Current primary investigation on the view of family planning of Chinese peasants]

The ideal number of children for 850 couples among 10 cities or counties and 20 villages in China were surveyed. Of the 850, only 1 wanted unlimited children, which accounted for 0.12% of the couples. About 33 desired more than 5, which accounted for 3.9%. However, most of the couples, about 81.4%, prefer 2 or 3 children. 3.2% of the couples were happy with 1 child in their life. In China, peasants still want more children because of their economic situation. There is no retirement and health insurance in the countryside, and the major labor force is in field work. Some consider males as better able to keep family heritage intact. Also, there is difference between agricultural and nonagricultural couples. Comparing the percentage of couples who want 2-3 children, 80% in agricultural sector and 92% in nonagricultural sector desired this number. The remainder of the agricultural group desired more than 3 children. Since economic reform started in the countryside in the early 80s, effects on fertility are seen. One is that peasants want more children because of a rising need for labor. On the other hand, many more opportunities are available to change careers and obtain more education, lowering fertility. However, a rise in fertility is predicted as people concentrate more on economic reform and economic development, increasing their need for children.     

Conflicting Preferences: A Reason Fertility Tends to Be Too High or Too Low

Fertility has often seemed to be too high or too low, relative not only to social and economic goals, but also to reproductive preferences. In developing countries actual fertility has often been higher than desired family size, while in developed societies fertility tends to be below replacement level even though people generally say that they want at least two children. In explanations of fertility extremes, or of the discrepancies between desired and actual fertility, the effect of partners' holding different preferences has tended to be overlooked. Individual preferences expected to lead to replacement‐level reproduction may in combination generate substantially higher or lower fertility. In explaining such outcomes, a crucial question is what happens when spousal preferences diverge. Given that personal practices or social norms may systematically favor high or low preferences in the event of disagreement, chance alone will ensure that desired and actual fertility do not coincide.     

Natural resource collection and desired family size: a longitudinal test of environment-population theories

Theories relating the changing environment to human fertility predict that declining natural resources may actually increase the demand for children. Unfortunately, most previous empirical studies have been limited to cross-sectional designs that limit our ability to understand links between processes that change over time. We take advantage of longitudinal measurement spanning more than a decade of change in the natural environment, household agricultural behaviors, and individual fertility preferences to reexamine this question. Using fixed effect models, we find that women experiencing increasing time required to collect firewood to heat and cook or fodder to feed animals (the dominant needs for natural resources in this setting) increased their desired family size, even as many other macro-level changes have reduced desired family size. In contrast to previous, cross-sectional studies, we find no evidence of such a relationship for men. Our findings regarding time spent collecting firewood are also new. These results support the “vicious circle” perspective and economic theories of fertility pointing to the value of children for household labor. This feedback from natural resource constraint to increased fertility is an important mechanism for understanding long-term environmental change.     

Models of contemporary Dutch family building

Summary Recent data suggest that the level of use of oral contraceptives in the Netherlands is perhaps the highest in the world. Moreover, the greatest recent change in family building patterns is the tendency of newly weds to postpone their first birth. A micro-simulation model was developed to test the effect on fertility of such a change. An attempt was made to employ input data compatible with conditions obtaining in the Netherlands, and the distributions of family building patterns were based on recent survey evidence. The aim was not to duplicate Dutch fertility, but rather to estimate the range over which marital duration-specific fertility can be expected to vary with an increase in the proportion of couples who space their first birth. Such an increase was found to lower fertility dramatically after five years of marriage, although completed fertility was seen to vary very little. This result indicates the care that must be taken in ascribing a decline in the fertility of the early years of marriage to an overall fertility decline.     

Family composition preferences in a developing culture: The case of Taiwan, 1973

Abstract As fertility comes increasingly under voluntary control in a developing society, it can be argued that individual desires or preferences about children will become more salient and more significant for eventual fertility. Hence, the study of preferences is increasingly important as contraceptive use is extended and results in decreasing the number of unwanted births.(1) Further changes in fertility then depend on changes in preferences. The assumption is that people will at least try to achieve the families they want, if the means to do so are available. The fact that contraception is used at all is some evidence of the soundness of this assumption, although it should be recognized that family size desires operate in a complex of preferences, under varying degrees of conflict and control. To expect a one-to-one relationship between attitudes or preferences and overt behaviour would be simplistic.     

Intensive Parenting: Fertility and Breastfeeding Duration in the United States

Using 30 years of longitudinal data from a nationally representative cohort of women, we study the association between breastfeeding duration and completed fertility, fertility expectations, and birth spacing. We find that women who breastfeed their first child for five months or longer are a distinct group. They have more children overall and higher odds of having three or more children rather than two, compared with women who breastfeed for shorter durations or not at all. Expected fertility is associated with initiating breastfeeding but not with how long mothers breastfeed. Thus, women who breastfeed longer do not differ significantly from other breastfeeding women in their early fertility expectations. Rather, across the life course, these women achieve and even exceed their earlier fertility expectations. Women who breastfeed for shorter durations (1–21 weeks) are more likely to fall short of their expected fertility than to achieve or exceed their expectations, and they are significantly less likely than women who breastfeed for longer durations (≥22 weeks) to exceed their expected fertility. In contrast, women who breastfeed longer are as likely to exceed as to achieve their earlier expectations, and the difference between their probability of falling short versus exceeding their fertility expectations is relatively small and at the boundary of statistical significance (p = .096). These differences in fertility are not explained by differences in personal and family resources, including family income or labor market attachment. Our findings suggest that breastfeeding duration may serve as a proxy for identifying a distinct approach to parenting. Women who breastfeed longer have reproductive patterns quite different than their socioeconomic position would predict. They both have more children and invest more time in those children.     

Urbanization, non-familial work, education, and fertility in Taiwan

Abstract It is well known, that there is a relationship between the level of development of a society and its level offertility.(1) However, it is not clear which of the complex ofvariables associated with development are primarily associated with the reduction of fertility. Urbanization, female labour force participation and education are three of the variables most commonly cited as bearing a causal relationship to fertility. Urbanization implies a change of environment of a substantial portion of the population which may result in a change in the value placed on large families. This is particularly true when urban mortality is lower than rural, so that more children survive.(2) However, it has also been argued that urbanization results in a change in family structure from the extended to the nuclear family with a concomitant reduction in the value placed on having many children.(3) Additional changes in family patterns which are sometimes said to explain fertility reduction due to urbanization are increases in the proportion of women never marrying and increases in the age at marriage.     

Persistence of high fertility in tropical Africa: the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The article explores how geography, history, and society have shaped childbearing behaviors over the last half-century, and how they are now being reshaped by modernity and the exigencies of urban life, in the democratic Republic of the Congo. The decline of prolonged postpartum abstinence and involuntary childlessness initially raised fertility to high levels (6–7 children per woman). More recently, socioeconomic differentials in fertility have emerged, suggesting that the country may be entering a phase of fertility decline. A full-blown transition, however, seems still a remote prospect. Supported both by cultural traditions and by economic rationality, Congo's people remain largely convinced of the benefits of many children for their own and their kin's security. While an eventual fertility transition may be taken for granted, the article examines the many hurdles, contradictions, and tensions that will have to be overcome to achieve that outcome.     

对解放后我国居民生育意愿变化情况的历史考察

生育意愿是人口学和社会学领域的一个重要研究话题,其转变受社会经济发展水平的影响,是生育率下降和人口转变的前提条件。本文运用历史考察和文献分析的方法。主要从生育目的、意愿生育子女数和恚愚生育性别三个雏度来探讨我国居民生育意愿的变化情况,摸索其中的变化规律,进而提出国家和政府应针对不同地区和不同人群。制定相应的、灵活而更具可操作性的计划生育政策,使生育政策在调节生育率水平的同时兼顾人们的生育意愿。     

Urbanization,non-familial work,education, and fertility in Taiwan

It is well known, that there is a relationship between the level of development of a society and its level offertility.¹ However, it is not clear which of the complex ofvariables associated with development are primarily associated with the reduction of fertility. Urbanization, female labour force participation and education are three of the variables most commonly cited as bearing a causal relationship to fertility. Urbanization implies a change of environment of a substantial portion of the population which may result in a change in the value placed on large families. This is particularly true when urban mortality is lower than rural, so that more children survive.² However, it has also been argued that urbanization results in a change in family structure from the extended to the nuclear family with a concomitant reduction in the value placed on having many children.³ Additional changes in family patterns which are sometimes said to explain fertility reduction due to urbanization are increases in the proportion of women never marrying and increases in the age at marriage.     

Reproductive goals and achieved fertility: A fifteen-year perspective

A measure of underlying family size preference obtained for a sample of Detroit married women in 1962 is related to their fertility over a 15-year follow-up period. The data represent completed fertility. The I-scale preference measure used differs from the conventional single-valued statement of number of children wanted; it is a more fine-grained measure reflecting the respondent's utility for children as evidenced by her entire preference order. The scales are found to be consistently predictive of fertility over the 15-year prospective period, net of other variables usually associated with differential fertility. The results for the just-married sample, in which preferences and expectations are not confounded with the number of children already born, are particularly striking, with underlying preference much better than expected family size as a predictor of fertility over the entire reproductive cycle. The question of prediction for continuous and discontinuous marriages is discussed.     

Poverty in the Philippines: the impact of family size

The people of Asia are beginning to realize that lower fertility translates into increased family wealth and educational attainment. This is the message that population and development efforts have been focusing on. In the Philippines, the goal is to lower fertility with a strategy based on the assumption that increased capacity of the economy will support a growing population at a higher standard of living. In the Philippines, over 33% of the households have 7 or more family members, while 20% of urban and 27% of rural households have 4 or more. The risk of poverty associated with increased number of children are 44-50% for 1 child and 60-78% for those with 5. Households spend up to 10% of their total income to raise 1 child, 18% for 2, and 26% for 4 children. Because many families lack the resources to raise children the per child share drops dramatically with each child, a household with 4 children spends 25% less per child than does 1 with 2 children. Occupation also affects income as the highest poverty rates are among heads of household who are: laborers (60%) and agricultural workers (73%). The best solution is an integrated approach with increases in family planning, education, and agricultural reform.     

Is There Evidence of Birth Control in Late Imperial China?

In recent publications James Lee, Wang Feng, Cameron Campbell, and Zhongwei Zhao argue—contrary to what has long been the view of most sinologists—that people in late imperial China deliberately controlled their fertility through a combination of late starting, early stopping, and long spacing. The present article challenges this argument and the data offered in its support. It attempts to show that though they did not want as many children as possible, most Chinese couples did want to raise as many sons as possible. What is interpreted by the revisionists as evidence of birth control is better understood as evidence of poverty.     

Economic considerations in family growth decisions

Abstract Examination of the fertility patterns of a sample of white Detroit couples at selected stages of the family life cycle indicates that, in a large American metropolis, family income is more closely related to the time when a family is formed and has its children than to the number of children it expects to have. In a longitudinal study, current income is strongly related to the timing of demographic events-the age at marriage, whether pre-maritally pregnant, the time interval from marriage to a given parity, and fertility during a two-year follow-up period. This paper also explores the hypothesis that a family's evaluation of its economic position and the choices it makes about important family expenditures has a relation to fertility apart from the family's objective current income level. Couples who consider their income adequate for their needs or relatively greater than that of their friends or peers, and those who expect substantial increases in the future, tend to expect more children than those who do not. Small but consistent differences obtain over the parities studied. Variables indexing alternative family expenditure patterns, such as cars, or savings for college education for children, are associated with lower family size expectations and longer spacing patterns.     

What's happening to U.S. family size?

A telephone survey by Zero Population Growth demographers found that birthrates have risen slightly for the 1st quarter of 1977. Average estimated family size is now 1.85 children per women compared with 1.77 for the 1st quarter of 1976. For all of 1976 the total fertility rate was 1.76 children per woman. It is predicted, on the basis of the informal survey, that the total fertility rate will rise to 2.0 or 2.1 children by the early or mid-1980s. In 1976, married women expected an average of 2.4 children each. Wives 18-24 expected 2.1 children each while older women (35-39) expected 3.0. Many women are delaying births. Wives 18-24 have an average of .8 children each, wives 25-29 have 1.6 children each. Campbell Gibson, former chief of the projections branch of the Census Bureau, believes births will not reach levels of expectations becuase of the financial, employment, and social problems the huge Baby Boom age group faces throughout its lifetime. The undecided women in the surveys reduce the predictive value. 18% of single women aged 14-39 and 8% of married women in the same age group said they were uncertain about how many children they would have. Since the personalitites and motivations of this undecided group are similar to those who expect to remain childless, it is possible that this group will have fewer children. Such nondemographic factors as media publicity about low fertility rates may inspire some couples to have children. Conversely, the postponement of births may enable couples to become comfortable with a certain lifestyle and these couples may not have as many children as they expect. Social norms are already changing. The percent of wives expecting to be childless rose from 1.3 to 4.1% between 1967-1975. Those expecting only 1 child rose from 6.1 to 11.2%.     

Fertility trends in Taiwan: Tradition and change

Fertility rates have been falling In Taiwan for several years. The declines appear to be general throughout the island, and are occurring mainly in the age groups above 50, as would be expected if there are beginnings of family limitation. There are indications that the fertility rates are negatively correlated with indices of modernization In local areas. Several pilot studies indicate a consensus in the population on the desirability of a moderate number of children, the desirability of the Idea of family planning, a positive valuation of such traditional Chinese values as the joint family and support of parents by their children In old age. In one urban area studied, a substantial minority of wives 25–29 years old have used a family planning method already. The “pre-pregnancy health program” of the Provincial Health Department has been quite successful in providing service to interested couples, and among these couples the programme is demonstrably effective in reducing birth rates. Data from the various sources are consistent with the speculation that Taiwanese couples want to use modern family planning methods to maintain elements of the traditional Chinese family in a modern setting.     

Impact of educational attainments on women's fertility]

The fertility rates of Chinese women of different educational backgrounds and ages were studied. The results indicate that women with higher educational backgrounds are likely to marry later in life, and have fewer children. The converse is also true; women with little or no education marry very young and have significantly more offspring. It is noted that many of the poory educated are traditionally conservative; they strongly desire at least 1 male offspring, and generally understand the least about matters related to family planning. In terms of economics and human investment, intellectuals are less likely to want more than 1 child. 2 of the most effective ways in which fertility rates may be lowered are to reduce early fertility and to improve the educational levels of women.     

Pakistan's population growth: the need for action

Despite the existence of a national family planning program that dates to 1965 Pakistan has not seen a reduction in the fertility rate. One of the poorest countries in the world, Pakistan has 1 of the highest population growth rates in the world at about 3.0% annually. For over 2 decades, the average woman in Pakistan has given birth to more than 6 children. At the current fertility rate, the country's current population of 120 million will increase to over 150 million by the year 2000, and it will increase to 280 million by 2020. And even if today every woman were to begin having only 2 children, the population would still reach 160 million before leveling off. But reducing fertility in Pakistan will prove difficult. One of the leading obstacles is the low status of women. Few women in Pakistan have advanced education or professional jobs. Only 1/4 of those women without education or who are not working have any knowledge concerning contraception. Family size and composition also fuel the high rate of fertility. On the average, women desire 5 children (the fact that women average more than 5 suggests an unmet need for contraception). And due to social, cultural, and economic conditions, Pakistanis generally prefer male offsprings. Islamic opposition to family planning has also contributed to the continued high rates of fertility. Finally, administrative and management weaknesses have hindered Pakistan's family planning program. In order to overcome these obstacles, Pakistan will have to enlist the commitment of political, religious, and community leaders. The status of women will have to be improved, and the attitudes of people will need to change.     

Reconciling Work, Family and Child Outcomes: What Implications for Family Support Policies?

This paper discusses the potential of family policies to reconcile the multiple objectives that they are expected to serve, over and above their role in offsetting the economic cost of children. We start by emphasizing the need to consider the multiple challenges that family policies in European Union??and/or OECD??countries have to address through a broadening of the standard economic approach to the cost of children. Policies indeed aim to reduce the ??direct?? monetary cost of raising children, but they also aim to minimise the indirect cost arising from the incidence of children on the parents?? work-life balance and on the aggregate level of employment. Moreover, motives for policy intervention such as concerns about child development, gender equity or aggregate fertility levels are not fully captured by cost measurements. We thus analyse how, and to what extent, family policies can successfully reconcile these multidimensional objectives. We offer a holistic approach, pointing out that a coherent family policy mix supporting working parents with preschool children is the only way to reconcile or limit the conflicts between work, family and child outcomes. Three main dichotomies are identified to explain cross-country differences in family policy packages: the emphasis on poverty alleviation; the supposed antagonism between fertility and female employment; and the potential conflict between this latter and child development. Ways to reconcile these objectives and to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of family policies are further discussed.     

论生育控制个人成本的社会补偿:一个理论分析框架

生育控制成本的社会补偿是我国目前而临的一个非常重要的现实问题。本文将以两种不同性质生育率下降条件下的家庭效用函数为分析的逻辑基础,建立生育控制成本估算及其补偿模型。并在此基础上分析我国的生育控制成本的补偿机制、补偿内容和补偿方式等。