On the distribution of completed parities when fertility is heritable

Over the last one hundred years, there has been, in many developed countries, a demographic convergence towards the two child family. The possible implications for population growth of such a tendency are considered in this paper in terms of both family limitation and also the intergenerational transmission of fertility. These two effects interact so that as the proportion of two‐child families increases, the possible influence of mother‐daughter fertility associations on population growth decreases, though even now it could override otherwise significant changes in either or both of the birth and death intensities. In particular, it is shown that according as to how fertility is transmitted through generations, it is still possible to have zero growth rates consistently with a widely dispersed stable distribution of family size as well as a typical mortality regime.     

Old-age security, religious celibacy, and aggregate fertility in a Tibetan population

Using the family system as a framework, this study investigates the connection between old-age security concerns and aggregate fertility in Sama and Lho, two ethnically Tibetan villages of highland Nepal. The microdemographic approach reveals a difference in family systems between the two villages that results in Sama having a significantly lower level of fertility than Lho. The key difference lies in the practice of Sama’s (but not Lho’s) householders of designating a daughter to be a nun, a strategy meant to retain female labour within the household and thereby guarantee a caretaker in old age. Although the effect of this practice on individual fertility is unclear, the comparison with Lho reveals how it sharply curtails aggregate fertility by preventing nearly one in five women from marrying. In this case the motivation to ensure old-age security acts as an unintentional preventive check on population growth. Comparisons with other societies illustrate how the population of Sama combines elements of both the historical European and Asian demographic experiences.     

Options for Fertility Policy Transition in China

This article compares five currently debated scenarios for fertility policy transition in China, in terms of their implications for future population growth and population aging, the proportions of elderly living alone, labor force trends, pension deficits, economic costs, the marriage squeeze, and other socioeconomic outcomes. Based on these comparative analyses, the author concludes that China needs to begin a gradual modification of its fertility policy as soon as possible. He proposes a three‐stage “soft‐landing” strategy for fertility policy transition: (1) a 7‐year initial smooth transition period; (2) from approximately 2014‐15 to 2032‐35 a universal two‐child policy combined with late childbearing in both rural and urban areas; (3) after 2032‐35 all Chinese citizens would be free to choose family size and fertility timing. This strategy will enable China to have much more favorable demographic conditions and socioeconomic outcomes, as compared to keeping the current policy unchanged.     

Population growth and differential fertility in Zanzibar protectorate

Of the two islands of Zanzibar and Pemba which together comprise Zanzibar Protectorate, the rate of population growth, as shown by intercensal increases, has been appreciably higher in Pemba than in Zanzibar. These differing rates of growth have been due principally to a lower level of fertility among the Afro-Arab population in Zanzibar Island and especially in Zanzibar Town. The exceptionally low fertility of the Afro-Arabs in Zanzibar Town presents a marked contrast to the fertility of the Afro-Arabs in Pemba and in the rural areas of Zanzibar Island, and to that of the Asian population in Zanzibar Town. It may be attributed in part to a high proportion of single, widowed and divorced women in the town and perhaps also to deliberate family limitation among certain sections of the urban population; but it would also appear that physical sterility may be an important factor, though the precise causes of this sterility remain obscure.     

The evolution in China's fertility and an analysis of population development]

There have been numerous projections on China's population at the end of century. Their differences are due to different estimations on the effects of fertility determinants. 2 simulation models have been developed, both from micro and macro levels, to estimate the population at the end of the century on the basis of 6 different fertility patterns. 3 possible options for fertility patterns are discussed. 1.) The 1 child per family option means that every couple has 1 child by the year 1989, the population of China will be 1.2 billion in the year 2000. Even if this is a ideal situation, it would not be a feasible policy, as the pressure from the rural population to have more than 1 child has been increasing in recent years. Nevertheless, it is still possible for urban couples to accept having only 1 child. Therefore, encouraging more people to have 1 child should be held as a basic policy. 2.) Under the option of 2 children per family with 2 or 3 years of spacing, the total population in the year 2000 would be 1.2 - 1.4 billion, which is unacceptable in terms of the development situation. 3.) Following a differential fertility policy towards urban, rural, and minority populations would mean that urban couples would have 1 child, rural couples whose first child is a girl or those who are in special circumstance would have 2 children. Minorities would have 2 or 3 children. AMong the above options, number 3 is more likely to be achieved in view of current socioeconomic, cultural, and demographic factors.     

The objectives of government policies on fertility control in Eastern Europe

Although demographers from the communist countries continue to maintain that overpopulation in the Malthusian sense Is possible only under capitalism, some East European demographers now concede that a form of overpopulation may, at times and under certain conditions, exist In a communist society. In this connection the ideological framework for an optimum population policy under communism has been developed, and demographers have been given the task of determining what the optimum population is and how it is to be attained. There has been considerable ferment on the Issue of fertility control in both the literature and action programmes of Poland, Chechoslovakia, and Hungary. The latter two countries have conducted surveys on family planning, including the use and effectiveness of contraceptives, and have established demographic journals.

All the communist countries of Eastern Europe except Albania and East Germany have relaxed laws restricting abortions and conducted campaigns for the spread of contraceptives. At the same time family allowances have been continued. These paradoxically divergent policies can be rationalized as attempts to sustain existing families while providing the basis for regulating future fertility to achieve an optimum population in relation to the resources of the respective countries.     

论陕西省人口的低生育率水平

自70年代初大力推行计划生育以来,陕西的计划生育工作取得了巨大成就,人口过快增长的现象得到了有效控制,实现了人口再生产类型的转变,进入到低生育水平时期。21世纪初,中央作出了《关于加强人口与计划生育工作稳定低生育水平的决定》,提出了新时期人口与计划生育工作的主要任务是转向稳定低生育水平,提高出生人口素质。如何按照中央的要求进一步做好人口与计划生育工作,本文就陕西的低生育水平现状、存在问题及稳定低生育水平的不利因素作了进一步的分析研究,强调要充分认识到人口与计划生育工作的长期性、严峻性和复杂性,必须克服盲目乐观情绪,保持清醒头脑,坚持以人为本,提高计划生育服务质量和管理水平,才能保证低生育水平的稳定,促进人口与经济社会资源协调发展与可持续发展。     

Shifting shares of the population and U.S. fertility

American fertility, as measured by the total fertility rate, apparently has been climbing since 1988 and could approach replacement level in 1990. Three possible explanations are explored: incorrect denominators, actual fertility increase, and changing ethnic proportions of the population. Using California data as a surrogate for the nation, it is found that at least part of the gain in fertility is attributable to what is called "shifting shares." Given that minorities have higher fertility than the majority, as these groups increase their share of the population, the nation's fertility can be expected to continue climbing. Any attempt to attain zero population growth must therefore be postponed indefinitely.     

Post-War trends in Maori population growth

Abstract Recent levels and trends of mortality and fertility of the minority Maori population of New Zealand are analysed. On this basis two projections for the year 1976 are presented, the first assuming a further rise in life expectation, which has already increased rapidly over the last two decades; and the other that both mortality and the consistently high fertility levels will be reduced. The conclusion is that, regardless of which projection one accepts, growth will be rapid (an increase of 60% to 70% in the period 1961-76), although the age distribution will be different at the youngest ages. Unless fertility is reduced, as in Projection 2, the dependency burden of Maori family heads will be extremely heavy.     

Population growth with variable family size

"The Sharpe-Lotka continuous time deterministic model of population growth is developed to take account of some possible forms of mother-daughter fertility association....Model specific results relating the intergenerational fertility effect to the long term population growth rate and magnitude are established. The quantitative implications of the theory are illustrated by a consideration of a general bilinear form of A and in this context numerical results illustrating the finite time growth and also the long term distribution of fertility levels in the stable female population are obtained. In particular, it is shown that different fertility specific subpopulations can coexist indefinitely."     

亚洲女性收入对生育率影响的国际比较研究--基于劳动参与率、受教育程度、就业方式的视角

通过构建家庭效用函数模型,论证了家庭收入增长中女性收入对家庭生育决策的影响,说明了随着女性收入的提高,会降低生育率。进一步,通过引用女性劳动参与率、受教育程度及就业方式作为女性收入对生育率影响的中间变量,再运用相关数据进行实证分析,发现女性劳动参与率、受教育程度对生育率有着负向的影响,而女性非全日制就业方式对生育率有着正向的影响。再进一步,对亚洲各国生育政策的调整进行国际比较,探讨生育政策的具体措施与影响女性收入的三个因素之间的关系,最后针对中国目前的生育水平提出两方面的建议：硬政策的完善和软环境的支持,以有助于提高人口素质,优化人口结构。     

Post-War trends in Maori population growth

Recent levels and trends of mortality and fertility of the minority Maori population of New Zealand are analysed. On this basis two projections for the year 1976 are presented, the first assuming a further rise in life expectation, which has already increased rapidly over the last two decades; and the other that both mortality and the consistently high fertility levels will be reduced. The conclusion is that, regardless of which projection one accepts, growth will be rapid (an increase of 60% to 70% in the period 1961–76), although the age distribution will be different at the youngest ages. Unless fertility is reduced, as in Projection 2, the dependency burden of Maori family heads will be extremely heavy.     

生育率演变的生态学逻辑及人口增长的长期趋势

人口增长的长期过程一直是充满困惑与引发争论的话题,将人类复归到生态系统的普通成员,按照生态学逻辑构建一个由替代生育率内生引导、人口容量外生制约的人口增长新模型,以代替用具体社会经济因子解释短周期人口变动的传统思路,探讨生育率转变的一般模式及人口发展的长期趋势。工业革命以来,全球人口已经或正在经历着第一次、第二次生育率转变,全球生育率演变可以聚类为欧美、亚非拉、撒哈拉以南非洲和东亚四种区域模式;在计划生育政策的推动下,我国在短短的三十年内完整经历了两次生育率转变。极限替代生育率是生育率演变的长期目标,但当前已有一些国家跌破更替水平,这也许会成为各个国家的普遍经历,预示着人口容量约束的日益显性化;世界及主要国家的人口规模正在日益逼近其容量极限,并会在惯性驱动下突破容量限制,达到峰值后再以负增长方式趋近人口容量,同期的生育率也将向极限替代生育率递增复归。按趋势模拟世界和中国的可持续人口容量分别约为65亿人和12亿人。研究设计出测量人口增长惯性的新指标——人口增长惯性系数,它是生育率与实时替代生育率之比或出生率与死亡率之比,相比常用的人口惯性因子更为简便易行。     

Family limitation and the fertility transition: Evidence from the age patterns of fertility in Europe and Asia

Summary The age patterns of marital fertility levels and decline in modern Asia and historical Europe are analysed in order to answer two questions: (1) How closely do the age patterns of marital fertility in both areas prior to a systematic fertility decline conform to the age pattern of natural fertility? (2) How similar are the age patterns of the fertility transition experienced in Europe in the past, and the age pattern of fertility decline now under way in a number of Asian populations? The answers have important implications for our understanding of the fertility transition. They suggest that modern family limitation (i.e. parity-specific fertility control) was largely absent prior to a secular decline in marital fertility in both Europe and Asia. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that once the practice of family limitation starts to spread among the broader strata of the population, it seems almost inevitably to increase until it becomes a common behavioural norm. In this respect, the modern fertility transition appears to result from the spread of innovative behaviour and cannot be viewed simply as an adjustment to new socio-economic circumstances based on previously established behavioural mechanisms.     

Kenya's record population growth: a dilemma of development

The causes and implications of Kenya's 4% rate of natural increase and fertility rate of 8.1 births per woman were examined. Attention was directed to the following: pronatalist pressures; inadvertent pronatalist impact of development; women's education and employment and fertility; population growth and pressures; mortality decline and population growth; fertility levels and differentials; fertility desires; the family planning program; and family planning knowledge, attitudes, and practice. Kenya's development success has worked to push up the population growth rate. Improved health care and nutrition halved infant mortality from 160 to 87 deaths/1000 live births between 1958 and 1977 and a marked increase in primary school enrollment may be factors in the birthrate increase to 53/1000 population. At this time fertility is highest among women with 1-4 years of education. The 1977-1978 Kenya Fertility Survey showed that only 5.8% of married women were using modern contraception, indicating that the national family planning program, established in 1967, has made little progress. Program difficulties have included shortages of staff, supplies and easily accessible clinic as well as an almost universal desire on the part of Kenyans for families of at least 7 children. Children are viewed as essential to survival and status to the rural population.     

Policy options when population growth slows: The case of Thailand

Thailand reached replacement-level fertility almost a decade ago, although there has been a lag in measuring and recognising the implications of this benchmark event. Fertility could well sink still lower. The momentum of population growth will ensure substantial further increase before the population levels off, but this is not true in all regions. For example, earlier and faster fertility decline in the North, and net outmigration, have led to a situation where some geographical and age segments of the North's population are decreasing. Population policy in Thailand since 1970 has had two major planks: to reduce fertility through an active family planning program, and to distribute population away from the large primate city of Bangkok. The paper discusses whether these policies may need to be modified as a result of the major demographic and socio economic changes that have been taking place. It also discusses the limits to population policy in terms of the likely efficacy of various measures that could be adopted, based on both an assessment of the Thailand situation and the experience of other low-fertility countries.     

中国妇女生育水平变动考证和未来人口发展的策略选择

1990年以来各类人口调查和相关学者的研究结果显示,目前的低生育水平的实现有外在政策强力的作用,更有中国社会经济发展内生化的作用;真实的生育水平既不是调查包括人口普查所显示的那样低(低于1.5),也不是有关部门和政府所想象的那样高。调查显示农村居民平均生育意愿不会高于2个孩子,这是生育率持续稳定的根本。众所周知,为了保证人口稳定持续的发展,应使妇女生育率保持更替水平或至少接近更替水平。从人口发展规律和人口发展与社会经济发展相适应的规律出发,结合当前我国居民生育意愿和生育水平走低的实际,我们应该抓住生育政策调整的最佳时期,调整应该在最佳时期即未来5-10年内完成。     

Modeling momentum in gradual demographic

The analysis of population momentum following a gradual decline in fertility to replacement level provides valuable insights into prospects for future population growth. Here, we extend recent work in the area by applying a new form of the quadratic hyperstable (QH) model, which relates exponentially changing fertility to the resultant exponentiated quadratic birth sequence. Modeling gradual transitions from an initial stable population to an ultimate stationary population indicates that such declines in fertility increase momentum by a product of two factors. The first factor is a previously noted continuation of stable growth for half the period of decline. The second is a not previously appreciated offsetting factor that reflects the interaction between the decline in fertility, the changing age pattern of fertility, and the changing age composition of the population. Numerical examples using both hypothetical and actual populations demonstrate that for declines of any length, the product of the two factors yields momentum values that closely agree with the results of population projections. The QH model can examine monotonic transitions between any two sets of constant vital rates. As a generalization of the fixed-rate stable model, it has great potential value in numerous areas of demographic analysis.     

Planet earth 1984-2034: a demographic vision

In recognition of 1984 as the year of both Orwell's famous futuristic novel and the International Population Conference following up the 1974 World Population Conference, this Bulletin examines the current state of world population and presents the author's speculations on what it might be 50 years from now. World population, now close to 4.8 billion and growing at 1.8%/year, is being shaped by 3 demographic phenomena: prolonged below-replacement fertility in developed nations, perhaps partly in response to the reduced need for workers in the emerging information era; rapid growth despite failing fertility in developing nations, due to earlier rapid mortality decline; and rapid urbanization in developing nations and unprecedented migration from poor to better-off nations. The author's assumptions for nondemographic factors related to population change in the next 50 years are no world war, nuclear or otherwise; global resource adequacy; rapid scientific and technological progress shared equitably; and the demise of capitalism and communism and greatly increased economic aid from advanced to less advanced nations. For 2034 the author envisages nations divided into service/information societies (4% of global population) where immigration balances low fertility to prevent population decline; industrialized nations (38% of total), with fertility close to or at replacement level and growth slowing; developing nations (43%), in sight of replacement level fertility; and least developed nations, with still critical demographic problems but only 15% of the world population. Total population will be 8.03 billion, but growth will be down to 0.8%/year and global zero growth is possible in another 50 years. This relatively optimistic scenario for 2034 will only be possible if mankind acts to see that the stated nondemographic assumptions are borne out.     

人口、文化与政策：解读日本的低生育率

通过对日法两国生育状况进行对比（法国1．98,日本1．29）,挖掘日本总和生育率急剧下降的原因。两国都采取了政府干预的行政手段以及在实用主义的右翼政党支持下进行家庭政策改革,以期提高人口出生率,但是两国家庭政策的作用效果却不尽相同。一种可能的解释是植根于日本劳动力市场的文化：它使得年轻夫妇若中断他们的职业生涯来抚养孩子需要付出高额的机会成本：使得理想的雇员无法拥有太多的时间来安排家庭生活：同时假设并强化了一种传统的社会性别意识,将女性推向非正规劳动力就业市场,迫使她们只能在“正规工作”与“生养孩子”之间做出取舍。这也是越来越多的日本年轻人宁可选择单身并推迟结婚,也不愿轻易结婚生子的重要原因。