A general concept of scoring rules: general definitions,statistical inference,and empirical illustrations

We develop the general conceptual, mathematical and statistical foundations of behavioral social choice for scoring rules. Traditional scoring rules are difficult to assess empirically because one rarely observes the deterministic complete linear orders that they require as input. We provide a general concept of scoring rules in terms of a broad range of mathematical representations of preference or utility, namely arbitrary finite binary relations, probability distributions over such relations, real valued multi-criteria utility vectors and real valued random utility representations. We extend Regenwetter et al.’s (Behavioral social choice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) statistical framework to a more general setting. We illustrate the general modeling and statistical tools by applying them to four well known sets of survey data. We illustrate two potential problems that have previously received little attention and that deserve systematic study in the future: (1) Scoring rule outcomes can suffer from model dependence in that the social welfare functions computed from ballot, survey, or hypothetical data may depend on implicit or explicit modeling assumptions. (2) Scoring rule outcomes may suffer from low statistical confidence in that the correct assessment of social orders from empirical data can be far from certain. We also illustrate the empirical congruence among conceptually competing social choice methods.     

Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences

Several game forms are given for Nash implementing general social choice correspondences (SCC's) which satisfy Maskin's conditions of monotonicity and No Veto Power. The game forms have smaller strategy spaces than those used in previously studied mechanisms: the strategy for an individual consists of an alternative, two subsets (of alternatives), and a player number. For certain types of economic and political SCC's, including -majority rule, the Walrasian, and Lindahl correspondence, the strategy space reduces to an alternative and a vector, where the number of components of the vector is at most twice the dimension of the alternative space.This paper was inspired by Tatsuyoshi Saijo's dissertation. I am greatly indebted to Kim Border, Leo Hurwicz, and Tatsuyoshi Saijo for some very helpful discussions. I acknowledge support of NSF grant No. SES 8208184.     

Experiment timing and preferences for fairness

Classroom experiments examining fairness preferences [Andreoni, J., Miller, J., 2002. Giving according to GARP: an experimental test of the consistency of preferences for Altruism. Econometrica 70 (2), 737–753] were conducted to examine two issues: first, are classroom points a salient reward medium (comparable to cash in research experiments)? Secondly, does experiment timing during the semester influence results. Subject choices are consistent with the existence of well-behaved utility functions, indicating that points experiments can be valid. Secondly, subjects are more likely to be “selfish” when the experiment is conducted early rather than late in the academic semester. This result has behavioral implications for environments where nonmonetary incentives prevail, as well as implications for the growing number of instructors using experiments and follow-up discussion in the classroom.     

A tractable model of process fairness under risk

This paper proposes a social utility model of individual preferences for process fairness that complements the Fehr–Schmidt model for outcome fairness. The model assumes that the outcome generating process rather than the actual outcomes influences fairness perceptions, and that process fairness is evaluated through comparison of expected payoffs. The process model successfully predicts data from bargaining games involving risky payoffs that neither outcome-based nor reciprocity models can explain. In a theoretical application, Machina’s parental example for non-expected utility in a distributional problem (Machina’s Mom) is analyzed by incorporating individual level process fairness preferences under expected utility.     

A concept of divorce

The severed strand concept of the process which accompanies dissolution of a marital relationship is presented as an alternative to the busted bond concept. In this theory, emphasis is on the individual and on the importance of retaining the intact strands in a relationship, rather than discarding the whole when one specific strand or strands fail to withstand the strain in the relationship. The impact on self-esteem is emphasized and processes and problems in applying this theory in practice are discussed.     

A procedural approach to distributing responsibilities in R&D networks

In professional settings, people often have diverse and competing conceptions of responsibility and of when it is fair to hold someone responsible. This may lead to undesirable gaps in the distribution of responsibilities. In this paper, a procedural model is developed for alleviating the tension between diverging responsibility conceptions. The model is based on the Rawlsian approach of wide reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus. The model is applied to a technological project, which concerned the development of an in-house monitoring system based on ambient technology. The development of this innovative technology raised questions among the technological researchers about its social acceptance and the way issues related to privacy and security should be addressed. The case is analyzed in terms of two procedural norms (reflective learning and inclusiveness), which are based on literature on policy and innovation networks. Analysis of the case shows that, in a pluralist setting, a procedural approach can be useful for encouraging discussion on the legitimacy of different responsibility conceptions and the question what a fair responsibility distribution amounts to.     

A measurement scale for the parental underinvestment concept

"The concept of parental underinvestment was used by Scrimshaw (1978) to explain infant and childhood mortality where a biological explanation was lacking. This report describes an underinvestment scale developed and tested in the Philippines. No previous scale had been developed to test the underinvestment concept. Reliability and validity of the scale are reported along with recommendations for improvement of the scale and an expansion of the parental underinvestment concept to explain outcomes other than mortality."     

The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result

A corollary of Maskin's characterization theorem for Nash implementable social choice correspondences is that only trivial social choice functions can be implemented. This paper explores the consequences of implementing non-trivial social choice functions by extending them minimally to social choice correspondences which are implementable. The concept of asymptotic monotonicity is introduced. The main result states that it is not possible to find social choice rules satisfying a mild condition on its range, which is asymptotically monotonic. The implication of this result is that the multiplicity of equilibria problem which is at the heart of Nash implementation theory persists even in the limit as the number of individuals in society tends to infinity. This is true even though the opportunities for an individual to manipulate the outcome disappears in the limit.This paper is an extensively revised version of a chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation submitted to Princeton University in June 1987. I wish to thank my advisor Hugo Sonnenschein for his valuable advice and constant encouragement. I am also grateful to Andrew Caplin, Vijay Krishna, William Thomson, Jean-Luc Vila and two anonymous referees of this journal for their numerous suggestions. All remaining errors are my own responsibility.     

A ham sandwich theorem for general measures

The ham sandwich theorem has been proven only for measures that are absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. After noting some uses of the ham sandwich approach in the study of majority rule voting, we prove a generalized version of the ham sandwich theorem which is applicable to arbitrary finite measures, and give some sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the hyperplane identified by the theorem.     

Equality,fairness and limits of diversity

Most western societies today are multi‐ethnic and multicultural. As such they need to determine the range of permissible diversity and develop a consensus on what an equal and fair treatment of minorities implies. This paper takes some of the controversial minority practices and analyzes the debates they provoked in Britain. It ends by suggesting how best to reconcile the community's desire to preserve its identity with the demands of fairness and equality.     

Domain specificity of fairness judgments in economic transactions

Two studies eliciting fairness judgments about hypothetical economic transactions examined whether fairness judgments were influenced by who was being judged. The first study replicated the results of Kahneman et al. (Am. Econom. Rev. 76 (1986a) 728–741; J. Business 59 (1986b) S285–S300) that people judge certain actions by firms as unfair, but it also demonstrated that people judge parallel actions by individuals as fair. The second study suggested that people apply different standards to individuals and firms because of presumed differences between them in wealth, power, and size. When firms were portrayed as no more powerful or wealthy than individuals, differences in fairness judgments were eliminated. Further, respondents were less inclined to judge the behavior of a firm harshly as perpetrator of an unfair act when the firm was identified with an individual than when it was large and anonymous, and they were more inclined to judge the behavior of an individual harshly as perpetrator of an unfair act when the action injured a firm with a clearly identified individual than when the firm was large and anonymous.     

Rationality,fairness and the cost of distrust

An adapted version of “the trust game with revenge” is applied to a Swedish setting. Senders – the first-movers – can keep an endowment of SEK 30, or give fractions or all to an unknown receiver. Donations are multiplied by five before reaching receivers, who may, or may not, send back part or the entire received amount. Half of the receivers are given information that the sender has the opportunity to exact revenge, while the remaining are not given this information. Results differ from Fehr and Gächter (2000), in the sense that the share of endowments sent in the first stage is around two thirds, compared to less than one third in Fehr and Gächter. Furthermore, they find a very strong effect of punishment while we find almost no effect. An efficiency frontier is defined and results show that that only 25% of the outcomes reach this frontier due to lack of trust. If senders were confident that receivers would return at least 20% of the donated amount, it is optimal to donate the whole endowment. Only about one-fifth returned of the receivers returned less than this, so for the most part the lack of trust is unwarranted.     

A concept for measuring network proximity of regions in R&D networks

This paper proposes a new measure for assessing the network proximity between aggregated units, based on disaggregated information on the network distance of actors. Specific focus is on R&D network structures between regions. We introduce a weighted version of the proximity measure, related to the idea that direct and indirect linkages carry different types of knowledge. First-order proximity arising from direct cross-regional linkages is distinguished from higher-order network proximity, resulting from indirect linkages in the R&D network. We use an macroeconomic application in which we analyse the productivity effects of R&D network spillovers across regions to illustrate the usefulness of a proximity measure for aggregated units.     

Habitat structure: A fundamental concept and framework for urban soil ecology

Habitat structure is defined as the composition and arrangement of physical matter at a location. Although habitat structure is the physical template underlying ecological patterns and processes, the concept is relatively unappreciated and underdeveloped in ecology. However, it provides a fundamental concept for urban ecology because human activities in urban ecosystems are often targeted toward management of habitat structure. In addition, the concept emphasizes the fine-scale, on-the-ground perspective needed in the study of urban soil ecology. To illustrate this, urban soil ecology research is summarized from the perspective of habitat structure effects. Among the key conclusions emerging from the literature review are: (1) habitat structure provides a unifying theme for multivariate research about urban soil ecology; (2) heterogeneous urban habitat structures influence soil ecological variables in different ways; (3) more research is needed to understand relationships among sociological variables, habitat structure patterns and urban soil ecology. To stimulate urban soil ecology research, a conceptual framework is presented to show the direct and indirect relationships among habitat structure and ecological variables. Because habitat structure serves as a physical link between sociocultural and ecological systems, it can be used as a focus for interdisciplinary and applied research (e.g., pest management) about the multiple, interactive effects of urbanization on the ecology of soils.