Teachers are students in ZPG program called 'Pop Ed.'

Zero Population Growth's Population Education (Pop Ed) program began in 1975 as an ongoing effort to bring the "real world" into the classroom by demonstrating the relationships among population trends, food and energy resources, and environmental and economic problems. The training workshops which last for a day or 2 have the following goals: 1) to offer a brief demographic overview for teachers, 2) to provide lesson plans and techniques readily usable in the classroom, 3) to alert teachers to the best written and audiovisual materials available, 4) to identify local resources for teaching Pop Ed, and 5) to provide sample materials. In the 1st year of program operation 10 workshops were held. These workshops are credited, at least partly, with the subsequent population instruction that reached over 10,400 students and 1600 teachers. Another 15 workshops were held in the 2nd year of operation. Obstacles to the program are the assumption on the part of some teachers that Pop Ed belongs in disciplines other than their own and the belief on the part of many teachers that they will require extensive training.     

Comments on Daniel A. Seiver's 'Recent fertility in Mexico: Measurement and Interpretation.'

Abstract In a recent article in this Journal,(1)Daniel A. Seiver concludes that 'fertility' in Mexico did not decline between 1960 and 1970. His conclusion is based primarily on an increase in the child-woman ratio from 725 per 1,000 in 1960 to 762 in 1970. Seiver simply asserts that this increase cannot be completely explained by declining infant mortality and under-enumeration. (2) . (3).     

World Population Day '93 observed

President Abdur Rahman Biswas inaugurated the World Population Day '93 at the Osmani Memorial Hall in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on July 11. He stressed the importance of reducing the national population growth rate from 2.03% in 1923 to 1.82% by the 1995. The event was organized jointly by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, the Directorate of Family Planning, and the United Nations Population fund (UNFPA). The president expressed his deep concern over the population growth rates in developing countries, which are much higher than resources. He noted with satisfaction that 40% of the eligible couples in the country practice family planning (FP) and expressed hope that this could be raised to 50% by 1995. If the program becomes successful, ideal families would consist of two children by 2005. He later presented prizes and certificates to field workers, ulemas, traditional birth attendants, FP depot holders, and the workers of nongovernmental organizations for their commendable services in Fp and maternal-child health services. The Health and Family Welfare minister in his speech warned that if the current population growth is not checked, the consequences would be disastrous, which could be averted by adopting new strategies. The deputy minister for Health and Family Welfare illustrated the threat of population escalation and recounted some of the recent government control measures. The secretary, Ministry of Health Family Welfare, said that at the present rate of growth the Bangladeshi population would double in 34 years. The director general, Directorate of Family Planning, said that the FP program has become accountable with a system of incentives and disincentives. Earlier, the UNFPA country director in his speech remarked that it was crucial for the entire world to solve the population problem. In the morning, in the main cities, hundreds of people involved in national FP activities paraded to demonstrate the social legitimacy of the Bangladeshi Fp program.     

The dynamics of the population sex ratio in India, 1971-96

This paper reconstructs the trend in the population sex ratio in India between 1971 ad 1996 from available information on changes in sex differentials in mortality in the country since the beginning of the century. It is estimated that, although the mortality of females relative to that of males in India has improved since 1968, the population sex ratio increased between 1971 and 1981, stayed constant between 1981 and 1991, and started to decrease only after 1991. This implies that the recorded decrease and increase in the periods 1971-81 and 1981-91 respectively were both spurious and were the results of undercounts of females in 1971 and 1991. Another implication of this finding is that, owing to the lagged effect of past mortality on current trends in the population sex ratio, this ratio is a bad proxy for use in the study of changes in differential mortality by sex.     

Assessing the validity of intercensal comparisons of indigenous Australians, 1986–96

The credibility of analysis of 1996 Census data on indigenous Australians hinges on who the people are who have changed their indigenous identification between the last two censuses. The number of people who identify as indigenous in either the Post-Enumeration Survey or the census is more stable than theprima facie evidence indicates. Also, the continuing low levels of education among the indigenous population means that self-identification signifies that one is, more than likely, disadvantaged. While it is difficult to say with absolute certainty that census statistics accurately reflect the economic status of the indigenous population, they are sufficiently credible to be taken at face value.     

The dynamics of the population sex ratio in India, 1971–96

This paper reconstructs the trend in the population sex ratio in India between 1971 and 1996 from available information on changes in sex differentials in mortality in the country since the beginning of the century. It is estimated that, although the mortality of females relative to that of males in India has improved since 1968, the population sex ratio increased between 1971 and 1981, stayed constant between 1981 and 1991, and started to decrease only after 1991. This implies that the recorded decrease and increase in the periods 1971–81 and 1981–91 respectively were both spurious and were the results of undercounts of females in 1971 and 1991. Another implication of this finding is that, owing to the lagged effect of past mortality on current trends in the population sex ratio, this ratio is a bad proxy for use in the study of changes in differential mortality by sex.     

Longevity Advances in High‐Income Countries, 1955–96

The advance of life expectancy within high‐income countries from 1955 to 1996 is well represented by a straight‐line trend. This explains more of the variance on average, and in 19 of 21 high‐income countries, than logged or unlogged age‐standardized death rates. Change in life expectancy in individual countries over this period was partially predicted by a country's level relative to the rest of this group of high‐income countries and partially by a country's own prior rate of advance, with substantial convergence toward the group mean for both measures.     

Mortality following conjugal bereavement,Belgium 1991-96: The unexpected effect of education

This paper examines excess mortality following spousal bereavement by time since bereavement, sex, age, and education. The main hypothesis challenged is that higher education buffers the harmful effects of spousal loss. Using a log-rate model, death-rate ratios (widowed/married) are estimated for 49,849 and 126,746 Belgian widowers and widows and an equal number of non-bereaved controls matched to the bereaved on their socio-demographic characteristics. The hypothesis that the more educated suffer less excess mortality is not supported. Although higher educational levels are associated with lower mortality in general, they do not alleviate the effects of bereavement. On the contrary, in the period immediately following spousal loss, the more highly educated seem to have more, rather than less, excess mortality. Three possible arguments are suggested to account for this: education-related differences in the partner-relationship, structural differences in the availability of appropriate social support, and cultural differences in potential support networks.     

Estimating the quality of life for children around the world: NICQL '92

The concept of quality of life (NICQL '92) is presented and illustrated through several formulations. From nine relevant child and adult variables extant in current literature an index of quality of life for children in one hundred and twenty-two (N=122) countries is presented. Characteristics of the top twelve and bottom twelve nations by quality of life for children are given, as are rankings by region and worldwide. The paper discusses application of the NICQL '92 Index to policy questions and to social changes across the decade to the year 2002.     

The impact of children on a parent's risk of suicide following death of a spouse, Belgium 1991-96

Since Durkheim's work on suicide, the family has widely been seen as providing partial protection against the development of tendencies to suicide. This study assesses the impact of parenthood (both number of children and age of youngest child) on suicide following the death of a spouse. Using data for Belgium in the 5 years following the 1991 census, the study adopts a nested case-control design with information on 3,800 suicides and 75,673 matched controls. The analysis takes into account several social-economic variables. The findings show that the impact of children on the elevated suicide levels found among widows and widowers relative to the still married can be positive or negative, and differs by both age and sex of the parent, age of the child or children, and time since bereavement.     

Comment on 'expectancy of life at birth in 36 nationalities of the Soviet Union: 1958-60'

Abstract In D. Peter Mazur's recent article, 'Expectancy of Life at Birth in 36 Nationalities of the Soviet Union: 1958-1960', crude rates of death and expectancies of life for nationalities are derived from a scant base of data that includes crude rates of natural increase for administrative units and various ratios of composition of the populations of both administrative units and nationalities. Students of Soviet demography genuinely appreciate Mazur's attempt to derive rich results from meagre data. Of course, to do this strong assumptions are required and Mazur warns that 'the quantitative results ... are valid only to the extent that the underlying methodology is theoretically sound'. One way to test the quantitative results is to examine how well the crude death rates for the nationalities calculated by Mazur reproduce the crude death rates for administrative units with which Mazur started. Mazur feels that the estimated death rates for nationalities closely agree with the death rates for administrative areas. The present author is sceptical. Application of the method described below does not show close correspondence, and this matter, which is crucial in the evaluation of Mazur's results, seems problematical.     

Comment on ``A first look at the 21st Century: Census 2000', Population and Policy Review,Special Issue: Census 2000

Population Research and Policy Review -     

Ancient practice . . . current conflict. (Abortion)

A brief overview of abortion as a legal and social issue with emphasis on controversial factors is presented. The author notes that abortion involves moral codes and medical developments which are obscured by polarized rhetoric. This editorial is an introduction to a Population Bulletin issue examining abortion from several viewpoints.     

An econometric analysis of the U.S. postwar G.N.P.

Whilst most developed countries have experienced stable economic conditions during the postwar period, the acceptance of the unit root null hypothesis implies wild fluctuations in the major economic variables over time. This paper investigates the sensitivity of the decisions to accept the unit root hypothesis to the specification of the trends underlying the U.S. postwar GNP and other macro-variables. In particular, the relationship between the nominal GNP and the resident population is found to be a non-linear one. The unit root null hypothesis can be firmly rejected when the conditional mean of the nominal GNP series is represented by a quadratic trend variable and the assumptions that changes in the price level and the resident population lead to equiproportionate changes in the GNP are not enforced on the data. The case of quarterly observations is also investigated for seasonally unadjusted and adjusted data.The author is indebted to two anonymous referees and the Managing Editor for helpful comments.     

Correlates of divorce in the U.S.S.R.

The theoretical rationale of this study is that conditions associated with divorce reside outside the family within a broader social system where the family finds itself located. The absence of major differences in divorce law from one place to another within the Soviet Union makes it possible to explore this hypothesis by examining areal differentials in divorce rates. Crude divorce rates and crude marriage rates for 1960 have been published in Vestnik Statistiki for 109 political-administrative areas in the Soviet Union. Several indicators of modernization are available for the same areas from the 1959 U.S.S.R. Census of Population. About 80 per cent of the variation among areas with respect to the crude divorce rate is accounted for by six variables: the crude marriage rate, the percentage of urban population, and the employee-worker ratio in the labor force, each of which is positively associated with the divorce rate; and the proportion of poorly educated women, the ratio of children to adult males, and the mean household-family size, each of which is negatively associated with the divorce rate.     

A rejoinder to S. K. Datta and J. B. Nugent

Abstract Extract The question of old-age security as a motivation for fertility in less-developed rural areas can be put in clearer perspective by pausing to consider the changing roles of land and offspring under the influence of fundamental demographic upheaval. Under the pre-transition regime, one generation approximately replaced the preceding one, particularly once unused but usable land became scarce and the possibility of expanding farm operations became remote. Judging from the settlement patterns and the history of the Maharashtrian study area, such a circumstance probably obtained long before the secular drop in mortality began. During this period, a single son, typically, would survive to adulthood, gradually assuming control of the father's land (or the father's trade, among non-agriculturalists) and, if the father lived long enough, would eventually be a source of security in the father's old age. It is not inappropriate to mention that this generational cycle no doubt fostered a strong urge to leave the family land to a son, so that a sonless farmer would keenly feel a lack of fulfilment. In fact, responses to certain survey questions suggest that ancestral land and male progeny are still somehow connected, according to the way village men think, to their sense of immortality. It would be hard, consequently, to separate old-age security, the idea of 'continuing a lineage', and the sense of immortality conferred by owning land into distinct motives for conceiving children.     

A rejoinder to S. K. Datta and J. B. Nugent

Extract

The question of old-age security as a motivation for fertility in less-developed rural areas can be put in clearer perspective by pausing to consider the changing roles of land and offspring under the influence of fundamental demographic upheaval. Under the pre-transition regime, one generation approximately replaced the preceding one, particularly once unused but usable land became scarce and the possibility of expanding farm operations became remote. Judging from the settlement patterns and the history of the Maharashtrian study area, such a circumstance probably obtained long before the secular drop in mortality began. During this period, a single son, typically, would survive to adulthood, gradually assuming control of the father's land (or the father's trade, among non-agriculturalists) and, if the father lived long enough, would eventually be a source of security in the father's old age. It is not inappropriate to mention that this generational cycle no doubt fostered a strong urge to leave the family land to a son, so that a sonless farmer would keenly feel a lack of fulfilment. In fact, responses to certain survey questions suggest that ancestral land and male progeny are still somehow connected, according to the way village men think, to their sense of immortality. It would be hard, consequently, to separate old-age security, the idea of ‘continuing a lineage’, and the sense of immortality conferred by owning land into distinct motives for conceiving children.