firm structure and strategy. Nevertheless, industrial district research eventually led to the question of firm networks, in particular how to manage relational capabilities and cooperation, both of which affect a firm’s competitive position. This new analytical framework no longer dependent on either the single firm or an industrial sector has opened up new research perspectives that promise rich insights into socio-economic studies.     

Knocking on Academia's Doors: An Inquiry into the Early Careers of Doctors in Life Sciences

The early careers of French doctors in life sciences are characterized by the importance of temporary jobs. While most young Ph.D. researchers wish to obtain a job in the French academic sector (which grants them, among other things, lifetime employment), few of them manage to achieve this objective immediately after completing their Ph.D. A majority of young doctors have to wait for a period of time before they find stable employment in the academic sector. In the meantime, they usually find temporary research jobs. Two main types of short–term jobs can be distinguished: fixed–term research contracts (in most cases in a French public laboratory) and post–doctoral positions (temporary research jobs in a foreign country). The aim of this paper is to determine whether these different types of temporary jobs have different consequences on the careers of Ph.D. researchers. We first discuss from a theoretical perspective the impact of choosing ‘post–doc’ research rather than a job on a fixed–term contract. Then, after dealing with selection biases that affect the access to these temporary jobs, we will use survival data analysis to estimate the impact of both types of temporary positions on the probability of entering the academic sector. The analysis is based on a database on the early careers of 800 young French doctors in life sciences. The main results include the following findings: the probability of a Ph.D. researcher finding stable employment is higher if he has held a post–doc position than if he has held a fixed–term contract. This result holds for both the private and public sectors. However, careers in the private sector are also affected by long–term choices, such as the decision to undertake Ph.D. research in partnership with a firm.     

ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH AND MORAL HAZARD

We analyze the interaction between intertemporal incentive contracts and search frictions associated with on‐the‐job search. In our model, agency problems call for wage contracts with deferred compensation. At the same time workers do on‐the‐job search. Deferred compensation improves workers' incentives to exert effort but distorts their on‐the‐job search decisions. We show that deferred compensation is less attractive when the value to the worker–firm pair of on‐the‐job search is high. Moreover, the interplay between search frictions and wage contracts creates feedback effects. If firms in equilibrium use contracts with deferred compensation, fewer firms with vacancies enter the on‐the‐job search market, and this in turn reduces the distortions created by deferred compensation. These feedback effects between the incentive contracts used and the activity level in the search markets can lead to multiple equilibria: a low‐turnover equilibrium where firms use deferred compensation, and a high‐turnover equilibrium where they do not. Furthermore, the model predicts that firms are more likely to use deferred compensation when search frictions are high and when the gains from on‐the‐job search are small.     

The Management of Redundancies in Europe: The Case of France

The paper presents the findings of comparative and interdisciplinary legal and economic study on managing labour redundancies in seven EU member countries. It is structured for comparability between the systems examined. The introductory section contains an account of the evolution of the French labour market, with special reference to redundancy trends, of the features of the programmes for managing redundancies, of the roles of firms and the ‘external environment’ in handling workforce adjustments. The second section presents a map of policies that work to prevent labour redundancies (preventive measures) such as flexibility, training etc. Next, the instruments for handling temporary labour redundancies (retentive measures) are examined (e.g. short-time working, temporary layoffs etc.). The following section is devoted to instruments and programmes involved in the management of permanent labour redundancies (expulsive measures), e.g. collective dismissals, severance pay etc. The final section provides an overall assessment of the French system for managing labour redundancies, and briefly discusses the national debate on the prospects for reform, in light of the principles and policies of convergence set forth by the European Union.     

Firms,Destinations, and Aggregate Fluctuations

This paper uses a data base covering the universe of French firms for the period 1990–2007 to provide a forensic account of the role of individual firms in generating aggregate fluctuations. We set up a simple multisector model of heterogeneous firms selling to multiple markets to motivate a theoretically founded decomposition of firms' annual sales growth rate into different components. We find that the firm‐specific component contributes substantially to aggregate sales volatility, mattering about as much as the components capturing shocks that are common across firms within a sector or country. We then decompose the firm‐specific component to provide evidence on two mechanisms that generate aggregate fluctuations from microeconomic shocks highlighted in the recent literature: (i) when the firm size distribution is fat‐tailed, idiosyncratic shocks to large firms directly contribute to aggregate fluctuations, and (ii) aggregate fluctuations can arise from idiosyncratic shocks due to input–output linkages across the economy. Firm linkages are approximately three times as important as the direct effect of firm shocks in driving aggregate fluctuations.     

Business- and environment-related drivers of firms’ return on natural resources: A configurational approach

The sustainability challenges society faces call for firms to manage their use of natural resources wisely. Prior work on firm responses to sustainability challenges has largely focused on explaining and enhancing economic rather than environmental performance. We build on recent developments to extend resource dependence theory to include natural resources and seek to explain how business- and environment-related firm activities influence the use of natural resources. Using a configurational approach, we develop a conceptual model that explains the return on natural resources of firms based on four distinct sets of business- and environment-related comparative advantages. An illustrative application to the car-manufacturing sector demonstrates the practical applicability of our model and provides first insights into configurations we are likely to observe in practice. Our model and its application show that economic success is neither necessary nor sufficient to enhance a firm's return on natural resources.     

The effect of public involvement on firm inefficiency: evidence using Japanese private firms

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of public involvement on firm inefficiency. Public involvement is defined as the actions taken by governments to control firm management, as expressed in regulation and public ownership. We make the following three contributions. First, we show public involvement is an important determinant of the inefficiency of private firms. Although public involvement has been shown to influence firm behavior in public or regulated sectors, existing studies in the private sector tend to ignore its effects. Second, we analyze firm inefficiency rather than firm performance by focusing on cost factors. Previous work tends to use performance measures such as return on assets or return on equity rather than inefficiency measures to judge a firm’s management level. Performance measures are problematic, however, in that they are affected by not only cost factors but also demand factors. Therefore, we must separate these factors when we analyze a firm’s management. Third, we use a stochastic cost frontier model for the estimation. Although this is a suitable approach for estimating firm inefficiency, it is rarely used for private firms. Our results suggest that public ownership increases firm inefficiency while regulation decreases firm inefficiency. It is also clear that the effect of public ownership is not significant in the manufacturing industry, while it is strongly significant in the nonmanufacturing industry. This shows the importance of studying the effect of public involvement in the private sector.     

Towards a Theory of Network Facilitation: A Microfoundations Perspective on the Antecedents,Practices and Outcomes of Network Facilitation

Firms cooperate in inter‐firm networks to foster their competitiveness and improve their innovation outcomes. In many cases, network facilitators who are either embedded in a lead firm or a third‐party organization manage the cooperation among the network firms. This qualitative study adopts a microfoundations perspective to investigate the behavioural antecedents of the network facilitators, their facilitation practices and the related network‐level outcomes. Results show that lead‐firm facilitators more strongly invest in trust‐building measures since they are considered deficient in benevolence and integrity. Without these investments, they run the risk that conflicts of interest hinder the stimulation of positive network‐level outcomes. Third‐party facilitators, by contrast, enjoy certain credits of trust and focus on balancing firm interests from the network's activation, but need to invest in enhancing their competencies and skills with regard to the industry the firms operate in. The findings contribute to developing a theory of network facilitation by providing a nuanced understanding of how network‐level outcomes can be reduced to individual‐level factors.     

The linkage between human resource practices and organizational ambidexterity: An analysis of internal labor market dynamics in a port-of-entry context

This paper presents our findings from an empirical survey of 580 individuals placed by a German temporary work agency. The study aims to examine the linkages between human resource management practices and ambidexterity with regard to the integration of an external, highly qualified workforce into the firm. We focus on aspects of the internal labor market (ILM) and its relationship to concurrent firm exploration and exploitation. We argue that a dynamic ILM contributes to a firm’s capability for ambidexterity. Based on differences in the access to promotional opportunities of the ILM between temporary and permanent workers, we expect this contribution to be different for these groups of employees. We argue that whereas permanent employees receive job satisfaction from the opportunities of a dynamic ILM, temporary employees lack access to this source of job satisfaction and therefore do not contribute equally to organizational outcomes. Results of our study are intriguing since they do not support arguments on expected differences between these two types of workforce. Rather, findings confirm the importance of a dynamic ILM not only for permanent but also for temporary employees.     

The vertical network organization as a specific governance structure: what are the challenges for incomplete contracts theories and what are the theoretical implications for the boundaries of the (hub-) firm?

Departing from the seminal question that Coase raised in his 1937 work, this article discusses and assesses incomplete contracts theories’ analyses of the firm’s boundaries—notably transaction cost theory and the modern theory of property rights—by investigating the case of the vertical network organization (VNO). We perform a theoretical characterization and analysis of the functioning rules of the VNO to shed light on intra-network incentive provisions and coordination mechanisms. Our findings cast doubt on the role that hold-up considerations on the firm’s boundaries play and allow us to question forms of power within the VNO. Finally, we focus on the theoretical implications of the emergence of the VNO. The legal nature of the firm does not match the economic definition of the VNO, which tends to treat the firm as a specific governance structure.