Das Erfordernis der Umsatzunabh?ngigkeit und die Konzentration auf dem deutschen Markt f��r Abschlusspr��ferleistungen

The German market for services provided by audit firms is characterised by a growing concentration over the last decades. Due to numerous scandals, an auditor is obliged to meet stricter independence regulations. An audit firm has to reject a client if it received more than 15% of its total income from the listed company to be audited at any time during the last five years and at the same time expects to receive more than 15% in the current period. It can be argued that this regulation accelerates the concentration process, while small and midsize accountants, which serve only a small number of clients, are suppressed. This analysis is based on the data of 442 Prime-Standard audits for the periods 2005, 2006 and 2007. The results show that the Big4-audit firm obtained an increasing market share in terms of clients (77% (2005), 83% (2007)) and total fees (96% (2005), 97% (2007)). Furthermore, it is noticeable, that in particular NonBig4-audit firms exceed the critical threshold of 15% during the periods under investigation. As a result hereof such firms must leave the market after five years. Hence, the German commercial code`s independence regulations may affect the audit market structure. The results suggest that an enhancement of auditor independence through income thresholds is in conflict with a reduction of market concentration. Furthermore, it can be observed that an increase in fees earned from a particular client does not impact auditor independence as long as the income threshold is not exceeded. In addition, internal auditor rotation, auditor engagement by supervisory boards, and the implementation of audit committees could also result in an increase of concentration.     

Quasirentenmodell und Honorare für Abschlussprüfungen in Deutschland – eine empirische Analyse

The model by DeAngelo LE (1981a) Auditor independence, ’Low Balling’, and disclosure regulation. J Acc Econ 3:113–127 suggests, that audit fees do not cover audit costs with the client´s first audit when there is perfect competition in the audit market (low balling). Further, audit fees are supposed to increase with the maturity of the relationship with the client (fee cutting). In order to test the DeAngelo model we perform a multiple regression analysis for the German market of listed clients. The results are: First year audit fees do not significantly differ from audit fees in later periods. Audit fees increase with the maturity of the relationship with the client. Additionally, audit fees are positively associated with non-audit fees and (weakly) with Big4-auditors. These findings partly support the propositions of the DeAngelo models.     

Unabhängigkeit des Abschlussprüfers — Zum Einfluss von Beratungsleistungen auf Unabhängigkeitswahrnehmungen von Aktionären

Zusammenfassung  Gleichzeitige Beratungst?tigkeit kann die Unabh?ngigkeit des Abschlussprüfers gef?hrden. Ausgel?st durch zahlreiche Bilanzskandale wurden sowohl die internationalen als auch die nationalen Unabh?ngigkeitsnormen versch?rft. Die Existenz von mandantenspezifischen Quasi-Renten erkl?rt das Unabh?ngigkeitsproblem und dessen Versch?rfung durch Beratungsauftr?ge. Aus der bisherigen internationalen empirischen Forschung l?sst sich schlie?en, dass weniger die tats?chliche als vielmehr die wahrgenommene Unabh?ngigkeit des Abschlussprüfers beeintr?chtigt wird. Dagegen zeigen die bisherigen deutschen Studien mehrheitlich keinen negativen Einfluss auf Unabh?ngigkeitswahrnehmungen. Die Unabh?ngigkeitswahrnehmungen von Aktion?ren wurden allerdings bislang noch nicht untersucht. Bei gleichzeitiger Beratungst?tigkeit nehmen Aktion?re eine Beeintr?chtigung der Unabh?ngigkeit wahr. Eine Analyse von 19 verschiedenen Beratungsleistungen zeigt, dass das Ausma? der wahrgenommenen Unabh?ngigkeitsbeeintr?chtigung mit der Art der Beratungsleistung variiert. Zahlreiche Beratungsleistungen werden als kritisch wahrgenommen, obwohl diese nicht ausdrücklich verboten sind. Dies gilt insbesondere für die Personalberatung. Eine personelle Trennung von Prüfung und Beratung innerhalb der Prüfungsgesellschaft erh?ht die wahrgenommene Unabh?ngigkeit.

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Auditor’ independence — The impact of advisory services on shareholders’ perceptions of independence —

Summary  The provision of non-audit advisory services (NAS) can endanger auditor independence. Recently, a number of changes have not only been made to the relevant international and US regulations, but also to the German regulations on this area. Theoretical research explains the emergence of non-independence and demonstrates that the provision of NAS can decrease independence. According to the economic model by DeAngelo, the existence of client-specific quasi rents impairs auditor independece. The provision of NAS increases quasi rents, and thus it is a threat to independence. A large number of empirical studies have investigated the influence of NAS on the perceived auditor independence. Most of these studies were performed in Anglo-Saxon countries, particularly in the US, and a majority found a negative impact. Six studies are based on data from Germany. Most of them failed to find a significant negative impact on auditor’s independence. German investors have not been surveyed so far. Thus an empirical investigation of the impact of NAS on investors’ perceptions of auditor independence in Germany seemed promising. It was found that shareholders generally perceive a negative effect on auditor’s independence if NAS are provided. The effects of 19 different services have been analysed. For most of them a negative effect was found, even if these services are not explicitly prohibited in Germany. Furthermore, it was shown that the type of NAS influences the degree to which auditor independence is perceived to be impaired. Thus independence rules related to NAS should be differentiated. Additionally, the study ascertained that perceived auditor independence does increase if NAS are provided by a separate department of the audit firm.

Die Autoren danken Herrn Prof. Dr. Norbert Krawitz für die ausgezeichnete Betreuung, Frau Prof. Dr. Marleen Willekens für hilfreiche Hinweise sowie den anonymen Gutachtern für die detaillierte Durchsicht des Manuskriptes und zahlreiche wertvolle Verbesserungsvorschl?ge.     

Audit committee perspectives on mandatory audit firm rotation: evidence from Canada

This study examines audit committee (AC) members’ perspectives on mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR), mandatory audit partner rotation, ways in which ACs monitor auditor independence and objectivity, and the costs associated with switching audit firms. In-person interviews with AC members in Canada were conducted to improve our understanding of the reasons underlying AC members’ positions on MAFR. All AC members interviewed in this study were adamantly opposed to MAFR. MAFR was perceived as a threat to their shareholder-granted authority to make audit firm appointment decisions. Participants believe that their professional judgment and observations are the most effective means of ensuring auditor independence and view MAFR as an unnecessary intervention. We explain these results using self-determination theory. Our findings were also used to develop a conceptual model of AC relationships with external auditors and financial management.     

?konomie des Abschlusspr��ferwechsels

In this state-of-the-art article we survey the analytical and empirical work on the economic determinants and consequences of auditor changes. First, we define the term ??auditor change?? and touch on the legal constraints affecting auditor changes in Germany and in the USA. Additionally. we discuss the corresponding disclosure requirements associated with auditor changes in these countries. Auditor changes can be triggered by the client or by the auditor. We identify four categories under which auditor change incentives can be classified: (1) changes in contractual relationships of the client which in turn can cause a change in demand for audit quality; (2) changes of information possessed by the client or auditor concerning certain attributes of the audit; (3) changes in certain characteristics of the audit and (4) changes in regulation. We use this classification to structure our discussion of analytical models and empirical evidence. Turning to the consequences of auditor changes, we summarize the findings of the prior literature to show that capital market participants react on auditor changes and that they differentiate between both the initiator of auditor changes and the incentives to change auditor. We conclude with a discussion of some of the limitations of the current literature on auditor changes and identify some possible avenues for future research.     

Zum Einfluss der Mandatsdauer des Abschlusspr��fers auf die Pr��fungsqualit?t

This study provides evidence on the relation between auditor tenure and audit quality. It is motivated by calls for mandatory auditor rotation, which are based on concerns that longer auditor tenure reduces auditor independence and thus audit quality. Earnings management is used as proxy for audit quality and is measured by absolute and signed performance-adjusted-Jones-model discretionary accruals. Multivariate analyses, controlling for additional firm and auditor characteristics indicate lower earnings management with longer auditor tenure. This result suggests that, in the current environment, mandatory limitations on the length of auditor-client-relationship would result in lower audit quality.     

External audit and goodwill write-off

Building on agency theory, we investigate whether and how salient external auditor characteristics (size, audit fees, non-audit fees, tenure) impact on the reported goodwill write-off. We use a sample of US firms applying SFAS 142. We find that Big-4 auditors are more prone to limit underestimated write-offs rather than overestimated write-offs and that auditors require higher fees from companies underestimating the write-offs. The findings are consistent with the auditors’ preference for more conservative goodwill and earnings values, which reduce their litigation and reputation costs. This preference can converge with the managerial interest to use unnecessary overestimated goodwill write-offs for earnings management purposes (e.g. to smooth the income or take big baths). Our findings do not support the hypotheses that non-audit fees and tenure affect the goodwill write-off. Our paper contributes to prior literature on external audit and financial accounting choices. Our study suggests that leniently audited discretional fair value estimates are likely to compromise the role of auditing (and of financial reporting) as an external control mechanism. Our study can contribute to the current policy debate around goodwill accounting.     

Zur Struktur des Marktes für Abschlussprüfungen

This comment refers to the paper ofStefani/Bleibtreu. In their model they combine two important topics of audit research: Auditor’s independence and audit market’s concentration tendencies. The objective of their paper is to demonstrate that abandoning non audit services might have negative impacts on auditors’ competitive behavior.

This comment addresses the following features of the model:

• The paper’s relevance, because it addresses aspects of the audit market structure, which have been so far neglected in the political discussion on the EU-level.
• The way of modeling different auditors’ offered product portfolios and auditors’ cost structures.
• The implications of the paper’s results, because only very few papers make use of analytical models for analyzing the audit market.

     

The impact of corporate governance on auditor choice: evidence from Germany

Statutory audits are only beneficial if the appropriate audit quality is both provided and perceived by the users of audited financial statements. On the one hand, Big 4 audit firms are commonly viewed as producing high quality audits. On the other hand, regulators complain about the high market share of Big 4 audit firms. In this context, it is of interest to examine the drivers of a Big 4 audit firm selection. Despite extensive prior research, there is still a lack of findings form Continental European countries and on the impact of corporate governance on auditor choice. This paper on hand is intended to fill the related research gap. Thus, our study identifies variables that determine the auditor choice of large German listed companies. Based on a sample of 432 firm-year observations for the period 2010–2014, our logistic regression analysis suggests that the corporate governance structure influences auditor choice significantly. Notably, the annual meeting frequency of the audit committee and the size of the supervisory board are positively associated with the engagement of a Big 4 audit firm. However, the meeting frequency of the supervisory board and the compliance to the German corporate governance code are negatively related to the choice of a Big 4 auditor. Additionally, the proportion of female supervisory board members does not exert a significant impact. The results remain stable when the DAX30 observations, for which statutory audits are exclusively performed by Big 4 audit firms, are excluded. The main contribution of our paper is, that it sheds light on the impact of corporate governance variables not analyzed by prior research, like supervisory board characteristics, deviations from a corporate governance code, or the female quota, in a Continental European setting, and that it mainly indicates a complementary relationship. Despite the peculiarities of the German setting, the two-tier corporate governance system and the low level of investor protection, the findings of our study are not only relevant for Germany, since many other Continental European countries are characterized by a similar environment. The study’s findings are of particular interest for regulators when addressing audit market structure problems.     

The role of audit technology and extension of audit procedures in strategic auditing

This article develops game-theoretic hidden action models for examining the role of noisy audit technology and the extension of audit procedures in deterring material irregularities. We model two different types of games: (1) a game in which the auditor makes the acceptlreject decision after the primary audit, by sometimes going contrary to the audit signal, and (2) a game in which the auditor makes the accept/reject decision after the primary audit or after extending the audit. Nash strategies are analyzed, and the equilibrium behavior involves mixed strategies on the part of the auditor and the auditee. The key results of this analyses are: (1) increasing precision in audit effectiveness may result in increasing material irregularities, and (2) the increase in material irregularities can be avoided if the audit technology, that is, audit effectiveness and audit efficiency, exceeds the required critical values.     

Prüfungshonorare in Deutschland – Determinanten und Implikationen

The audit fees available since 2005 as a consequence of the Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz (commercial code reform act) show an extremely high supplier concentration on the German audit market of publicly listed companies. This justifies the assumption of audit fees above perfect market equilibrium prices. However, the complete collection and multivariate regression analysis of all relevant audit fee and client data document a 24 % decrease in audit fees in 2005 and an average 15 % decrease in the two subsequent years due to auditor changes. This can be interpreted as an indicator for price competition. In addition, the audit fee data shows that the audit fee decreases are only partially compensated by subsequent increases. As a consequence, there is no evidence for lowballing at present. Further time series are necessary to show if the current trend is sustainable.     

Audit quality and earnings management in less developed economies: the case of Saudi Arabia

This paper aims to determine if significant associations exist between audit quality and earnings management in less developed economies, providing their various shortcomings and differences. Five different measures of audit quality (auditor size, auditor industry specialization, auditor opinion, auditor change and timeliness of auditor report) were examined based on a sample of 337 non-financial Saudi listed firms from 2006 to 2009. The absolute value of discretionary accruals is used as a proxy for earnings management by using a cross-sectional variation of the Kothari model. The results of this research indicate that only auditor opinion indicates earnings management practice. The results support the argument that auditors are powerless in front of managerial opportunistic activities. Issues that may impair audit quality in Saudi Arabia are discussed.     

External audit and bankruptcy prediction

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between external auditor characteristics and the likelihood of bankruptcy. We use a sample of US public companies to analyse whether auditor attributes are associated with default. We also test whether the inclusion of such attributes in bankruptcy prediction models improves their predictive ability. We find that firms audited by industry-expert auditors, large audit firms and long-tenured auditors are less likely to default. Firms with higher audit fees are more likely to default. Our results also show that the inclusion of auditor attributes significantly increases the predictive ability of bankruptcy prediction models. This paper contributes to the literature about auditing and bankruptcy prediction. Our results suggest that the auditor attributes can provide predictive signals concerning a default risk and that an external audit can play a relevant role in early warnings of financial distress. Our study also suggests that bankruptcy prediction models can become more effective if they are complemented with audit data. Our results are of interest to market participants, auditors, regulating authorities, banks and other financial institutions that are interested in credit risk assessment.     

审计师关注客户所在地区社会信任水平吗? ——基于Pecking Order模型的研究

文章利用CGSS调查数据度量客户所在地区的社会信任水平,进而考察其对审计师决策的影响。文章首先分别考察了社会信任水平与审计定价、出具非标审计意见的倾向、审计师变更之间的关系,结果发现,公司所在地区的社会信任水平与审计定价、审计师变更均呈显著负向关系,表明审计师会对位于高社会信任地区的客户收取更低的审计费用、审计契约更为稳定,但社会信任与审计师出具非标意见的倾向之间没有显著关联。有序Logistic检验结果表明,在审计定价和审计师变更决策之间,审计师存在优先选择次序:对于低社会信任地区客户,他们会优先通过提高审计收费的手段来控制相关风险。只有在风险超出其承受力、不能通过提高审计费用来控制时,才会放弃客户。此外,文章还发现,地区法治水平能够缓解社会信任对审计师决策的影响。这一研究有助于加深社会信任与审计师决策之间关系的理解,并有助于理解审计师的风险管理策略。     

Managerial dominance and audit committee independence in Spanish corporate governance

The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the independence of audit committees is affected by the degree of control exerted by managers over the board of directors. Results from a sample of 75 listed Spanish companies show that the majority of firms that voluntarily adopted an audit committee between 1998 and 2001, made an effort to guarantee their independence from management. The degree of independence is shown to be determined by the proportion of inside directors on the board, the same person holding both the CEO and board chairperson positions, and the level of management ownership. These findings may have political implications because existing regulations do not limit the presence of inside directors on audit committees. The presence of inside directors may compromise effectiveness, turning audit committees into instruments of management to provide the appearance of monitoring.

Fuzzy quality-team formation for value added auditing: A case study

Value-added (quality) auditing is emerging as one of the most powerful tools for continuous quality improvement, with the introduction of the ISO 9001:2000 and ISO 19011 standards that focus team-based audits, proper auditor skills, process auditing, and effectiveness, etc. Formation of an effective quality audit team (QAT) based on the required auditor skills is therefore the initial stage of the value added auditing. QATs audit organizations at different locations with varying auditing requirements in order to evaluate an organization's own quality system (first party part audits according to IEC9001 Clause 8.2.2). The QAT consists of a lead auditor and one or more auditors that have the required skills in varying levels for the execution of an audit. For a successful audit, the formation of a QAT is vital since each audit team must at least fulfill the minimum requirements and skills needed for a specific audit. In this case study, a fuzzy mathematical-programming model and a solution algorithm based on “simulated annealing” is proposed for the formation of QATs. This is one of the first attempts in the literature to form this kind of teams analytically. Example problems are also solved in the paper to present the application of the proposed approach.     

The value of audit quality in public and private companies: evidence from Spain

This paper compares the value of audit quality, proxied by the selection of a big N auditor, to the external claimholders of private and public companies. Although the combination of a lower ownership concentration of public companies, the greater demand for financial information quality about these companies and their higher litigation risk can result in the expectation that audit quality should be more valuable for public than for private companies, the greater information asymmetry between the managers and the external stakeholders and the unavailability of alternative mechanisms for monitoring the managers can make external audit more valuable for the external claimholders of private companies. In this paper, we test these two competing views by analysing if banks and lenders take into account auditor selection in the formation of the cost of debt. Our results support the second view: we find that only private companies obtain a lower cost of debt when they are audited by a high-quality auditor. These results are robust to both endogeneity and unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity.     

基于审计路径的发行人寻租动机、定价效力与市场甄别研究

为了获取上市资格、合理定价等价值不菲的“经济租金”,结合我国独存的股票发行审核委员会(发审委)制度,发行人进行“发审寻租”是新股市场长久存在、且亟待解决的重要问题。本文选择“发行价格”议题与“审计”视角,运用回归模型(Logit、OLS)与随机前沿模型(SFA),探索性地研究了我国A股市场2009-2018年间、非金融行业发行人寻租的动机、定价效力及相应的市场甄别。结果表明：(1)寻租发行人多具有典型“风险”特征与较高“内审”能力、并出于“规避失败”的动机;(2)寻租具有“提高发行定价、降低抑价损失”的定价效力;(3)现阶段新股市场尚不具备对该寻租行为的甄别能力。整体而言,我国A股市场发行人进行“发行价格”寻租的行为切实存在,且多能成功。本文结论首次为“发行价格”寻租提供了稳健的经验证据,为发审委近年来大幅缩减审计专家成员的政策科学性提供了支持;也对进一步规正审计、尤其是外部审计职能定位,梳理、总结发审委工作具有重要启示意义。     

The Governance Role of Audit Committees: Reviewing a Decade of Evidence

Even though audit committees have traditionally been a key component of corporate governance regulation, the last decade has witnessed a greater emphasis on audit committee regulation and a parallel intensification of academic research on the subject. This review synthesizes recent empirical research seeking to investigate various aspects of audit committees’ governance role. The review is structured around current regulatory expectations of audit committees seeking to document the extent to which specific characteristics of good practice influence various components of audit committee effectiveness. It is found that larger and more independent audit committees as well as those with financial expertise are more likely to seek a higher level of external audit coverage and assurance. There is also evidence that more independent audit committees are associated with the purchase of lower levels of non‐audit services from auditors, thereby seeking to preserve the independence of the external audit process. There seems a consensus that more independent audit committees and those with greater accounting/financial expertise have a positive impact on the quality of financial statements. Evidence on the stock market reaction to audit committee issues suggests that investors both welcome the presence of audit committees and react positively when members are appointed with relevant expertise. It is also found that internal auditors view certain audit committee characteristics, specifically independence, expertise and frequency of meetings, as leading to more effective audit committee performance. In summary, therefore, this review documents a significant amount of evidence offering support to current regulations concerning the desired characteristics of audit committees.     

A MINIMUM-COST AUDIT SAMPLING METHODOLOGY UNDER CONDITIONS OF PREDETERMINED BETA RISK

This paper presents a minimum-cost methodology for determining a statistical sampling plan in substantive audit tests. In this model, the auditor specifies β, the risk of accepting an account balance as correct when it is not, according to audit evidence requirements. Using β as a constraint, the auditor then selects a sampling plan to optimize the trade-off between sampling costs and the costs of follow-up audit procedures. Tables to aid in this process and an illustration are provided.