Sex preference and fertility: what is the link?

It is argued that investment in programs for changing attitudes toward sex preference may not have the greatest impact on reducing fertility or increasing fertility control. Arnold's new method of analysis of determining sex preference was applied to data from a 1977 Egyptian survey of 36,000 rural households in Menoufia Governorate. Findings indicated that couples increased their use of modern contraceptives in direct proportion to an increase in the number of sons. Arnold determined that a large majority of all couples would have at least one boy early in their childbearing years. Thus sex preference would not have a large effect on fertility. Arnold's analysis among 27 countries found that without any sex preference, contraceptive usage would increase by an average of less than 3.7 percentage points. Arnold found that sex preference was strongest in Asia, particularly in South Korea and Taiwan that already have reduced fertility levels. In Africa, where fertility is high, the total elimination of sex preference would have only a 2.9 percentage point difference in contraceptive use. Sex preference had small effects on the percent of women who practice contraception, the percent who desire no more children, and the average number of additional children wanted. For example, in Bangladesh having no sex preference would show a percentage difference of 1.6 percentage points for contraceptive use, 4.7 percentage points difference for women desiring no more children, and -0.1 percentage point difference for the average number of additional children wanted. The effect of having no sex preference was strongest in India compared with Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, Thailand, Ghana, Kenya, Costa Rica, Haiti, Paraguay, and Peru. The effect of no sex preference in India would have the respective percentage point effect of 3.7, 8.9, and -0.2. Public policy should be directed to information, education, and communication with other social goals.     

Sex preferences for children in Ghana: the influence of educational attainment

Education influences aspects of demographic behaviour and outcomes including a child sex preference. Sex preferences of children have been studied in different societies because of its associated social and demographic implications. Using the 2014 Ghana Demographic and Health Survey, we examined the association between educational attainment and sex preferences of children. Findings from the study indicated that there is preference for sons (26.1%) compared to daughters (17.4%). At higher levels of education, there is a higher likelihood for no preference for a sex of a child. Among the characteristics of respondents that influenced sex preferences are: gender, lineage, religion, occupation and desired family size. Acquisition of knowledge through education to some extent alter fertility preferences and hence the need to motivate individuals to attain some level of education.     

Family structure and and fertility behavior in Taiwan

The present analysis is based on the 1990 Taiwan Human Resources Survey to study the relationships between family structure, women's complete fertility and birth spacing. Imputed family size, as measured by either the ideal number of children expressed by a married woman or the number of actual surviving children whichever is larger, is used as a proxy of a woman's complete fertility. The results indicate a majority of married couples in Taiwan begin married life living with the husband's parents and later move out to establish a nuclear unit. This limited experience in the extended family exerts an upward pressure on imputed family size even when other relevant variables are statistically controlled. Further, the effect of living with the husband's parents on shorter duration of birth spacing is only limited to the time when the parents provide free child- care for married couples.     

Agency in Fertility Decisions in Western Europe During the Demographic Transition: A Comparative Perspective

We use a set of linked reproductive histories taken from Sweden, the Netherlands, and Spain for the period 1871–1960 to address key issues regarding how reproductive change was linked specifically to mortality and survivorship and more generally to individual agency. Using event-history analysis, this study investigates how the propensity to have additional children was influenced by the number of surviving offspring when reproductive decisions were made. The results suggest that couples were continuously regulating their fertility to achieve reproductive goals. Families experiencing child fatalities show significant increases in the hazard of additional births. In addition, the sex composition of the surviving sibset also appears to have influenced reproductive decisions in a significant but changing way. The findings offer strong proof of active decision-making during the demographic transition and provide an important contribution to the literature on the role of mortality for reproductive change.     

Reproductive goals and achieved fertility: A fifteen-year perspective

A measure of underlying family size preference obtained for a sample of Detroit married women in 1962 is related to their fertility over a 15-year follow-up period. The data represent completed fertility. The I-scale preference measure used differs from the conventional single-valued statement of number of children wanted; it is a more fine-grained measure reflecting the respondent's utility for children as evidenced by her entire preference order. The scales are found to be consistently predictive of fertility over the 15-year prospective period, net of other variables usually associated with differential fertility. The results for the just-married sample, in which preferences and expectations are not confounded with the number of children already born, are particularly striking, with underlying preference much better than expected family size as a predictor of fertility over the entire reproductive cycle. The question of prediction for continuous and discontinuous marriages is discussed.     

子女孩次性别结构与女性再生育——基于孩次性别递进生育率的分析

现有子女的孩次性别结构是影响女性再生育的重要因素。使用中国2000年人口普查数据和时期孩次性别递进生育指标对女性生育水平进行了测算。结果显示,女性普遍生育但终身只生育一个孩子的比例很大,基于孩次性别结构的生育行为体现了男孩偏好;城市和镇在生育第一孩时就存在性别选择;第一个孩子是女孩的女性生育二孩的可能性较大,且二孩是男孩的比例显著大于是女孩的比例;第一个孩子是男孩的城市和镇的女性大部分不再生育,而农村女性有很大比例会生育二孩,但几乎不存在性别选择。采用某地区2019年的数据进行补充验证,同样发现:只有一个女孩的女性相比较只有一个男孩的女性生育者生第二孩的可能性要高很多,以上研究发现对当前二孩生育行为具有一定的启示意义。     

The influence of wives’ and husbands’ fertility preferences on progression to a third birth in Nepal, 1997–2009

As couples across the globe increasingly exercise conscious control over their reproduction, both spouses’ family-size preferences have the opportunity to influence their fertility. Using couple-level measures of rural Nepalese spouses’ family-size preferences and more than a decade of monthly panel data collected subsequently on fertility outcomes, we investigate how both spouses’ preferences influence progression to a third birth in a country where the widely professed ideal family size is two children. Contrary to expectations based on women's relative disadvantage, we find that it is wives’ preferences that drive couples’ progression to a third birth. We find also that the influence of wives’ preferences is not explained by contraceptive use but that this influence is moderated by couple communication about family planning. Wives’ preferences drive progression to a third birth among couples who had discussed how many children to have.     

Nonmarital cohabitation and fertility in the United States and Western Europe

The increasing popularity of nonmarital cohabitation and a decline in marriage rates in the United States and Western Europe has led to a growing research interest in cohabitation without marriage and its relationship to traditional marriage. This article examines the evidence on the prevalence of cohabitation and the characteristics of cohabitants, and focuses on the childbearing behavior of cohabiting couples who are not married. The evidence to date suggests that in Denmark and Sweden cohabitation is widespread, especially among young people, and childbearing within cohabitational unions is relatively common. In the rest of Western Europe and in the United States, cohabitation is less common and fertility is less frequent. Fertility will be affected to the extent that couples delay having children until they are married. Policy and law concerning cohabitants and their children are changing rapidly. Most of these changes have resulted in a blurring of the distinctions between married and unmarried couples and between legitimate and illegitimate children.     

Family composition and marital dissolution in rural Nepal, 1945–2008

The presence, number, sex, and age composition of children within families can have important influences on couples’ marital outcomes. Children are valued across settings, but their value in settings where there is an absence of formalized social security is distinctive. This paper explores the influences of childlessness, and different number, age, and sex compositions of children, on the odds of marital dissolution among couples in rural Nepal. Results reveal that childless couples face significantly higher odds of dissolution than couples with at least one child, and each additional child—up to three children—reduces couples’ odds of dissolution. Furthermore, having a child aged under two reduces couples’ odds of marital dissolution, but interactions reveal that this age effect only holds at parity one. Surprisingly, despite a history of son preference in this setting, there is no evidence that children’s within-parity sex composition is associated with the odds of marital dissolution.     

Women’s sex preferences in the United States: 1970 to 1975

This analysis examines the potential effect of sex preselection technology in the United States. The results suggest that controlling the sex of offspring is not the desire of most American women; that if it were employed, there would be a significant increase in sons as first-born and daughters as second children; that the overall sex ratio would be little changed from that occurring naturally except at very low fertility levels with universal use of such technology; and that fertility is only minimally influenced by gender preferences.     

Domestic Outsourcing in an Ultra-Low Fertility Context: Employing Live-in Domestic Help and Fertility in Hong Kong

The fertility rate in Hong Kong has been very low for decades. Because work–family conflict is one of the major barriers for married couples in actualizing their fertility ideals, domestic outsourcing that relieves women from the burden of domestic labor may help reduce the gap between ideal and actual fertility. Hiring live-in domestic helpers, who co-reside with the hiring families and work on a full-time basis, is gaining popularity in Hong Kong. However, past studies neither inside nor outside of East Asia have examined how employing live-in helpers affects fertility. This study investigates the relationship between live-in helpers and fertility by analyzing retrospective event-history data we collected from a representative survey of married couples in Hong Kong (n?=?1697). Our results show that married couples employing live-in helpers tend to have more children than couples not employing live-in helpers. Specifically, the practice is associated with higher odds of first childbirth and of second childbirth, with no evidence of a positive effect beyond bearing a second child. The findings have implications for other East Asian societies, which share similar backgrounds of ultra-low fertility rates, rising female labor force participation rates, rigid gender inequalities in domestic labor, and demanding work cultures.

     

性别偏好如何影响家庭生育数量?——来自中国城市家庭的实证研究

家庭生育数量会受到性别偏好的影响,但影响方向和作用机制还未达成共识。文章利用全国城市青年调查数据,对性别偏好和家庭生育数量之间的关系进行实证研究。结果表明,性别偏好并不等同于男孩偏好,其内容呈现出多元化特点;无性别偏好在城市已婚已育青年中所占比重最高。不同性别偏好对家庭生育数量的作用方向和强度有所差异:性别数量双偏好会显著提升家庭生育数量;与无性别偏好相比较,单性别偏好也会提升家庭生育数量,但女孩偏好对家庭生育数量的提升作用更强也更显著。     

What's happening to U.S. family size?

A telephone survey by Zero Population Growth demographers found that birthrates have risen slightly for the 1st quarter of 1977. Average estimated family size is now 1.85 children per women compared with 1.77 for the 1st quarter of 1976. For all of 1976 the total fertility rate was 1.76 children per woman. It is predicted, on the basis of the informal survey, that the total fertility rate will rise to 2.0 or 2.1 children by the early or mid-1980s. In 1976, married women expected an average of 2.4 children each. Wives 18-24 expected 2.1 children each while older women (35-39) expected 3.0. Many women are delaying births. Wives 18-24 have an average of .8 children each, wives 25-29 have 1.6 children each. Campbell Gibson, former chief of the projections branch of the Census Bureau, believes births will not reach levels of expectations becuase of the financial, employment, and social problems the huge Baby Boom age group faces throughout its lifetime. The undecided women in the surveys reduce the predictive value. 18% of single women aged 14-39 and 8% of married women in the same age group said they were uncertain about how many children they would have. Since the personalitites and motivations of this undecided group are similar to those who expect to remain childless, it is possible that this group will have fewer children. Such nondemographic factors as media publicity about low fertility rates may inspire some couples to have children. Conversely, the postponement of births may enable couples to become comfortable with a certain lifestyle and these couples may not have as many children as they expect. Social norms are already changing. The percent of wives expecting to be childless rose from 1.3 to 4.1% between 1967-1975. Those expecting only 1 child rose from 6.1 to 11.2%.     

Deliberate birth spacing before the fertility transition in Europe: evidence from nineteenth-century Belgium

Many scholars have argued that deliberate birth spacing may have played a role before and during the modern fertility transition. There are good historical and theoretical reasons for this view, but it has proved to be hard to demonstrate convincingly that birth intervals were in fact partly determined by attempts at deliberate fertility control. This paper suggests a method of securing evidence on the issue for married couples. The method is applied to three cohorts living in a Belgian town in the nineteenth century. The findings indicate that, even before the fertility transition, couples in the working class were controlling their fertility by deliberate spacing.     

Fertility preferences and subsequent childbearing in Africa and Asia: A synthesis of evidence from longitudinal studies in 28 populations

Survey data on fertility preferences have played a central but controversial role in fertility research and advocacy for family planning. We summarize evidence from longitudinal studies in 28 Asian and African populations on the relationship between preferences and subsequent childbearing. While we found no consistent association between women's desire to delay childbearing and subsequent fertility, the baseline desire of women to stop childbearing was a powerful predictor of subsequent fertility in all populations and increased in strength as overall contraceptive use in the study populations rose. Partners’ desire also exercised some influence but was of modest importance in most populations. However, the correspondence between desire to stop and behaviour was found to be far from perfect. Weak implementation of preferences by contraception is likely to be the major cause of this preference–behaviour discrepancy. Uncertainty and instability in preferences may also contribute to the discrepancy, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.     

Determining the impact of sex preferences on fertility: A demonstration study

The stopping rule measure of sex preferences represents a combination of psychological measures of preference and behavioral intentions. This study of 172 college students demonstrates that the stopping rule measure is a useful and practical method of measuring sex preferences. The results further indicate that parity progression ratio measures inherently underestimate the effect of sex preferences on individual fertility because they incorrectly assume that sex preferences (a) are homogeneous within the population and (b) can only act to increase, not to decrease, fertility. Use of the stopping rule measure to predict the possible effects of sex preselection techniques on fertility is also discussed.     

Measuring the effect of sex preference on fertility: The case of Korea

Preferences for male or female children or a balanced number of sons and daughters are common throughout the world. The dominant preference is for male offspring, particularly in less developed countries. Strong son preference is often tempered, however, by a desire to have at least one child of each sex. In more developed countries a balance preference is more common, often together with a strong preference for the first child to be a son. Although it is usually assumed that sex preference can substantially influence fertility, some analysts argue that the effect is negligible. An intermediate position is taken by those who say that sex preference may not have much impact at high fertility levels, but that as average family sizes begin to fall, sex preference will become a more important factor in fertility decisions. Despite the keen interest that has been shown in sex preference, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence of its effects on fertility. Moreover, much of the research in this area is methodologically weak. The measures that have been used in the past have been subject to a number of criticisms that call their results into question. This paper proposes a new measure of the effect of sex preference on fertility that avoids many of the problems inherent in other methods. The measure is based on widely available survey data on the sex composition of children and can be used with any measure of fertility or family planning. It can handle any type of sex preference and does not assume a linear relationship between sex preference and fertility.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)     

A modified hurdle model for completed fertility

In this paper it is argued that models for completed fertility have to take into consideration that childless couples and couples with an only child are qualitatively different from couples with two or more children. Indeed, these differences may be the cause of the underdispersion that characterizes completed fertility data. An empirical illustration using Portuguese data suggests that accounting for the qualitative difference between having zero, one, or more children leads to considerable improvements over a model of the type generally used to describe this sort of data.     

A joint model of marital childbearing and marital disruption

Married couples with children appear to be less likely to end their marriages than childless couples, especially when the children are young. Although this suggests that children affect the chances that their parents will divorce, the process may not be so simple: the chances that the marriage will last also may affect couples’ willingness to make the commitment to the marriage implied by having children. This paper uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to test the hypothesis that the risk of disruption faced by a married woman affects the chances that she will conceive and bear a child. The model used takes into account the simultaneous relationships between marital dissolution and marital fertility by including the hazard of disruption as a predictor of timing and likelihood of marital conception, and by including the results of previous fertility decisions as predictors of disruption of the marriage. We find that the hazard of disruption has strong negative effects on the hazard of marital childbearing, lengthening the intervals between births and decreasing the chances that a child will be born. This effect appears to be strongest for women who have had at least one child, either before or during the current marriage, although it is also large for childless women. Explicitly including the hazard of disruption in models of marital childbearing has sizable and important effects on many predictors of fertility.     

Two and a half centuries of demographic history in a Bavarian village

Abstract A village genealogy containing family histories of couples married between 1692 and 1939 serves as the basis for a study of the demographic history of a Bavarian village. The past patterns of marriage, re-marriage, widowhood, illegitimacy, bridal pregnancy, marital fertility, family size, and birth intervals are examined. Both the age at marriage and illegitimacy increased and then declined during the nineteenth century, apparently in response to changes in restrictive marriage legislation. Differences in fertility for occupational groups were insignificant. Marital fertility remained extremely high before 1900 suggesting the absence of any substantial family limitation within marriage. A rise in marital fertility that occurred during the last half of the nineteenth century appears to result from a change in breast-feeding customs. The actual number of children surviving to maturity for most couples was kept quite low, however, through late marriage and high infant mortality. Only during the twentieth century are substantial declines in infant mortality and fertility evident.