Peers and Fertility Preferences: An Empirical Investigation of the Role of Neighbours,Religion and Education

Individual fertility preference is influenced by observed social norms. The present paper investigates the effect of the observed fertility of peers on a woman’s fertility preference. We explore the role of two peer groups: neighbourhood peers and religious peers. Data from the National Family Health Surveys (1992–1993, 1998–1999 and 2005–2006) in India is employed for empirical estimations using a multinomial logit model. We find that both neighbourhood and religious peers have a significant impact on individual fertility preferences, but their relative importance changes with family size. An increase in peer fertility increases the probability of preferring more children. We further examine the roles of education and wealth as transmission channels between the fertility norms of peers to the fertility preferences of the women and find that education plays an important role in moderating peer influences. These findings can serve as vital inputs in formulating family planning and gender policies.     

Aging,Proximity to Death,and Religiosity

Considerable evidence has documented that the elderly are more religious and that religiosity is associated with better health and lower mortality. Yet, little is known about the reverse role of life expectancy or proximity to death, as opposed to age, for religiosity. This paper provides evidence for the distinct role of expected remaining life years for the importance of religion in individuals’ lives. We combine individual survey response data for more than 300,000 individuals from 95 countries over the period 1994–2014 with information from period life tables. Contrary to wide-held beliefs, religiosity decreases with greater expected proximity to death. The findings have important implications regarding the consequences of population aging for religiosity and associated outcomes.     

Women’s fertility, religion and education in a low-fertility population: Evidence from South Australia

The old issue of religion and fertility is examined in relation to women s level of education. In-depth interviews exploring influences on parity for Adelaide parents in 2003–04 suggest that more frequent attendance at religious services in childhood, and affiliation with particular religious denominations, are related to both higher preferred and higher achieved parity, even for women with university education. For some university-educated women, their religious upbringing appears to play a part in negating the traditional relationship between higher education and lower fertility. Quantitative data on religion, fertility and educational level from the 1996 Census for women aged 40–44 in South Australia show that women with No Religion had lower fertility than those With a religion, while university-educated women in New Protestan-New Christian groups had higher fertility than university-educated women in other denominations. The findings provide an understanding of some social conditions that support higher fertility in a low-fertility population. Future fertility research in developed countries should include consideration of the influence of religious affiliation and religiosity at disaggregated levels of inquiry.     

Gender Equity,Religion, and Fertility in Europe and North America

Religion has historically been a pronatalist force, but because it fosters traditional gender role attitudes, its importance for fertility may wane where gender equity is thought to be emerging as the new natalism. In this study, I used World Values Survey and European Values Survey data from 1989 to 2018 to determine whether more religious Northern countries are slower to develop the widespread egalitarian gender role attitudes associated with fertility recovery. I concluded that the “old natalism” and the “new natalism” do not compete with each other as much as their negative association implies that they might. By tracing the evolution of country‐level gender equity in more‐ and less religious countries of Europe and North America, I showed how country‐level religiosity does not dampen the potential for a gender equity‐stimulated fertility recovery. This paper also contributes by showing that the curvilinear relationship between gender equity and fertility has continued into more recent time periods than covered by previous work.     

Reproductive goals and achieved fertility: A fifteen-year perspective

A measure of underlying family size preference obtained for a sample of Detroit married women in 1962 is related to their fertility over a 15-year follow-up period. The data represent completed fertility. The I-scale preference measure used differs from the conventional single-valued statement of number of children wanted; it is a more fine-grained measure reflecting the respondent's utility for children as evidenced by her entire preference order. The scales are found to be consistently predictive of fertility over the 15-year prospective period, net of other variables usually associated with differential fertility. The results for the just-married sample, in which preferences and expectations are not confounded with the number of children already born, are particularly striking, with underlying preference much better than expected family size as a predictor of fertility over the entire reproductive cycle. The question of prediction for continuous and discontinuous marriages is discussed.     

Marital fertility and religion in Spain, 1985 and 1999

Since the transition to democracy in Spain in 1975, both total fertility and rates of church attendance of Catholics have dropped dramatically. In this study the 1985 and 1999 Spanish Fertility Surveys were used to investigate whether the significance of religion for fertility behaviour -- current family size and the spacing of births -- changed between the survey dates. In the 1985 survey, family size was similar for those Catholics who actively participated in religious activities and those who, though nominally Catholic, were not active participants. By 1999, the family size of the latter was lower and comparable to the family size of those without religious affiliation. These findings accord with the declines in both church attendance and fertility in Spain. The small groups of Protestants and Muslims had the highest fertility. Women in inter-faith unions had relatively low fertility.     

How Religiosity Shapes Rejection of Homosexuality Across the Globe

ABSTRACT

This study investigates to what extent different dimensions of religiosity are differentially related to rejection of homosexuality in countries around the world and, moreover, to what extent these relationships can be explained by particular mediators: authoritarianism and traditional gender beliefs. The theoretical framework includes in particular socialization and integration theories. Hypotheses are tested by employing multilevel models, using data from the World Values Survey, covering 55 countries around the world for the period 2010–2014. The results indicate that every dimension of religiosity has a positive relationship with rejection of homosexuality, rejecting some of our hypotheses: those who adhere to any denomination more often attend religious services and have stronger religious particularistic beliefs, or those who are more religiously salient do reject homosexuality more strongly. Sobel tests and bootstrapping procedures indicate that the relationships between the dimensions of religiosity and rejection of homosexuality are partially explained by authoritarianism and traditional gender beliefs.     

Religiosity and quality of life in South Africa

Using nationally representative survey data, this paper explores the relationship between religiosity and quality of life. Three indicators of religiosity are used: (i) frequency of attendance at religious services or meetings, (ii) orthodoxy of beliefs in relation to Biblical teachings and (iii) religious denomination. Quality of life (QoL) is measured in terms of (i) household access to modern conveniences, (ii) self-assessed life satisfaction and (iii) level of satisfaction with government institutions. The data shows a significant but not very strong statistical relationship between religiosity and QoL. People who attend religious meetings most frequently and who hold the most orthodox religious views are thus more likely to have access to modern conveniences and to be satisfied with their lives. Satisfaction with government, however, tends to be highest amongst nominally religious people and lowest amongst both the most orthodox and the least religious.     

Explaining son preference in rural India: the independent role of structural versus individual factors

Much research has been done on demographic manifestations of son preference, particularly girls’ excess mortality; however, there is less research that focuses on son preference itself. This paper analyzes the determinants of son preference in rural India. We separate the independent, relative effects of characteristics of individual women and their households, village opportunities for women and village development, and social norms. We look at both socioeconomic and sociocultural variables. Finally, we examine whether predictors of son preference differ by desired family size. Our data come from the National Family Health Survey (NFHS) India, 1992–1993. We use an ordered logit model, with dummy variables for state of residence. Our analysis shows that women’s education, particularly at secondary and higher levels, is consistently and significantly associated with weaker son preference, regardless of desired family size. Once factors measuring social norms, such as marriage customs, caste and religion, are included, economic wealth and women’s employment at household or village levels are not significant. Media access remains significant, suggesting an influence of “modernizing” ideas. Among social factors, caste and religion are associated with son preference but, once state of residence is controlled for, marriage patterns and cultivation patterns are insignificant. The strength and significance for son preference of many determinants differs by desired family size. Our results suggest that policy makers seeking to influence son preference need to identify and target different policy levers to women in different fertility and social contexts, rather than try an approach of one size that fits all.     

Parents’ Religious Involvement,Family Socialization and Development of Their Children in a Chinese Sample of Hong Kong

The present study investigates the effects of parents’ religious involvement on their psychological health, family functioning and development of their children from a Chinese sample of parent–child pairs in Hong Kong. Results support the beneficial effects of religious involvement on effective parenting and favorable outcomes of their children, which have been well reported in western studies. Besides, this investigation finds that (1) parental psychological health is a mediator between their religious involvement and positive family processes; (2) family processes is an important family socialization factor with spill-over effects into the function of parenting; (3) different family socialization factors have different effects on child outcomes; (4) parental positive religious coping is a function of their intrinsic religiosity; and (5) both parental religious coping and their intrinsic religiosity have a protective effect on parental psychological difficulties, with the former having robust direct effects on positive family processes and effective parenting, and (6) both intrinsic religiosity and positive religious coping in parents show significant total indirect effects on respective child outcomes through parental psychological and family socialization factors. Implications and directions for further study are also discussed.     

Competing Claims: Religious Affiliation and African Americans’ Intolerance of Homosexuals

Literature on religion and political intolerance indicates competing expectations about how Black Protestant church affiliation affects African Americans’ attitudes about civil liberties. On the one hand, Black Protestant theology emphasizes personal freedom and social justice, factors generally linked to more tolerant attitudes. On the other hand, Black Protestants tend to be conservative on family and social issues, factors often linked to intolerance of gays and lesbians. Data from the General Social Survey are used to examine the influence of religious group identification, as well as other relevant aspects of religiosity, on political intolerance among African Americans. Results indicate that although other aspects of religion (beliefs and behaviors) help explain variation in political intolerance, Black Protestant church affiliation has no relationship with attitudes about the civil liberties of homosexuals. However, additional tests show that Black Protestant church affiliation significantly predicts intolerance of other target groups (atheists and racists).     

Fertility patterns among religious groups in Canada

The U shape that has been traced out by the crude birth rate in the United States and Canada is well known. Falling birth rates reached a low point in the mid-1930’s; the rate rose to a peak in 1947 and remained high through the 1950’s. In terms of cohorts, completed family size was smallest for women born around 1910, whose childbearing was concentrated in the 1930’s. With data from the 1961 census of Canada, trends in cohort marital fertility by religion are examined. The U pattern appears for both Protestants and Jews. For Catholics, a reversal in the downward trend of family size had not appeared by 1961, although the U pattern can be discerned for some subgroups such as Catholics living in big cities and persons of Irish ancestry. In the United States, however, changes in family size for all three religious groups and both whites and nonwhites follow the U pattern. Religious differentials in family size in Canada have been decreasing, but they remain much larger than either religious or color differentials in the United States, which show no decrease. The distinctive features of Catholic fertility in Canada are most pronounced among the regionallyconcentrated French Canadians, suggesting an interplay of religious, regional, and ethnic influences.     

婚姻形式与男孩偏好:对中国农村三个县的考察

应用在招赘婚姻高度流行区、中度流行区和低度流行区的调查数据 ,本文研究了严格生育控制下婚姻形式以及个人、家庭和社会因素对男孩偏好的影响及其区域差异。研究发现 ,嫁娶婚姻的生育行为有明显的男孩偏好倾向 ,而招赘婚姻的生育行为则不存在性别偏好 ;男孩偏好存在显著的区域差异 ,招赘婚姻的流行显著降低了当地的男孩偏好水平。研究结果为政府在农村降低男孩偏好水平、稳定低生育率提供了新的思路和途径     

Images of a Loving God and Sense of Meaning in Life

Although prior studies have documented a positive association between religiosity and sense of meaning in life, the role of specific religious beliefs is currently unclear. Past research on images of God suggests that loving images of God will positively correlate with a sense of meaning and purpose. Mechanisms for this hypothesized relationship are drawn from prior work on attachment theory, religious coping, and symbolic interaction. We suggest that these mechanisms are complementary and that secure attachment styles, reliable coping strategies, and positive self-images work in tandem to facilitate a sense of meaning and purpose. Using a random, national sample from the second wave of the Baylor Religion Survey, we perform multivariate regression analysis that controls for key religious and demographic effects. In our full model, results indicate that the dependent variable is positively associated with student status, religious non-affiliation, congregational friendship networks, and frequency of prayer. Most important from the perspective of the present study, the connection between loving images of God and a sense of meaning and purpose is consistent and robust.     

Donating Time or Money? The Effects of Religiosity and Social Capital on Civic Engagement in Qatar

Few studies have examined the role of religiosity and social capital on civic engagement in the context of a Muslim country. In this paper, we explore the impact of religiosity and social capital on charitable donations and volunteerism in Qatar. Drawing on a nationally representative survey from Qatar, we consider various attitudinal and behavioral measures for capturing religiosity and social capital. The results indicate that, even after controlling for a wide range of demographic variables, behavioral measures have a stronger effect than attitudes. Individuals who regularly perform daily prayers are more likely to donate than those individuals who simply describe themselves as religious. Similarly, individuals who are more active in their neighborhood engagement are more likely to volunteer than those who merely report high levels of social trust. These results suggest that when it comes to the relationship between religiosity, social capital and civic engagement, individual behavior is much more predictive than attitudes alone. We also find that even in the case of Qatar, where citizen wealth has rapidly increased in the last few decades, there is little evidence of substitution effects: citizens do not appear to trade-off or substitute between time and money. Instead, more religious and active citizens are likely to do both.     

Explaining spousal differences in reproductive preferences: A gender inequality approach

Using data from the 1988 Ghana Demographic and Health Survey we show that, contrary to some earlier findings, substantial differences in fertility goals exist between spouses in sub-Saharan Africa. Further, we indicate that gender inequality is associated with these differences in fertility goals. Women in dyads that give nonnumeric responses to questions on preferred family size are very likely to have low status, which may lead them to have high fertility. The need for more research at the micro level is stressed, given the social, economic, and environmental costs of neglecting to do so.     

Mother's education and effect of son preference on fertility in Matlab,Bangladesh

This analysis follows earlier research that hypothesized and substantiated that, in a society with strong son preference, its effect on fertility would be conditional on the level of contraceptive use. Present analysis of the prospective fertility experience of 22,819 women of reproductive age during 3.5 years in Matlab, Bangladesh, shows that this effect is higher among mothers with postprimary schooling versus those with primary or no education. The higher effect conforms with the known positive relationship of contraceptive use with maternal schooling. However, this increase when contrasted with the idea that education promotes modern values, including gender equality, suggests that education in Matlab, with its traditional slant, is not resistant to son preference. In a poor, traditional society with low status for women, schooling alone is not enough to motivate women to abandon low esteem for daughters though schooling promotes child survival. But if preference for smaller family size increases, promoted by education including such modern values as gender equality, then sex preference, although it cannot be completely removed, will have minimal effect on fertility as in most developed countries.Abbreviations DSS demographic surveillance system - ICDDR,B International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh - MCH-FP maternal/child health and family planning - SPEF sex preference effect on fertility     

The effects of formal church affiliation and religiosity on the fertility patterns of Mexican-American catholics

The effects of religion on the fertility patterns of Mexican Americans are examined with two different path models, the Institutional Model using formal affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church as a measure of religion, and the Religiosity Model using a measure of religiosity. Each model, tested separately for husbands and wives, examines the effects of religion on types of contraceptive methods used and on wanted family size. Although the majority of Mexican Americans are Catholics and tend to have large families, religion does not seem to have the same effect on their fertility patterns as on that of other Catholics in the United States. Among the men, neither formal affiliation nor religiosity affect the fertility patterns in any way, while among the women the effect is slight. Considering the Catholic Church’s position on contraceptive usage, it is especially noteworthy that religion does not affect the use or non-use of the more effective means of contraception, a factor contributing to the generally weak association between the measures of religion and wanted family size. The last section attempts a partial explanation of why the results turned out as they did.     

Another Child? Fertility Ideals,Resources and Opportunities

Low fertility in most developed countries has prompted policy concern in relation to labour market supply, pensions, and expenditure on health and welfare services as well as policy debate about both the cost of children and the opportunity costs of parenthood. The extent to which family policy interventions can be effective in slowing or reversing fertility decline is much debated. This paper, based on a fertility module of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2005, examines the current fertility, and ideal and expected fertility of a nationally representative sample of 455 parents of reproductive age and focuses on whether they plan to have another child. It compares the characteristics of those who intend to have another child with those who do not, and how parents with one child differ from those with more children. It addresses three questions about family size: (1) fertility ideals, (2) resources and the economic implications of childbearing, and (3) opportunities for childbearing and the effects of a late start on fertility expectations. It concludes that, despite a sustained period of low fertility in Scotland, childbearing ideals are robust and explanations of low fertility must derive from difficulties in realising those ideals. Difficulties in realising fertility aspirations are associated less with resources than with opportunities for childbearing, especially the timing of first birth. Those who delay their first birth are less likely to realise their ideal family size, and their lower fertility is associated with the opportunity costs of childbearing in terms of foregone qualifications, careers and earnings.