Probabilistic Projections of the Total Fertility Rate for All Countries

We describe a Bayesian projection model to produce country-specific projections of the total fertility rate (TFR) for all countries. The model decomposes the evolution of TFR into three phases: pre-transition high fertility, the fertility transition, and post-transition low fertility. The model for the fertility decline builds on the United Nations Population Division’s current deterministic projection methodology, which assumes that fertility will eventually fall below replacement level. It models the decline in TFR as the sum of two logistic functions that depend on the current TFR level, and a random term. A Bayesian hierarchical model is used to project future TFR based on both the country’s TFR history and the pattern of all countries. It is estimated from United Nations estimates of past TFR in all countries using a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm. The post-transition low fertility phase is modeled using an autoregressive model, in which long-term TFR projections converge toward and oscillate around replacement level. The method is evaluated using out-of-sample projections for the period since 1980 and the period since 1995, and is found to be well calibrated.     

The Effect of Urbanization on China’s Fertility

The relationship between urbanization and fertility decline is known to be inverse in developed countries. However, the nature of this relationship in developing countries that already have relatively low fertilities is not well-understood. This study aims to illustrate how much urbanization contributed to China’s fertility decline between 1982 and 2008 and forecasts how much it can contribute to future reductions in fertility. The study examines changes in the total fertility rate (TFR) at both the national and provincial levels, given regional differences in the urbanization rate. The results show that changes in rural fertility behavior accounted for most of the decline in the national TFR between 1982 and 2008. This finding suggests that official birth control policies were instrumental in curbing China’s population growth. However, urbanization was responsible for about 22% of the decrease in TFR during this period, and its effect was especially important during the latter years (2001–2008). In most provinces, urbanization associated with a decline in provincial-level fertility. The forecasts indicate that urbanization will become the primary factor behind future declines in national fertility. Given the negative effect of urbanization on the TFR, it is possible to relax the one-child policy without having adverse implications for population growth.     

Below-replacement fertility of ethnic Indians in Fiji: a decomposition analysis of the components of changes in the total fertility rate

The population of Fiji consists of two major ethnic groups, Fijians and Indians; it also comprises other groups, such as Europeans, Chinese and other Pacific Islands. The 2007 Census showed that there were 56.8 % Fijians and 37.5 % Indians, with the remaining 5.7 % consisting of other groups. This paper examines ethnic variation in fertility using current fertility estimated directly from the census data. As the Fiji census continued to gather information on the relationship of mothers with their own children, this information has been used to estimate fertility trends over the past 15 years preceding the census by the application of the own-children method. Fiji has recently undergone a spectacular decline in fertility but with a marked variation between Fijians and Indians. The total fertility rate (TFR) among Indians dropped to 2.8 in 1986 and 2.5 in 1996. It continued to decline further, approaching below the replacement fertility of 1.9 in 2007. By contrast, Fijian fertility reached 3.9 in 1996. As with that of Indians, Fijian fertility also fell sharply, to 3.2 in 2007. This paper uses a decomposition analysis technique to determine the components of changes in the TFRs due to marital structure and marital fertility among Fijians and Indians, covering the intercensal periods, 1966–1976, 1976–1986, 1986–1996 and 1996–2007.     

Birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures

This article explains that birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures. When successive groups of women who have delayed childbearing start having children, the rapid fertility decline stalls. Such change in the timing of childbearing skews the total fertility rate (TFR). Analysis of the tempo component of TFR trends in Taiwan suggests that tempo effects reduced its TFR by about 10% in the late 1970s and early 1990s and by about 19% in the late 1980s. In Colombia, on the basis of increasing mean maternal age at childbirth between the 1970s and the late 1980s, tempo distortions of the TFR during the most of the 1980s seem likely. Moreover, many developing countries are now experiencing rapid fertility declines that are in part attributable to tempo changes. These changes have accelerated past fertility transitions, but they also make these countries vulnerable to future stalls in fertility when the delays in childbearing end. Since fertility reductions caused by tempo effects lead to real declines in birth rates and hence in population growth, countries that wish to reduce birth rates can take actions that encourage women to delay marriage and the onset of childbearing.     

Multivariate analysis of parity progression—based measures of the total fertility rate and its components

This article describes a methodology for applying a discrete-time survival model—the complementary log-log model—to estimate effects of socioeconomic variables on (1) the total fertility rate and its components and (2) trends in the total fertility rate and its components. For the methodology to be applicable, the total fertility rate (TFR) must be calculated from parity progression ratios (PPRs). The components of the TFR are PPRs, the total marital fertility rate (TMFR), and the TFR itself as measures of the quantum of fertility, and mean and median ages at first marriage and mean and median closed birth intervals by birth order as measures of the tempo or timing of fertility. The focus is on effects of predictor variables on these measures rather than on coefficients, which are often difficult to interpret in the complex models that are considered. The methodology is applicable to both period and cohort data. It is illustrated by application to data from the 1993, 1998, and 2003 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) in the Philippines.     

How Far Has Fertility in China Really Declined?

According to births in the last year as reported in China's 2000 census, the total fertility rate (TFR) in the year 2000 in China was 1.22 children per woman. This estimate is widely considered to be too low, primarily because some women who had out‐of‐quota births according to China's one‐child family policy did not report those births to the census enumerator. Analysis of fertility trends derived by applying the own‐children method of fertility estimation to China's 1990 and 2000 censuses indicates that the true level of the TFR in 2000 was probably between 1.5 and 1.6 children per woman. A decomposition analysis of change in the TFR between 1990 and 2000, based on our best estimate of 1.59 for the TFR in 2000, indicates that about two‐fifths of the decline in the conventional TFR between 1990 and 2000 is accounted for by later marriage and less marriage, and three‐fifths by declining fertility within marriage. The analysis also applies the birth history reconstruction method of fertility estimation to the two censuses, yielding an alternative set of fertility estimates that are compared with the set derived by the own‐children method. The analysis also includes estimates of trends in fertility by urban/rural residence, education, ethnicity, and migration status. Over time, fertility has declined sharply within all categories of these characteristics, indicating that the one‐child policy has had large across‐the‐board effects.     

Revolution,war and modernization: Population policy and fertility change in Iran

Fertility trends in Iran over recent decades can be plausibly related to a number of causal factors. Population policy shifts were quite marked, and were related to political upheaval and war, which influenced both official policy and popular perceptions of the nation’s need for children. A range of developmental factors were also important. The key fertility trends to be explained include the rise to an exceptionally high level in the early 1980s (a TFR of just below 7), and the speed of the subsequent decline to a TFR of about 2.7 in 1996. As well as estimating the proximate determinants of these trends, the paper sets them in their political and developmental context. Iran’s fertility trends are then compared with those of Islamic countries of North Africa and West Asia to gain additional insights into possible causal factors. An adequate explanation of fertility change in Iran needs to draw on elements of a number of theories of fertility transition.     

Analysis of the determinants of fertility decline in the Czech Republic

In this paper, we analyze the decline in the total fertility rate (TFR) in the Czech Republic during the economic transition. To identify transition-specific features of this decline, we estimate a Heckman–Walker multistate model of the birth process using data from the 1998 Family and Fertility Survey. We find that the negative effect of transition on TFR is mostly driven by a sharply increased influence of higher education, limited ability to combine employment with childbearing and lack of adequate childcare facilities. We also detect a significant role of the increased use of contraception, motivated by both economic and demographic reasons.     

An Explanatory Model for Projecting Regional Fertility Differences in the Netherlands

Current differences in the level of the total fertility rate (TFR) between Dutch municipalities are smaller than they were in the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, there are still considerable differences. Small municipalities have higher TFRs than large cities. This article aims to answer the question whether these differences will decline further until differences between large and small cities disappear. For that purpose we develop a regression model of regional differences in the TFR including demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural variables. Using the estimation results we decompose differences in fertility between large and small cities into the contribution of differences in levels of the determinants versus differences in the relationships between the determinants and fertility. The results show that differences in cultural variables have a larger effect on differences in the TFR than the demographic and socioeconomic variables. As cultural differences do not tend to change quickly, they will not lead to quick changes in regional differences in the TFR. Demographic differences are not expected to lead to strong changes either, as the two demographic variables (household structure and ethnic structure) have opposite effects. As the effect of the socioeconomic variable is caused by differences in the magnitude of the regression coefficient rather than by differences in the value of this variable, even if differences in this variable disappeared, this would still not lead to convergence of the TFR. Thus the article concludes that differences in the TFR between large and small cities are not likely to diminish quickly.     

Has East Germany Overtaken West Germany? Recent Trends in Order‐Specific Fertility

Some 20 years after reunification, the contrast between East and West Germany offers a natural experiment for studying the degree of persistence of Communist-era family patterns, the effects of economic change, and fertility postponement. After reunification, period fertility rates plummeted in the former East Germany to record low levels. Since the mid-1990s, however, period fertility rates have been rising in East Germany, in contrast to the nearly constant rates seen in the West. By 2008, the TFR of East Germany had overtaken that of the West. We explore why fertility in East Germany is higher than in West Germany, despite unfavorable economic circumstances in the East. We address this and related questions by (a) presenting an account of the persisting East/West differences in attitudes toward and constraints on childbearing, (b) conducting an order-specific fertility analysis of recent fertility trends, and (c) projecting completed fertility for the recent East and west German cohorts. In addition to using the Human Fertility Database, perinatal statistics allow us to calculate a tempo-corrected TFR for East and West Germany.     

Women’s fertility, religion and education in a low-fertility population: Evidence from South Australia

The old issue of religion and fertility is examined in relation to women s level of education. In-depth interviews exploring influences on parity for Adelaide parents in 2003–04 suggest that more frequent attendance at religious services in childhood, and affiliation with particular religious denominations, are related to both higher preferred and higher achieved parity, even for women with university education. For some university-educated women, their religious upbringing appears to play a part in negating the traditional relationship between higher education and lower fertility. Quantitative data on religion, fertility and educational level from the 1996 Census for women aged 40–44 in South Australia show that women with No Religion had lower fertility than those With a religion, while university-educated women in New Protestan-New Christian groups had higher fertility than university-educated women in other denominations. The findings provide an understanding of some social conditions that support higher fertility in a low-fertility population. Future fertility research in developed countries should include consideration of the influence of religious affiliation and religiosity at disaggregated levels of inquiry.     

Immigration to the UK from High‐Fertility Countries: Intergenerational Adaptation and Fertility Convergence

The fertility of immigrants' children increasingly shapes the ethnic diversity of the population in Western Europe. However, few data are available on the fertility patterns of immigrants and their offspring. This article provides new fertility estimates of immigrants and immigrants' children by ethnic group in the United Kingdom that may provide better‐informed fertility assumptions for future population projection models. The impact of migration‐specific tempo effects on the period TFR of immigrants is analyzed. Among the results, intergenerational fertility transitions strongly contribute both to fertility convergence between ethnic groups and to fertility “assimilation” or “intergenerational adaptation” to the UK mainstream childbearing behavior. Ethnic fertility convergence, particularly marked for populations originating from high‐fertility countries, reflects in part decreasing fertility in sending countries and in part intergenerational adaptation to the UK mainstream. Higher educational enrollment of the daughters of immigrants may partly explain their relatively lower fertility.     

Case study: fertility decline in Iran

Iran has experienced one of the most successful family planning programs in the developing world, with 64 percent decline in total fertility rate (TFR) between 1986 and 2000. This paper focuses on Iranians’ unique experience with implementation of a national family planning program. Recognition of sensitive moral and ethical aspects of population issues resulted in successful collaboration of technical experts and religious leaders. Involvement of local health workers, women health volunteers and rural midwives led to great community participation. Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data in 2000 indicated a TFR of 2.0 births per women and 74 percent contraceptive use among married women. This case study will help policy makers and researchers in Moslem countries and other developing countries with high fertility rate to consider a successful family program as a realistic concept with positive impacts on nation’s health and human development.     

Transitional stages and identity boundaries: the case of ethnic minorities in China

At the advent of the Republic in China in 1911, the minority issue took on its real dimension. Its founder Sun Yat Sen, aware of the fragility of the new Nation-State, and turning a deaf ear to the statistical evidence, tried to minimize the influence of the minorities and to enhance, in his writings and speeches, the demographic supremacy of the Hans. On the contrary, the communist regime since the very start (1949) made a full-fledge recognition (including religion as a criterionr of ethnic minorities. There are now 55 minority groups, amounting to 120 million inhabitants, almost 10% of the population. This article explores the relationship between fertility trends since 1970, as depicted in the single age and sex structures in the 1990 census, and socio-economic, cultural and religious factors. Most sinicized minorities (Manchu, Mongols, Koreans …) have more or less followed the same pace of fertility transition as the Hans, under the yoke of the tough restrictive population policy. On the other hand, fertility trends among the less sinicized groups (Tibetans, Uigurs, Kazakhs and Kirgiz), have been largely at odds with the mainstream Han group. Their fertility remained high at the very moments when it was sharply reduced among Hans and decreased when Han fertility was remaining almost stable. This reflcts the fact that the Chinese authorities have conceded substantial privileges to their minorities, especially in the frontiers by relaxing the family planning policy. Religion as such does not emerge as a key explanatory variable explaining fertility differences. Hence, fertility among Moslem minorities has diverged to a great extent among the more integrated Hui minority, on the one hand, and the Turkic ones (Uigurs, Kazakhs and Kirgiz), on the other. Whereas the patterns of the Hui fertility were always in line with those of the Hans, the Xinjiang populations have displayed a higher than expected fertility, which might be a demographic response to the ambitions of the central government, whose aim was to strenghten its buffer-zone in the Turkic regions by drowning them under the masses of Han immigrants. The proportion of ethnic Chinese in Xinjiang has thus increased from a mere 7% in 1953 to some 40% today. However, this proportion is unstable and likely to decrease in the near future under the impact of the higher natural growth of the Turkic populations.     

Religion and Subjective Well-Being in Ghana

Using 2008 Afrobarometer survey data, we examine the relationship between religion and subjective well-being (SWB) in Ghana, as well as religious group differences in their experiences of SWB. Two measures of religion—religious affiliation and religious importance, and two measures of SWB—absolute SWB (own perceived living conditions) and relative SWB (own living conditions compared to those of other Ghanaians) are employed in this study. Results show that religious affiliation is significantly related to both measures of SWB although associations depicted for such relationships were not strong. Religious importance significantly related to relative SWB only (with a weak-to-moderate association). Significant religious affiliation and religious importance group differences are found on both SWB outcomes via non-parametric test procedures (Kruskal–Wallis H test, followed by post hoc tests). On balance, the None/Traditional religious group experienced less favorable SWB than Other Christian, Evangelical/Pentecostal, and Muslim groups, especially for absolute SWB, while the None/Traditional group experienced particularly less favorable relative SWB than the Protestant group. Religious importance groups also significantly differed in such a way that the group that considered religion very important had more favorable experiences of both types of SWB than the group that considered religion not at all/not very important. Other significant differences on both outcomes are found among ethnic, educational, and regional groups. In view of the findings, the study contributes to SWB research and suggests policy implications.     

Ethnic population projections for the UK, 2001–2051

This paper reports on projections of the United Kingdom’s ethnic group populations for 2001–2051. For the years 2001–2007 we estimate fertility rates, survival probabilities, internal migration probabilities and international migration flows for 16 ethnic groups and 355 UK areas. We make assumptions about future component rates, probabilities and flows and feed these into our projection model. This model is a cohort-component model specified for single years of age to 100+. To handle this large state space, we employed a bi-regional model. We implement four projections: (1) a benchmark projection that uses the component inputs for 2001; (2) a trend projection where assumptions beyond 2007 are adjusted to those in the UK 2008-based National Population Projections (NPP); (3) a projection that modifies the NPP assumptions and (4) a projection that uses a different emigration assumption. The projected UK population ranges between a low of 63 millions in 2051 under the first projection to a high of 79 million in the third projection. Under all projections ethnic composition continues to change: the White British, White Irish and Black Caribbean groups experience the slowest growth and lose population share; the Other White and Mixed groups to experience relative increases in share; South Asian groups grow strongly as do the Chinese and Other Ethnic groups. The ethnic minority share of the population increases from 13% (2001) to 25% in the trend projection but to only 20% under our modified emigration projection. However, what is certain is that the UK can look forward to be becoming a more diverse nation by mid-century.     

Religion as a determinant of marital fertility

This paper develops hypotheses about the effects of husbands‘ and wives‘ religious affiliations on fertility. The hypotheses are based on two central ideas. First, religions differ in their fertility norms and corresponding tradeoffs between the quality and quantity of children; differences in religious beliefs between husband and wife may thus lead to conflict regarding fertility decisions and possible resolution through bargaining. Second, a low level of religious compatibility between the spouses may raise the expected probability of marital dissolution and thereby decrease the optimal amount of investments in spouse-specific human capital. Analyses of data from the 1987–1988 National Survey of Families and Households conducted in the United States suggest that both of these effects play important roles in explaining the observed linkages between the religious composition of unions and fertility behavior. JEL classification: J1, J11, J13 Received February 17, 1995 / Accepted February 15, 1996     

An assessment of the own-children method of estimating fertility by birthplace in Australia

This paper examines the validity of the own-children method of fertility estimates derived from the 1991 Census by a detailed investigation of mortality assumptions, the presence of non-own children, age misreporting and undercount. A comparison of fertility measures derived alternatively from the census using the own-children method and from vital statistics for the period 1987–91 indicates remarkably similar rates for Australia-born women, and plausible results for long established migrant groups. The own-children fertility levels for some recently arrived migrant groups, however, were found to be misleading. It is suggested that the own-children method is useful for the study of differential current fertility in Australia. Revised version of an essay awarded the W.D. Borrie Prize (graduate section), 1997, and presented to the session: Advances in methods for the analysis of demographic data of the 23rd General Conference of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, 11–17 October, Beijing. This paper is based on the author’s PhD thesis entitled:Fertility patterns of Australian selected immigrant groups, 1977–91.     

Adapting the Own Children Method to allow comparison of fertility between populations with different marriage regimes

The Own Children Method (OCM) is an indirect procedure for deriving age-specific fertility rates and total fertility from children living with their mothers at a census or survey. The method was designed primarily for the calculation of overall fertility, although there are variants that allow the calculation of marital fertility. In this paper we argue that the standard variants for calculating marital fertility can produce misleading results and require strong assumptions, particularly when applied to social or spatial subgroups. We present two new variants of the method for calculating marital fertility: the first of these allows for the presence of non-marital fertility and the second also permits the more robust calculation of rates for social subgroups of the population. We illustrate and test these using full-count census data for England and Wales in 1911.     

Social Networks and Support,Gender, and Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Hypertension Among Older Adults

Using data from the 2001 NHIS and the 2005–2006 and 2007–2008 NHANES, we examine how self-reporting a previous diagnosis of hypertension among adults aged 65+ differs by race/ethnicity for men and women; we explore the extent to which disparities are driven by group differences in social risk factors, particularly social support and integration; and last, whether these relationships mimic patterns seen for measured hypertension at interview. Findings indicate that rates of ever-diagnosed hypertension in both samples are highest among black seniors and older women and lowest among Mexican-American men, with the gender gap lowest among whites and substantially higher among blacks and Mexican-Americans. However, replication analyses of NHANES models using measured hypertension, instead of a self-report of having ever been diagnosed with hypertension, suggests that reporting bias and measurement error contribute to observed disparities, as racial/ethnic differences in hypertension rates are smaller when measured hypertension is examined, especially among women. Logistic regression models also show that while adjusting for group differences in measures of support and integration mediates some of the disparity in measured hypertension between Mexican-American and white seniors, adjusting for support and integration amplifies black-white disparities in both ever diagnosed and measured hypertension—driven primarily by adjustment for attendance at religious services, which reduces hypertension risk for all older adults but is more commonly reported among black seniors, especially women.